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**Pressure Groups and Greek Foreign Policy,
1945-67**

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Introduction

Observers of Greek events during the early 1990s were struck by the extent to which nationalism dominated the domestic political discourse and dictated foreign policy options. To most, on account of a highly sentimental approach to a seemingly parochial issue, Greece failed to act as one of the ‘Western Club’ of states and forfeited a rare opportunity to enhance its international standing. Greek foreign policy during the Macedonian controversy resulted from the interplay of external and domestic pressures, the latter being conditioned by the workings of the political system and its culture. Political leaders encouraged popular mobilisation only to end up hostages to their own maximalist rhetoric. But the impressive display of public sentiment cannot simply be attributed to a ‘top-down’ effect. It was also the work of private individuals, associations and institutions which brought pressure to bear upon decision-makers. Their potential role was amplified by the burgeoning, private-owned electronic media. After three years or so, this campaign died down before a compromise was finally struck under foreign pressure.

Far from being an unprecedented phenomenon, the events of the early 1990s seem to fit in with a long-standing Greek tradition of conflating domestic issues and foreign affairs. This tradition is nearly as old as the Greek state itself.¹ This study focuses on the role of domestic factors, which are broadly defined as ‘interest’ or ‘pressure’ groups, in Greek foreign policy from the end of World War II to the breakdown of representative government in 1967. A number of hypotheses stem from this approach: group activity did not express a developed civil society, which hardly existed in Greece; rather, it originated with institutions and groups intimately connected with the state through practices of patronage or outright control; it was embedded in a political culture that little corresponded to the values of a modern democratic state and civil society; such activity tended to develop a momentum of its own that raised the stakes for policy-makers and ultimately undermined the prospects of success. A brief overview of the German and Israeli experience may also help to test the above hypotheses in a comparative perspective. Before turning to the Greek context and the three historical precedents presented here, a number of key analytical concepts ought

1. See, for instance, Yorgos Yannouloupoulos, *Η ευγενής μας τύφλωσις. Εξωτερική πολιτική και «εθνικά θέματα» από την ήττα του 1897 έως τη Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή*, Βιβλιόραμα, 1999.

to be explained. The importance of domestic factors in foreign policy-making and the sense in which terms such as ‘pressure groups’ and ‘political culture’ are used here are not necessarily self-evident.

Foreign Policy and Domestic Factors

There can be little doubt today, at least among historians, that in explaining the behaviour of states on the international scene domestic politics may only be ignored at the analyst’s peril. Even if the external context is taken as a starting point, an enquiry into the causes of foreign policy behaviour is simply bound to come across the actors’ domestic considerations. Then it is a matter of considered judgement to determine how the interplay of internal and external factors shaped the specific outcome.²

The influence of domestic factors on foreign policy is, of course, conditioned by the political system and its mode of operation. In the case of modern liberal democracies, foreign policy and internal politics often appear closely interwoven with a considerable potential for generating domestic dissent. As it has been aptly observed,

at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision makers.³

‘Interest’ seems a central concept. For political actors, such as the government and political parties, it means maximizing their ability to retain office. In the case of non-

2. The debate is still alive in the field of International Relations. For a ‘state of the art’ account, see Harald Müller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘From the Outside In and from the Inside Out: International Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy’, in David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson (eds.), *The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation*, Westview Press, 1993.

3. Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, *International Organization*, 43:3 (Summer, 1988), p. 434. See also, Helen V. Milner, *Interest, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*, Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 5.

state or social actors, their basic interest is to maximize their particular values.⁴ Such values may not be entirely divorced from material ends, although they often appear to be so. Ideological motives alone can hardly be relied upon to sustain the joint effort of a sizeable group of people for any length of time.⁵ The pursuit of political and economic benefits is often couched in terms of religious beliefs, ideological goals or cultural demands by social actors who act as interest groups.

There are as many definitions of interest groups – or pressure groups, as they are interchangeably called – as there are studies of this phenomenon in the fields of economics, political science and sociology.⁶ Here the term is used to describe associations of individuals or even institutions, which attempt to influence public policy.⁷ Spontaneous and usually ephemeral social expressions of a common cause, such as demonstrations or riots, may not be relevant to this analysis unless they result in more organised and lasting attempts to influence state policy. Interest groups should also be distinguished from political parties. It is assumed that interest groups do not aim at coming to power but rather seek to influence those in office.⁸

The relationship between the state and interest groups is often mediated by bureaucracies and/or clientelistic networks. Affinities in background, professional skills and experiences encourage private ‘interested’ parties to seek access to like-minded members of the state apparatus.⁹ What ultimately counts is access to policy-makers.¹⁰ This may be effected through networks of patronage. These are based on a

4. Milner, 33; Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, *Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science*, Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 24-25.

5. Mancur Olson, ‘The Logic of Collective Action’, in Jeremy J. Richardson (ed.), *Pressure Groups*, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 30-31.

6. A glimpse of the diversity of definitions may be obtained from Baumgartner and Leech, pp. 25-30.

7. This is the definition given by Clive S. Thomas and Ronald J. Hrebenar; see Clive S. Thomas, ‘Studying the Political Party - Interest Group Relationship’, in *idem* (ed.), *Political Parties and Interest Groups: Shaping Democratic Governance*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 7-8. See also Jeremy J. Richardson, ‘Pressure Groups and Government’ in *idem* (ed.), *Pressure Groups*, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 1; Robert Salisbury, ‘Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions’, *American Political Science Review*, 78:1 (March, 1984), 64.

8. Milner, pp. 35, 60-65; Thomas, pp. 9-11, 18, 22.

9. W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and Élités in Contemporary German Foreign Policy*, Octagon Books, 1973, pp. 93-96.

10. Thomas, pp. 271, 282, 286.

reciprocal personal relation of trust between voter and patron which undermine corporate loyalty and blurs the line between individual and public interest.¹¹

In Western polities interest groups usually wield their influence in areas of domestic policy. Purely ‘high politics’ concerning the aims and conduct of foreign policy are normally the prerogative of government.¹² At the same time, ruling élites are constantly engaged in a process of gaining and maintaining legitimacy. Whereas they enjoy important advantages in the policy-making process *vis-à-vis* other domestic players, they are ultimately accountable to the electorate. Their choices in foreign affairs may affect the material interests of citizens or provoke ideological conflict over values and goals.¹³ Thus, political legitimation offers interest groups a chance to interfere in the policy-making process.

Foreign policy decisions are often legitimised as serving the ‘national interest’. This concept – always a matter of interpretation – generally reflects a society’s political culture.¹⁴ References to a nation’s ‘mission’ or its role in world affairs are prominent in most politicians’ rhetoric. Such cultural beliefs are normally internalised as self-evident by the majority of citizens.¹⁵ Political culture is understood here as a historically formed set of values, beliefs as well as attitudes according to which a political system functions.¹⁶ It should be distinguished from ideology which is a ‘self-contained’ system of concepts through which social reality is interpreted and occasionally transformed. Ideologies as well as traditional modes of thought, such as myths and religious beliefs, usually co-exist within the same culture.¹⁷

11. George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Ομάδες πίεσης και δημοκρατία*, Πατάκης, 2000, p. 238. 31; *idem*, *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936*, University of California Press, 1983, pp. 5-14.

12. Müller and Risse-Kappen, p. 39.

13. Christopher Hill, ‘Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy since, 1945: Research in Progress?’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10:1 (Spring, 1981), 59; Valerie M. Hudson, Susan M. Sims and John C. Thomas, ‘The Domestic Political Context of Foreign Policy and Making’, in Skidmore and Hudson (eds.), pp. 53 and 54; Milner, 12, 16, 18; Skidmore and Hudson, p. 4-6, 10.

14. Skidmore and Hudson, p. 7. ‘National interest’ is used here to the extent that foreign policy-makers and their critics resort to this concept. It does not imply any preference for the Realist paradigm in international relations.

15. Hill, p. 56; Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda’, in *idem* (ed.), *Culture and Foreign Policy*, Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 13.

16. A number of definitions of culture see in Hudson, ‘Culture and Foreign Policy’, p. 3.

17. Hudson, pp. 6 and 9. pp. 23-26.

The impact of domestic constituencies on foreign policy agendas is sometimes publicly admitted. Politicians and political analysts often claim that public opinion will or will not stand a certain policy. Thus, one final concept demands clarification. Public opinion has been defined as the aggregate of many different and competing attitudes, and opinion as expressed through the press, parties and pressure groups. Its analytical value is limited, however, as 'public opinion' can be easily shown to be riddled with divisions and inconsistencies, and also extremely susceptible to manipulation in political argument. It has aptly been described a 'political totem', a mere legitimising device. If deconstructed into its cultural components, it may help to illustrate the workings of political culture within the body politic.¹⁸

Greek Political Culture

Certain elements of Greek political culture in the early post-war decades appear relevant to this analysis: nationalism and its transformation under the impact of the Civil War, Christian Orthodoxy, and an ambivalence about the modern state and its institutions. It is argued that the dominant culture not only discouraged rational decision-making, but it also served little the consolidation of a liberal democratic regime and an open society.

Greek cultural identity was shaped by a centralised and effective education system which cultivated an excessive reliance on the Past in the form of an ancestors' cult (*progonolatreia*).¹⁹ As a result, the classical legacy came to be regarded as the exclusive patrimony of modern Greeks. This assumption fed a sense of pride which uneasily coexisted with an inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* the 'advanced West'.²⁰ Not unrelated was the distinction between culturally 'superior' and 'inferior' peoples, in which Greek education long indulged. Ethnocentrism, chauvinism, and racial

18. See the incisive analysis by Christopher Hill, *op. cit.*

19. John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, *Modern Greece*, Frederick Praeger, 1968, pp. 384-5. This study records the conformism and other shortcomings of Greek education before the short-lived reforms of 1964.

20. As Thanos Lipowatz has observed, even today Greek attitude appears to oscillate between a feeling of inferiority and impotence and an attitude of arrogance and superiority. Lipowatz, *Ζητήματα πολιτικής ψυχολογίας*, Εξάντας, 1991, p. 276. See also, Konstantinos Tsoukalas, «Ιστορία, μύθοι και χρησιμοί: Η αφήγηση της ελληνικής συνέχειας», in Venetia Apostolidou *et al*, *Έθνος - Κράτος - Εθνικισμός*, Εταιρεία Σπουδών Νεοελληνικού Πολιτισμού και Γενικής Παιδείας, 1995, pp. 297-303.

determinism survived the tribulations of the first half of the twentieth century and would come to the fore in moments of popular mobilisation on foreign policy issues.²¹

Nationalism, of the ethnic, irredentist type, has dominated the political discourse in Greece since independence. For nearly a century, it was encapsulated in the *Megali Idea*, the irredentist dream of uniting all Greeks within a resurrected Eastern Empire. Its dissemination within and without the national territory became the task of state mechanisms, the education system in particular. The University of Athens, the first institution of higher education in the Near East, played a central role as a hotbed of nationalist ideology. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, academics joined irredentist societies together with military officers, lawyers and clerics, often themselves graduates of the same institution.²² By projecting irredentist objectives as the ‘inextirpable rights’ of the nation, these élites fed a tradition of treating matters of foreign policy as issues of national survival (*ethnika themata*).²³

The Asia Minor catastrophe was a traumatic event that shook earlier convictions. Intellectual élites were left to face ‘an ideological void’ during the interwar years. Yet, by the end of this period, the majority of Greek intellectuals seemed to take refuge in a sort of defensive, xenophobic nationalism, centred around the much debated concept of ‘hellenicity’ or Greekness.²⁴ Self-delusions about the civilising mission of Hellenism fed the vision of a ‘Third Hellenic Civilisation’, the grand design of the Metaxas regime.²⁵ Mass education was never disassociated from its irredentist legacy.

21. Georgios Varouxakis, ‘A Certain Idea of Greece: Perceptions of the Past and European Integration’, *Synthesis*, 2:1 (1997), 34-5, 39. See also, Panos Kazakos, «Απόδημος ελληνισμός και εθνικά θέματα», *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης*, 3 (April, 1994), pp. 106-7; Lipowatz, pp. 238-265.

22. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ‘“Imagined Communities” and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans’, in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis, *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, SAGE-ELIAMEP, 1990, pp. 23 ff.; *idem*, ‘Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus’, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 26:1 (1990), pp. 3-17.

23. As Yannouloupoulos observed, ‘the so-called “national issues” ... precisely when they are defined as such and not as problems of foreign policy and defence, then they do not “unfortunately end up” but are by definition issues of primarily domestic policy directly related to gaining or retaining political power’. Yannouloupoulos, *Η ευγενής μας τύφλωσις*, p. 56. See also Nikiforos Diamandouros, *Πολιτισμικός διίσχυος και πολιτική αλλαγή στην Ελλάδα της μεταπολίτευσης: Πλαίσιο ερμηνείας, Αλεξάνδρεια*, 2000 (first published as Nikiforos P. Diamandouros., *Cultural Dualism and Political Change in Post-authoritarian Greece*, Estudio/Working Paper, 1994/50, Madrid, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1984, pp. 54-5.

24. Lipowatz, p. 279. On the intellectual debate during the interwar years, see Dimitris Tziouvas, *Οι μεταμορφώσεις του εθνισμού και το ιδεολόγημα της ελληνικότητας στο μεσοπόλεμο*, Οδυσσεάς, 1989.

25. During the Metaxas regime, if not earlier, leading Greek intellectuals embraced a determinist interpretation of Ancient Greek cultural superiority owing to ‘the biological composition of the race

On the eve of World War II, young pupils were instructed that they, contemporary Greeks, ‘could never forget the glory and grandeur of the Greek Empire and do not cease to believe that one day the dreams of the race will be fulfillment, namely, what is usually called *Megali Idea*’.²⁶

As a result, successive generations of Greeks were imbued with a highly romantic version of nationalism which, in the aftermath of World War II, seemed out of touch with international realities.²⁷ It was shared by both those who were politically radicalised during the war and occupation and the post-war upward mobile social strata. As a successful civil engineer put it during the Cyprus campaign of the 1950s, he supported Enosis

because all of us Greeks have been nourished with the feats of our ancestors that were totally unrelated to logic, and because the present generation in charge of the fortunes of the Nation has seen miracles taking place in disregard of numbers and logic (the Straits naval battle, the Greek-Italian war), and, moreover, because all of us Greeks are convinced that Liberty is never recovered without sacrifices and perils for the entire Nation ...²⁸

The protracted and bloody civil war that ensued gave Greek nationalist ideology a new twist. *Ethnikophrosyne* or ‘national-mindedness’ was even more defensive and introvert than interwar nationalism, reflecting the sense of mortal danger that the dominant political élites had just experienced. It was premised on the existence of an

and the peculiar character of the place’ (I.M. Panagiotopoulos). Stratis Myrivilis, a liberal author who once entertained left-wing sympathies, wrote of the need for contemporary Greeks to ‘cultivate our Greekness as a synthetic virtue of our racial personality’. In the early post-war years, the author and literary critic Spyros Melas preached that ‘imitation is completely out of the spirit of the race’ and demanded a genuine national art ‘absolutely indigenous, steadfastly rooted in our national soil’. All quotations from Tziovas, pp. 145-6, 154. See also the reference to the ‘great historical mission’ of Greece in the, admittedly more moderate, founding declaration of the National Society of Greek Writers, dated June, 1948, in Nikos Alivizatos, « “Εθνος” κατά “Λαού” μετά το, 1940», in D. G. Tsaoussis (ed.), *Ελληνισμός - ελληνικότητα: Ιδεολογικοί και βιωματικοί άξονες της νεοελληνικής κοινωνίας*, Βιβλιοπωλείον της «Εστίας», 1983, pp. 85-86, note 10.

26. Anastasios Lazarou, *Greek History* (for the Fourth Grade of secondary education), Organisation for School Books Publication, Athens, 1940, quoted in Terlexis, p. 429, note 46. In, 1964-5, Terlexis conducted an inquiry among hundreds of Athenians, primarily university students, which showed that a vast majority still considered the *Megali Idea* a ‘desired task’ and a plurality a ‘feasible task’.

27. As Campbell and Sherrard observed, ‘unilateral instruction based on authority and emotion will continue to impress on young Greek boys and girls habits of thought which subsequently in adult life make it very difficult for them to retreat openly from any intellectual position even when they have ceased to believe in it’. Campbell and Sherrard, p. 389. See also Pantazis Terlexis, *Διπλωματία και πολιτική του Κυπριακού: Ανατομία ενός λάθους*, 2nd edition, Εκδόσεις Ράππα, 1971, pp. 38, 421ff.

‘internal enemy’, communism, serving the designs of the ‘ancestral foes of the race’. It was fully embraced by the parties of the Right, the throne and the military, although Centre politicians also appeared to subscribe to it. *Ethnikophrosyne* offered the ideological platform which sustained the security apparatus of the civil war well into the 1960s. It also helped to condemn the Left to quasi-permanent exclusion from mainstream politics.²⁹ The revival of irredentism, however, on account of Cyprus would gravely test its assumptions about the source of threat facing the nation.

Ethnikophrosyne also placed a premium on Christian values as an antidote to the blandishments of atheist communism. Christian Orthodoxy was a living tradition stretching several centuries in the past and had been the main source of collective identity before the advent of nationalism. After independence, this tradition was effectively adapted to the needs of building a national identity through the spurious construct of ‘*Hellenochristianismos*’.³⁰ According to Nikiforos Diamandouros, the Orthodox Church reinforced authoritarian elements in the Greek culture by encouraging ‘resignation, fatalism, and similar non-rational attitudes towards life’.³¹ Its anti-Catholic and, ultimately, anti-Western tradition is also regarded to have contributed to the defensive and xenophobic character of Greek nationalism thus undermining the prospects of political modernisation.³²

Attachment to pre-modern traditions and defensive, xenophobic nationalism are attributes of what Diamandouros describes as ‘underdog’ mentality. He perceives two antagonistic trends in Greek political culture: one indigenous, introvert, xenophobic and traditional; and another Western orientated, modernising and extravert, which he

28. Dragoumis Papers, file 113.3, doc. 140, I. M. Papaioannou to Dragoumis, Athens, 6 March 1957.

29. Alivizatos, 87-90; Diamandouros, ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends’, in Richard Clogg (ed.), *Greece in the 1980s*, Macmillan, 1983, pp. 52-3; K. Tsoukalas, «Η ιδεολογική επίδραση του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου», in John O. Iatrides, *Η Ελλάδα στη δεκαετία, 1940-1950: Ένα έθνος σε κρίση*, Θεμέλιο, 1984, p. 571-5; Dimitris Dimitrakos, «Η ιδεολογία των κομμάτων στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα», in Georgios Kontogiorgis (ed.), *Κοινωνικές και πολιτικές δυνάμεις στην Ελλάδα*, Εξάντας, 1977, pp. 232-4. On the emergency regime of the civil war and its extension after, 1949, Alivizatos, *Οι πολιτικοί θεσμοί σε κρίση, 1922-1974: Όψεις της ελληνικής εμπειρίας*, Θεμέλιο, 1983, pp. 458 ff., particularly 474-479, 591-600.

30. Kitromilides, ‘“Imagined Communities” and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans’, pp. 51ff.

31. Diamandouros, ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition’, pp. 57-8.

32. Lipowatz, «Ορθόδοξος χριστιανισμός και εθνικισμός: Δύο πτυχές της σύγχρονης ελληνικής πολιτικής κουλτούρας», *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης*, 2 (October, 1993), pp. 31-47. For a critique of Lipowatz’s views, see Elizabeth Prodromou, «Ορθοδοξία, εθνικισμός και πολιτική κουλτούρα στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα: Καινούριες προσεγγίσεις ή εσωτερικοποίηση δεδομένων παραδειγμάτων;», *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης*, 2 (April, 1995), pp. 101-132.

describes as ‘underdog’ and ‘reformist’ respectively.³³ According to Diamandouros, it is the ‘underdog’ culture that has dominated Greek politics since independence. This aspect of Greek political culture cuts across political divisions and manifests itself in a variety of ways: a predilection for conspiracy theories; extreme nationalistic reflexes; a manichean casting of foreigners as ‘philhellenes’ and ‘*anthellenes*’; an inferiority-superiority syndrome *vis-à-vis* other nations; and ‘a clear tendency to identify with groups or persons ... which are thought of as victims of Western injustice’.³⁴

Clientelism, Political Parties and Interest Representation

Then, one is entitled to ask oneself what became of the modernising trends in Greek politics? Political élites, including the Diaspora intellectuals who fathered Greek nationalism, politicians and administrators from the time of Count Capodistria made serious attempts to modernise state and society.³⁵ The Greek state has enjoyed long periods of parliamentary politics, longer than many countries of Western Europe. It seems, however, that the social and economic forces with a stake to modernisation were inadequate to the task. Greece eventually lost its Diaspora *bourgeoisie* without ever acquiring its indigenous equivalent. No civil society emerged as a buffer between citizen and state authority. There were no effective forms of interest representation, independent of state control and party patronage, which could gain access to the centres of political power. In a sense, the traditionalist and conservative elements succeeded in subverting institutions and practices in a way that the latter, while retaining the formal trappings of modernity, actually bred the reproduction of traditional mentalities and behaviour.³⁶

33. Diamandouros, *Πολιτισμικός δυϊσμός και πολιτική αλλαγή*; see also his earlier ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition’, pp. 43-69.

34. Diamandouros, *Πολιτισμικός δυϊσμός και πολιτική αλλαγή*, p. 49.

35. On their abortive attempt to have Enlightenment ideas introduced in the political culture of modern Greece, see Kitromilides, *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-eastern Europe*, Aldershot-Varioum, 1994, chapter I.

36. Demertzis, «Εισαγωγή στην ελληνική πολιτική κουλτούρα: Θεωρητικά και ερευνητικά ζητήματα», p. 27; Diamandouros, ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition’, pp. 58-60; K. Tsoukalas, *Κοινωνική ανάπτυξη και κράτος: Η συγκρότηση του δημόσιου χώρου στην Ελλάδα*, 2nd edition, Θεμέλιο, 1983, pp. 282-289, 310; *idem*, ‘Free Riders in Wonderland’, in Dimitri Constan - Theophanis G. Stavrou (eds.), *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*, The Woodrow Wilson Center - The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 196-9; Nikolaos Ventouris, «Μορφολογικές πτυχές της νεοελληνικής πολιτικής κουλτούρας», in Evangelos Arabatzis *et al.*, *Ο φιλελευθερισμός στην Ελλάδα: Φιλελεύθερη θεωρία και πρακτική στην πολιτική και στην κοινωνία της Ελλάδας*, Βιβλιοπωλείον της «Εστίας», 1991, p. 200. Mouzelis refers to formalism as a facet of political and cultural ‘underdevelopment’ which

In post-war Greece, whatever elements of civil society survived felt the stifling impact of clientelism and the illiberal practices of the state. Patronage and personal relationships served to keep interest representation under control. There were no organised party mechanisms through which social and political forces could channel their views and pursue their interests. Political activity as such was suspect for large sections of the population. With the exception of the communist Left, represented by the United Democratic Left (EDA), parties were little more an array of personalities, usually under charismatic leadership and dependent on networks of patronage.³⁷

During the period under consideration, the Greek state did not exactly correspond to the democratic model then prevailing among Western nation-states.³⁸ Using the emergency apparatus of the civil war period, Greek governments felt few qualms about intervening interest politics, the labour movement, in particular. State control aimed at neutralising leftist influence and securing social peace. Its highest organ, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), was reduced to a state-funded bureaucracy, mostly made up of low density, ‘rubber stamp’ unions.³⁹ ‘Dissident’ unions free of government control were left in the wilderness. The weakness of Greek trade unionism was also due to the absence of a working class in the proper sense. This was attributed to the country’s poor industrial development.⁴⁰ With the exception

prevents real issues from entering the political discourse: Nikos Mouzelis, *Νεοελληνική κοινωνία: Όψεις υπανάπτυξης*, Εξάντας, 1978, pp. 303-330. Veremis stresses the importance of the early introduction of universal manhood suffrage in restoring the influence of ‘traditional’ indigenous élites: «Κράτος και Έθνος στην Ελλάδα, 1821-1912», in D. G. Tsoussis, *Ελληνισμός – ελληνικότητα*, pp. 59ff. The role of a formalistic ‘hellenocentric’ education is noted in Varouxakis, p. 35 and note 41.

37. Nikos Georgarakis, «Κόμματα και δημοκρατία στη μεταδικτατορική Ελλάδα: Προϋποθέσεις ενσωμάτωσης και νομομοποίησης», in Nikos Demertzis (ed.), *Η ελληνική πολιτική κουλτούρα σήμερα*, Οδυσσέας, 1994, pp. 261-2, 264.

38. According to the regime typology proposed by Juan Linz, a system can be regarded as democratic ‘when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information and communication’ for the purposes of the contest of political power ‘without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preference’. Quoted in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamantouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 5-6.

39. Jean Meynaud, *Πολιτικές δυνάμεις στην Ελλάδα*, 2nd edition, Μπάϋρον, 1974, pp. 181-7; Serafeim Seferiadis, «Διεκδικητικό κίνημα και πολιτική: Ο ελληνικός συνδικαλισμός πριν από τη δικτατορία, 1962-1967», *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης*, 12 (Nov. 1998), pp. 12-13; Giorgos F. Koukoules, *Ελληνικά συνδικάτα: Οικονομική αυτονομία και εξάρτηση, 1938-1984*, Οδυσσέας, 1984; *idem*, *Το εργατικό κίνημα και ο μύθος του Σίσυφου, 1964-1966*, Οδυσσέας, 2000.

40. Statistics amply illustrate the Greek petit bourgeois social landscape. In 1961 nearly one third of the workforce were self-employed and another 30% were assisting family members; only 34,5% were salaried employees. See Mavrogordatos, *Ομάδες πίεσης και δημοκρατία*, p. 39; *idem*, *Μεταξύ Πτυοκάμπτη και Προκρούστη: Οι επαγγελματικές οργανώσεις στη σημερινή Ελλάδα*, second edition, Οδυσσέας, 1998, p. 136.

of builders, state employees in public utility enterprises, education and banks made up the majority of organised work force.⁴¹

With a labour movement effectively under government control, employers' associations could not possibly present a problem. The professions remain a field little researched. Lawyers, medical doctors, accountants, civil engineers and technicians were among the beneficiaries of the economic upsurge of the 1950s and 1960s. Some of these groups traditionally enjoyed considerable social status. They were represented by high density, interest conscious but politically accommodating associations. One has also to consider a host of non-professional interest groups, such as refugee and irredentist, regional and cultural, veteran and war victims associations, and the student movement.⁴² All these groups invariably proved ready to jump on the bandwagon of a good nationalist cause.

As has been noted, institutions may act as pressure groups. In Greece they did so on account of foreign policy issues. In the case of the Orthodox Church, it is important to note that its separation from the State still appears as a rather unthinkable proposition. Since its establishment in 1833, the Church of Greece remains a state institution, 'a *sui generis* public service'. In a sense, it is a relationship that often conflates the public with the ecclesiastic domain. It is also a 'special relationship', in so far as Orthodoxy represents a tremendous symbolic capital subscribed to by the vast majority of the population; and this is something that no government may easily ignore. Basking in its role as 'national institution', the Church often claimed a say in the country's foreign affairs.⁴³

Foreign Policy-making in Post-war Greece

In parliamentary regimes, foreign policy-making belongs to the executive branch. According to the Constitution of 1952, executive authority rested with the King but it

41. Mavrogordatos, pp. 134-5; Seferiadis, pp. 12-14.

42. On this category see Mavrogordatos, *Ομάδες πίεσης και δημοκρατίας*, pp. 125ff.

43. Demertzis, «Η επιλεκτική παράδοση της ελληνικής πολιτικής κουλτούρας», in *idem, Η ελληνική πολιτική κουλτούρα σήμερα*, Οδυσσέας, 1994, pp. 53-60; Argyris Fatouros, «Κοινωνία και κράτος στις διεθνείς σχέσεις της Ελλάδας», in D.G. Tsaoussis (ed.), pp. 121-141, p. 128; Theophanis G. Stavrou, 'The Orthodox Church and Political Culture in Greece', in D. Conostas - T.G. Stavrou (eds.), *Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 41-8.

was exercised by the responsible government and no royal act was valid unless signed by a minister. The offices involved in foreign policy-making were primarily that of the Prime Minister seconded by the Foreign Minister, the National Defence Minister, and the Co-ordination Minister. Charismatic leaders heading single party governments, such as Constantine Karamanlis, tended to treat foreign policy as their personal domain. In matters with serious domestic repercussions, such as Cyprus, they preferred to rely on their small circle of aides rather than on the competent bureaucracy of the Foreign Office. This tendency severely reduced the role of the diplomatic service as an institutional group in the policy-making process.⁴⁴

Still, 'the hegemonic role of the executive' in foreign policy issues was far from unfettered. Despite the letter of the Constitution, the Palace, that is the King, the Queen, and their entourage, maintained a deep personal interest in foreign affairs. The military, partly as a result of its role in the civil war, perceived a mission in the protection of both the prevailing social order and the country's allegiance to the Western alliance. The so-called 'allied factor', primarily the United States government and its diplomatic representatives in Greece, maintained a steady influence on the foreign policy-making of successive Greek cabinets. No government could ignore these three potent factors without risking its own stability.

Democratically elected governments normally need to consider public reactions to their policies as expressed through representative institutions, the press or civil society. In the case of post-war Greece, the role of the parliament in foreign affairs was described as 'cosmetic'. Although there had been instances of censure motions over the conduct of Cyprus policy in the 1950s, government majorities always toed the line.⁴⁵ The press, for its part, displayed a lively interest in foreign policy issues, which were often blown out of proportion in the highly polarised conditions of the early post-war decades. It has already been noted that questions of foreign policy have often led institutions, including the Church and the military, to act as pressure groups. As will be shown, interest groups, professional or otherwise, were habitually involved in mobilisation efforts on account of so-called 'national issues'. The question is

44. Fatouros, pp. 124-127.

45. P.N. Lytras, «Ελληνικό κοινοβούλιο και εξωτερική πολιτική», in T. Couloumbis - D. Constatas (eds.), *Το ελληνικό κοινοβούλιο στην εξωτερική πολιτική, 1974-84*, Αντ. Ν. Σάκκουλας, 1986, p. 80.

whether such manifestations were expressions of a, however deficient, civil society or were engineered by the omnipresent state apparatus.

To be sure, interest groups were never accorded anything like an institutional role in foreign policy-making. Whatever influence they exerted was bound to be indirect, through informal contacts and personal relations or through the press. Lawyers, journalists and retired officials, who usually manned the staffs of politicians, served as intermediaries. In cases like the GSEE or the Church, close association with the state machinery offset their lack of representative credentials or organisational capacity. These groups could then function as a two way transmission belt between public opinion and government. Once set in motion, however, this mechanism tended to develop a momentum of its own.

One more factor needs to be considered. In the three cases examined below, government and pressure groups alike attempted to draw support from the large Greek Diaspora communities, particularly that in the United States. Indeed, this period witnessed the origins of the Greek-American lobby. Its task was to enlighten American opinion on Greek national interests and to facilitate access to US policy-making centres. There were also sporadic attempts by individual Greek-Americans to offer their good offices, as in the case of the film industry magnate Spyros Skouras during the Cyprus controversy in the 1950s. Others, like businessman Tom Papas, played a more controversial role in Greek domestic politics. It is unclear, however, whether this community tried to influence Greek decision-making on foreign affairs. If it ever did so, the impact was imperceptible.⁴⁶

See also, Theodore Couloumbis, 'The Structures of Greek Foreign Policy', in Clogg, pp. 111; Terlexis, 348.

46. On the role of the Greek Diaspora in Greek foreign policy, particularly after 1974, see Van Coufoudakis, 'The Reverse Influence Phenomenon: The Impact of the Greek-American Lobby on the Foreign Policy of Greece', in V. Coufoudakis, D. Conostas, D. Platias (eds.), *Diasporas in World Politics*, Macmillan, 1993, pp. 51-75; Panos Kazakos, «Απόδημος ελληνισμός και εθνικά θέματα», *Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήμης*, 3 (April, 1994), pp. 103-133.

Interest Groups and the Post-war Irredentist Revival

a. The Greek National Claims, 1945-46

As has been noted, Greek irredentism was far from dead and buried in the aftermath of disaster in Asia Minor. While banished from the realm of practical politics, it remained a powerful underlying factor. It took another World War to trigger its resurgence. In 1945 a consensus cut clean across the civil war divide, to the effect that her gallant war record and suffering under enemy occupation entitled Greece to a new, perhaps the final, bout of national restitution. Irredenta were not limited to the Dodecanese Islands, Northern Epirus and Cyprus – all three being areas with compact Greek populations. The Communist Party advanced claims on Turkish Thrace while its ‘nationalist’ opponents clamoured for territorial acquisitions to the north.⁴⁷ Both sides tried to outbid each other in patriotic fervour.

After the December fighting and the Varkiza agreement, the communist Left was increasingly isolated, its supporters persecuted and its activities penalised. Opting for abstention from the general elections in 1946 and for armed struggle later on, it forfeited any chance of participating in mainstream politics. The result was that the Communist Party and its affiliated organisations were barred from public life. Thus, from an early stage, the irredentist discourse was effectively monopolised by the forces of the incipient *ethnikophrosyne*.

Following the Varkiza agreement, irredentist groups of more or less clear right-wing leanings proliferated. They were soon joined in their campaign by a host of other groups, from established professional associations to explicitly anti-Communist and royalist organisations. Thessaloniki became the centre of their campaign and with good cause. The city was situated near the vulnerable northern frontier, the extension of which these groups claimed. There was a strong element originating from various Greek communities in adjacent Balkan countries, with a record of organisation and strong connections with local patrons and politicians.⁴⁸ Soon, these groups would compete for public attention and scant government funds.

47. Basil Kondis, ‘Greek National Claims at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946’, *Balkan Studies*, 32:2 (1991), pp. 309-324; particularly pp. 315-316, 321 on the position of the Left.

48. Prominent among the latter was Philippos Dragoumis, an Athenian politician from a family of national status with ancient ties to Western Macedonia. He served as Under-Secretary for Foreign

Among the earliest organisations was the Committee of Unredeemed of Northern Greece which appeared in Thessaloniki, in February 1945. It was headed by professor Pericles Vyzoukides and Aristoteles Matlis, a local patron of the right-wing People's Party. Matlis was also in contact with Philippos Dragoumis, at the time Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.⁴⁹ The Committee claimed to represent not only 'all those who were at times forcibly expatriated from their, since the remotest antiquity Hellenic, ancestral hearths' in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria but also an unspecified number still living under alien rule.⁵⁰ The aim of this group was to co-ordinate private enlightenment efforts at home and abroad. The same task but in a more scholarly fashion was to be served by a Committee of National Publications which appeared in Athens, in March 1945, under professor Antonios Keramopoulos, a distinguished archeologist. It appealed to Greek academics to contribute scholarly expositions of Greek 'national rights'.⁵¹

The end of the war in autumn was greeted by a flow of declarations from various groups expatiating upon Greek territorial and reparation claims. They were signed by representatives of universities, cultural institutions, professional associations, the Chambers, farmers' co-operatives, and 'national' labour unions. They were distributed to government services, politicians, and foreign legations, particularly those of the three leading Western Powers.⁵² Approaches to foreign diplomats were

Affairs and then of Defence from 1944 to 1947 and took part in the Greek delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In these capacities he was the recipient of a steady flow of communications from various groups involved in the post-war irredentist campaign. His papers at the Gennadeios Library in Athens are the main source of this chapter.

49. Dragoumis Papers, file 67.3, doc. 38, Aristotelis Matlis to Dragoumis, 24 Feb. 1945; doc. 40, Matlis to Dragoumis, 3 July 1945.

50. Committee of Unredeemed of Northern Greece (Επιτροπή Αλυτρώτων Βορείου Ελλάδος), *The Unredeemed Northern Macedonia: An Appeal to the Democratic Peoples of the United Nations, Allies of Hellenism during the Last War*, Thessaloniki, 1946. According to this pamphlet, the Committee claimed to represent a great number who 'studiously concealing their Greek descent and Greek consciousness from their masters, as well as a great part of the Muslim populations, who are in every way oppressed by the afore said Slavic states'.

51. Dragoumis Papers, file 69.3, doc. 150, Committee for National Publications (Επιτροπή εθνικών δημοσιευμάτων), Athens, 2 March 1945.

52. A typical 'declaration' of this sort, issued in Thessaloniki, in September 1945, was signed by the Rector, and the Chairmen of the Society of Macedonian Studies, the Friends of Byzantine Macedonia, the Macedonian Educational Brotherhood, the Medical Society, the Bar Association, the Medical Association, the Notaries Public Association, the Pharmacists Association, the Technical Chamber, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Chamber of the Professions, the Chamber of Artisans, the Federation of Farmers' Associations, the National Labour Front, the Association of Industrialists of Macedonia and Thrace, the Merchants Association and the Federation of the Professions. Dragoumis Papers, file 67.3, docs. 28-30

undertaken by individuals representing organised interests. They invariably presented Greek claims as an ‘act of elementary justice’.⁵³

‘Irredenta unionism’ was apparently monopolised by a relatively limited number of people of considerable social standing and political connections. Certain individuals appear in more than one groups. Professor Keramopoulos, for instance, headed the Committee for National Publications, the Athens executive committee of the Committee for the Vindication of National Rights, in 1945, and the National Union of Northern Greeks: Epirotans-Thracians-Macedonians and was a member of Free Northern Greece, in the following year.

The campaign momentarily assumed a mass character with the convening of a Panhellenic Congress of National Rights in Thessaloniki, in autumn 1945. Preparations had begun as early as March 1945. A Committee for the Vindication of National Rights was eventually formed with two sections, in Athens and Thessaloniki respectively, and branches in each of the nine geographical regions of Greece. The event was designed to coincide with the 33rd anniversary of the liberation of Thessaloniki. It was a national pageant complete with a *Te Deum* mass, parades, band playing, folk dancing, torch procession and speeches. The Congress proceedings opened by Metropolitan Gennadios. It was attended by academics, bishops, local government officials and a motley crowd representing anything from labour, veteran and war victims associations to obscure groups under ingenious labels such as the ‘Union for the Protection of Anglo-American Interests’, the ‘Association for Combating Blasphemy of the Divine’ and ‘Swords of the Byzantines’.⁵⁴

Addressing ‘the Arbiters of the fortunes of the World’ from Thessaloniki – ‘the eye, heart, lung and kidney of the Hellenic body’ – the Congress considered the vindication of Greek claims certain, if only ‘Justice and Truth’ prevailed over ‘Power and Fraud’. Greece, it reaffirmed, was not ‘matter’ but ‘Spirit’, thus destined to live eternally.⁵⁵ Its concluding resolution stressed the Greek contribution to the allied war

53. Dragoumis Papers, file 67.3, doc. 42, Apostolos Pouloupoulos, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Athens, to Dragoumis, 15 Nov. 1945; doc. 47, Theodoros Oikonomou, Chairman of the Thessaloniki Bar Association, to Dragoumis, 2 Jan. 1946.

54. Dragoumis Papers, file 67.4, docs. 48-55, daily bulletins of the First Congress of National Rights, Thessaloniki, 25 Oct.-1 Nov. 1945.

55. Dragoumis Papers, file 67.4, doc. 48, daily bulletin of the First Congress of National Rights, no. 1, Thessaloniki, 25 Oct. 1945.

effort as well as security and economic considerations in order to claim Northern Epirus, Northern Macedonia, Eastern Rumelia, the Dodecanese, war reparations from Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Albania, and access to natural resources in neighbouring countries. With respect to Cyprus, it expressed confidence that Great Britain would repeat the Ionian precedent.⁵⁶

The campaign was given wide publicity in the press and publicly praised by politicians. Official endorsement was crucial for the continuation of the campaign in conditions of undeclared civil war. The impeccable nationalist credentials of its leading figures made it impossible for like-minded government officials to repudiate their activities. These activities, however, did cause discomfort among circles responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. As early as May 1945, Alexis Kyrou, then head of the Research and Information Directorate at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, officially complained about the futile prominence of ‘tens, if not hundreds’ of organisations, associations and societies dedicated to the ‘defence of our national rights’. Their heavily sentimental and romantic approach, he cautioned, was likely to stand in the way of a cool-headed projection of postwar claims. Kyrou lamented that in conditions of absolute freedom of the press ‘hyperbole and outbidding in ultra-nationalist spirit’ could not be easily restrained. As a remedy he recommended the formation of a high level council excluding the Left which should work out the proper framework for national claims.⁵⁷ Indeed, a Foreign Affairs Committee was set up in May 1945. It was a consultative body consisting of former prime ministers, foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers. Its task was to contribute to the formulation of Greek claims before the Peace Conference.⁵⁸

Eventually, in the absence of serious official discouragement, irredentist groups did claim a role in projecting the Greek case in Paris and elsewhere. As early as July 1945, the Committee of Unredeemed of Northern Greece dispatched Panteleimon, Metropolitan of Argyrokastron, to the United States in order to solicit support from Greek Americans. In Paris, the ‘already inflated’ Greek delegation to the Peace Conference was joined by a crowd of ‘non-competent and non-responsible’ persons

56. Dragoumis Papers, file 67.4, doc. 52, daily bulletin of the First Congress of National Rights, no. 6, Thessaloniki, 28 Oct. 1945.

57. Dragoumis Papers, file 68.1, doc. 13, Alexandros Kyrou to Michael Tsamados, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 12 May 1945.

who, according to Under-Secretary Dragoumis, only confused and obstructed the delegation's task. Only after the conclusion of the Peace Conference did Dragoumis openly denounce the 'self-appointed' solicitors of the national cause, who resided in Paris thanks to 'public funds and national decency'.⁵⁹ The latter retorted that their services had not been adequately availed of.⁶⁰ It seems unlikely, however, that their lengthy and verbose 'memoranda' would have served the Greek effort at all. The results of the Peace Conference, which adjudicated Greece the Dodecanese and limited reparations from Italy and Bulgaria, were received as a grave disappointment of national aspirations. Most irredentist initiatives did not survive this gloomy outcome, which coincided with the rekindling of the civil war. A significant exception was the Northern Epirus lobby which continued its rather low key activities with a strong backing from state sources, the Church and Greek-American communities.⁶¹

b. The First Cyprus Campaign, 1950-58

Within a few years of the Paris Peace Conference irredentism staged an impressive come-back under the banner of Enosis. For nearly a decade, the union of Cyprus with the mother country became the rallying cry of the most serious irredentist campaign in post-war Greece. The initiative came from the Cypriots themselves, the Cyprus Ethnarchy in particular, who found a powerful sponsor in the Church of Greece.⁶² As early as June 1950, a Panhellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus (PEEK, later PEAK, when 'Self-determination' replaced 'Enosis') was set up in Athens under Archbishop Spyridon. Before long, similar committees sprang up in almost every district (*nomos*) of the country. They were typically headed by the local bishop and included the mayor and representatives of professional and other legally constituted associations, the local 'brotherhood' of Cypriot expatriates as well as the Boy Scouts

58. Dragoumis Papers, file 67.1, doc. 4 dated 9 May 1945.

59. Dragoumis Papers, file 76.5, doc 94, Dragoumis to the director of *Ethnos* (Athens daily), 5 Nov. 1946.

60. Dragoumis Papers, file 68.1, doc. 21, National Union of Northern Greeks: Epitotans-Thracians-Macedonians to Prime Minister Constantine Tsaldaris, 20 April 1946.

61. Regarding the channeling of 'secret' state funds to Northern Epirus activists, see *Eleutheria*, 17 Dec. 1964. For an account of the Northern Epirus question in post-war politics, see Sotiris Walden, «Εθνικισμός και εσωτερική πολιτική: Μακεδονικό και Βορειοηπειρωτικό στη μεταπολεμική κομματική διαμάχη», in Venetia Apostolidou *et al*, pp. 270-7.

and the Girl Guides. Para-ecclesiastical organisations also played their part.⁶³ The ‘loyalist’, state-funded labour unions under Fotis Makris were also enthusiastic supporters. Significantly, political parties and party youths were not represented on Cyprus committees which also guarded against leftist inroads.

Working closely with the Greek Cypriot lobby in Athens,⁶⁴ PEEK tried to mobilise public opinion behind the cause of Enosis and put pressure on Greek governments to take the matter to the United Nations. After 1954, when the conservative Greek Rally government adopted the course of internationalisation, the domestic campaign was intended to demonstrate the unswerving commitment of the nation to Enosis. Whenever the occasion demanded, PEEK and its local committees produced a barrage of resolutions, petitioned foreign embassies, held symbolic strikes and mass meetings. In the pattern of the 1945-46 campaign, ‘prominent’ individuals and institutions, such as universities or the Athens Academy, undertook to assist official policy in ‘enlightening’ world opinion on the Greek case. Pamphlets and other material was mailed to tens of thousands of recipients and various missions were dispatched abroad. The United States with its large and active Greek American community remained the preferred destination of these efforts.⁶⁵ They also engaged in fund raising for financing their own activities and the struggle in Cyprus.⁶⁶

Throughout this period, state authorities remained helpful, except when the safety of Anglo-American interests was at stake. Perhaps more than it had been the case in

62. Ioannis D. Stefanidis, *Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, Hurst and New York University Press, 1999, pp. 10-15, 236-8, 256-7.

63. During the first post-war decade para-ecclesiastical organisations flourished, partly as a response to the powerful grassroots movement of the Left. These organisations, whose relations with each other and the official Church were not always harmonious, acquired considerable political patronage, which made them particularly hard to ignore. *Enosis* offered a rallying point which the Church successfully used in order to mobilise the support of these modern zealots. For a first hand account of this movement, see Christos Yannaras, *Καταφύγιο ιδεών: Μαρτυρία*, revised edition, Ίκαρος, 2000.

64. It consisted of a small circle of expatriates, such as the Loizides brothers, and other persons of Cypriot origin, including Colonel Georgios Grivas. They entertained important connections with prominent conservative politicians, army officers, academics, journalists and businessmen, which proved helpful once it was decided to resort to armed struggle in Cyprus. Stefanidis, pp. 244-246.

65. Centre for Asia Minor Studies, Hristoforos Hristidis Papers, File B9 (300), Πανελλήνιος Επιτροπή Ενώσεως Κύπρου, Εισήγησις Αρχιμανδρίτου Ιερωνύμου Κοτσώνη «επί του προγράμματος Ενεργειών», Athens 25 March 1955.

66. In October 1955, PEEK organised a first nation-wide fund raising campaign for ‘the assistance of Cypriot freedom fighters’. *Makedonia*, 20 Oct. 1955. It seems that, by that time, PEEK was plagued by internal dissent, fed by complaints from Colonel Georgios Grivas. The leader of the EOKA, which waged the armed campaign against the British in Cyprus, considered the mobilisation of the domestic

1945-46, the intimate relationship between the political Right and the leaders of the Enosis movement, the Church and the ‘official’ trade unions in particular, made it inexpedient for the Papagos and Karamanlis governments to try and disavow the campaign. Universities and schools were permitted to suspend classes in order to ensure the success of mass meetings for which the police had given permission. The press offered wide publicity and whole-hearted support to these activities. Political parties generally appeared happy to leave the initiative to the Church and the various non-political groups. EDA, the party of the communist Left, admitted that it lacked the organisational capacity to take the initiative. Nonetheless, it tried to outbid its rivals in nationalist fervour and encouraged its members to participate and try to plant anti-Western slogans in mass events.⁶⁷

The rhetoric and literature of the Enosis campaign confirmed the tenacity of a political culture that appeared to defy the bitter historical experience of three decades. Nationalism was hardly the hallmark of political discourse among Greece’s Western partners. Yet the myths and ideological constructs of 19th century Greek culture looked alive and well. The leading role of ecclesiastics seemed to reaffirm the identification between Orthodoxy and Nation. Launching the campaign in 1950, Archbishop Spyridon declared that the union of Cyprus with the mother country was an incontestable right of the Greek people and called upon all Greeks to ‘complete the liberation and strengthen the independence of Hellenism’.⁶⁸

The ‘historic mission’ of Hellenism was a common theme, occasionally complemented with references to divine election. Racial determinism was very much in evidence in the rhetoric of public speakers, the press, even in cartoons scornful of the granting of liberty to ‘coloured’, ‘spiritually inferior’ or ‘semi-civilised’ peoples – at a time when the ‘white’ Cypriots, descendants of those who fathered the greatest human civilisation, were still under colonial yoke. Significantly, Greek Cypriot

front in Greece inadequate. Gerasimos I. Konidaris, «Ιστορικά αναμνήσεις από την προετοιμασίαν του αγώνος της Κύπρου», *Παρνασσός*, Στ':2 (1964), p. 255.

67. EDA Records, file 268, «Απολογισμός δουλειάς από την Πανελλήνια Συνδιάσκεψη της 19ης Ιουλίου 1956 ως τον Νοέμβριο του 1956». Δημοκρατική Νεολαία Λαμπράκη, «Η κατάσταση της Ελληνικής νεολαίας μεταπολεμικά, οι αγώνες της και οι σημερινοί προσανατολισμοί της», προσυεδριακό κείμενο, προ της 28ης Μαρτίου 1965. For the KKE leadership in exile, the Cyprus questions offered a rare opportunity to try and rid itself from the stigma of ‘national treason’ on account of its position on Macedonian autonomy during the civil war.

68. Stefanidis, p. 259.

intellectuals and the Ethnarchy appeared to share such stereotypes.⁶⁹ From late 1954, when the opposition of most Western countries to Enosis became painfully apparent, ‘underdog’ mentality broke loose. The myth of the martyred people, constantly victimised by the ‘powerful of the earth’, was played up as the Cyprus campaign assumed a bitterly anti-Western tone.⁷⁰ More than once Prime Minister Karamanlis pointed to a sense of isolation taking hold of people’s minds. Speaking on a national anniversary, he himself attributed the lack of solidarity on the part of Greece’s allies to the ‘fact’ that Greece did not belong to any racial group.⁷¹

Much more than the initiatives related to post-war national claims, the Cyprus campaign assumed proportions of a genuine popular movement. Government attempts to control or even defuse it were only partially successful. When demonstrations could not be averted, the government sought to tighten security measures. Police brutality then offered the opposition and its press an opportunity to denounce the government. This was a source of discomfort for the self-proclaimed and generally ‘loyalist’ leaders of the campaign, not least the Orthodox prelates. A social group which apparently had something to gain from the fray were the students. Their intense involvement in the campaign taught them the benefits of organised action and led to the formation of the first student unions. In effect, an irredentist cause triggered a process of relative emancipation for students and urban youth in general from the regimented conditions of the post-civil war period.

The Cyprus campaign was ultimately a failure. It ended with a compromise which set up an independent republic under tripartite tutelage and explicitly excluded Enosis in perpetuity.⁷² This outcome did not permit its domestic champions to reap any fruits of victory. Rather, nine years of irredentist agitation had encouraged opinion leaders

69. In a pamphlet on the ‘national character of Cypriot literature’, ‘race’ is a key concept. It comes up eight times in the text, which also speaks of the ‘racial dynamism of the Greek Cypriots’, ‘racial potential’, ‘racial attributes’, etc. See Terlexis, p. 58.

70. This part is based on the author’s ‘The Movement for the Union of Cyprus with Greece in Thessaloniki, 1950-1958’, unpublished paper presented at the Centre for the History of Thessaloniki, 29 November 2000.

71. Terlexis, p. 340. See also Karamanlis’ speech at Messolonghi in April 1957, in Constantine Svolopoulos (ed.), *Κωνσταντίνος Καραμανλής: Αρχαίο, γεγονότα και κείμενα*, vol. 3, Εκδοτική Αθηνών, p. 321.

72. The diplomatic history of the Cyprus question has attracted a growing volume of research. Essential remain the works of Stephen Xydis (1967), François Crouzet (1973), and Evangelos Averoff-Tositza (1986). For an analysis based on recently available primary sources, see Evanthis Hatzivassiliou,

among the press, interest groups and opposition parties to outbid each other in intransigent, maximalist rhetoric. Greek foreign policy and, to a considerable extent, domestic politics came to be dominated by the Cyprus issue. Doubts were raised about the pro-Western orientation of the country even among supporters of the ruling party.⁷³ Dissidents were ignored or intimidated.⁷⁴ At some point, following the announcement of the Macmillan plan,⁷⁵ Karamanlis felt compelled to allude publicly to a reappraisal of foreign policy. Under such circumstances, any room for diplomatic manoeuvre was severely reduced. Following a series of ‘missed opportunities’, the Zurich - London compromise came too late to salvage much of the original Greek objectives.

c. The Second Cyprus Campaign, 1963-67

Within three years of independence communal politics in Cyprus reached deadlock. In late 1963, President Makarios attempted to have the power-sharing safeguards for the Turkish Cypriot community curtailed. The fact was that the nationalist leadership of either ethnic group tended to treat the young Republic as little more than a temporary expedient; neither abandoned their long-cherished objectives, Enosis and partition respectively. Communal violence broke out, threatening to draw in Greece and Turkey and dislocate NATO’s southern flank.

At the time Greece was passing through a period of transition from eleven years of high handed conservative rule to the more liberal administration of the Centre Union under George Papandreou. Facing two successive elections in late 1963 and early

Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 1997.

73. Speaking as chairman of the Panhellenic Committee for the Self-determination of Cyprus, Archbishop Theoklitos of Athens set the tone by declaring that Cyprus was ‘above friendships, above alliances, above every interest’. Quoted in Terlexis, p. 344.

74. Among them, Philippos Dragoumis, whose criticism of Enosis agitation and the policy of internationalisation would not be published even by conservative newspapers. Eventually, he issued a pamphlet, titled *On the Cyprus Issue*, which cost him much abuse. Dragoumis Papers, files 113 and 115. The distinguished author Georgios Theotokas, of liberal convictions, also considered the Enosis campaign a futile display of political underdevelopment. Panagiotis Pipinelis, the ultra-conservative former Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Palace confidant, was also a critic who, unlike Dragoumis and Theotokas, did not publish his views until after the Zurich-London accords.

75. The Macmillan plan, announced in June 1958, effectively opened the way to a tripartite condominium and, ultimately, partition in Cyprus.

1964, Greek leaders were at first inclined to urge a course of moderation and reconciliation on the Greek Cypriots. Before long, however, they were faced with a powerful revival of pro-Enosis and anti-Western sentiment at home and President Makarios' increasingly independent course in Cyprus.⁷⁶

The initiative, it seems, came from the societies of Greek Cypriot students in Athens and Thessaloniki. Together with national student unions began holding mass meetings and issuing resolutions. Before long, the usual array of organised interests and institutions joined in. They invariably urged the government to denounce the Zurich-London accords and support the Greek Cypriots' bid for self-determination.⁷⁷ While the Holy Synod gave its blessing and clerics were still at the lead of marches, this time the driver's seat was not reserved for the Church. The effort was much more diffuse. Although PEAK was revived under retired General Notis Botsaris, it played none of its past role. Moreover, the Left was now able to make its presence felt through its own Committee for Cypriot Self-determination.⁷⁸ The party of EDA and its youth organisations were better organised, more numerous and stood to benefit from the relaxation of the security regime under the Centre government.

Once again exalted irredentist rhetoric was very much in display, complete with expressions of chauvinism and stereotypes oozing cultural determinism.⁷⁹ This time, however, there were two novel elements in comparison with the 1950s campaign. Government officials, from Prime Minister Papandreou down to prefects and education inspectors, did not hesitate to adopt a staunchly nationalistic posture publicly, in contrast with the reserved manners of the Karamanlis administration. Receiving a petition on Cyprus, the Speaker of Parliament claimed to 'serve History

76. The diplomatic history of the period see in Sotiris Rizas, *Ένωση, διχοτόμηση, ανεξαρτησία: Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και η Βρετανία στην αναζήτηση λύσης για το Κυπριακό., 1963-1967*, Βιβλιόραμα, 2000.

77. *Eleutheria*, 28-29 Dec. 1963, 16 Jan. 1964.

78. Archives of Contemporary Social History, EDA Records, file 479, communiqué of the Committee of co-operating scientific, cultural, labour, student *et al.* organisations for the self-determination of Cyprus, 10 May 64. *Eleutheria*, 28 Aug. 1964.

79. A resolution issued by the Greek Women Intellectuals considered it 'unthinkable that in the twentieth century, while semi-developed peoples acquire their liberty', the rights of the people of Greek Cyprus are suppressed. *Eleutheria*, 12 Feb. 1964. Addressing a student meeting, the Rector of the Athens University declared that 'the Turks may not live among civilised peoples, because they are distinguished by stout spiritual non-existence'. *Ibid.*, 11 Aug. 1964. Speaking in Thessaloniki later that year, Prime Minister Papandreou stirred his student audience to rapture, when he declared that, following the impending Enosis, 'Cyprus is destined to continue with peaceful means the march of Alexander the Great to the East'. *Ibid.*, 28 Oct. 1964.

and the Nation' by declaring that the entire Greek people 'throbbed with desire for Enosis'.⁸⁰ In early March 1964, Papandreou sanctioned the unfettered expression of popular feeling for 'the just struggle of Cypriot Hellenism', with which, he declared, his government was 'in full psychic harmony'. Only after demonstrations turned violently anti-American and diplomatically embarrassing, did the government seek publicly to discourage them.⁸¹ This was a second point of departure from the 1950s experience, since anti-Western manifestations were now combined with a display of neutralist and pro-Soviet feeling.

From the outset, the reluctance of the Western allies to satisfy Greek claims on Cyprus appeared to incense public opinion. The prospect of NATO involvement was rejected and the American mediation efforts under former Secretary of State Dean Acheson were construed as part of a sinister plot to deprive the Greek Cypriots of their right to self-determination and clear the way to partition. As has been noted, neutralist and, to a lesser extent, pro-Soviet manifestations were very much in evidence. This was not merely the result of leftist influence, however substantial that was. Traditional anti-Western feeling combined with the attributes of 'underdog' mentality to produce a heady blend. The trend reached its peak during the summer crisis, when the government of President Makarios received substantial Soviet backing in the face of Turkish threats. A growing body of opinion now perceived United States and NATO policies to be detrimental to national interests. When, in early 1965, the new leaders in the Kremlin switched in favour of a federal solution to the Cyprus question, pro-Soviet sentiment died down, contributing to a defensive mood and a growing sense of isolation.

The Cyprus campaign gradually petered out following the summer crisis and UN mediation. The rejection of the Acheson plan and the infiltration of Greek troops into the island apparently were in line with public sentiment. The last mass meeting took place in January 1965.⁸² Public interest was soon monopolised by the acute political crisis in which the country became enmeshed in the summer of that year. Declarations

80. Terlexis, p. 421.

81. *Eleutheria*, 1, 4, 5, 6 March 1964.

82. *Eleutheria*, 27 Jan. 1965.

in favour of self-determination and Enosis were still reported, not least by President Makarios, mostly on some national occasion.⁸³

Some further stirrings were observed in early 1967, when Greek-Turkish contacts failed to achieve a breakthrough and Ankara appeared to harden its position. A National Committee of Cypriot Struggle was set up in Athens. It was remarkable in that its members represented a wide spectrum of political affiliations, from the extreme Right to members of EDA.⁸⁴ The Committee declared Enosis to be the only nationally admissible objective and expressed support for Makarios' policy of non-alignment. It also demanded the immediate suspension of the 'infamous' Greek-Turkish dialogue, a position shared by Andreas Papandreou, the up and coming leader of the Greek Centre-Left.⁸⁵ The advent of the military dictatorship in April 1967 would bring these stirrings to an abrupt end.

For the third time in two decades popular mobilisation did not fail to raise the stakes for policy-makers. To the extent that it contributed to the decision of the Papandreou government to reject a compromise as advocated by Greece's Western allies and to insist on the course of internationalisation, the activities of the various groups mobilised in 1964 were probably more successful than those in the two previous instances. Their impact was apparently enhanced by the obvious populist reflexes of Papandreou and certain members of his cabinet. It is now clear that his entourage, including Andreas Papandreou, and President Makarios were instrumental in convincing the aging Prime Minister that the compromise plans on offer went against the real interests of Greece and Cyprus.⁸⁶ In underestimating the risks involved, official considerations and popular sentiment were for once in harmony.

83. ' "Enosis and only Enosis" declared Makarios', *Eleutheria*, 9 Nov. 1966.

84. The Committee was chaired by Professor Dimitrios Vezanis, once an apologist of General Metaxas' authoritarian regime, later a member of the Struggle Committee which assisted Colonel Grivas in organising his armed campaign in Cyprus. Present were moderate figures, such as the economist Hryssos Evelpidis and Alexandros Sakellarios, chairman of the Athens Bar Association, as well as Komninos Pyromaglou, former EDA deputy, and Kostas Hatziargyris, a distinguished journalist of the EDA daily organ.

85. EDA Records, file 479, National Committee of Cypriot Struggle, pamphlet dated 23 Jan. 1967. For Andreas Papandreou's views, see his statement to the press in *Eleutheria*, 3 Feb. 1967.

86. Rizas, 157-160.

A Comparative Perspective: Pressure Groups and Foreign Policy in West Germany and Israel

After World War II, interest groups were involved in matters of foreign policy in several Western countries. The ‘Suez group’ of the mid-1950s in Britain comes to mind. At first sight, however, two particular cases present some analogies to Greece: in West Germany and Israel interest groups perceived a stake in their country’s foreign policy and attempted to influence it accordingly. Social, political and ideological factors were at play group but their interaction with state policy varied considerably.

Not unlike Greece in the aftermath of the Asia Minor catastrophe, post-war West Germany faced an acute social and ideological crisis. Apart from the effects of war on its soil, the country played host to nearly nine million persons expelled from eastern German territories lost and other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. It also received an influx of refugees from East Germany. By the late 1950s these two elements comprised almost one quarter of the population. Predictably, various associations sprang up claiming to represent their interests. Their activities were not limited to keeping the memory of the ancestral lands alive and to pressing for economic and social rehabilitation. They also attempted to influence the foreign policy of the federal government. Irredentism, however, was out of the question. Although such tendencies existed, the experience of Nazi terror and defeat had utterly discredited the pre-war German nationalism and militarism. A new, liberal political culture was gradually built up and, for the first time in German history, civil society had its chance. This ideological watershed did much to marginalise irredentist dreams.

Expellee and refugee organisations lobbied Bonn against recognition of Germany’s eastern border with Poland and assumption of full diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia prior to a settlement of their property claims in those countries.⁸⁷ In 1950 some of these groups came together to form a political party, the Bloc of Expellees and Disenfranchised (BHE), which enjoyed a short-lived success in regional and the 1953 federal elections. Before long, however, the party lost its appeal. This was primarily the result of the country’s economic miracle and the

successful rehabilitation policy of the Adenauer government,⁸⁸ Expellee and refugee associations continued to try and influence German policy towards the East through their connections with the Christian Democratic Union, in particular, and their contacts in the Foreign Ministry. By 1970, Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* cut the ground from under their feet.⁸⁹ More than its predecessors, the Social Democratic leadership felt confident enough to ignore the pressure tactics of a group which was evidently out of step with the prevailing public mood.

Israel may *prima facie* present better analogies with post-war Greece. During the same period, the two states faced acute external problems and were involved in irredentist projects. They were both highly centralised states imbued with strong nationalist ideologies. But such analogies can be misleading. Israel was still going through a process of state building, whereas the territorial consolidation of Greece had all but been completed in 1923. Israel faced intermittent fighting, whereas Greece, entrenched within the Western Alliance, stirred clear of armed conflict. Moreover, Israel enjoyed a much more consolidated, inclusive political system – except, of course, in the case of its disenfranchised Arab population – which tended to accommodate interests and discourage confrontation.⁹⁰ Greece's political system, on the other hand, proved far from solid and representation of interests was either controlled or excluded.

Three institutional groups play a key role in Israeli foreign policy to this date: the military and defence establishment, the civil bureaucracy of the Foreign and Defence Ministries and the Jewish Diaspora, particularly in the United States. In a state constantly faced with acute security dilemmas, the military was naturally in position to influence foreign policy-making. It advocated high levels of preparedness and the use of force as the best instruments of policy. It has also been described as a

87. Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of Germany*, vol. 1, *From Shadow to Substance*, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 309; Deutsch and Edinger, pp. 95-6.

88. Bark and Gress, pp. 305-10; David Childs, 'The Nationalist and Neo-Nazi Scene since 1945', in Klaus Larres and Panikos Panayi (eds.), *The Federal Republic of Germany since 1949: Politics, Society and Economy before and after Unification*, Longman, 1996, pp. 211-2; Deutsch and Edinger, pp. 104-5.

89. Other groups, such as the German Soldiers League, or the Churches, also attempted to press their views on relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Germany, respectively. Deutsch-Edinger, pp. 96, 105-10.

‘permanent arms lobby’. Military views often clashed with the more accommodation-oriented attitude of the Foreign Ministry staff. Finally, the Jewish lobby in the United States has long proved a valuable source of support for the state of Israel. As a rule, the Jewish-American organisations urged a more conciliatory policy towards the Arabs and upon occasion, e.g. during the Suez crisis of 1956, tried to restrain Israeli aggression. Their impact on Israeli foreign policy, however, has been assessed as ‘marginal’.

Whereas in Greece the role of clientelistic networks and personal connections was paramount, interest politics in Israel were dominated by the all pervading influence of political parties.⁹¹ Associational interest groups that mattered were the General Labour Federation (Histadrut), the members of the collective farms (*kibbutzim*) and, increasingly, the groups representing the minority of Sephardic (mostly non-European) Jews. Histadrut was a source of support for the Labour Party which dominated Israeli politics well into the 1970s. The *kibbutzim* played an active role as supporters of settlement and security policies. Non-associational groups were both active and divided. In times of crisis, as in May 1967, academics, intellectuals and the media helped to generate considerable public pressure in favour of a pre-emptive strike against neighbouring Arab states. After the war, these elements joined the Land of Israel Movement, which advocated the retention of all occupied territories. Only a small minority had consistently preached accommodation with the Arab neighbours.⁹² Public pressures for a change of policy would become more pronounced and effective after the Yom Kippur war in 1973.

Not unlike Greek irredentism, Israeli expansionism was grounded on ‘historical claims’. Still, the Labour leadership of David Ben-Gurion and his successors proved able to abandon historic land, ‘when a historical claim confronted the state interest’.⁹³ This was the case after the 1956 war and, later, in the 1970s, at the time of the Camp

90. See, in particular, the studies of Yael Yishai, *Interest Politics in Israel*, State University of New York Press, 1991; ‘Civil Society in Transition: Interest Politics in Israel’, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 555 (Jan. 1998), pp. 146-62.

91. Shmuel Sandler, *The State of Israel, the Land of Israel: The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy*, Greenwood Press, 1993, pp. 91-98; Yishai, ‘Interest Politics in a Comparative Perspective: The (Ir)regularity of the Israeli Case’, *Israel Affairs*, 5:2-3 (1998), p. 76.

92. R.D. McLaurin, Mohammed Mughisuddin and Abraham R. Wagner, *Foreign Policy-making in the Middle East: Domestic Influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, and Syria*, Praeger, 1977, p. 194. Cf. Sandler, pp. 105-7.

93. Sandler, 128.

David accords. To a far greater extent than their Greek counterparts, Israeli policy-makers sought 'to mobilize public opinion in support of policies adopted, rather than looking to public opinion for guidance'.⁹⁴ The strength of the party system, its ability to mobilise public opinion behind government options in particular, was one reason. A more flexible political culture, in the sense that it stressed civil values as much as nationalist tenets, was also a factor that was absent in the Greek case. Like in West Germany, the degree of openness and consolidation of political institutions enabled the ruling élites to eschew the lure of nationalist overbidding and to adopt policies more commensurate to the external challenges and the domestic capabilities of their country.

Epilogue

Throughout the early post-war period, Greece remained a militarily vulnerable state which lagged behind the economic, social and political standards of its Western partners. Security, economic development and political modernisation were the tasks facing those in office. Their efficacy, however, was undermined by both material and cultural constraints. Among the latter, the strong irredentist undercurrent of the dominant culture threatened to disrupt the country's external relations, undermine political stability and distract successive governments from their urgent tasks.

The 'national claims' agitation and the Enosis campaign of the 1950s reflected little concern, if any, for the immediate problems facing the Greek state and society. They flourished in default of civil society. While claiming to represent 'society', their leaders usually identified themselves with the conservative, 'national minded' élites which controlled the state throughout this period. Clearly, the groups which took the initiative in mobilising the public needed little official encouragement. The traditions of the nation showed them the way. For irredentist societies after the war, it was an opportunity to gain national status and bolster their political influence. Many of their members were active in local networks of political patronage. A few years later, Enosis offered the Church of Greece a chance to reassert its role as the 'Ark of

94. Micahel Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process*, Yale University Press, 1972, pp. 134-160; McLaurin and Mughisuddin-Wagner, pp. 169-85, 194-6; Yishai, 'Civil Society in Transition: Interest Politics in Israel', pp. 146-51, 161-2.

Hellenism’ –an ideological construct of the post-liberation period.⁹⁵ The same issue provided the ‘official’ trade-unionism with a worthy cause, which Makris, its unscrupulous leader, relished to the extent of calling occasional industrial action. Participation in the ‘national struggle’ was considered a duty by most organised sections of society. It further conferred respectability and occasional legitimacy to groups otherwise excluded from the political mainstream. This was the case of the student groups, unions outside the GSEE and the other organisations of the Left.

Political patronage and a common ideological outlook further ensured that these activities were tolerated, when not abetted, by the state authorities. They fitted in with a generally intolerant political culture in so far they did not challenge the post-civil war social and political order. They might even help to defuse social pressures from ‘below’: against the grim social, political and economic background of the 1940s and 1950s, these recurrent outbursts of irredentism constituted a display of escapism on a mass scale.⁹⁶ By the time of the second Cyprus campaign, however, nationalism had blended with demands for social and political change and a more independent international role for Greece. It was this mixture of traditional political culture and the material aspirations of hitherto excluded social strata that would fuel the populist ascendancy of the 1970s and 1980s.

To the extent that political élites are answerable to a domestic constituency, it is reasonable to expect that their options in foreign affairs will be restrained by expectations stemming from particular interests as well as the prevailing political culture. As a result, actual decisions often diverge from the rational-choice model, which stipulates that actors choose policies that promise to maximize benefits and minimize losses.⁹⁷ This was clearly the case of Greek foreign policy during the period discussed here. Irrespective of official endorsement, group mobilisation on foreign policy issues proved a double-edged instrument. It could help defuse social tensions; it could confer legitimacy on government policies; it might even assist those in office

95. Kitromilides, ‘ “Imagined Communities” and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans’, pp 51-59.

96. Escapism may also describe the persistence of those involved in disregarding international realities. Lipowatz has attempted to interpret popular agitation over the Cyprus as reflecting a tendency of psychopathological dimensions: individuals unconsciously refuse to ‘see’ a part of reality, refuse to take it into account, although they have perceived it, and continue to stick to that part that suits them. Lipowatz, *Ζητήματα πολιτικής ψυχολογίας*, pp. 244-5.

97. Hudson, pp. 10-15.

in holding out against foreign pressures. But it also raised the stakes in terms of domestic political 'cost' and thus reduced the range of politically acceptable options. It encouraged inflexibility and maximalism, often against the better judgement of policy-makers. Ultimately, the government ought to take decisions. In doing so it could disregard the opposition parties but not its own constituency. A series of setbacks and 'missed opportunities' was almost invariably the outcome.

The dashing of the irredentist dreams rekindled during the period, combined with the experience of the seven-year military rule, might lead one to anticipate a thorough reappraisal of the nationalist core of Greek political culture. This was not to be. Irredentism may be all but extinct but the defensive, xenophobic and anti-Western version of Greek nationalism is still very much in evidence. Nor was the scope for making political capital out of foreign policy issues limited, as the Macedonian controversy of the 1990s proved. That Greek foreign policy still has to be relieved of its heavy domestic nexus, cultural and political, must be a failure of both the state and society.

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