Assessing the views of academics in Greece on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: a critical appraisal and a research agenda proposal

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Introduction

When the war against Iraq began in the night of 19-20 March 2003, Greek public opinion expressed its strong opposition through mass demonstrations and in the media. The government, which was holding the Presidency of the EU (European Union) Council at the time, engaged in a delicate balancing act: opposition to any unilateral use of force, trying to keep the EU united, and at the same time pleasing the Americans without being seen to doing so. The official position was that Greece was opposed to the war. Greek Premier Costas Simitis declared a few days in the war: ‘Our policy is a policy of peace’. Earlier he had not only repeated his opposition to any military action without UN authorization, but also claimed that the EU was united on that approach, and that the presence of Britain, France, Germany and Spain on the UN Security Council strengthened the Union in its actions and decisions (sic). He fully committed the Greek Presidency to produce a common EU stance on world affairs. Later he had also stated that: ‘Our position is that violence is the last resort and this last resort needs to be sanctioned by the United Nations’. All major political parties agreed. Only extreme left and leftist parties (in the Greek Parliament, the Communist KKE and the Left Coalition Party Synaspismos) criticised the ‘hypocrisy’ of the government and other parties for letting the Americans use their bases in Greece. Greek academics were also quick to show their unanimous condemnation of the US-led attack (see the views of seven historians and international relations experts in Kathimerini). As most European public

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1 During 2002-03, Dr Stavridis was Onassis Foundation Fellow, EKEM, Athens, and Hellenic Observatory Honorary Fellow, LSE European Institute, London. These are the author’s own views and do not represent those of any institutions or of any other individual. Therefore the usual proviso about responsibility applies here too.
3 his interview [in Greek] in EuroMagazine, February 2003, pp 6-10. See also Foreign Minister Papandreou’s interview in Kathimerini (26 January 2003 [in Greek].
6 Sunday 30 March 2003 [in Greek].
opinions also supported the so-called ‘no war’ movement, it was quickly pointed out in
Greece (media, but also my own research interviews - see list in Appendix 1) that, contrary to the 1999 Kosovo war, Greek public opinion was, for once, in sink with the rest of the EU (European Union) public opinions.

The related questions of whether there was, at last, evidence of a European (read: EU) voice in international affairs and of how far Greek foreign policy has become Europeanised are worth considering. The former question quickly dissolved on the ‘Letter of Eight’, which supported the US action. Transatlantic relations reached a new low and the work of the European Convention on the Future of Europe in general and its debates on the CFSP and ESDP in particular encountered numerous obstacles. This situation led Alain Touraine to ask if ‘Europe actually existed’. Stanley Hoffmann wrote that 'the split within the EU over Iraq is clearly a disaster'. Mr PESC/CFSP, Javier Solana, accepted that he had failed to produce a EU consensus. There were bitter exchanges between France and Britain, which meant that the ‘Entente cordiale’ had turned into an ‘Entente Glaciale’. It also led French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin to argue that:

‘[w]e well understand the domestic pressure being put on the British government. But these remarks are not worthy of a friendly nation and a European partner’.

Giles Merritt summed up the situation as follows:

‘Europeans are shocked by the scale of their own disarray over the Iraq crisis, and by the depth of the rifts that have opened up inside the European Union’.

The Greek Presidency made the most of the above as it presented its ‘unbiased’ position on the question of the war in Iraq as a necessary obligation that stemmed from the need to preside over the EU for the period January-June 2003. What is conveniently ignored is that Greece allowed the Americans to use its bases in Greece (mainly the US naval facilities in Souda Bay in Crete), that PM Simitis consistently stated that Greece was

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8 I will limit myself here to just quote several of the titles of articles published in the influential Le Monde: L’ EUROPE DECHIRE; LA CRISE IRAQUIENNE BRISE LES REVES DE DIPLOMATIE COMMUNE EUROPEENNE; L’EUROPE DE L’IMPUISSANCE ET DE LA DIVISION; L’UNITE DE L’EUROPE EN LAMBEAUX.
9 El Pais, 20.01.03.
10 EUSA Review, Spring 2003, p.3.
opposed to the war and therefore aligned himself with the Franco-German axis within the EU, that Foreign Minister George Papandreou acted as a bridge with the USA (hence his nickname of ‘the American’), and that (then) Socialist Party (PASOK) Secretary General Costas Laliotis led anti-war rallies in the centre of Athens.

This rather confusing state of affairs was presented by many an observer as a result of the need to continue in the anti-US tradition that prevails in Greece, keep a balancing act because of, but equally thanks to, the EU Presidency, and, at the same time, as an expression of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. What was conveniently ignored was the fact that 18 governments out of the enlarged (in the future) 27-strong EU supported the USA. So much for EU consistency, so much for Europeanisation, and so much for the democratic disjunction between the EU governments and their populations. One must also be rather careful about the role of public opinion in foreign policy, in particular its volatility. Hence, my interest in trying to make sense of the Greek situation. In particular, I was rather surprised by the 100% unanimity among academic elites against the war. There was no sign of any dithering whatever the grounds, as was clearly the case in the USA and in other EU countries.

As a result, I was particularly interested in the role of academia in Greek foreign policy. Greece is a small country by international standards, but a medium one with the EU. The objective of this working paper is to present and assess the views of academics on the question of **whether Greek foreign policy has become Europeanised**. I will not address the question of what Europeanisation means. This study results from the award of an Onassis Foundation Foreign Fellowship in 2002-03, which was held at EKEM (Hellenic Centre for European Studies) in Athens for six months during the period 2002-03

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17 In terms of population at least, almost 11 million Greeks put the country 7th in the current EU list. Greece will be 8th in an enlarged 25 next year, and 9th in an EU with 27 members later this decade. Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and after the next enlargement(s), Poland and Romania have larger populations than Greece. The Treaty of Nice has redistributed votes and seats with a population bias and the Convention has worked on the introduction of a double majority, one of states and one of populations (8 out of 15 and 60% of the EU citizenship).
March-September 2003. The venue and the duration of the fellowship are important. First, Professor Ioakimidis, who among other responsibilities is the Director of EKEM, is an expert on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. His extensive contribution to the study of the subject was acknowledged by all of the interviewed academics. It was therefore not a coincidence that I applied to the Onassis Foundation to support a research study visit at EKEM. Second, the duration of the fellowship is important because it meant that it coincided with the Greek Presidency, with part of the European Convention (its most interesting stage with the finalization of the draft Constitution/Constitutional Treaty), and with the war in Iraq and all the EU divisions it has generated. After reviewing part of the existing literature and discussing the issue at length with Professor Ioakimidis, my practical choice was to concentrate on the views of academics rather than to try and carry out a comprehensive analysis of what is after all a huge subject. It is therefore a qualitative assessment of the issue at hand. It is also hoped that it does not amount to an ‘academic view’ in the negative sense of the term, but that it rather represents a fair and accurate assessment of the views of academic colleagues. The study also proposes an agenda for future research on the subject.

This paper consists of three parts. The first part examines the views and opinions of a number of academics, both established senior staff and upcoming younger ones, who kindly accepted to be interviewed extensively for this study [a list is provided at the end of this paper]. The second part presents my critical analysis of a number of points raised in the interviews. The third and concluding part refers to future research, based both on the methodology adopted in this work and in a proposed methodology entitled ‘the pendulum test’.

1. Academic views on the Europeanisation of Greek FP

Introduction and methodology

Academics play a priori a much bigger role in Greek society than in other EU states. This situation results from a number of reasons, which range from the socio-political status of academic professors in Greek society, but also from their importance in several political parties after the restoration of democracy in 1974 and in particular in the PASOK party.

19 See Bibliography for details.
20 In this appendix I also include a number of events I attended during my stay in Athens as further sources of information.
PASOK has been in power since 1981 barring a small interruption in 1989-1993. Because of their many jobs (a Southern European phenomenon), academics often act as advisors to politicians or government officials, or, sometimes actively participate in Greek politics. To name but a few examples, this is the case for Professors Rozakis, Papadimitriou, and Venizelos (a government minister) for PASOK, and for Professors Alogoskoufis (an MP) and Valinakis (now the party foreign affairs spokesman) for New Democracy. Here one must stress the different statuses from party members to advisors to a ministry or to a specific minister.

The main reason for conducting a series of selected interviews, in addition to the stated limitations of time, has to do with the fact that interviewing has become a key element in the study of foreign policy analysis. The interviewing of elites is important not only for their expert knowledge but also as ‘opinion shapers’. One should bear in mind the long term effect of academics as much as their short term impact on public opinion at large but also on elites perceptions be they political, governmental etc. The latter mainly occur via numerous interventions in the media, be it the written press or television. This activity has now become a favourite pastime for many an academic in Greece. The former refers to the education and teaching dimension of academic life. Most politicians and other practitioners (diplomats, party officials, advisers, etc) now have a university education. Thus, academics, wearing their lecturing hats this time round, do mark generations to come, although it is admittedly more difficult to assess their actual impact. Finally, and that point complements the previous two, the written work of academics does inform the wider debate (including policy recommendations), be it at the theoretical level or at the empirical one. ‘Second jobs’ are also common among academics, often related to actual policy making. As usual, there is a positive and a negative dimension to this situation. The positive element is that Greek academics may be closer to ‘the real world’ than is the case in other EU states (but not in the USA where academics and practitioners enjoy a close relationship and often move between the two categories). However, there might be an element of clientelistic politics too here. Also this close relationship with political parties and governments may lead to an apologetic role in some academic and other writings. I leave these questions open. As for wider access to public opinion, there are regular columns in the press for academics, but one needs to

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21 See the expert survey on EU party positions, [www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data.htm](http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data.htm). It is also mentioned in Schmitt (2003) and also at least once explicitly and several times implicitly during interviewing (Moschonas).
add that the real issue is whether the Greek public reads them or not (Greek newspapers circulation is one of the lowest, if not the lowest, in Europe in comparative population terms).

Methodologically speaking, I preferred an open-end approach to the interviewing process, thus without a list of specific questions (see indicative list in appendix 3). In terms of responses, I contacted by email (a Europeanised way of contact nowadays in the academic community) 25 academics over a period of five weeks (late May-June 2003). 15 of them (just over 60%) responded positively to my request for interview. In addition to lengthy discussions with Professor Ioakimidis, 13 such interviews materialised during the period 28 May-16 July 2003, and one in September. They were carried out in Athens and lasted between one hour and two hours.

As for the selection of the case-studies, I based my choice on the existing literature but made sure to ask all interviewees about any other areas they would have liked to comment upon. From the literature, Ioakimidis defines as ‘ethnika themata’ Greece’s relations with neighbouring countries, most notably Turkey and Cyprus\(^{22}\). He also adds relations with the USA through NATO or at the bilateral level, as well as the Balkans\(^{23}\). Most other observers also agree. Thus, in a number of collective volumes on Greek FP\(^{24}\), the main areas of interest for Greek FP reproduce the same, by now familiar, topics:

- Turkey, Cyprus
- the Balkans
- USA.

It is worth noting that the interviews were conducted in Greek, although two of the interviewees preferred to use English (Couloumbis and Keridis) when they were informed that the study would be published in English. Those using Greek did however often use English words and expressions throughout the interviews. Some did so more than others. This can be interpreted in part because they knew my work will be published in English, and in part because of their own respective place of study (Tziampiris for instance has made all his studies in the USA and in the UK). I mention this here as to

\(^{22}\) Ioakimidis (2000: 363).
\(^{23}\) Ibid.: 364.
\(^{24}\) Couloumbis, Kariotis and Bellou 2003, Mitsos and Mossialos 2000; Lesser et al. 2001; Featherstone and Ifantis 1996.
whether there is a Europeanisation (read: English\textsuperscript{25}) of language as well. Terminology is also often related to where and when one has learnt his/her ‘trade’. My own transcripts were made in English from the notes, mainly in English again, taken during interviews. This study was meant from the start to be written in English. A final comment on this aspect of the question might be for sociologists to investigate whether the place of study (outside Greece) has an impact on the way academics later assess the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. I leave this question open but simply note that it is linked to the question of the socialization of elites.

What follows reproduces a number of points/quotes taken from the interviewing process. I have tried to be as accurate as possible but I did not use a tape recorder to allow for as open a discussion as possible.

\textit{The findings}\textsuperscript{26}

The interviewed academics could be split them into three groups:

- The \textit{optimists} who claim that the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy is a positive development, that it has now, finally, fully materialized, and that it can no longer be reversed.
- The \textit{skeptics} who remain circumspect, be it in general (about the Europeanisation of Greece) or in particular (FP).
- The \textit{critics} who deny there has really been a Europeanisation of FP.

In terms of interviewees, out of 15, there were 9 who belonged to the first group, 2 (Moschonas and Tsakaloyannis) to the second group, and finally two to the last group (Huliaras and Tsardanidis). So, a clear majority claims that there has been such a process, at least in FP.

It is also interesting to mention that almost all interviewees consider foreign policy to be one of the most ‘successful’ areas of the Europeanisation process in Greece. In fact, there was near-consensus that Foreign Policy is \textit{the} most successful area of Europeanisation in Greece. Some even argued the \textit{only} success story of Europeanisation in Greece to date. FP was also identified as an initiator of Europeanisation in Greece.


\textsuperscript{26} When just names appear in brackets it means ’interviews 2003’ (see appendix 1 for details).
Some contrasted it to a lack of similar progress in the internal policy field, with the (very) notable exception of the adoption of the euro (EMU). Thus, attempts at privatisation and other restructuring efforts in the Greek economy continue to be major obstacles for the Europeanisation of Greece (see also Keridis 2003).

On Greece and Europeanisation in general, there was emphasis on a change of ‘style’ in the way politics are conducted away from a rather confrontational to a more consensual type of conduct (Keridis). The use of ‘coalition-building’ in the EU was also stressed (Keridis, Tsardanidis, Tziampiris). Economic progress, and in particular the introduction of the ‘euro’ in 2001, were also mentioned (Keridis). Others disagreed (Moschonas, Tsakaloyannis) and preferred to stress the social implications and costs of EU membership. There was a clear stress on the historic dimension of the question when applied to Greece and in particular its reference to Greece’s belonging to the West or to the East, i.e. Europe or the Orient (Botsiou, Keridis). The latter is an issue that dates back to Greece’s independence in 1821-1830, but an issue that continued well after the mid-1920s when Greece suffered what is known as the ‘mikrasiatiki katastrofi’ of Asia Minor in 1923. Thus, this identity question has informed all recent debates including the current one on Europeanisation. It contains a number of ‘ideational’ issues such as those on the re-definition of the nation-state, the role of the Church, and that of a multi-cultural Greek society, mainly through recent foreign immigration (Botsiou, Keridis). There was also some confusion between the various concepts of Europeanisation, modernization and democratisation. The last two concepts have a particular connotation in Greece as it is a country that gained independence late and has only made economic and political improvements in the post-1945 era.

I reproduce verbatim (from my notes), the various definitions of Europeanisation given by the interviewees (alphabetical order).

BOTSIOU: convergence of economic and political policies and development of a European identity that combines with national identities. A positive but not above (elevated) level, a synthesis of national identities, no more wars, cooperation. Fusion in some areas, practical, euro and Schengen, but also identities but here it is a qualitative shift.
BELLOU: adjustment/adaptation (change) of behaviour and institutional set up in member states to rules, principles and other values as defined by the EU. Including candidates states. A process that is dynamic and still in its early stages. Acquis communautaire as a system.

CHRYSSOCHOOU: a process of institutional harmonisation and inclusion/adaptation of European norms, principles and rules.

COULOUMBIS:
- democracy, rules, institutions
- convergence
- functional cooperation
- transcending borders
- freeing the national definition of the national interest from territorial considerations.

IFANTIS: in policy making (not in particular order) harmonisation, common standards, loyalty to European system of cooperation, solidarity, definition of European interest (EU). More difficult in terms of defence, only minimum solidarity is possible, not a European defence, nor is it possible to adapt to EU norms in defence. (sceptical realist approach).

IFESTOS: To what extent does one gets closer to Europe, its common interests and policies. Need to define the latter of course and that is not easy (especially for Greece). Methodologically difficult. A question for the elites.

KERIDIS: moving away from a certain nationalist, inward-looking, traditionalist, xenophobic, reactionary/reactive, siege-mentality, zero-sum game, hard-core realist discourse -> to a more liberal, positive-sum game, post-nationalist, sovereignty pooling, interests/values/identities overlapping, cosmopolitan, outward looking, proactive, much more confident foreign policy.

MOSCHONAS: roots in hermeneutic example of modernization with the specificity of the EU dimension, acquis communautaire. Need to adapt national rules to EU practice.

PERRAKIS: moving away from ethno-centric criteria in policy making towards those of the EU and other European institutions (Council of Europe, OSCE).
TSAKALOYANNIS: *a process that produces synergy with partners and leads to (Monnet approach)*

*our problems are common, more than just mere competition between member’s views. EU institutional framework allows success in objectives and achieving goals that cannot be done alone.*

There was overwhelming consensus on the **positive side of Europeanisation.** Many argued that in fact the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy was the most visible side of that process and one to be welcomed (Botsiou, Couloumbis, Keridis, Moschonas). Most interviewees confirmed therefore that there has been a Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy, especially with regards to Turkey/Cyprus and the Balkans. Even one of the academics I contacted (but did not manage to organise a formal research interview with him) told me ‘of the top of his head’ that ‘Cyprus/Turkey and FYROM (‘Ta Skopia’ in Greek)’ where the obvious candidates for illustrating empirically where Greek foreign policy had indeed Europeanised (6 June 2003 in Athens). Thus, in terms of Greek FP policy areas, Turkey was seen as the most Europeanised nowadays (Bellou, Botsou, Couloumbis, Ifantis, Keridis, Tziampiris), followed by the Balkans (Bellou, Couloumbis, Chryssochoou, Tskaloyannis, Tziampiris), and by Cyprus (Bellou, Chryssochoou, Ifestos). It is worth noting that Ifestos’ comments on Cyprus were based on the fact that he sees such a Europeanisation as being the result of Greece using the ‘weaknesses’ of the EU system and in particular the prospects offered by EU enlargement (EU linkage politics and package deals). As for Tziampiris’ comments on the Balkans, he argues that even Greece’s public opinion now accepts that the 1993-94 policy towards FYROM was a ‘fiasco’ due to ‘neurosis’. Keridis sees Greece’s policy towards Turkey as ‘emblematic’ of this new Europeanised approach and specifically mentions George Papandreou as its embodiment, after the ‘cathartic effect’ of the 1999 Ocalan crisis.

Admittedly, there were some qualifications linked to both general concerns about identity, the relative weakness of the economy (‘there has been no substantial convergence a-la Maastricht’, Moschonas; also Tsakaloyannis’ worries about the absence of a welfare state system in Greece), and more specific ones about the success of such a Europeanised FP. Particular attention was given to Turkey and Cyprus. The USA remains the main actor: ‘it is not a coincidence that after the Imia crisis in 1996, Simitis went to the *Vouli* to thank the Americans’ (Moschonas). ‘The pro-Turkish line has not paid off’ (Tsakaloyannis). Others fundamentally disagreed with that approach and claimed that one of the success of Europeanisation in Greece is that now the Cyprus
Problem and relations with Turkey are no longer national issues but have become European (EU) ones. The same applies to the Balkans and in particular the Macedonian question. These are positive developments (Bellou, Botsiou, Chryssochoou, Couloumbis, Keridis, Tziampiris). Some stressed the limits of Europeanisation in defence and security matters (Ifantis, Iffestos). But this dimension of the question falls beyond the scope of this study.

It was also agreed that Europeanisation in Greek FP was a **dynamic process**. Some argued it has been achieved in foreign policy and that it represent a **permanent** achievement nowadays (Chryssochoou, Couloumbis, Botsiou, Keridis, Tziampiris). It is important to note (I will return to this below) that there was a lot of agreement about the fact that the process of Europeanisation was **elite-driven** (importance of individuals), that it had been ‘imposed’ from the top, and that it was largely **superficial** because there had been no real impact on Greek society (and in particular its administrative system), at least as yet. Here one should stress the importance attached by many interviewees to the ‘socialisation’ effect of Europeanisation. In particular Tziampiris stressed that we are now dealing with a process that goes ‘well above and beyond a mere socialisation effect’.

Thus, he argued that:

‘now it is a different strategy altogether. Greece’s national interests are better served via multilateral efforts, mainly in the EU, rather than unilateral or bilateral ones’.

Europeanisation is also a process that allows for ‘flexible alliances’ with other EU partners according to issue-areas: on human rights with Scandinavian countries, on federal visions with Germany, on agriculture with France, on defence with large states, on structural funds with Southern European states, and on institutional reforms with small states (Keridis).

Others stressed the simple fact that there are now Foreign ministers who do speak foreign languages (Huliaras). It is equally important to stress (as was indeed noted by many an interviewee) the catalytic effect of some events such as the return to democracy (1974), the shift to social democracy among Socialist governments in Europe (in the case of Greece 1985 but the key event here occurs in Mitterrand’s France in 1982), the Imia

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27 To a certain extent this in itself is a negation of Europeanisation, see section 4 below for more comments on that particular point.
crisis (1996), or the Ocalan fiasco (1999). Needless to say one should also add other ‘bigger developments’ in the world, such as the end of the Communist bloc and the reunification of Europe.

There was clear emphasis on the negative impact of past Greek policies such as the early 1980s and its plethora of examples: Poland, the Korean jumbo (Tziampiris, Moschonas). The East-West divide was also criticised by some as having more to do with anti-US rather than anti-European feelings, mainly due to the role of the USA in the Greek junta and in Cyprus (Moschonas).

**When did Europeanisation start?** There were those who view this process as a historic one dating back to many centuries, those who see it as a more recent event mainly linked to Greece’s return to democracy in 1974 (and the fundamental role played by Constantine Caramanlis\(^2\)), a major ideological shift within the Socialist Party (around 1985), the appointment of Simitis as PM in 1996 (‘a point of no return’, Chryssochoou), or since 1999 and the appointment of George Papandreou as foreign minister following the Ocalan fiasco. It is difficult to have a clear view of who dates what where and when because all interviewees agreed Europeanisation is a dynamic and multi-faceted process.

There were also signs of some confusion about Greece’s Europeanisation and its NATO membership and the role of the USA in its security policy widely defined but in particular with regard to Turkey. This aspect of the question was presented as fundamentally problematic by a number of interviewees (especially Ifantis) but not so by others (Botsiou, Couloumbis).

In more details (sometimes more than one case put forward), the supporters of the ‘historic’ dimension of the process of Europeanisation of Greek FP were Botsiou and Huliaras, and to a lesser extent Moschonas (modernisation 1960s rather than 1821). Those supporting the Caramanlis claim (mid 1970s) were Botsiou and Moschonas. Those favouring the PASOK shift in the mid-1980s were Huliaras (*but see also below), Ifestos, Moschonas, Perrakis, Tsakaloyannis, Tsardanidis (*but see also below). And, finally those who credited Simitis’s efforts and a more recent date (mid to late 1990s) were Bellou, Chryssochoou, Couloumbis, Ifantis, Keridis.

\(^2\) A link bridge of the Strasbourg EP building has just been named ‘Espace Constantin Caramanlis’, *Kathimerini*/English edition, 8 September 2003.
On the **Future of Europe** debate (‘what kind of EU?’), there was clear consensus that Greece is seen as pro-federal, pushing for more integration, especially in defence issues (Keridis). This overwhelming pro-Europeanism was contrasted to Greece’s anti-Americanism. It was also claimed that the real test has yet to come: when Greece becomes a net contributor to the EC budget, that is to say when it stops enjoying the _largesse_ of other members (Keridis). Few questioned why Greece is in favour of the abolition of the veto in EU matters when it goes cold feet on its use in foreign and security policy areas (Ifestos). Others claimed that no one really knows what ‘federalism’ actually means in Greece because it is no familiar with this kind of political system (Botsiou).

There were many explanations on offer for the fact that the **Greek Presidency** was used as a ‘blessing’ (Tziampiris) that allowed for a double (if not triple) language. One argued that PASOK is not schizophrenic at all but rather that it has cultivated such a policy over the years (‘maverick’, ‘satanic’ were words used by Keridis). There are different audiences: a domestic public and an EU one to address. Others suggested that Simitis is a ‘smart’ politician (Botsiou). Only one interviewee argued that the EU in general, and the Greek Presidency in particular, did not have any real impact on public opinion. It is seen as ‘boring and technocratic’ and the PASOK government was only trying its best ‘for domestic politics and party politics’ (Tsakoyannis). It was also mentioned that one needed to assess the Greek Presidency in relation to other recent presidencies, some of which have been rather ‘poor’, e.g. France in 2000 (Ifantis).

Most interviewees insisted on the fact that Greece is a fundamentally **anti-American** country (mainly for its support to the 1967-1974 Greek colonel junta, and its role in the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus). Henry Kissinger is a _persona non grata_ in many a Greek circle, contrary to many other EU countries where he is considered as a highly successful Secretary of State (in particular: end of conflict in Vietnam and opening to China but also his role in the Middle East in the 1973 war). It was stressed that this kind of anti-Americanism is not the case in other EU states which took an anti-American line on the recent conflict in Iraq (2003), for instance in Germany (Keridis), but which are not fundamentally anti-US. It was also confirmed that Greece had an ‘underdog’ mentality often associating itself with the weak (Keridis interview, for more see Diamandouros’.
work which was mentioned in the interviews as a reference point). It was also generally agreed that the Greek media were of a poor quality, especially with regard to the coverage of the war in Iraq (Botsiou, Keridis).

On other issues worth researching in the future, the following were suggested: ‘anti-Americanism’, ‘counter-terrorism’, and the ‘the impact of globalisation on the Greek psyche’ (Keridis). He also suggested the impact of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games. In that respect, it is interesting to note that PM Simitis only recently claimed that:

‘[a]nother issue is especially significant for Greece [in 2004]: the Olympic Games (…). The Olympic Games are not only a sports event, they are a social, political event which highlights a country and creates opportunities for development … That’s where we must succeed’\(^{29}\).

Very few interviewees mentioned that the Europeanisation of a country (in this case Greece) also depends on how much the other member states want this process to be successfully completed. That it is a dynamic process but that it also depends on relationships with other similar processes in other EU states and institutions (Tsakaloyannis: ‘Europeanisation is not only a question for the Greeks, do they others also want us?’).

Only two interviewees (Huliaras, Tsardanidis) presented a rather damaging picture of the effects of Europeanisation in Greece in general, and on its FP in particular. It is true that others have also expressed several reservations. For instance, Perrakis’ argument was that \(l’intendence ne suit pas\!\). The blame for not following the lead by a few individuals is to be shared by the Greek administrative system, the political parties, and other elements of society (‘established interests’). Other interviewees, especially when pressed (hence the usefulness of face-to-face interviews rather than printed questionnaires), did also accept that in fact there was still some way to go. But on the whole there was a rather self-satisfactory state of affairs. It is therefore worth explaining the dissenting views in more detail here, not only because they go against the grain (although one could argue that many other interviewees did also agree implicitly when they said that it has been a superficial process to date), but also because of what follows in the next section (section 4) and my own critical assessment of the question. Thus, Tsardanidis argues that Greek FP has become ‘Africanized’, ‘Sub-Saharanized’ or ‘Balkanized’ rather than Europeanised.

\(^{29}\) Kathimerini/English edition, 8 September 2003.
He claims that corruption and clientelism have been reinforced, rather than weakened by Greece’s membership of the EU. Thus, the importance of the state has increased in that regard, as has the number of people affected by this process, hence facilitating clientelistic practices. This is a point further stressed by Huliaras who argues that whereas there was no Greek international development policy prior to 1997, the fact remains that 45% of Greece’s development assistance is not audited (that is to say the part that does not go through the EU)\(^{30}\). Finally, they both stress that there is no evidence of the Foreign Ministry and other ministries dealing with EU affairs having been successfully Europeanised.

Huliaras also stressed that there are some examples of Europeanised Greek FP but that these do not amount to an Europeanisation of Greek FP. The rhetoric may be ‘pro-Europe’ but the reality remains that Greece is accepting US views because ‘Greece has a deep mistrust of the European project in security matters’ (similar views were also expressed by Ifantis and Tsakaloyannis). He also criticised the ‘village mentality’ that still prevails in Greece (for instance, the continued emphasis on Greek success abroad as if it were something special) as backward ‘mimetism’ (i.e. ‘we Greeks can do as well as the others’). He did make a direct comparison to current Turkish efforts to join the EU direction. Huliaras also recalled that until recently South European EU member states were labelled in Brussels as P.I.G.S (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain). Despite these criticisms, he accepted that it would be ‘difficult to impose an embargo on a third country unilaterally as was the case in 1994 with FYROM’. He also argued that more systematic work\(^{31}\) on how the Foreign Ministry functions now could help in identifying if there is a trend towards Europeanisation.

Tsardanidis also highlighted another important point: Did Greek policy towards Turkey shift first or had the EU moved first? In other words, there is now a link between Turkey’s democratisation, its stance on Cyprus and its EU accession prospects but did


\(^{31}\) Such an approach could also use more quantitative methods, including a systematic study of how many EU committee meetings Greek officials now attend (and compare to past experience), how many trips abroad are carried out (especially to Brussels but also to other EU capitals), how much has the use of modern technology increased (especially internet), and finally (a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods) how many more Greek proposals are being presented, and accepted (how much more confidence Greek negotiators feel they have as compared to previous years). All this to find out if Greek participation in EU affairs is now pro-active as opposed to reactive as was the case in the past.
the Greeks change tack first (by dropping their opposition to the 1995/6 Customs Union) and then got the Cyprus accession promise or was it the other way round? In brief, did Greek FP become Europeanised by intent or by duress?

Neither Huliaras nor Tsardanidis were convinced that ‘Europeanisation has materialised successfully’. They reflect to a large extent comments made by Ioakimidis in his 1996 contribution where he mentioned clientelism, a culture of the underdog, and the need for foreign protection, as major obstacles to real Europeanisation. What is worrying is that they remain current nowadays, i.e. 7 years later. What matters here is not only that this is almost a decade later but that these seven years coincide with the so-called modernization efforts by the Simitis government.

2. A critical evaluation

What follows makes a number of comments, mainly critical ones but hopefully – and this is my clear intention – of a constructive kind, on what was said in the interviews. In other words, this section is my own contribution to the academic debate on Europeanisation.

The first of my critical comments refers to a number of contradictions in the debate over the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. Has the process been completed or is it a dynamic one (i.e. still ongoing)? There was no agreement on this particular point even if there was indeed consensus on the fact that there was no going back. I am not convinced by this argument that reflects perhaps more wishful thinking than reality. I am not implying that I expect a return to more traditional foreign policy in Greece or a re-nationalisation of foreign policies. But, there are examples, plenty of them for that matter, when there has been reversal of the process, be it in the 1996 Imia crisis, or for other EU states, as was the case with Spain in the 2002 Perejil crisis.\footnote{see Monar 2002; Gillespie, 2002, pp 69-70; Soler and Mestres, 2003, pp 7-8.}

Needless to say, I do not expect either that a full Europeanisation of Greek FP will mean that all Greek positions on international affairs will become those of the EU. But some such effect will need to materialise if my dynamic understanding of Europeanisation is correct. I do not expect everyone for instance to agree with MEP Ostlander that a settlement to the Cyprus Problem ‘should be made a criterion for evaluating Turkey’s
progress towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria’ or that, as British MEP Theresa Villiers has argued, that ‘no date should be set for the opening of accession negotiations on Turkish entry to the EU, until Turkish troops leave Cyprus’. But a closer EU view on that of Greece on issue of ‘national interest’ (the so-called ethnika themata) will confirm progress towards the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy but also of those of other national foreign policies of EU states. A similar argument could be made when for instance Turkish violations of Greek air space will no longer consider to be a bilateral issue but one of real concern to the EU. The latter question is not unrelated to the lack of substantial progress on a security guarantee clause in the EU. It is perhaps not a coincidence that when Greek government spokesman Christos Protopapas comments on the recent declarations made by Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the 29th Anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (a ‘peace operation’ in Erdogan’s own words), he says that the Turkish PM ‘provokes all humanity’. But Protopapas then lists only the United Nations and not the EU as affected but this ‘provocation’.

This point relates to the question of where the EU will decide to go in the future. The ‘Solana paper’ (June 2003), which is seen as a draft strategy paper for the Union, does not offer any clear view as to the direction the Europeans will adopt because it represents the beginning of a debate, is the result of a compromise between the two different views over the Iraq war, and was produced just days prior to the Presidency visit to Washington (anything short of pretending to accept some of the views in the current US administration in particular with regard to rogue states and use of military force would have led to serious problems for President-in-Office Simitis).

There are still diverging views among member states on European defence, a situation that will become even more complicated after enlargement. Most of the governments supporting the US-UK view over Iraq came from Central and Eastern Europe. To the traditional ‘Europeanist versus Atlanticist’ divide, one must also add the views of the former neutral or post neutral or non-allied states.

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34 For more see Chryssochou, Stavridis and Moschonas 2000.
My second point refers to the **confusion** that the term ‘Europeanisation’ creates. In most, if not all, interviews there was a slippage, on the one hand, to ‘modernisation’ and ‘democratisation’, and on the other, to ‘westernisation’ and even ‘globalisation’. In particular, many interviewees often appeared unsure if they were referring to modernisation or to Europeanisation. Such confusion is not unique among Greek academics. It reflects a lack of clarity about what Europeanisation actually means. A good example occurred when a French academic revealingly described Chirac’s stance on Iraq in 2003 as ‘a Europeanist view’ before he quickly corrected it to ‘or rather a Gaullist one’\(^38\). Suffice it to say that the concept itself is confusing but still useful. It requires further investigation. It also means that more work needs to be done on the way national foreign policy priorities and other objectives become fused into those of the EU. This will be an easy exercise but such an approach accepts that there is no obvious ‘European position’ to start with. It is also shifting sometimes, as was the case in the European Parliament with the European stance on the Western Sahara that was the French view until Spain joined and then it became the Spanish view\(^39\). I do not enter here the debate over the discrepancy of views between various EU institutions. Not much work has been done on how national positions affect the EU one. To start with problematic FP issues is needed and there has been a development in this direction but only recently\(^40\).

But more work is still required. Perhaps, ironically, the anecdote of the French ambassador in Athens playing with a *koboloi* (worry beans) during a recent seminar\(^41\) visualises best what I mean by a two-way process of Europeanisation. Europeanisation represents not only the domestic adaptation to EU rules and practices, i.e. behaviour, but also that such behaviour is equally influenced and informed by national practices. As it is incorrectly therefore claimed by the newly-formed Young ECPR Network on Europeanisation, Europeanisation is not only ‘the impact of European integration at the national level’\(^42\). In other words, the domestic impact of Europeanisation is a **necessary but not sufficient condition**. Examples of Europeanisation do not necessarily mean that the process itself is finalised and completed. Many interviewees in the ‘optimistic

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\(^{38}\) 11\(^{th}\) Diplomatic Academy organised by Panteion in Spetsae, 1-5 July 2003.

\(^{39}\) Urruela, 1995.

\(^{40}\) see LSE International Relations Department Conference June 2002: [http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EuroFPUnit.html#workingpapers](http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/EuroFPUnit.html#workingpapers).

\(^{41}\) 11\(^{th}\) Diplomatic Academy organised by Panteion in Spetsae, 1-5 July 2003.

camp’ appeared not to be fully aware of this important additional dimension to the question under study.

Divisions among Europeans cannot be ignored in general but these are important elements in an effort to define what constitutes the ‘European’ in a Europeanisation process. Thus, on foreign policy and international affairs there is a clear divergence of views between the French and the British and the Germans over what kind of Europe we want (a super power, a civilian power etc) and what kind of world is desirable, let alone feasible (a multipolar one or a multilateral one or a world dominated by the only hyperpower?). On all these issues I will not comment, but suffice it to say the existing divergences among the governments of the big EU states confirm that a Europeanisation of foreign policy, let alone defence, remains problematic.43

Another good illustration of the issue of how difficult it is to define what is ‘European’ and how to achieve a common European stance can be found in the European Parliament’s debates in early 2003. Whereas in January the EP had passed a resolution condemning any unilateral use of force against Iraq, at the end of March, it was so split that it was unable to adopt any resolution on the subject44. Some observers/actors blamed British Labour MEPs clearly and squarely, for instance, PASOK MP Milena Apostolaki45. Although there is some truth in her allegation, the picture is much more complex than that46.

Moreover, this difficulty in identifying a European interest not only points to the need for such an exercise to be carried out (c.f. the recent Convention work) but also to try and avoid phrases such as the ‘Champions of Europe’ when such views only describe the stance of a given government (or governments) at a given time: thus, Daniel Vernet’s analysis47 refers to the Germans and the French as ‘champions d’Europe’ for their stance on the 2003 Iraq war misses completely the fact that a European stance is not predetermined but the result of a long process. Vernet does however hint in the right

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44 *Le Monde*, 28.03.03.
45 Greek NET TV, 30.3.03.
46 for details see Stavridis and Retta 2003.
47 *Le Monde*, 13.3.03.
direction when he argues that without the UK there cannot be a European defence dimension. Thus, all national views will need to be included. This discussion is important but it falls beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that the international situation is rather more complex and difficult than to argue that:

‘Europe will follow France (…); a Europe with an independent policy, exercising an equal influence on international affairs, probably through primarily political and economic means, rather than military means. That is just what the United States does not want’.

Vernet’s arguments about the reasons why Spain, Italy and some central European states backed the Americans over the Iraq war concentrate too much on the negative points (fear of the Germans, the Soviets/Russians, and the Franco-German axis within the Union). He forgets that such an approach fails to explain why Britain joined in (or Australia for that matter) and he ignores all the more positive arguments about a new world order, which may require pre-emptive action. Thus, the real issue may not be about US unilateral action but about pre-emptive action, ideally under UN auspices.

There is a tendency right now in Greek academic circles to pretend that all that is needed for international conflicts to go away is to take a neo-liberal approach (a ‘win-win’ situation) and ignore the lessons of Machiavellian realism. It is only fair to add that this is an oversimplification of IR theory and one that tends to ignore its evolution over the past 100 years or so. There is a strong traditional IR theory that claims that order and justice are possible but that there is no need for utopian idealism either. All this also ignores that the EU is actually militarising, a decision favoured by the Greek government. Equally, there was very little discussion about the emerging doctrine of ‘the right to interfere’ (what Bernard Kouchner has labelled ‘the responsibility to protect’), which began after the end of the Cold War, well before the Bush administration (the current one) took the term to its exclusive use. Thus, it remains clear that ‘a law without a sword remains an empty threat’, to paraphrase Professor Yves Roucaute’s own words (‘le droit sans l’épee n’est qu’un mot et la morale sans volonté un songe creux’).

One should not assume either that what is good for the French (as defined by a Gaullist president in a Gaullist system with the support of an opposition that whilst in power was...

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49 see Ortega 2001.
50 this is particularly visible in Keridis 2003, pp.1 and 12.
more Gaullist than de Gaulle) is necessarily good for all Europeans irrespective of their nationalities and other preferences. Thus, one should not rush to easy labels such as a ‘European Europe’ versus an ‘American Europe’\textsuperscript{53}. The real world is more complex than clichés. Also, subsequent events showed how even supposedly highly principled views could change over time\textsuperscript{54}. \textit{Le Monde}’s editorial piece dated 22 May 2003 put things into perspective: ‘Retour aux realites’. This part of the discussion also relates to the wider debate about the future of Europe and what kind of Europe we want: a real super power or a mere civilian presence\textsuperscript{55}? It relates to the wider debate about intergovernmentalists versus federalists, and big versus small states\textsuperscript{56}. Again, I do not enter here this debate.

Europeanisation could mean ‘shorthand’ for European convergence. It is more than integration, but it still needs more work, both empirical and theoretical, to be define well enough to be extremely useful. If one adopts the same approach to economic and financial convergence models, and on the EMU model for instance, then it would be desirable to identify clear criteria for FP convergence. Whether such a possibility is feasible or at least as easily identifiable as the Maastricht criteria remains an open question.

In short, how can one plausibly claim that Greek foreign policy has been Europeanised when over Iraq there was no common EU stance? But one needs to go beyond the mere claims that Europe has been built on crises and that therefore automatically there will progress after the one in Iraq. This fails to consider the seriousness and importance of this particular crisis and also, as importantly, that Iraq acted as a catalyst for a variety of difficulties and problems that the EU in general and the CFSP in particular had. That is to say those who pay are the ‘others’. To name but the most recent crises, Maastricht was agreed when the Balkans descended into chaos and war, NATO’s 40\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary occurred during the Kosovo bombing. So, if the EU needs to agree on a strategic doctrine according to this approach, I simply pity the victims of dictators and dictatorial regimes in the world. To claim that a ‘regenerated Europe’ has come out of the crisis (the words used by the French ambassador in Athens), smacks of arrogance and a lack of


\textsuperscript{54} see Pierre Lellouche, \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 18.04.03.

\textsuperscript{55} Stavridis 2001d.

\textsuperscript{56} Chryssochoou et al., 2003, pp. 1-40; Stavridis 2002a.
sensitivity with all due respect to diplomats. But diplomats, contrary to what is expected of academics, are known to ‘lie’ for their country when they deem it necessary.

As for viewing the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy as a positive development, it is somehow surprising that so little was mentioned in the interviews about the pros and cons of each FP case, whether it was claimed that such a process had actually occurred. This may represent consensus in Greece but it does not reflect the strong differences over Europe that have existed in the past, especially between Left and Right, and within the Socialist Party (c.f. its evolution from a Third-Worldist, anti-European stance to a pro-EU party, at least at the elite level). What stems from the above is that one should not confuse the Europeanisation of PASOK and that of Greece unless when claims that as New Democracy was already pro-European, and as both parties represent over 80% of the Greek electorate (2000 election results), then Europeanisation has indeed occurred. Thus, here we have a difference between the conclusion of the process, and the continuation of a process, as we also need to differentiate between elites and mass opinion. Without entering in the details, it is important to stress the existence of a discrepancy between those views especially over the wars in Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003). One could expand this problématique to the issue of terrorism in general and ‘17 November’ trials in particular (I leave this open but non scientific discussions I had in Greece show some worrying trends among mass opinion with many ordinary people arguing that although they disagreed with the means used, they fundamentally agreed with the terrorists’ objectives!). One should also add that there are some diverging voices within New Democracy which can of course conveniently be dismissed as ‘nationalistic’ but which could prove difficult to handle in the future (especially if there is New Democracy victory in the forthcoming elections) or if the Macedonian issue comes back with a revenge. Another divisive issue would be Cyprus/Turkey. Former defence minister Giannis Varvitsiotis made it clear that although he was not opposed to a rapprochement with Turkey, he could not see why Foreign Minister Papandreou had extended the informal Foreign Ministers Kastellorizo meeting to include a lunch session in Kas in Turkey.

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57 In an interview published [in Greek] in Kathimerini, 1 June 2003.
58 A similar argument is put forward in Everts and Keohane (2003), pp183-184 under the title of ‘School of failure’. I do not agree with this approach if only for moral reasons.
59 “Diazifismi”, MEGA TV, 5 May 2003.
As for anti-Americanism, several interviewees rejected it as a popular, populist argument but there was very little interest or explanation as to how the academics' own views may affect this aspect of the wider debate in the Greek society. Thus, to name but one example here on the specific example of the 2003 Iraq war, and to leave the wider debate open, there was no reference to the theoretical debate in the IR (International Relations) literature on the ‘international system’ in light of the 11th September mega-terrorist attacks, on ‘just war theory’, or on ‘pre-emptive strikes’. To put it simply on the use of force in international relations (see also above). Nor on the need to reform the United Nations, and in particular its Security Council. It is also interesting to note that the so-called ‘pro-EU’ French still refuse to see a single EU seat on the UN’s Security Council. Such a suggestion was unanimously rejected by all 5 French academics attending the 11th Diplomatic Academy organised by Panteion University. The whole question of what anti-Americanism means is becoming more complex now that the so-called ‘new anti-Americans’ have been defined as ‘former anti-anti-Americans, now forced to become anti-American themselves’.

A side effect of Americanism or anti-Americanism has to do with internal Greek politics where the Right is traditionally seen to be more pro-American than the Left. But even within the Right there are different levels of pro-Americanism. I do not enter this debate here but it will undoubtedly become more important in the near future (elections) and also because PM Simitis has been on record (in the Greek Parliament) to thank the US administration for its support just after the 1996 Imia crisis. Something that no one expects from a Right PM to do publicly. Similarly, it has been said that Simitis has asked the Americans (via US ambassador Thomas Miller in Athens) not to be thanked for Greece’s support of the Allied offensive in Iraq. All this amounts to the domestic sources of foreign policy and deserves more attention than was given in this study.

One should add that conspiracy theories thrive in Greece. This is not limited to public opinion. Even serious academics (from an Athens-based university, but un-named here

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60 in that respect see Glennon, 2003.
62 see Le Monde, 23-24 March 2003, ‘En Grece, le conflit a ranime un puissant sentiment antiamericaain’. See also Thanos Veremis, ‘Anti-Americanism’ [in Greek], Kathimerini, Sunday 13 April 2003. See also Aris Tziampiris (forthcoming), The False Premise of Greek anti-Americanism, in particular his references to who was to blame for September 11th (about 25% the CIA and 7% Mossad).
for obvious reasons) informally ‘joked’ with me about the fact that there is no guarantee that Al Qaida were the real attackers on 11th September 2001. They argued there was no evidence and that there were no Jewish victims in these attacks. Besides the fact that there is plenty of evidence and that there were Jewish victims (in fact 54 nationalities were involved if my memory serves me right) and *Le Monde* has carried out an investigation in the initial allegations that came out of a Lebanese newspaper. The allegations were totally discredited but it appears not in Greece. A situation that is not dissimilar to the Arab media where conspiracy theories thrive (e.g. Saddam as a CIA agent currently in Florida). An additional fundamental problem with conspiracy theories is that if they are rarely proved, and the same conspiracy lovers then argue that it simply confirms such a big conspiracy cannot be proven!

Another important underlying issue here is that of ideology and more particularly ideological bias: everything is the result of world capitalism and therefore some resistance must take place. Thus, on the campuses of two Athens universities with a ‘strong’ IR tradition (University of Athens and Panteion University), there were huge placards in support of Socialist Cuba with a picture of Che Guevara. It is interesting to note that EU policy on Cuba is one of the few areas where there is agreement among the 15 and it is not in support of Che’s or Fidel’s ideals. One can of course dismiss this approach as non-representative but I use it here to give a picture of the wider context (atmospheres are important in politics). Similarly on the 2003 anniversary of the first man landing on the moon on 20 July 1969, Greek TV commemorated the event with pictures from that historic event but hastened to stress that there are some who believe it was a Hollywood-engineered coup to upstage the Soviet Union who were the first to send a man into space in 1962. Needless to say we all know that the USSR did not engage into any propagandistic exercise and that of course only the Americans can stage such ‘world lies’.

On the **Greek Presidency** (I only refer to foreign policy issues), one would like to claim that everything went fine and that contrary to past experiences, and in particular the Presidencies of 1983 and 1988, but also the one in 1994 (mainly over the FYROM embargo), the 2003 Greek Presidency went well. There were plenty of congratulatory comments in the media from a number of political leaders. Thus, Simitis claimed it was a

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63 see *Kathimerini* [in Greek], 28 August 2003.
success\textsuperscript{64}. So did several of his ministers, for instance Finance Minister Nikos Christodoulakis\textsuperscript{65}. Foreign Minister Papandreou even threw a celebratory party in his family house of Kastri on 16.7.03. In his words, it had been ‘a difficult but beautiful Presidency’\textsuperscript{66}. He also appeared in an interview in one of the leading Sunday newspapers the following Sunday where he claimed there was no attempt on his part to succeed to the current PM\textsuperscript{67}. Many commentators agreed\textsuperscript{68}. In fact, during the June European Council meeting, to use words from \textit{Le Monde}, most of the Greek press played a ‘patriotic fibre’\textsuperscript{69}. In Greece, even those critical of the government for party political reasons accepted that the Presidency had been successful, but some before attacking the government on its internal performance\textsuperscript{70}. So did 80\% of Greek public opinion\textsuperscript{71}. Even EU officials –admittedly Greeks- in Greece went as far as to claim that the Presidency had ‘successfully bridged the gap between Euro-American relations’\textsuperscript{72}. Perhaps the climate created by so many academics did not help for a more accurate and realistic assessment.

Foreign observers or practitioners agreed as well: European Popular Party leader Hans-Gert Poettering for instance: ‘your success is our success too’\textsuperscript{73}. Foreign leaders also were at hand in that respect. During Simitis’ end of Presidency tour of EU capitals (prior to the Salonica/Halkidiki European Council meeting of 20-21 June 2003), when he was in Paris, French President Jacques Chirac declared that:

‘I took the opportunity to express to the Greek prime minister the appreciation we feel for the masterly way in which the Greek presidency handled EU issues through its presidency. I am sure this is a superb presidency’\textsuperscript{74}.

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder praised Athens for its ‘first-class’ handling of the Presidency when Simitis visited Berlin\textsuperscript{75}. There were plenty more ‘flowers’ from foreign officials, especially when one saw how well the Italian Presidency began with the

\textsuperscript{64} Kathimerini/English edition, 1 July 2003.
\textsuperscript{65} www.in.gr/news, 5 March 2003.
\textsuperscript{66} Greek TV news reports on that day.
\textsuperscript{67} \textit{To Vima} Tys Kyriakis, 20 July 2003.
\textsuperscript{68} see Giannis Kartalis on ‘the new role of Greece’, in \textit{To Vima}, 20 April 2003 [in Greek].
\textsuperscript{69} 25 June 2003.
\textsuperscript{70} see Stavros Lygeros, ‘One step back, two forward’, \textit{Kathimerini}/English edition, 23 May 2003.
\textsuperscript{71} www.in.gr/news, based on a ‘Metron Analysis’ survey, 5 May 2003.
\textsuperscript{72} George Markopoulouiotis (Head of European Commission in Athens) interview, \textit{Kathimerini tys Kyriakis} [in Greek], 21.09.03.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Kathimerini}/English edition, 2 July 2003.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Kathimerini}/English edition, 7-8 June 2003.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Kathimerini}/English edition, 14-15 June 2003.
Berlusconi outburst against the Germans in the EP plenary in early July. The Greek press also dedicated space to the positive reports made in the international media. There were only isolated critical views, mainly for sympathisers of the Greek Opposition parties. No academic criticism was expressed as far as I know. For an isolated journalistic approach that went against the grain, see Nikos Konstandaras, ‘Hopelessly devoted to EU’. Konstandaras also wonders if:

‘there is such unanimity in the way that the war is seen that it is impossible to know whether this is the result of the one-dimensional view of the news media or whether the media do not dare to challenge the monolith of public opinion and therefore pander to it’.

I would like to point out the title of this other article of his: ‘Owners of the truth’.

The same view was widely shared by the interviewees (see above), although some did refer to the intrinsic limitations of the Presidency and of a small(er) state in particular. I do not want to be the one ‘spoiling the party’ as it were, but I am rather amazed at the lack of serious academic analysis on the subject besides the self-congratulatory opinions. This is particularly so when some observers outside Greece did not hesitate to make snoopy comments at the Greek presidency. See for instance ‘the Greek Presidency was sidelined’ in the Institute for Security Studies’ Institute Note of 17 March 2003 from a meeting on ‘CFSP confronting Iraq’ held in Paris on 3 March 2003. Professor Esther Barbe expressed a similar viewpoint in her introductory comments to the ‘Special Iraq’ dossier mentioned above. Similarly, very little attention was given to the fact that the Greek Prime Minister was informed about the ‘Letter of the Eight’ not by Tony Blair or Silvio Berlusconi with whom he had phone conversations on the eve of its publication, but by Hungarian Premier Peter Medgyessy who happened to be in Athens on an official visit. This is just one example to add it to a number of more dismissive approaches to the ‘success’ of the Greek Presidency. It must also be contrasted to the flattering comments in the media, politicians and other commentators in Greece, because it shows that a credibility gap is difficult to close for a country with a relatively bad reputation as a European partner, if only one side (Greece) believes it has moved away

76 see [in Greek] To Vima tys Kyriakis, 3 August 2003.  
79 www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/rep03.1e.pdf as printed on 2.5.03.  
from such a past (now described as a full EU member by its PM) whilst the other partners have decided not to do so, intentionally or not. I do not develop this dimension at all in the current work but it deserves further attention all the same.

Indeed, listening to/reading reports in the media and elsewhere (I refer to those made by Greek academics), one could forget that, to use someone else’s words, mainly over Iraq, the unity of Europe was torn to pieces. Where does this leave the Greek Presidency? It is often forgotten that PM Simitis had claimed that one of the key objectives of the Presidency would be to keep the EU united and to avoid a war in Iraq. Only a fool (et je pese mes mots) could argue that either objective was achieved. Thus, for domestic reasons, a government is sometimes ‘obliged’ to push for a foreign policy card in order to divert attention from other domestic problems. Such a situation was clearly visible in May 2003 in Greece where opinion poll after opinion poll put the Opposition Party (New Democracy) in the lead over the ruling Socialist government (PASOK). In response, Simitis called on everyone to concentrate on the Presidency for the time being. Political scandals did not help the situation, nor did mass redundancies. What is important is that such a tense (pre-electoral) situation (elections are due by April 2004) means that bipartisan divergences appear on almost all assessments of international events. The fact that early 2003 was particularly difficult due to the war in Iraq and its consequences mean that the issue of the Presidency had become more and more an alibi for the government’s action, that is to say, until the end of the Presidency on 31 July 2003. Therefore even when one reads carefully the official Greek foreign ministry assessment on the Presidency’s achievements, it is not easy to find somewhat unrealistic the claims made in it, or the comments attached to them.

To be complete one should also add that more often than not a coincidence of deadlines and dates makes some Presidencies appear more ‘successful’ than others but independent-minded experts should not be fooled by this aspect of the question (the coincidence of the Greek Presidency with the enlargement signing ceremony in April in Athens and the formal end to the Convention work in Salonica in June). I reckon that the self-congratulatory nature of the various declarations made by the current

82 See for instance pages 2 and 6 (Iraq). Results of the 2003 Greek Presidency by Policy Area: A scoreboard (Greek Foreign Ministry, July 2003, on Presidency website). On a lighter note, I have included a number of political cartoons at the end of this work (see Annex 4), one of them refers to this particular period.
government is rather unconvincing when the EU experienced one of its most divisive crises ever. It is also common knowledge that all presidencies claim that they live in ‘one of the most challenging six-months periods in the history of the EU’.

Also, as if often the case, it is no coincidence that there is a plethora of articles praising the Presidency, mainly from government supporters, declared or not. For instance, PASOK MEP (and academic professor of constitutional law) Dimitris Tsatsos described Greece’s role in the Presidency as ‘historic’. What is surprising is not only the date (less than two months in the Presidency) of the article but the fact that a few days later the EU was going to go through one of its deepest crisis over Iraq, unlike Professor Tsatsos’ claim to the contrary (Ta Nea, 19 February 2003 [in Greek]).

It is also no coincidence that the PM did not handle very well the press conference in Brussels after the extraordinary European Council (for details see the Aggelopoulos article [in Greek] in Kathimerini, Sunday edition, 23 March 2003). Nor is it a coincidence that his end of Presidency speech in Strasbourg refers to Iraq as ‘the most difficult chapter of our Presidency’. His other comments on the same question are vague and general and simply do not reflect the reality of the deep divisions that this episode generated for the EU.

A final point on the Greek Presidency and its handling of the Iraq situation must be made, however briefly. The question of the discrepancy between governments’ views and those of public opinions in the case of Iraq in 2003 has led to some discussion on the subject. But it has been rather journalistic in style. Even academic experts, appearing on the numerous programmes that could be seen on Greek TV stations during the war, did not offer any serious explanations as to the reasons of such a phenomenon. Greek analysts conveniently hid behind the fact that Greek public opinion was in tune with that of the rhetoric put forward by the Government: 91% were against the war. The equivalent number was 95% against the 1999 NATO bombing of Kosovo. Thus, some easy self-congratulatory comments referred to the ‘consistency’ of Greek public opinion and on how in their view other EU national public opinions had ‘converged’ with that in Greece. No one seriously wondered why Greece was the exception in 1999, or what the

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84 www.eu2003.gr, 1.7.03 as printed on 2.7.03.
implications of the current (2003) situation means for the future of Europe. Is it a
democratic disjunction that will have long-term implications? Again, even if they fall
beyond the scope of the current study, these are questions that need further and more
systematic analysis.

There was a barrage of TV programmes on a number of channels, most of them of
dubious quality. Exceptions included two channels: NET and MEGA (in the latter,
Alexis Papahelas was particularly good in his work). Others, like ALTER, deserve a
special price for misinformation (or is it disinformation?). According to most of these
reports, the US forces were bogged down, and Iraqis were resisting ‘heroically’. The
overall quality of the Greek media is rather saddening (this is based on my own –
admittedly anecdotal, but still lengthy - experience of French, British, Spanish and Italian,
as well as Greek, TV programmes over the past few decades). I must add that other
countries do not fall far behind either\textsuperscript{85}. This approach puts the Greek case in a
less critical viewpoint but it confirms that most debates were of a poor quality. This is a
question that deserves attention at the time when mass communications (mass education,
etc.) allow for easier and better access to information as never before.

As for the particular aspect of the question of Europeanisation, or rather its absence in
the media, or in the general level of knowledge among society at large, despite being
mentioned as problematic by several interviewees (Botsiou, Keridis, Perrakis), there
seemed to be no real linkage with the role of academics in that respect. Be it through
their purely academic work or through their vulgarisation in the media (as noted above a
very common exercise for all Greek academics \textit{based in Greece} nowadays). My own
experience on a daily basis is that Greek society is extremely politicised and discusses at
length international issues but with very little depth and plenty of unsophisticated biases.

Thus, when a seasoned observer complained about the lack of accuracy about the French
case as presented on the US media (and in particular TV), I can but only point to those
who want to access information to do a better job rather than blame governments for
not allowing access to that information. In this particular case Professor Stanley
Hoffmann was complaining that the US administration did not allow for a fair

\textsuperscript{85} For a general critique of the poor quality of most debates about Iraq, see Annie Cohen-Solal, ‘France
- Etats-Unis: un clivage depassable’, \textit{Le Monde}, 9.5.03.
representation of the French case\textsuperscript{86}. All that was needed was for the American public to access the internet and get the required ‘raw material’ (which incidentally is also available in English) from the French government website or listen to President Chirac’s live interview on TV5 on the eve of the US-led attack on Iraq. One should also wonder if any Greek university would have invited an American academic who was not highly critical of the war. Thus, prominent place was given to Kiesling, Hoffmann, Chomsky, and even Johnny Depp\textsuperscript{87} (also anti-Blair Labour MPs). One wonders how much objectivity there was in such a selective approach.

What Hoffmann was right to remind us about is that governments often blame the lack of public interest for justifying their exclusive prerogatives in foreign policy, when in fact they nurture such a situation. See British MP Ponsonby for a (nearly) century-old accurate criticism of this situation: ‘the people’s opinion on foreign questions is discounted because of their ignorance – an ignorance for which the Government itself is largely responsible’\textsuperscript{88}. One should add that there were no radio, TV or internet at the time (yes: almost a century ago) Ponsonby was writing, so today the blame should be shared more equally between those who govern and those who are governed.

The question remains: is this an effect of Europeanisation, or can we safely blame the Americans (a traditional and annoying \textit{passe-temps} in Greece)? To be fair on Greek public opinion, one should also add that about a third of the French polled during the war in Iraq said that they were wishing for an Iraqi victory (various press reports during that period). As for the Germans (aged under 30), almost one in three of them believed in 2003 that the 9/11 attack may have been sponsored by the USA\textsuperscript{89}.

Finally, a few more points about public opinion and how it perceives Europeanisation (this refers to the wider political and policy context and not only to FP): If Europeanisation means democratization and modernization (both economic and political), and if it is at the same time claimed that Europeanisation has indeed occurred

\textsuperscript{86} 7 May 2003 Athens at a lecture organised by the Kokkalis Foundation and the Hellenic-American Union.
\textsuperscript{87} on the American actor see [in Greek] ‘VimaMagazino’ in \textit{To Vima Tys Kyriakis}, 17 August 2003 and on the US diplomat based in Athens who resigned over Bush’s policy, see a full interview in \textit{To Vima Tys Kyriakis}, 17 August 2003. Symbolically, Prof Hoffmann thanked publicly Mr Kiesling for his stance during his lecture in Athens. Kiesling was in the audience.
\textsuperscript{88} Ponsonby, 1915, pp 28-29.
\textsuperscript{89} according to a poll in \textit{Die Zeit} as reported in \textit{International Herald Tribune}, 24 July 2003.
in Greece, then how come that there is so little trust in a Europeanised Greece? As I mentioned above, these are questions I will not develop here but they deserve further attention in the future. What remains clear is that ‘Europe’ continues to be seen as a panacea for all problems in Greece. Other similar questions would be how to reconcile the fact that it is now argued that in part thanks to Europeanisation, personalities are no longer as important in Greek FP as in the past, and then give credit to PM Simitis himself for such a change. Is this simply a perception because it has been repeated often enough or is it a correct reflection of a new reality? Most recently by Greek Commissioner Anna Diamantopoulou who described the Greek PM as a ‘northern European’ because he sets out clear objectives and then carries out the necessary policies to achieve them. Similarly, The Economist described George Papandreou when he first became foreign minister as ‘flouting Greek tradition’ because ‘he is less prickly with foreigners than are most Greek Socialists’, mentioning his life abroad and in particular his teenager years in Canada and in Sweden (1 May 1999).

Thus, it is said that:

‘[t]he high level of Greek public trust in EU institutions reflects to a significant degree the low trust in the national civil service (…), and the low degree of overall satisfaction with the functioning of national democracy’.

Similarly, a recent poll suggests that:

‘most Greeks are sceptical of the government (53%) while eight out of 10 do not trust political parties and half do not trust the news media (…) Greeks are more distrustful of their democratic system (80 percent) than of multinational corporation’.

These phenomena deserve further and more systematic investigation. Without entering in any detail here, I mention some contradictions in a number of opinion polls. Some of them concern the question of the methodology used, especially with respect to the type of questions asked. Eurobarometer is especially ‘guilty’ in that respect because it tends to ask either questions that no one could really be opposed to, because they are too vague or general, e.g., ‘are you in favour of more Europe?’ These remind us of questions such

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90 Ioakimidis 2000.
91 Interview [in Greek] with Stavros Theodorakis (a leading Greek journalist), To Vima (Sunday edition supplement Vimagazino, pp 16-21), 27.4.03.
92 I will not comment on the ‘socialist’ reference as I leave this to the reader to guess where The Economist stands ideologically speaking.
95 For a more positive assessment of the Eurobarometer surveys, see Schmitt (2003). My point here is that sometimes there is an element of ‘benign propaganda’ as these surveys are often used to argue for
as are you in favour of peace, love and equality. As I have mentioned elsewhere\textsuperscript{96}, as soon as a third option (to a EU or a national options) is made available (the third allows for a combination of an EU and a national response), then overwhelming support for an EU defence or foreign policy falls back to about a third of responses. The other two possibilities (the national response and the EU alone response) obtain again about a third each. Thus, when a more sophisticated approach is used, the results look much more close to an accurate reflection of reality: i.e. the world is more complex and also these three options are actually happening in the EU according to issue-areas and countries involved. Therefore, work that uses results based on poorly devised or even guided questioning can only be seen as problematic\textsuperscript{97}.

Similarly, it is ironic that so many interviewees claimed that personalities matter much less nowadays as further evidence of Europeanisation, and then stressed the vital role played in that process by specific individuals (almost all interviewees, see also Keridis 2003, pp. 8 and 10). I do not dispute the role of elites but simply note that if the elite level is the only one that has become Europeanised, how is it possible to claim the process has been completed and cannot possibly be reversed? Equally, if Greek foreign policy has indeed become Europeanised how come traditional \textit{ethnika themata} continue to dominate Greek FP? As it was illustrated by the recent (end of August 2003) meeting between PM Simitis and FM Papandreou: Greek-Turkish relations (including Turkey’s EU membership prospects), the European Convention, and the Cyprus Issue topped their agenda (\textit{Kathimerini} [in Greek], 28 August 2003). Perhaps a change of style but not of substance. Again, my point here that there is some Europeanisation but that the process has not finalised yet.

3. \textbf{Conclusions and recommendations for future research}

To a large extent this work is a \textbf{pilot-study} because, despite the existence of an extensive literature on Europeanisation in Greece in general and in Greek foreign policy in particular, there is still a lot of work to be done not only with respect to particular empirical cases but also in terms of comparative foreign policy work. What follows

\textsuperscript{96} Stavridis 1997a: 139-140 and Stavridis 2001b: 299.

\textsuperscript{97} for instance Pagoulatos 2002: 23-24; other recent examples include Seabra 1998; Mestres 2002.
covers both the findings of the study (Conclusions) and a proposed test for the future assessment of whether specific issue-areas of national foreign policy have become Europeanised (the ‘pendulum test’).

**Conclusions**

The first conclusion is that Greek foreign policy has come a long way from the time it was described as disruptive, non-European (even anti-European), or the ‘black sheep’ of Europe.  

This viewpoint was based on Greece’s alleged record in EPC. I will not enter here the wider debate about whether such an assessment was totally correct, but suffice it to say that Greece’s international image and reputation were rather tarnished. Such a negative assessment still occurred until the early 1990s. For instance, in the summer of 1992, *The Spectator*’s front page showed a Parthenon with barbed wires and guards towers a-la-concentration camps and an article entitled ‘I fear the Greeks’, sub-titled ‘how Greece’s profound neurosis about its own identity is the biggest single impediment to any sensible EEC policy in the region’. In contrast, the November 2002 issue of *Greece-Background/News/Information* (published by the Greek embassy in London) stressed that *The Economist* had recently produced a survey on Greece in which it said that ‘all of a sudden the naughtiest pupil in the class is getting top marks’.

In brief, ‘EOK-NATO idio syndikato [EEC-NATO –same club]”, is a well forgotten slogan nowadays. For instance, it would not be possible nowadays to adopt Greece’s PM (at that time) claim that:

> ‘we remain unshaken in our position with regard to proposing a special agreement with the European communities which will allow the application of our development programme (...) and will safeguard our national independence. The government (...) will honour the decision of the Greek people, whatever it may be, when it is expressed. In any event, until the Greek people decide, we shall give battle within the organs of the European Communities to defend the interests of the Greek people’.

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98 Significantly, when Spain joined in 1986, the fear was that it would become a ‘second Greece’, Barbe, 1996.
100 For details, see Ioakimidis (1995) where he refers to the way *The Economist* used to brand Greece in the 1980s as the sick man or the black sheep of Europe. A former foreign minister and current MP now uses the term ‘black sheep’ for Britain, ‘VimaMagazino’, *To Vima*, [in Greek] Sunday 30 March 2003.
101 15 August 1992. For more along the same lines, see Featherstone, 1996, p.4.
102 p.2.
103 For more details see Huliaras (1989).
According to Botsiou (interview), there are numerous past quotes in the same vein by various political leaders, including some made by Simitis himself during the late 1970s.

What remains problematic however is whether a positive assessment of Europeanisation in Greek FP is not too optimistic and resides on shaky grounds, as the process appears at best to be superficial. The real test of Europeanisation must also include the whole of Greek public policy and society and not just academic elites and its foreign policy.

The second conclusion is that further research is needed because so far emphasis has been given to the ‘domestic impact of Europeanisation’ but not to the dynamic effect of this process. Therefore there are at least two further areas for future research. The first refers to a more systematic and comprehensive analysis of Greek foreign policy, because at the end of the day the citizens and not experts would be the best judge on whether Europeanisation has successfully occurred or not. It could build on the current work and also refer to the vast literature on the subject in Greek (for obvious time limitations, I have preferred to concentrate on the existing writings in English and supplement them with interviews). For instance, the impact of Europeanisation of Greek FP on political parties, public opinion or the Vouli (Greek Parliament) would be of particular interest. There is already a conference proposed for early next year that will develop this aspect of the question.\[105\] This approach would develop the empirical dimension of research on Europeanisation. An additional effort to then compare various Europeanised national foreign policies would also be needed. As for the second area of future research, it concerns the theoretical question of what Europeanisation actually means. From the literature, but equally from the interviews, there was a lot of confusion and slippage (for instance to concepts such as democratisation, modernisation, ‘regionalisation’, ‘EUisation’\[106\] or even globalisation). More academic research on the concept of ‘Europeanisation’ itself is therefore needed.

This is therefore an important conclusion of this study: Europeanisation appears to be a two-way process. The Europeanisation of a national foreign policy is only half of the story. ‘Internalizing’ (to use Ioakimidis’ expression) is a necessary process but not a

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105 To be organised by EKEM Athens, LSE HO London, and Intercollege Nicosia.
106 See for instance in the field of education, Field (2002).
sufficient one. ‘Externalizing’, or perhaps even better ‘EUizing’, national interests to the EU level appears to be as important. Although it is admittedly much more problematic to achieve, especially when there is an opposing view already taken (for whatever reason) by other EU governments or institutions (especially the Commission over the Greek embargo on FYROM in 1994\textsuperscript{107}). Of the EU institutions, the EP appears \textit{a priori} as more open to change in particular with regard to human rights questions\textsuperscript{108}.

What remains clear is the need for the EU to have and apply clearly defined principles in its foreign policy. In other words, principles in EU FP are not a luxury but a necessity, to use Professor Hill’s words\textsuperscript{109} in 1991. Such a conclusion also confirms that institutions however useful are not enough\textsuperscript{110}. There is a need for political will and direction. Europeanisation as a process can be useful in defining these EU principles. Otherwise double and multiple standards will prevail and reinforce further the anarchical nature of the international system.

Another, more theoretical, question that I have not addressed is whether Europeanisation (however defined) is more effective before accession. That is to say that because of the length and depth of European integration since the early 1950s, any candidate state needs to make a real change in its political system, institutions, etc well before it joins. Thus, Montenegro (of Serbia and Montenegro) has just announced it is establishing an Ombudsman office by a parliamentary vote\textsuperscript{111}. The role of the Ombudsman (in fact in plural) is now well established in the EU. In Greece, its first Ombudsman (Prof Diamandouros) has now become the second EU Ombudsman, a development well praised in Greece as another sign of its Europeanisation.

One also needs to consider whether EU enlargement will make the process of Europeanisation all the more complex and difficult. As was witnessed during the Iraq war in 2003, some states backed one option and others another. Some observers claim that for the new member states it is just a question of time and their national foreign policies will become Europeanised in due course\textsuperscript{112}.

\textsuperscript{107} see Stavridis 1997a.
\textsuperscript{108} On the EP and the Western Sahara question, see Urruela 1995.
\textsuperscript{109} Hill, 1991.
\textsuperscript{110} Stavridis 1997b.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Kathimerini}/English edition, 9 July 2003.
\textsuperscript{112} what Tsoukalis calls the ‘optimistic’ view of enlargement, \textit{Kathimerini}, 26-27.4.03.
The ‘pendulum test’

The ‘pendulum test’ model is rather simple, and hopefully not too simplistic. It draws a medium line between the two original (initial), usually extreme (but at least widely different), positions on a given FP issue, of on the one hand Greece and on the other the remaining EU states (often supported by the Commission and the EP). It spells out the differences of opinions in the past and then tries to consider these differences as they might appear nowadays. It then assesses if there has been a coming together of the two positions. To do so, it tries to assess if this ‘rapprochement’ is the result of a Europeanisation process defined here as the need to use ‘Europe’ (read the EU) to try and achieve a national foreign policy goal, or, perhaps more interestingly, if the other EU states have come closer to the initial Greek position. It is important to note that I do not think one should enter too much in the merits of each case. The question becomes ‘has the pendulum shifted’? If so, in what direction? For what reasons?

In order to carry out this research, one would interview practitioners and academics from the other 14 EU member states and assess how they react to this kind of research in general and this set of empirical cases in particular\textsuperscript{113}. To complete this dimension, one should also extend it to include officials from EU institutions, including perhaps most importantly, MEPs. Such a ‘mirror’ interviewing process on the same case studies as analysed in this study would indeed be extremely useful. But such an exercise would require undoubtedly more time and effort than a shorter research project like the current one could possibly afford. Finally, to offer a complete comparative dimension one would need to carry out similar exercises in the national foreign policies of other EU member states. This double-sided approach (impact on Greece plus impact on the rest of the EU) would go one step beyond the current literature, which has so far concentrated on the domestic impact of Europeanisation but has ignored its dynamic effect.

Such an approach would also build on the use of ‘controversial’ FP issues (Ballesteros 1998 as reported in Vaquer 2003). The existing literature on the ‘Europeanisation of foreign policies’ nowadays is increasingly using such an approach. This can be seen in a recent academic Workshop in June 2002 at LSE. Paper presentations concentrated on a

\textsuperscript{113} Such an approach could build on the EKEME (2002) poll of non-Greek EU elites’ views on Greece’s first 20 years of membership.
number of difficult foreign policy areas for EU members and applicant states: the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe for Germany, Asia for France, Zimbabwe for Britain, Morocco for Spain and Polish-German relations for Poland (all 2002 papers by Alister Miskimmon, Reuben Wong, Paul Williams, Jordi Vaquer, Marcin Zaborowski respectively). A similar direction can be found in another recent academic conference with papers on the EU and the Western Sahara, and the European dimension of Greek-Turkish rapprochement (during the 2003 Edinburgh ECPR Joint Research Session. Papers by Jordi Vaquer and Gilles Bertrand respectively). Another recent individual case refers to the UK and Somaliland (Huliaras 2002: 171). Another interesting case-study, this time to do with Portugal, would be East Timor, especially if carried out in a diachronic manner just to show how Portugal’s preoccupation with that problem only emerged as a crucial international, and EU, issue at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s. A visualization of the ‘pendulum test’ model would look as follows:

As for the EP becoming closer and closer to the Greek stance on Cyprus, it also confirms a Europeanisation of an EU institution. Thus a long way from the time Greece was seen as the ‘black sheep’ of Europe. But that does not mean in my view whether its foreign policy has become Europeanised or if it is a way (a means) to achieve traditional FP objectives. The difference of approach here can be summed up as the one between ‘tactics’ and ‘strategy’ (most interviewees claim the latter but at least two, not surprisingly IR experts, claim the former: Profs Ifestos and Ifantis). I leave this question open for future research.

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\[114\] http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECPR.
Another question worth investigating in the future is that of the Ethniko Symvoulio (National Council) on Foreign Affairs which has now begun to function its first informal meeting took place on 30 August 2003\textsuperscript{115}, following a constitutional amendment package in 2001. Is this further evidence of Europeanisation of Greek FP? A new trend appears to be emerging in a number of European countries in this direction. The need to obtain as wide a consensus as possible is not only desirable but also necessary from a democratic theory perspective. Perhaps this new interest in wider consultation about FP issues could develop in a Europeanisation of foreign policy making processes\textsuperscript{116}.

Another specific concern for Greece has to do with its educational system. The question of how to make the Greek education work better has been a constant headache for all Greek governments. It is a general problem that affects the whole education system and not just its university sector. It falls beyond the scope of this work but further study is needed in general and also in particular about the link between academia and politics. It remains clear (and interviews confirmed this particular point) that a reform is needed for the university sector in Greece\textsuperscript{117}. It is no coincidence that several interviewees concurred: only 5\% of students are really worth any effort at all, as the other 95\% do not count. Another common complain was about the lack of real academic research in Greece (resources, output, quality). In brief, many noted that a systemic change is required to make Greek universities work properly. Otherwise, as Tsoukalis has noted\textsuperscript{118}, Greece will continue to prefer to live on in its university education ‘mizeria’ or something like misery or miserable state of affairs as a good translation of a bad situation. What matters here is that there can be no Europeanisation of a country without an adequate education system.

In terms of geographical areas, the Middle East appears as one important area of particular interest for Greek foreign policy that has not been given enough attention in

\textsuperscript{115} as reported in Kathimerini/English edition, 31 July 2003.

\textsuperscript{116} for Spain, see the National Security Council (El Pais, 14.02.03) for an institutional mechanism, and current Opposition leader promises to meet with opposition leaders on foreign issues if he becomes PM (Zapatero se reunira cada 6 meses con el jefe de la oposicion si llega a la Moncloa’, El Pais, 25.01.03.

\textsuperscript{117} For a stinging, but accurate, attack on the current university system see Professor Tsoukalas excellent piece in Kathimerini [in Greek], 8 September 2002. His main criticism being the lack of efficiency of the current system which ‘produce’ eventually (as Greece suffers from the ‘permanent student’ syndrome) poor graduates that only a clientelistic state (as the rest of the society) can really accommodate. See also ‘Education reform needed’, Kathimerini/English edition, 15.09.03. For more criticisms, see N. Vagena in To Vima, 18.04.99.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
my own view. I refer to the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy towards the Middle East, and the Palestinian issue in particular. Historic reasons do play a role but also the fact remains that the Greek position has traditionally been more pro-Arab and more pro-Palestinian than the rest of EC/EU governments. Indeed, in the early 1980s the Socialist government of Andreas Papandreou recognised the PLO and granted it diplomatic status in Athens\textsuperscript{119} (with Israel there was no official, i.e. de jure, relations until 1990, under a New Democracy government, and a full nine years after joining the then EC. Greece was the last EU state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, unlike Spain that established them when it first joined the then EC in 1986). Thus, Greece took a pioneering stance on the Palestinian issue. Even if the EC/EU ‘bottom-line’ had been agreed in Venice in 1980 (prior to Greek accession). In practice, many a EU government backed the US position (Camp David 1979) or tried its own national unilateral initiatives (France throughout the 1980s and 1990s). This aspect of the question is also related to wider issues of the Middle East and beyond, most notably the Iraq issue (again mainly France just days before the launch of the air offensive in January 1991 and again in early 2003 this time in the UN Security Council).

In terms of institutional and other changes within Greece as a result of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. Particular attention should be given to Greek public opinion. There is still a huge discrepancy between Greek public opinion and those in other EU states, mainly to do with Greece’s deep anti-Americanism. An interesting aspect of the question would be the increase in anti-US feelings (what appears like a worldwide phenomenon in recent months). Pro-Europeanism and anti-Americanism should not be misunderstood for one and the same thing. More research is needed and in particular about the role of university and other education institutions in the country. I do not expand on this question here but only list a number of recent polls findings that

\textsuperscript{119} ‘We recognize the PLO. There has been a change of status. As you know, there is an office, a bureau of the PLO in Athens already. What we intend to do is to raise its status to a diplomatic mission. And I think that maybe I should state our reasoning on this. That terrible problem of the Middle East has not been faced properly up to now. Our position is that, just as Israel has the right to its own state so does the people of Palestine. They do have a right to a state of their own. And until that is understood and until that takes place, there will be no peace in the Middle East’ (A. Papandreou interview with ABC TV on 25 October 1981, as reproduced in \textit{Hellenic Review of International Relations} (Volumes 3-4,1983-1984), pp 668-673, quote on page 672. It is also interesting to note that this is more or less the current US position as expressed by President Bush in June 2002 and confirmed in the 2003 ‘Road Map’. One possible conclusion might be that once there is also agreement between the Americans and the Europeans (once the latter have achieved consensus among themselves), a given policy becomes possible and effective. The question then arises: is Europeanisation enough or does one need the US on board as well? I leave this question open for further study.
confirm Greece’s intrinsic anti-Americanism. I repeat how disturbing it is for a democracy to see such a discrepancy between the public view and that of the elites.

Metron Analysis survey (as reported in Kathimerini/English edition, 5-6 April 2003)
94.1% of Greeks against the war in Iraq (2003)
77.5% negative view of USA (5.4% favourable)
67.9% in favour of EU with 55.6% wanting political unification.120

MGW ALCO survey on war (Kathimerini/English edition, 16 April 2003)
89% unjust and illegal intervention
3.8% just/legal
7.2% do not know.

What remains problematic for the future of Greek foreign policy is the fact that, as noted in the introduction, PM Simitis consistently played the EU card especially over Iraq, whereas Foreign Minister George Papandreou acted as a bridge with the USA, and (then) Socialist Party (PASOK) Secretary General Costas Laliotis led many an anti-war rally in the centre of Athens. Can this double or even triple language be considered to represent the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy? What, in my view more importantly, are the implications of such a situation for the democratic accountability of Greek foreign policy?

This concludes what I hope was a useful and interesting study. I very much hope there will be more to come on this important subject for Greek foreign policy, international relations, and EU studies. Finally I would like to formally thank the Onassis Foundation, EKEM, and all the interviewees, and in particular Professor Ioakimidis, for their support and insight. Without their help this work would not have been possible. Of course, the usual proviso about responsibility applies here too. It is hoped that the current study has added to our knowledge and understanding of what Europeanisation in Greek foreign policy actually means, and that it has also identified a number of useful avenues for future research.

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF INTERVIEWS (chronological order):

120 see also Kathimerini/English edition, 10 April 2003.
• 28 May 2003: Dr Dimitris KERIDIS
• 3 June: Dr Konstantina BOTSIOU
• 11 June: Prof Panayotis IFESTOS
• 12 June: Prof Panos TSAKALOYANNIS
• 13 June: Prof Costas IFANTIS
• 17 June: Prof Theodore COULOUMBIS
• 18 June: Prof Andreas MOSCHONAS
• 20 June: Dr Dimitris CHRYSSOCHOOU
• 25 June: Dr Charalambos TSARDANIDIS
• 10 July: Dr Fotini BELLOU
• 11 July: Dr Aris TSIAMPIRIS
• 16 July: Prof Asteris HULIARAS
• 5 September: Prof Stelios PERRAKIS
• Prof Panayotis IOAKIMIDIS (March to September 2003)

Interviewees (alphabetical order):

• **Dr Fotini BELLOU**, Researcher, ELIAMEP.
• **Dr Konstantina BOTSIOU**, Researcher, Constantine Caramanlis Foundation, and Lecturer in European History, University of Athens.
• **Dr Dimitris CHRYSSOCHOOU**, (on leave) Reader in European Integration, University of Exeter, and Director of Studies, IAA Athens (Institute for Defense Analyses).
• **Prof Theodore COULOUMBIS**, Emeritus Professor of International Relations, University of Athens, and General Director, ELIAMEP.
• **Dr Asteris HULIARAS** Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, Harokopion University, Athens.
• **Prof Kostas IFANTIS**, Associate Professor of International Relations, University of Athens.
• **Prof Panayotis IFESTOS**, Professor of International Relations, Panteion University, Athens.
• **Prof Panayotis IOAKIMIDIS**, Professor of European Politics, University of Athens, and Director, EKEM, and alternate member of the European Convention (Greek government representative), and Greek Foreign Ministry and Greek PM advisor.
• **Dr Dimitris KERIDIS**, Director, Kokkalis Foundation, and Lecturer, University of Thessaloniki (Salonica).
• **Prof Andreas MOSCHONAS**, Jean Monnet Chair in European Sociological Studies, and Associate Professor of Sociology, and Director, European Centre, University of Crete.

• **Prof Stelios PERRAKIS**, Associate Professor, Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, and former Foreign Ministry Secretary-General.

• **Prof Panos TSAKALOYANNIS**, Jean Monnet Chair in European Political Studies, Economic University of Athens.

• **Dr Charalambos TSARDANIDIS**, Director, Institute for International Economic Relations, Athens.

• **Dr Aris TZIAMPIRIS**, Lecturer in European Studies, University of Piraeus.
APPENDIX 2

OTHER EVENTS ATTENDED DURING FELLOWSHIP TENURE IN ATHENS WHICH ALL HAVE A DIRECT RELEVANCE TO THIS STUDY:


• Independent Science and Technology Studies (IST) College event on ‘The war in Iraq and its implications for the European Union’ [in Greek]: Prof Theodore Couloumbis, ELIAMEP and University of Athens; Mr. A. Andrianopoulos, former minister; G. Romeos, former minister and former MEP (Athens, 17 March 2003)

• OKE (Greek ECOSOC) and Greek Presidency event on ‘The Future of Europe’ [in Greek and in French]: Jean-Luc Dehaene, Vice-President of the European Convention and Greek Parliament representative Marietta Giannakou (New Democracy MP) and Greek government (PASOK) alternate representative Prof Panayotis Ioakimidis (Athens, 8 April 2003)


• Lecture on ‘US foreign policy after Iraq’ [in English] by Professor Stanley Hoffmann organised by the Kokkalis Foundation and the Hellenic-American Union (Athens, 7 May 2003)

• Lecture on ‘The Problem of Spain’ [in Spanish] by Professor Jose Luis Abellan organised by the Cervantes Institute in Athens (Athens, 8 May 2003)

• Book presentation on ‘Theories of European integration’ [in Greek] by Dr Dimitris Chryssochoou, organised by the European Parliament Office in Greece (Athens, 15 May 2003)


I also gave the following lectures, talks and seminars:

• Taught (in Greek) four times two-hour long lecture/seminars on Euro-Mediterranean issues, and on ‘the democratic control of the CFSP and the ESDP’, MA in European and International Studies of the University of Athens (17, 26 March and 9 April and 5 May 2003).
• presented a paper (in Greek) on ‘EU foreign policy and Iraq: the democratic deficit dimension’ at IDOS/Institute of International Economic Relations (31 April 2003).

• presented a paper (in Greek) on ‘the democratic control of EU foreign and defence policy’ at IAA Institute of Defence Analyses (on 4 June 2003).

• chaired a guest lecture (in English) by Dr Roderick Pace (University of Malta) on ‘Malta and the EU’ organised by EKEM (10 June 2003).

• presented a conference paper (in English) on ‘parliamentary diplomacy in Euro-Mediterranean relations’ at a conference organised by the Greek Ministry of Information and Media in Athens (conference for journalists 30 June 2003).

• chaired a session (in French) on ‘The EU, the USA and global governance’, 11th Summer Academy organised by Panteion University and the Hellenic University Association for European Studies, Spetses (1-5 July 2003).


All these activities have further informed this study.
APPENDIX 3

RESEARCH INTERVIEW TOPICS

1. EUROPEANISATION: CONCEPT AND THEORY
2. EUROPEANISATION AND GREECE
3. EUROPEANISATION AND GREEK FOREIGN POLICY
4. CYPRUS – TURKEY
5. ‘MACEDONIA’/FYROM and BALKANS
6. MIDDLE EAST, ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
7. 2003 WAR ON IRAQ
8. FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION DEBATE, including: CFSP/ESDP, GREEK PRESIDENCY
APPENDIX 4

CARTOONS

source: Kathimerini/English edition, 26.5.03

On the ‘milking’ of the EU Presidency for domestic purposes (above and below) The first at a time when there were important job losses in Greece and the second during a dustmen’s strike in Athens.
source: Kathimerini/English edition, 5.5.03
on 'successful' (sic) Europeanisation in foreign policy and not internally
source: Kathimerini/English edition, 7.4.03

on the discrepancy between domestic discourse and discourse abroad during the 2003 Iraq war
source: Kathimerini/English edition, five years anniversary of the English edition that is enclosed in the International Herald Tribune in Greece, 8-9 March 2003

On how Europeanised Greece has really become!
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