From Pragmatism to Idealism to Failure:  
Britain in the Cyprus crisis of 1974

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ABSTRACT
Both before and after 1974, the question of territory controlled by the Greek or the Turkish side in Cyprus has been one of the most important and enduring aspects of the Cyprus problem. With its starting point at an unpublished telegram (from the National Archives of Australia) detailing secret UK views, this paper examines British -and to a slightly lesser extent, US- policy towards Cyprus in July and August 1974. In particular it focuses on policy towards the amount of territory that could, would or should be controlled by Turkey in Cyprus; on the factors that led to this policy and its eventual implementation by Turkey; on the changes of stance and the interaction between British and US policy (and James Callaghan and Henry Kissinger respectively); on military assessments and options in Cyprus; and on the reasons why ultimately the British policy in Cyprus failed in August 1974.

Keywords: Cyprus-Turkish Invasion-1974, British and US policy - Cyprus Crisis 1974, James Callaghan, Henry Kissinger, military option, territory.

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From Pragmatism to Idealism to Failure: Britain in the Cyprus crisis of 1974

1. Introduction

After a long crisis involving Archbishop Makarios, at the time President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Greek military junta, on 15 July 1974, the latter launched a coup that successfully deposed the former. With the delicate balance on the island of Cyprus upset, Turkey, initially using as a pretext the restoration of the constitutional order of the island (and later, increasingly, the protection of the Turkish-Cypriot minority), in a two stage operation (20-30 July and 14-16 August 1974), invaded and occupied initially around 5% and eventually close to 36% of Cyprus. Contrary to their previous (1964 and 1967) record, in 1974, the US did not deter Turkish aggression. Neither, according to popular views, did the British live up to their role as guarantor power. As a result, a wave of anti-Americanism swept over both Greece and Cyprus. In the examination of the Cyprus crisis, the popular view that emerged subsequently, mainly in Cyprus and Greece (but also among some non-Greek authors) is that in 1974 there existed some kind of international conspiracy; according to the most extreme manifestations, this conspiracy aimed at the previously agreed handover (by the US and / or Britain) of part of Cyprus to Turkey or to the partition of the island between Greece and Turkey, in the form of double

1 See, for example, Argyrou (1992), Drousiotis (2001) and Venizelos (2002). Among English language works see O'Malley and Craig (1999) and Hitchens (2002).
Enosis (union of each of the two parts of the island with its motherland). In this context, usually the main conspirators (either directly named or alluded to) are the US, Henry Kissinger (then US Secretary of State), the CIA, NATO, Britain and the Greek Junta. In this approach the July 1974 coup that overthrew President Makarios in Cyprus on 15 July 1974, is seen as the handiwork of the CIA, which either encouraged Dimitrios Ioannidis, the strongman of the Athens junta to plan and execute it -or, alternatively, gave him its tacit permission to implement his plans.

As regards Britain, public perception of its policy towards the Cyprus 1974 crisis, in both Greece and Cyprus (and to an extent elsewhere), has traditionally followed two paths: it has either considered Britain in the light of a perfidia Albio approach (perfidia because it either ‘sold’ Cyprus to Turkey or because it refused to face up to its responsibilities as Guarantor Power); or it has largely ignored Britain, focussing mainly on the interpretation of the role of the US.

Both before and after 1974, the question of territory has been one of the most important and enduring aspects of the crisis. The percentage of Cypriot territory that the Turkish side would control was and has consistently been\(^2\) of paramount importance: in Cyprus, control of ‘adequate’ territory (no matter what numerical value is attached to it) is equated with the viability of state (or federal) structures. Post-1974, in the negotiations about the Cyprus issue, return of territory has (together with constitutional issues) been central (for the Greek side); for the Turkish side, territory has consistently been a highly significant

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\(^2\) For this view see eg. Arthur Hartman’s view that territory was “the only lever the Turks had. They had to be brought to see that withdrawal was in their long-term interest.” See TNA (The National Archives, UK), FCO 9/1922, Record of a conversation between Mr. Callaghan and Mr. A. Hartman at the FCO on 8 August 1974 at 10.30 a.m., p. 94.
bargaining chip\textsuperscript{3}. In this light, what this paper will look at is Britain’s (and to a slightly lesser extent, US) policy towards Cyprus just prior and during the Turkish invasion of 1974, with particular emphasis on policy views towards the amount of territory that could, would or should be controlled by Turkey in Cyprus, slightly before, during and as an outcome of the invasion of 1974. In this context we will examine in particular the source of the ‘rule of thirds’ regarding the territorial division of Cyprus that has been the final outcome of the crisis. We shall also look at the evolution of policy that stemmed -directly or indirectly- from views as regards territory; lastly we shall try to look for the reasons why ultimately British policy in Cyprus failed.

The author was led to this approach, from a two-page telegram found in the National Archives of Australia (hence referred to as the ‘Australian telegram’, see below), in the course of ongoing research on the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Compared against existing knowledge, this telegram appears to give us a very different view of British policy in July 1974; apart from published sources, this paper uses evidence drawn from primary sources, mainly British archival material in The National Archives (TNA), and US diplomatic papers, mainly those published in the \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States} (Van Hook, 2007; henceforth, FRUS). Some additional material is drawn from the National Archives of Australia.

Lastly, this paper will not deal with the responsibilities of the Greek Junta: there is no doubt that it gave the orders for the coup against President Makarios. Neither is there any doubt that the coup set in motion the chain of

\textsuperscript{3} The issue of territory continues (in 2010) to be one of the main sticking points in the ongoing negotiations for of the solution of the Cyprus problem.
events that followed: even if Turkey intended to invade anyway at some point in 1974, the coup provided an ideal opportunity, too good to miss (Asmussen, 2008:292). Lastly, we will not look at the allegations of a pre-invasion deal on the division of Cyprus between the Colonels’ regime in Greece and the Turkish Government: as with other conspiracy theories, the existing evidence of such a deal is weak.

2. Policy at the starting line: the UK on the territorial division of Cyprus, July 1974

Evidence for what the UK had (secretly) expected to be the outcome of the Turkish invasion, comes first from the British military experts’ views. Even beyond the long-standing Cyprus issue, in November 1973 Turkey had added the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf to the list of bilateral issues, leading to a general worsening of Greek-Turkish relations. In this general context, the British military attachés in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey kept supplying relatively detailed information on the armed forces of the countries they were accredited to. Thus, in the months before the 1974 invasion, the UK government was in possession of detailed and up-to-date information regarding both the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot Forces.

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4 See also Nicolet (2001: 419, 428 and passim).
5 E.g. TNA, FCO 9/1892, tel. DIG: FOJ 602 171635Z, BNA Athens to MODUK, 17 July 1974; FCO 9/1891, tel. FOJ 161150Z, BRITDEFAT Ankara to MODUK, 16 July 1974; on the Turkish military preparations see TNA, FCO 9/1892, tel. no. FOJ 170955 Z Jul Ankara to MODUK, 17 July 1974. See also notes 9 and 10, below.
6 TNA, FCO 9/1973 Military Reports from Cyprus. This file, covering the period 18 Jan to 20 June 1974; it includes a detailed “Cyprus Military Report”, dated 23 April 1974, as well as the final (“Valedictory”) report of Col. Stocker, the Defence Advisor to the High Commission dated 4 April
When the projected Turkish invasion of Cyprus came to the fore, the briefs prepared for the 17 July talks between Ecevit and Wilson (just three days before the start of the invasion) included a factually correct assessment of Greek and Turkish military strengths which stated that geography favoured the Turks and that “Greek mainland forces would be unable to [intervene in Cyprus] effectively”.

Another assessment by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) dated 19 July (i.e. shortly before the hostilities started), estimated that Turkey could deploy 8,000 airborne troops within 12 hours and land one tank and two artillery battalions in Cyprus. The assessment continued stating that,

The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots would almost certainly oppose the Turks but we have no doubt that the latter would succeed in attaining their objectives. We cannot make any firm prediction as to how long it would take the Turks to achieve their military objectives, but we think that most would have been achieved within 24 - 48 hours of landing.

[...] We do not believe that the Greeks could prevent the Turks from attaining their objectives.

There are two questions that arise from the above. First, what, according to the British military, were the Turkish objectives? According to the same source, it

1974; which also includes the order of battle of both the National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot forces, as well as details of events of military significance that took place during this period.

7 TNA, FCO 9/1892, Military coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July), “Background Brief for the Prime Minister for the working dinner for the Prime Minister and the Acting Foreign Minister, Mr. Ecevit and Mr. Isik: 17 July 1974”, Confidential, Brief no. 2. The orders of Battle of Greek and Turkish forces are included in Annexes A and B.

8 See TNA, WO 386/21, JIC(London) to HQ BAOR(G) (Pass JIC Germany), AOCINCNEAF (Pass JIC Cyprus), HQ UKLF, HQ STC, CINCFLEET, IMMEDIATE, SECRET, 191450Z JUL, Annex Q, to BFNE 1500/24. The telegram was also sent to Harold Wilson (at the time in Paris) as JICTEL 495, of 19 JUL 74.
was the occupation of the North-Eastern part of Cyprus (from Famagusta to Morphou, via the Turkish quarter of Nicosia), an area that would include a major port (Famagusta) and an airfield (Tymbou); though it is difficult to have a precise estimate, this would be close to 30% of Cyprus.

The second question is how did the assessments above impact on the formulation of UK policy? It has already been said that officially there is obviously no public mention of Britain accepting that Turkey occupies by force land belonging to the Republic of Cyprus, an independent state, a member of the UN and the British Commonwealth and a state for which Britain was itself a Guarantor Power. However, evidence from the National Archives of Australia seems to imply the opposite, at least for the beginning of the first phase of the Turkish invasion.

3. The ‘Australian telegram’

The text of the Australian telegram\(^9\), seems to offer us a glimpse into a level of policy that is seldom allowed to see the light of day (at least not a ‘mere’ 35-odd years from the event), namely the level where the political and / or diplomatic establishments face up to -or even help shape- the developing realities on the ground, no matter how unpleasant or painful these may be for those immediately concerned. In its first five paragraphs, the Australian telegram contains a number of interesting points. It gives an outline of British aims and objectives on 20 July, as communicated to the Australian diplomats in London by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); it also describes the

\(^9\) The National Archives of Australia, tel. O.LH13267 2130 21.7.74, SECRET, London to. Canberra /10734, Ref. 152/2/3 Part 1, Barcode 583852
anticipated effects of the Turkish military operations for Cyprus and Greece. Particularly its second paragraph seems to shed new light on the early views of the British side on the Cyprus crisis. The full transcribed text of the first page of the telegram^{10} is published below (facsimile images of both pages are to be found in the Appendix):

O.LH13267 2130 21.7.74
To. Canberra /10734
CC. Athens/85  Ankara/65
From. London
SECRET
Cyprus: British Policy
1. You will have seen media reports of Turkish Invasion of Cyprus on 20 July. FCO spokesman has summarized British objectives as being threefold: to protect British lives and property; put pressure on Turkey to stop the fighting and on Greece to do nothing to make matters worse; and to get talks [sic: talks] started in London.

2. Commenting privately to us on the situation on 20 July a senior FCO official said that Britain secretly would not object if Turkish military forces occupied about 1/3 of the island before agreeing to a ceasefire. (Please protect). Such a position would need to be reached by 21 July if peace prospects were not to be endangered further. In the meantime, Britain continued to support publicly appeals for an immediate ceasefire.

3. According to the same source reports from the British Ambassador in Athens express concern that the present military regime in Greece may fall and be replaced by an even less desirable one. There is some feeling on the FCO that were Greece to intervene militarily in a land war with Turkey she would end up with a “bloody nose”.

4. In his London talks last week Makarios asked the British frankly what he should do. He was encouraged to go ahead with his plan to got to New York and await developments there. There seems little prospect of his returning to Cyprus in the near future, if at all. Some observers have suggested the President of the Cypriot National Assembly as a possible alternative Head of State to Sampson who is unacceptable to the Turks.

5. Britain is acting diplomatically, not militarily [sic: militarily], in the current crisis. The only military moves have been related strictly to the improvement of the security of the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). Over the last 24 hours some 1500 British troops have been flown to Cyprus for this purpose.

^{10} The contents of the second page (paragraphs 6 and 7) appear much less important. They refer to the evacuation of foreign nationals by the British Forces in Cyprus (paragraph 6) and an FCO request to the Libyan government for Quantas overflights of Libya. There is also a handwritten note below the text of the first page, signed by Hugh Gilchrist, a career Australian diplomat, who had been the Ambassador to Greece (and Cyprus) during 1970-72. The text of the note refers to Glafkos Clerides and the question of a constitutional successor to Makarios in the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus. The text is transcribed in the Appendix. Its author later went on to write a monumental history of the Greeks in Australia. See Gilchrist (2004).
As is observable in the text, the secret “cablegram” (as Australian parlance describes it) was sent by the Australian High Commission in London to Canberra, in the evening (London time) of 21 July 1974. Neither date nor time\textsuperscript{11} is given concerning the meeting with the FCO mentioned in paragraph 2, but it would be logical to assume that it took place at some point during 21 July\textsuperscript{12}.

It is necessary here to open a parenthesis to examine why the FCO considered it important to make the Australians privy to such a sensitive piece of information. It is true that in 1974 Australia had behind it almost six decades of involvement in the affairs (mainly military) of the Eastern Mediterranean, beginning with the ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps) involvement in the Dardanelles campaign and continuing to Crete in 1941. By 1974, Australia also had a substantial Greek community (part of it composed of Greek-Cypriots, though the bulk of migrants from Cyprus arrived in Australia after 1974).

However, historical and other ties notwithstanding, in 1974 Australia did not even have diplomatic representation \textit{in situ} in Cyprus (the Australian Ambassador in Athens was also accredited to Nicosia). Australian subjects resident on the island only numbered a few score persons\textsuperscript{13}. Indeed, in 1974

\textsuperscript{11} The author has tried to find evidence of briefings the FCO may have conducted on 20 or 21 July 1974, but the reply from the FCO in-house historians was that all relevant material has been transferred to the National Archives in Kew. Though the research is ongoing, no other traces of a private briefing for the Australians have up to now been located.

\textsuperscript{12} A meeting at the FCO on 20 July, though possible is unlikely: this would mean that the Australian High Commission waited for a period of up to -or even more than- 24 hours before transmitting sensitive and urgent information to Canberra.

\textsuperscript{13} According to the UK Ministry of Defence News Release no 38/74 of 26 July 1974, of the 7,526 persons evacuated to the UK from Cyprus, 2,355 were not British subjects; 151 of these were Australians. See TNA, AIR 8/2656, Ministry of Defence News Release, 38/74, 26 July 1974.
Australia’s most substantial presence in Cyprus was its contribution to UNFICYP, in the form of a civilian police (CIVPOL) element\(^{14}\).

While there is no explicit answer, the most plausible explanation seems to lie in the fact that in 1974, Australia was also a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The other members were Austria, the Byelorussian Soviet Republic, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mauritania and Cameroon. Thus, if we discount the neutral Austria, Australia was the only western country and probably the only one among the members of this group on which Britain could depend\(^{15}\). This, together with the traditional links between the two countries (and possibly the Australian Police Contingent serving with UNFICYP), probably explains why the FCO chose to privately brief Australia, passing on information on the secret views of the British Government.

Turning to the content of the Australian telegram, the first paragraph sets out the openly declared British objectives; they are the same as those contained (in expanded form) in FCO tel. no. 151, of 20 July, sent to no less than eight British diplomatic missions (including Ankara and Moscow) and copied for information to a further eight\(^{16}\). All three objectives are highly commendable; the citizens of any country have a right to expect it will do anything in its power to protect them. Since at least the 1960s, fighting is officially seen as an undesirable development, justified in self-defence and -less frequently- as a last

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\(^{14}\) On 19 July 1974 there were 35 Australian Police officers in Cyprus. See Australian National Archives, tel. O.CE 153 19.7.74 UNC, Commander AUSTCIVPOL, Cyprus to Foreign Office [sic], Canberra, File 152/2/3 Part 1. See also Henn (2004: 17).

\(^{15}\) See e.g. TNA, FCO 9/1897, United Nations Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record of the Seventeen Hundred and Eighty-Second Meeting, Monday, 22 July 1974.

\(^{16}\) TNA, FCO 9/1875 “Military coup against President Makarios in Cyprus 15 July 1974”, FCO tel no. 151, 20 July 1974; the telegram was sent at 0700 hrs.
resort when all else has failed, or as a means to redress the effects of aggression. Any peace-loving country (and virtually all countries want to be considered such) wishes to avoid military conflict; when conflict erupts, the international community generally wishes it to remain limited in time and space; indeed the reference to Greece in this paragraph may be interpreted in this light; and it is expected that even after the conflict has come to being, the differences that caused it will be solved by talks between those involved. Thus there seems to be nothing out of the ordinary in the first paragraph.

4. An unequivocal (but secret) UK position?

Paragraph 2 of the Australian telegram is probably the most important in the text; it is indeed clear from the special ‘please protect’ phrase, that the significance of the information contained here was not lost on the Australians (the alternative is that it could have been requested of them, which would again stress the importance of its content). There are three surprising statements in this paragraph:

A. The readiness of Britain to accept in Cyprus a fait accompli, a result of the Turkish military action already underway.

B. The specific time-scale set for the completion of military action: the occupation of one third of the island would have to be completed within 48 hours of the beginning of the invasion.

C. The fact there is a specifically defined area -one third of the island- that Britain would ‘suffer’ Turkey to occupy; it should also be noted that this territorial extent matches the area of Cyprus described as the Turkish military objectives in the British military experts’ report (see above) as well as the area occupied by Turkey three-odd weeks after the date of the telegram, following the second wave of hostilities, in 14-16 August 1974.

Theoretically the contents of this paragraph could be the result of a misunderstanding; or the private views of an individual (albeit high-level)
official in the FCO; or it could (always in theory) express the collective views of the FCO bureaucracy adopting the military experts’ views. However, all the above appear highly unlikely. The reference to Britain in the text implies state policy, to which James Callaghan, the Secretary of State has to have agreed. Cyprus was certainly not the centre of the universe for UK foreign policy, but it had been at the forefront of foreign affairs since the 15 July coup, enough time to force Britain to consider policy options.

4.1. Britain: readiness, resignation or complicity?

Of the three questions above, the readiness of Britain to accept in Cyprus a *fait accompli*, may be interpreted as acquiescence to a course of events that may be considered unjust, but is (according to Britain) unavoidable. The Turkish invasion was underway, and, at that stage, Britain was not prepared to stop it. The experts were also clear in that the operation could not be stopped. As elaborated in paragraph 5 of the telegram, as long as the security of the immediate British interests in Cyprus (mainly the Sovereign Base Areas) was not in danger, there would be no requirement to intervene in order to influence the course of events. Lastly, neither the USSR\(^\text{17}\) nor the US or, for that matter, the UN (despite a substantial increase in UNFICYP troops), appeared inclined to intervene with more than diplomacy to stop the developing conflict\(^\text{18}\).

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\(^{17}\) On 21 July, the British Ambassador in Moscow, after informing the FCO that the Turkish Ambassador had met Gromyko on 19 and 20 July, put forward the view that “the Russians may have connived at the landings”. See TNA, FCO 9/1896, Moscow to FCO, tel. no. 868, 21 July 1974.

4.2. Why a ‘deadline’?

The time scale given in the telegram is slightly more obscure. One possible source for the choice of the deadline of 21 July is the time included in the UK military assessments that expected the Turkish operation to be complete within 24 to 48 hours (see above)\(^{19}\). Another possible (though a little less likely) source of the time frame could be a telegram sent on 20 July by Sir Robin Hooper, the UK Ambassador in Athens. In it he reported a conversation with Kypraios, the acting Foreign Minister of Greece, in the course of which, Kypraios stated that:

6. […] In regard to the Greek demands, the cardinal point was of course the cease-fire. But the Greek military also attached great importance to the concentration of Turkish forces. However he did not think they would insist on the operation being completed by 1400 so long as it was carried out within the next 24 or 48 hours [underline added].\(^{20}\)

Either way, the information from this conversation included in the telegram would seem to fit with the British military assessments and with the time frame included in the text of the Australian telegram.

When looking to explain the 48 hour ‘window’ set in this paragraph, one should also take into consideration the permanent western fear of a generalised Greek-Turkish war and of the effect this would have on NATO as well as on the anticipated future settlement in Cyprus; to this one should add the fear of theoretically possible Soviet intervention – a factor less probable but present at different degrees throughout the crisis); and the possible reaction of the

\(^{19}\) The Turkish invasion began at daybreak on 20 July (around 0600 hrs local time). Thus 48 hrs from the start would strictly speaking take the operation to the early hours of 22 July (not 21, as the telegram says). However, one could argue that military operations of this scale hardly ever follow prepared timetables – hence the time difference.

\(^{20}\) TNA, FCO 9/1895, tel. no. 237, Athens to FCO, 20 July 1974. The telegram was sent on 11:15 GMT, after a 0915 Athens time meeting with Kypraios.
international public opinion. In any event, as already shown, 48 hours was deemed militarily adequate for the success of Turkish aims and not long enough to become the cause of a wider conflict. Lastly, as regards time, it should be noted that the first ceasefire (admittedly brokered by the US) in Cyprus was to take effect on 21 July, at 1600 hrs local time, ie within the 48 hour window. The second ceasefire did come into effect 24 hrs later, on 1600 of 22 July (Asmussen, 2008:105-109, 101-111).

4.3. Britain, Cyprus and the ‘rule of thirds’

The third question, the extent of territory Turkey would occupy as a result of its invasion is much more intriguing. It is not the first time that the ‘rule of thirds’ (one third Turkish, two thirds Greek) appears in the Cyprus problem. In 1957, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, then leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, had published the book *The Cyprus Question – A Permanent Solution*, on whose cover the island of Cyprus was divided along the 35th Parallel, with an area roughly coinciding to a similar one-third – two-thirds division (Soulioti, 2006).

According to the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the public servants would be divided at a ratio of two thirds Greek-Cypriot to one third Turkish-Cypriot; and in March 1964, the UN mediator Gallo Plaza, noted in his

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21 According to a British report from Athens, the US Military Attaché expected Greece to declare war on Turkey on 22 July. See TNA, FCO 9/1876, Athens to MODUK, tel. FOG 368, 21 July 1974. On the Soviet angle as seen by the US, see eg. Telegram, Department of State to Certain Posts, Washington, July 18, 1974, 2354Z, 156312. Subject: Policy Considerations in Cyprus Situation, particularly paras. 1 and 8, in FRUS, p. 322; Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group [henceforth: WSAG], Washington, July 22, 1974, 10:42–11:25 a.m., in FRUS, p. 379-380; Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger,Washington, July 22, 1974 in FRUS, p. 367; Department of State, Cyprus Critique, Secretary’s Conference Room, Monday, August 5, 1974, Secret, p. 7, 9 in http://www.foia.cia.gov; Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 15, 1974, 4:30 p.m., SUBJECT Cyprus, in FRUS, p. 443. On British fears of Soviet intervention see TNA, FCO 9/1895, UKMIS New York to FCO, tel. no. 810, 20 July 1974: “We should need to avoid anything which could justify independent action by third army (Red Army in blue berets).”
report to U Thant, the then UN Secretary General, that the Turkish proposals for Cyprus entailed the request for a Turkish zone in the northern part of Cyprus, “[beginning] at the village of Gialia on the northeast coast [of Cyprus] passing through the centre of Nicosia and east of Famagusta [sic]. […] It is claimed that this zone covers an area of approximately 1084 square miles or 38% of the total area of Cyprus” (Clerides, 1991:163 and Soulioti, 2006:761).

However, HM Government’s acquiescence to the ‘rule of thirds’ contrasts with the stated minimum Turkish ‘war aims’ as set out to the British side on 17 July 1974, in the course of the meeting between Harold Wilson and James Callaghan and Bulent Ecevit and Hasan Isik, the acting foreign minister of Turkey. This was a top level meeting, involving high level political office holders -the Prime Ministers of Britain and Turkey, and two cabinet ministers for each side. On the British side another seven officials participated, while the Turkish side included four ambassadors, the head of the Cyprus and Greek affairs Department in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and two generals (in all 11 persons) 22. In the meeting Bulend Ecevit said that,

The minimum Turkish requirement in the future, whatever the status of Cyprus – independent or “whatever other arrangement” – would be to secure access to the sea somewhere near Turkey, which would enable his

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22 TNA, FCO 9/1892, Military coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July), “Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister, the Acting Foreign Minister and Minister of the Interior after dinner at 10, Downing st., on Wednesday 17 July 1974”. The other persons in the UK delegation were: Roy Mason (Secretary of State for Defence), Sir Thomas Brimelow (Permanent Undersecretary of State, FCO), Sir John Killick (Deputy Under-Secretary, FCO), Charles Wiggin (FCO), Arthur Hockaday (Deputy Under-Secretary of State Ministry of Defence), Alan Goodison (Head of the SE European Department), Joe Haines (Press Secretary to the PM) and Lord Bridges (Thomas Edward Bridges, 2nd Baron Bridges, Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to the Prime Minister). The Turkish delegation comprised Bulend Ecevit (PM), Hasan Isik (Acting Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence), Oguzhan Asilturk (Minister of the Interior), Haluk Bayulken (special adviser and former Foreign Minister), Turgut Menemencioglu (Ambassador to the UK), Orhan Eralp (Ambassador to NATO), Ercumen Yavuzalp (Ambassador, Director General of the International Security Department, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Ecem Barutcu (Head of the Cyprus and Greek Affairs Department, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Generals Haydar Saltik and Kemal Yamak (General Staff) and A. Alacakaptan (Turkish Embassy in London).
Government to prevent Turks from dying from starvation as had occurred in the past.23

To achieve this, the Turkish side asked for British cooperation (in the form of allowing them to use the SBAs) for a military intervention in Cyprus. The British side was not ready to accept such a plan; use of the SBAs remained out of the question; they offered to mediate and get Greece to the negotiating table (an offer to which Turkey was at best indifferent) (Asmussen, 2008:59-63). The closest the two sides appear to have got to some form of military cooperation in the course of the meeting was when,

“The Prime Minister said that he understood Mr Ecevit’s remarks as an expression of the Turkish wish that Britain would not blockade an action of the kind contemplated by Turkey, but that they would blockade the Greeks. Mr Ecevit asked if Britain would be ready to do so. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary said it was not impossible.”24

Thus, at least by the evening of 17 July, there seems to have been no clear agreement for cooperation, even though both Harold Wilson and James Callaghan appeared impressed by the Turkish side; indeed, there is some distance between the cooperation asked for (to which Callaghan replied with a double negative), and the acquiescence to the occupation by Turkey of a third of Cyprus, as the Australian telegram expressly states three days later.

23 TNA, FCO 9/1892, Military coup in Cyprus (Wednesday 17 July), “Record of Conversation …” p. 4. According to Ecevit, this cooperation would be welcomed by everybody, the Greek and Cypriot people included, would restore democracy to Greece, would justify British military presence in Cyprus and also restore NATO unity in the region…
24 TNA, FCO 9/1892, “Record of Conversation …” p. 12. This acquiescence seems the closest Britain got to cooperation with Turkey. It could be argued that the Turkish proposal to use the SBAs was an opening bid, aimed at getting this acquiescence by the British side.
25 See Donoughue (2005: 166): “HW [Harold Wilson] was very impressed by them [the Turks]. See also Sir John Killick, interview by John Hutson, 14/2/2002, p. 28: “It was very interesting to see Jim Callaghan handling it [the crisis in Cyprus]. He had a good deal of sympathy, let’s face it, with the Turks, who’d had a pretty raw deal. Nobody loved Makarios after all, but we couldn’t afford to see this awful man, Nico Sampson taking over.”
How was the gap bridged? How did the ‘rule of thirds’ come into the Australian telegram as something Britain was prepared to see happen, albeit secretly? The author of this paper does not subscribe to conspiracy theories; thus we do not interpret the reference in the telegram to “1/3 of the island before agreeing to a ceasefire” as an expression of a British aim. One possible interpretation could be that in this paragraph the “senior FCO official”\(^\text{26}\) appears, once more, to state what Britain was expecting to happen and therefore what Britain was ready to accept on the first day of the Turkish invasion, given the likelihood of success of the latter, as forecast by its own military experts.

Conspiracy theorists would be tempted to look for the US influence on British policy. Thus here is perhaps a suitable point to look briefly at the US policy towards Cyprus at the time.

5. A common policy? US policy and expectations

As regards the objectives of the US indications are that, since the coup of 15 July, US policy had been evolving\(^\text{27}\). On 18 July, in the meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group, Kissinger seemed unclear: though he accepted the possibility of Turkish intervention, he also asked to be briefed on the availability of military forces for use in Cyprus (both US and British), but

\(^{26}\) We can only speculate as to the identity of the official: persons with seniority in the FCO at the time whose names appear in the files were Sir Thomas (later Lord) Brimelow (1915-1995) the Permanent Undersecretary FCO (1973-75), Sir John Killick (1919-2004), the Deputy Under Secretary of State, FCO and Sir Alan Goodison (1926-2006), the Head of the Southern European Department.

\(^{27}\) Thus, on 17 July the main decision taken in the conversation between Pres. Nixon and Henry Kissinger was that the US would neither openly oppose nor support Makarios, see FRUS, pp. 311-312; His other concerns in the 18 July meeting were the fear of an increase in “Soviet/East bloc influence”; while “Preventing a Greek-Turkish war and a shift in the balance of power are factors”, see FRUS p. 317). Cf. FRUS, p. 316: “We do not want to elaborate a theme for Soviet intervention, or Turkish.”
decided that “We do not want to tip our hand on a Cyprus solution yet til [sic] we know what will come out of it.” Referring to US public statements, he also added “Just repeat our standard line on the territorial integrity of Cyprus.”

Was the US administration aware of Turkish territorial goals? According to an oral account, on 15 July 1974, William R. Crawford Jr., a US diplomat who had served in Cyprus until 1972 and was in Washington when news of the coup against Makarios came, had warned William B. Buffum, Assistant Secretary International Organizations, and an unnamed member of the NSC that in his view the coup would lead to a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the occupation of a third of the island:

> Question: "How much of Cyprus do they want to take? All of Cyprus? I said, "No. They'll go for the northern third, which is enough to establish strategic control over the island."

Once the invasion had begun, the above was further confirmed. On the evening of 19 July (the early morning hours of the 20th July in Cyprus), a conversation between Henry Kissinger and William Colby, then Director of the CIA, after a discussion of the military information available on the invasion forces and the relative military strengths of Greece and Turkey, the conversation continued on the territorial goals:

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28 Meeting of the WSAG, Washington, July 18, 1974, in FRUS, pp. 315.
29 ‘There was also the decision not to stop deliveries of military aid to Greece or worry whether Ioannides’ regime in Greece survived or not, see FRUS, p. 316. The essence of the above was included in tel. Telegram 156312, From the Department of State to Certain Posts, Subject: Policy Considerations in Cyprus Situation, date Washington, July 18, 1974, 2354Z, in FRUS, p. 322.
30 See, interview with William R. Crawford (1988). Both Buffum and Crawford were later involved in Cypriot affairs: Buffum was the US representative in the first stage of the Geneva talks in July 1974; Crawford was sent to Cyprus to replace Ambassador Roger Davies, following the latter’s assassination on 19 August 1974.
K[issinger]: But what do you think they’re after? They’re not after the whole island are they?

C[olby]: No, no. What they would be after would be Famagusta and Kyrenia and kind of a line between the two.

K: That kind of a quadrangle in the northeast.

C: Yeah. Well, call it almost the (inaudible) from roughly Baranaka\textsuperscript{31} on up and then just assert themselves and give themselves a position to bargain with.

[...]

K: Do you have any good ideas what we should do?

C: Well, I think the biggest thing is to get the Greeks not to fight. To say all right, let’s negotiate and discuss what ought to be done.

K: OK.\textsuperscript{32}

One should note here that the geographical area outlined as the target of the Turkish invasion is, again, the northern “third” of Cyprus (between Famagusta and Kyrenia, though later some confusion seems to ensue).

An indication of the movement of the US policy towards acceptance of the rule of thirds is furnished by another Australian telegram, this time from Ankara, that stated that “Although Turks may not have achieved full military objectives [emphasis added], Americans here believe that they may now be ready to accept a ceasefire”; and further “Americans […] consider they [the Turks] would not be willing to surrender areas captured, except for minor adjustments, but will seek to hold these so as to secure permanent access to sea and security of Turkish minority. As a consequence some movement of

\textsuperscript{31} Baranaka is a place name in Indonesia and so a mistake; the closest one could find in Cyprus is Larnaca, which is however in the southern part of the island. The only way Larnaca could be the target of the Turkish invasion would be if this took place eg in the British base of Dekeleia, in the SE and then the Turkish forces moved towards the SW (to Larnaca) rather than N (to Famagusta). Even so, this sounds implausible and (if ‘Baranaka’ means Larnaca) it would point to a gross failure of intelligence by the US. Larnaca is also incompatible with the references to Famagusta and Kyrenia a little previously in the same conversation. Similar confusion (the main thrust of the Turkish invasion is placed in the north and east of Cyprus, “in order to cut off a north eastern quadrant where the bulk of the Turkish population in Cyprus lived” is to be found in National Archives of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs, file 152/2/3 Part 1, tel. O.WH 7601, Washington to Canberra, 20.7.74, reporting information by given by Arthur Hartman, US Assistant Secretary of State.

\textsuperscript{32} Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Director of Central Intelligence Colby, July 19, 1974, 9:35 p.m. PDT in FRUS, p. 334 and p. 335
population might therefore be involved”\textsuperscript{33}. Along the same lines, on 22 July, the Cyprus Task Force of the Washington Special Action Group, noted in its first paper “It should be noted that Turkish military occupation of the island’s northeastern third does not of itself constitute a viable partition solution (although it may lay the basis for one)…”\textsuperscript{34}.

However all these were in the course of private briefings and confidential or secret communications; officially, on 20 July, in the meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group, Ambassador Robert McCloskey outlined the basic policy objectives of the US regarding Cyprus as,

“(1) support a ceasefire; (2) get both Greece and Turkey to agree on negotiations with the British, in London; and (3) that our objective is to see the reestablishment of constitutional rule in Cyprus.”\textsuperscript{35}

It should be noted that, these official US aims are essentially the same as the British ones (stated, among others, in the Australian telegram, above) with the exception of the issue of British lives and property, for which the US had obviously no responsibility. The interesting aspect is, once more, the territorial question.

6. Military Assessments

As the events showed, detailed information notwithstanding, the UK military experts seem to have overestimated the ability of the Turkish Armed Forces and / or seriously underestimated the ability and willingness of the Greek-

\textsuperscript{33} National Archives of Australia, tel. O.AN244, Ankara to Canberra no. 377, 21.7.74. Turkish surprise at the extent of Greek resistance is also mentioned in the telegram as well as the “inability to achieve a quick victory”.

\textsuperscript{34} WSAG, Cyprus Task Force, “Paper No. 1, Cyprus: Issues and Options”, 22 July, in FRUS, p. 367.

\textsuperscript{35} See eg. summary of US policy in WSAG, July 20, 1974, 11:07 a.m.–12:07 p.m., SUBJECT Cyprus, in FRUS, p. 343; Kissinger did not attend this meeting. See also Kissinger, \textit{Years of Renewal}, p. 219.
Cypriot National Guard to resist the invasion. By 1600 hrs on 22 July (when the US-brokered ceasefire came into effect in Cyprus) the territory of the Republic of Cyprus occupied by Turkey was still relatively small (probably around under 4% of the total); though no precise data exists, it appears that the 4% mark was probably reached sometime in early August; this was after the continuous armed incursions of the Turkish Forces and the fighting of the period 22-30 July. The Geneva Declaration signed on 30 July by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and Britain, was supposed to put an end to the clashes; however, further fighting broke out subsequently, lasting intermittently for the first ten days of August. During this time the Turkish-occupied area was further enlarged: according to the opening statement of the Greek Foreign Minister George Mavros in the second round of the Geneva Conference, the Turkish army had expanded the zone it occupied by 130 square kilometres between 22 July and 8 August (or approx. 1.4% of the total land area). To outside observers, the question of control of territory by the Turkish Army in Cyprus would still seem to indicate limited overall success for the Turkish operation, despite the gradual increase in the strength of the Turkish military presence in Cyprus.

36 See TNA, FCO 9/1895, tel. no. 2442, Washington to FCO: “US diplomatic efforts were now being devoted to urging maximum restraint on the Greek Government and on the National Guard not to respond”. Cf Miller (2008: 194) and Birand (1984: 215).

37 The area controlled by the Turkish Cypriots after the 1963-64 intercommunal clashes was rather small. According to a letter of the Director of the Cyprus Lands and Surveys Department dated 17 September 1964, the area under Turkish Cypriot control was 60 square miles, well under 2% of the area of Cyprus. See Soulioti (2006: 749 and accompanying map in the map supplement). This area did not grow substantially between 1964 and the Turkish invasion of 1974. Turan Gunes, the Turkish Foreign Minister, is quoted telling James Callaghan on Saturday 10 August 1974 that Turkish forces in Cyprus controlled 1/25th of the total area of Cyprus, i.e. 4%. See Birand (n.d.: 274).

38 See TNA, FCO 9/1921, Greek Embassy (London) Press and Information Office Press Release, 9th August 1974, p. 2. See also FCO 9/1897, C 74(77), 22 July 1974, Cabinet, Cyprus; Cf. TNA, FCO 9/1897 BRITDEFAT Ankara to MODUK tel. FOJ 222010Z July 1974 and Kazamias (2009a: 273-282). According to Birand (n.d.: 24), the area the Turkish army controlled on the eve of the second stage of the invasion was 448 sq. km., or approximately 4.8% of Cyprus.
This did not go unremarked. Indeed, both the British and the US remarked on Turkey’s failure to secure control of the significant part of Cyprus they had predicted. On 22 July, a note on Cyprus submitted to the British Cabinet, jointly by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office, stated that “the Turks […] badly misjudged the potential extent of National Guard Resistance” and concluded that “there is no question now of a quick victory”\(^{39}\). The gap between the expected outcome and reality was also reflected in the conclusions of the Cabinet meeting of 22 July, where it was noted that ”The Turks must be disappointed at the meagre success of their armed intervention”\(^{40}\). On the same day, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the British ambassador to the US repeated the point to Henry Kissinger, voiced as concern that the performance of the Turkish troops, would imply serious effects for the whole of the southern flank of NATO, as the Turks “did not appear able to handle modern weapons well” \(^{41}\).

Across the Atlantic, US’s own military assessments of Turkish performance were even more disparaging. On 21 July, Kissinger, speaking about the Turkish leadership (military and political) remarked to the Washington Special Actions Group: “If their [the Turkish] generals are as bad as their leaders, what can their captains and majors be like!”\(^{42}\) Similar remarks were repeated in the same forum, the next day (22 July), when Kissinger even appeared to have doubts about the ability of the Turkish Army to hold its own in Cyprus:

\(^{39}\) TNA, CAB 124/178, “Cyprus, Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet” (Sir John Hunt), Cabinet Office, 22 July 1974, p. 3 para. 5.
\(^{41}\) Memorandum of Conversation, between Secretary Kissinger and William B. Buffum, and Sir Peter Ramsbotham, British Ambassador to the United States, Washington, July 22, 1974, 4:30 p.m. in FRUS, p. 387. The failure to capture Nicosia Airport (which was still in the hands of the National Guard on 22 July) was cited as an example of the limited Turkish performance.
\(^{42}\) WSG, July 21, 1974, 9:33–11:23 a.m., Subject: Cyprus, in FRUS, p. 357. Similar arguments seem to be echoed in The National Archives of Australia, tel. O.AN 246, Ankara to Canberra, 22.7.74 in 152/2/3 Part 2, Barcode 588486.
Secretary Kissinger: Why were the Turks so incompetent?

Gen. Walters: Well, I think that one-to-five ratio was a big factor. They (the Turks) couldn’t even take Nicosia airport.

Gen. Brown: I think history will show that they were rather inept in the whole operation. I think analysis will show that their whole situation was amateurish. Their air support was ineffective.

[...]

Secretary Kissinger: How is it that they are so incompetent? Are they (the Turks) really that strong on the island then?

Gen. Walters: Well, I don’t know.43

It is the author’s opinion that a divergence between UK and US policy began at approximately this point. Though beginning from the same starting point (the ceasefire and the end of large scale fighting in Cyprus) and the same military assessment (the apparent failure of Turkey to achieve its territorial aims in Cyprus), the two main western players in the Cyprus crisis reached different conclusions and explored different options. Possibly from the ceasefire and more probably from the first Geneva meeting (25-30 July) James Callaghan chose active involvement in the search for a solution to the crisis; since it appeared that there was a will (of sorts) by both Turkey and Greece to negotiate, negotiations were to be the next step. And if need be, the UK could consider backing up its policy with some military muscle (Polyviou, 2010:147-148, 170-171).

43 WSAG, July 22, 1974, 10:42–11:25 a.m., in FRUS, p. 380. However, ‘sandwiched’ between these comments (at least in the FRUS), the official assessment of the Cyprus Task Force Special Action Group still considers the possibility that the Turkish Forces will occupy the northern third of Cyprus. See Cyprus Task Force, Special Action Group, “Paper No. 1, Cyprus: Issues and Options”, in FRUS, p. 367 and quote above. This paper is an attachment to the Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger, dated July 22, 1974.
7. Callaghan’s involvement and the military option

It appears that the military assessments of the Turkish invasion operations in July 1974, helped shape a new UK policy regarding Cyprus. Indeed, from approximately the first ceasefire (on 22 July) until the beginning of the military operations for the second phase of the Turkish invasion, James Callaghan seems to have abandoned the territorial policy described in the Australian telegram. What appears to have been adopted instead was what could be called the ‘one-shot policy’. According to this, Turkey had had its chance to get what it wanted in Cyprus and had failed. Now negotiations would have to shape the future of Cyprus. Furthermore, after the ceasefire of 22 July and even more so after the conclusion (on 30 July) of the Stage I negotiations in Geneva, Britain apparently assumed that at least the main part of the fighting in Cyprus was over; the other assumption seems to have been that Britain had the option of using its forces in Cyprus as a tool to impel the parties involved (mainly Turkey, which was openly reinforcing its army in Cyprus) towards a negotiated agreement on Cyprus, an agreement that might even prove to be the hitherto elusive final settlement.

That negotiations were seen as the next step for Britain is implied from the comments in the British Cabinet (that assumed failure of the Turkish invasion, see above); from the enthusiasm of the British delegation after the signing of the Geneva Declaration on 30 July\textsuperscript{44}; the effort put in by Britain in the demarcation of the ceasefire line in Cyprus (Kazamias, 2009a); and even from the Steering Brief prepared on 7 August for the UK Delegation to the second

\textsuperscript{44} “…we came away from Geneva fairly euphoric”. “On the journey home, everybody was on a high and when they got to the airport, they sat on their suitcases and sang a patriotic song: ‘It wasn’t Rule Britannia but it was something daft’ recalled McNally. ‘Everybody felt that we’d cracked it.’ ”. See O’Malley and Craig (1999: 203).
round of the Geneva talks, which predicted that “With five delegations participating and the threat of war receding, the danger is that other delegations will dig in for a very long session.”

Let us now turn to the issue of British military intervention, or using ‘military muscle’, as is sometimes referred to. Was military intervention an option for the UK?

Even in the recent past, it was certainly far from unheard of: according to one study, between 1949 and 1970, Britain had intervened militarily on 34 occasions; most of these interventions (29 of the 34) took place in former British Colonies and 27 of 30 in areas where “an [British] Army base existed within or immediately adjacent to the border” (Van Wingen and Tillema, 1980:296) of the country where the intervention took place.

Was intervention possible in Cyprus? After the coup against President Makarios, the British Forces on the island were increased significantly. Between 15 and 26 July, the British forces in the Sovereign Base Areas the army elements stationed in Cyprus rose in number from just under 3000 officers and men on 15 July 1974 to over 5500 on 26 July. Further reinforcements (a Gurkha unit) were sent to Cyprus between 11 and 13 August, raising the number of British officers and men to 5640. Among the reinforcements in war materiel were 12 state of the art Phantom aircraft. The naval units available in Cyprus were strengthened by HMS Hermes (an

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45 See eg. TNA, FCO 9/1920, Steering Brief for the United Kingdom Delegation to Stage II of the Geneva Talks on Cyprus, FCO, 7th August 1974, p. 2 para. 5.

46 TNA, DEFE 13/1251, Select Committee on Cyprus, Memorandum. According to TNA, DEFE 13/1251, “Select Committee on Cyprus, Memorandum by Minister of Defence”, undated [28 October 1975], the 41st Marine Commando Unit was withdrawn at the end of July 1974; the withdrawal of the 41st Marine Commando began on 8 August 1974, but stopped and the unit returned to Cyprus reinforced with artillery elements.
amphibious assault ship carrying a Royal Marine unit), three other surface ships, a submarine and other auxiliary units.\footnote{For the Phantoms see TNA, DEFE 24/1794, DOC/117/DO, Defence Operations Centre Situation Report for the period 0600 24 Jul to 0600 25 Jul 74; for the naval forces see TNA, DEFE 13/966, (deployment maps are also included). See also TNA, DEFE 24/703, Flag Officer Carrier and Amphibious Ships (FOCAS), report to Commander in Chief Fleet, 7 Aug. 1974. For a time it also appears that even the Aircraft Carrier \textit{HMS Ark Royal} was put on limited alert. See TNA, FCO 9/1897, Note, Cormack to Everett, 22 July 1974.}

It is true that in the beginning of the crisis no military action was envisaged by Britain (see, among other sources, paragraph 5 of the Australian telegram, above); however, this approach was apparently abandoned even before the territorial issue, after the first day or so of the invasion. In fact, in 1974 Britain used its military forces in Cyprus repeatedly for a variety of missions. British land forces were used to evacuate foreign nationals by land to the SBAs on 20-21 July;\footnote{TNA, WO 386/12, “Cyprus: Outline narrative of coup d’etat, invasion and occupation”, Annex A to Part I of Joint Intelligence Staff Near East (JIS(NE) 16/74, Dated September 1974, p. A-2.} British naval units were used for the same purpose for the northern coast of Cyprus; in both cases, the use of combat air patrol had been authorised to protect the British forces, while for the naval units authorisation for the British ships to return fire had been mooted.\footnote{TNA, WO 386/21, CBFNE [Commander British Forces Near East], Report on the Cyprus Emergency, 15 Jul-16 Aug 74, pp. 39-40, 41} Days later, on 23-25 July, Britain came very close to using force against the Turkish troops, when the Turkish Army challenge to UNFICYP over the Nicosia Airport brought (according to Harold Wilson) the UK and Turkey to “within an hour of war”.\footnote{The phrase comes from an interview Harold Wilson gave to Brian Wildlake, on BBC Radio’s, \textit{The World This Weekend}, 14 October 1979, quoted in Henn (2004: 378). The crisis is described in more detail in DEFE 13/966, MoD, Note for the Record, Cyprus: threatened Turkish attack on Nicosia Airport, SECRET MO 5/1/4, 24 July 1974. Cf. Callaghan (1987: 347); Waldheim (1985: 84); Asmussen (2008: 126-131).}

Further on in the crisis, at the request of James Callaghan active military involvement by British Forces was considered twice. The first was on 25-26
July, when the possibility a British naval blockade of the northern shores of Cyprus to stop Turkish reinforcements was actively explored at the request of Callaghan himself\textsuperscript{52}. The second came during the second Stage of the Geneva negotiations: between 9 and 12 August (Kazamias, 2008, 2009b), Callaghan explored the possibility of interposing the UN forces in Cyprus, beefed-up by British forces from the SBAs, between the Turkish forces and the Greek-Cypriot National Guard, in order to contain the expected Turkish advance\textsuperscript{53}. It is true that on both these cases there were doubts expressed by the British military as to the efficiency of British involvement: when the blockade was discussed, it was judged, that “Interposition of R[oyal] N[avy] was too grave a step at this stage, would have serious consequences and might not affect the ground situation”\textsuperscript{54}. Similar doubts were later voiced for the use of ground troops\textsuperscript{55}. Despite the doubts on the feasibility of military intervention, the fact that Callaghan kept the option alive should be considered in tandem with his very active stance in Geneva, where he alluded that British forces in Cyprus might even be entering the fray against Turkey (Callaghan, 1987:351).

A recent account of the period has argued that contrary to other assessments that joint or assisted intervention by Turkey and the UK (as proposed by the former in the 17 July talks) would have contained “…Turkish operations and prevented partition” (Asmussen, 2008:294); while counterfactual arguments are of limited value, it is the author’s view the same could have been the outcome had Britain used its troops in Cyprus in August 1974, as a \textit{cordon sanitaire}.

\textsuperscript{52} TNA, WO 386/21, CBFNE, Report…, pp. 54-55.
\textsuperscript{54} See TNA, WO 386/21, CBFNE, Report, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{55} For the proposed use of ground troops in August see TNA, AIR 28/12649 [draft] Tel. no. 631 to New York, 15-4-40 IMMEDIATE SECRET; and TNA, AIR 28/12649, DUS/P/301 1974, A.P. Hockaday, MoD, to Sir John Killick, FCO, 15 August 1974.
between Greeks and Turks. In this vein, it could be argued that given the previous caution shown by the invading Turkish Forces, it is unlikely that a ‘shooting war’ would have broken out. If nothing else, the political odium produced by an armed conflict between Turkey and a major NATO ally would have been too great.

The overall history of the ill-fated Geneva negotiations has been discussed in several publications, academic and other (Asmussen, 2008:181-215 and Polyviou, 2010). What should be noted here is that the UK and Callaghan in particular invested considerable effort to convene both its stages; Callaghan actually took it upon himself to achieve some measure of agreement, even strive for success. An exchange between Callaghan and Hartman, the US envoy is quite indicative of the former’s views and the latter’s opinions on 8 August, just as the negotiations were starting. They also point to the difference in attitude that was evident between the UK and the US:

*Mr. Callaghan* said that he would not put his hand to a bad agreement.

*Mr. Hartman* said that it was not necessary for the Secretary of State to put his hand to anything except encouraging the parties to find more common ground. When *Mr. Callaghan* suggested that this would mean there would have to be some Turkish withdrawal, *Mr. Hartman* said that this was the only lever the Turks had56.

As regards James Callaghan, the episode begs at least two important questions. The first question is why was Callaghan “rattling the sabre” (as Kissinger later accused him) particularly if he did not intend to use military force? This was an action that made him (at least appear) partial to the Greek side, in a negotiation

56 See eg TNA, FCO 9/1922, “Record of a conversation between Mr. Callaghan and Mr. A. Hartman at the FCO on 8 August 1974 at 10.30 a.m”, where Hartman clearly tells Callaghan that “that the important thing was to keep the process going. As long as there was talking, there was hope. The UK role should be that of a patient referee.”
he was chairing. We shall return to this question later. The second question is what stopped Callaghan from using force.

8. Killing Callaghan’s military option

Looking at the question of using the British military in Cyprus first, the answer is relatively clear. It was difficult for Britain to ‘go it alone’ in Cyprus. If force was used, this would have to be either with the support of the US, or at least with its tacit agreement. There was no chance of using force against the wishes of the superpower: the shadow of Suez was still weighing heavily on Britain (Polyviou, 2010:165). And throughout the crisis the US was either unwilling to intervene or openly against an active involvement. Indeed Kissinger, the single most powerful force in US foreign policy at the time, seems to have been consistently, even avidly, against any form of military involvement whatsoever throughout the Cyprus crisis. To give one example, on 21 July, 08:10 GMT, the US Consul in Nicosia requested permission from the FCO to land a company of US Marines in Dhekelia SBA, to help with the evacuation of US citizens within the confines of the Sovereign Base Area; by 09:30, Kissinger had heard of this and “was angry about it. He had ordered that the request be withdrawn…”57. Subsequently, the US consistently followed the policy of strictly diplomatic involvement, with not a shadow of military muscle behind it throughout the crisis.

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57 TNA, FCO 9/1896, “Cyprus, Time-table of events 21 July”; Cf. Note, “US Request to land Marines at Dhekelia”, putting the conversation with the Americans at 10:30: “Dr Kissinger was ignorant of it [the request], and was alleged to have been furious when told.”
Kissinger’s ‘strictly diplomacy’ policy was further reinforced by a clear refusal to sanction or accept military moves by Britain, the UN or any other quarter except Turkey (complemented by active efforts to prevent Greece from going to war). As far as the UN is concerned, it is fair to say that this policy had the obvious advantage of stopping Soviet forces from arriving in Cyprus (even as part of UNFICYP). However, since it also extended to Greece, which was also discouraged or stopped from either declaring war or sending significant reinforcements to Cyprus; indeed it could be argued that the point in time when the US (and Henry Kissinger himself) exerted the strongest force on Turkey, was the 22 July armistice. A discussion in Washington on 21 July is quite indicative of the approach that seemed to aim for a new “balance of forces” in Cyprus, a balance that could be achieved only if Turkish presence was reinforced further at the expense of the Greek side:

Secretary Kissinger: […] Our major effort now is to achieve a ceasefire; the talks can get started any time. If the Turks hold—what is the state of play on the island now?

Mr. Colby: Well, it’s unclear, but they do have a foothold.

Secretary Kissinger: It seems to me they haven’t done as well militarily as they have politically.

Mr. Colby: You’re right, they haven’t done very well militarily.

 […]

Secretary Kissinger: Then the Greeks are fighting better than we thought they would.

 […]

Secretary Kissinger: I’m trying to understand what the balance of forces [underline added] would be when negotiations start so that we can chart a course.

Mr. Colby: If there is a ceasefire, it would seem to me that the Turkish effort failed. They wanted to seize a substantial area—more than they have now—and they have failed [underline added]58.

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58 WSAG, July 21, 1974, 9:33–11:23 a.m., in FRUS, p. 358. The meeting was chaired by H. Kissinger.
And a little further in the same discussion:

Secretary Kissinger: [...] Seems to me that Ecevit is not doing well militarily. They are doing lousy militarily. [...] What is going to be the balance of forces if we get a ceasefire?

Mr. Colby: The National Guard is doing quite well, they have some 40,000 troops.

Secretary Schlesinger: I don’t think we can get an accurate picture of the balance of forces because the only thing we have is a ceasefire. They can bring in more troops under a ceasefire, reinforce here and there. That would change the whole picture.

Secretary Kissinger: It is against our interests to have the Greeks in there. A strong Turkish presence would be highly desirable. What went wrong, anyway? [underline added]

Mr. Colby: They have turned out to be tough 59.

The ceasefire actually stopped Greece from going to war, even if it could or wanted to; however, one has to take into account the fact that the final text of the US-sponsored armistice in Cyprus did not prohibit Turkey from landing further forces in Cyprus. As the US policy makers put it,

Secretary Kissinger: As I look at it, the balance of forces picture is this. The Turks have not followed up their gains on the beachhead, and they are doing even less well in the communities. It seems to me that it is unlikely that the Turks will be able to overtake the Greek Cypriots. Even in time.

Mr. Ingersoll: We can probably rely on the Turks to keep reinforcing 60.

The result appears clear: as early as 22 July 1974, the US was helping shape a new balance of forces, a balance that had a strong military and territorial component. However, this policy could work only if all other parties, other than Turkey, agreed (or were made to agree) not to use force. Hence the scuttling of British intentions for military action, either alone or in collaboration with the

60 WSAG, July 22, 1974, 10:42–11:25 a.m., in FRUS, pp. 378-79:
UN was necessary. In effect, all this left the field clear for the Turkish armed forces to proceed with the imposition of the territorial ‘rule of thirds’.

As shown above, James Callaghan seems to have been relatively slow on the uptake of this aspect of US policy. It was from Geneva as late as 12 August, that he telegraphed to Harold Wilson:

“[..] d. The United States could not consider military action against the Turks; it was out of the question at a time when a new US Administration was taking office.

e. Kissinger does not consider threats of military action are helpful in present circumstances. Such gestures tend to create problems for Ecevit with the extremists in Turkey.

It has been made clear to Hartman that I am not contemplating any further military action at the moment and that all new action on reinforcements has been suspended since yesterday”61.

In the author’s view, what is remarkable is not that Callaghan (and Britain) fell in line with the US policy of non-intervention; it is the fact that in July and August 1974 Callaghan kept the option alive (and therefore diverged from US policy) for almost three weeks.

9. Britain in Cyprus: a defeat on home ground and the final eclipse

The existence of the Australian telegram appears to indicate a slightly different interpretation of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The evidence presented in this paper seems to point towards an alternative approach, at least as regards Britain. Even though it may have entered the crisis in a *perfidia albia* ‘mode’, ready to secretly accept territorial concessions in Cyprus that would normally be unacceptable in open diplomacy, Britain subsequently radically altered its

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61 See TNA, PREM 16/20, tel. no. 819, UK MIS Geneva to FCO, 12 August 1974. Cf., TNA, FCO 9/1907, Goodison to Private Secretary for Secretary of State, note “A Few Basic Principles”, 11 August 1974: “2. We have no long term interests in Cyprus which we do not share with the Americans. 3. We should take no forcible action except in co-operation with the Americans or with their support.”
course, trying to assume a much more central and active role. Thus it could be argued that in Geneva Britain, did try to fulfil at least part of its Guarantor Power obligations, working on the assumption that the talks were aimed at trying to find a negotiated solution. However, that assumption appeared increasingly shaky and a solution proved way beyond Britain’s capability.

Combined with other data (some of it presented above), the evidence also puts in doubt the established view in part of the relevant literature, that the Turkish invasion was a clear victory, at least in its first phase. If what the FCO told the Australians stands, the invasion was not the crushing success which is often portrayed to have been, since it clearly failed to attain its goals. In fact, at the time, the British, the Americans (and based on US information, the Australians and the Canadians) considered it a near-failure. In fact, the “crushing success” for the Turks came later, during the second phase of the invasion; this is why the British and the US attitude in mid-August becomes important.

To get back to the first stage of the invasion, in a related (counterfactual) argument, one wonders whether Britain would have adopted the same position, if the military outlook was not favourable for Turkey. If the military experts’ views had indeed such a deciding influence on British policy, the real success of Turkey in the first phase of the invasion was not military; it was in the realm of perceptions of its expected success. During the early stages of the invasion, perceptions of success gained time for Turkey, during which its military action was acceptable (at least for Britain) if only because it was expected to succeed.

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62 See footnote 38, above.
The question of the path the Turkish war aims followed from the limited version presented to Britain on 17 July, to one third of territory in the Australian telegram, remains unanswered. We may, however, speculate that the British side reached its conclusion not because Turkey made a clear statement of aims, but by a) the fact that it neither outlined nor excluded specific territorial demands in Cyprus and b) the British military experts’ views. Again, perceptions seem to be an important factor. In any event, the Turkish aim appears to have been a third of the territory of Cyprus from the very beginning, and both the British and the US Government had apparently realised this. The difference lay in whether they accepted it (as the US did) or rejected it (as was Callaghan’s line)\(^{64}\). However, why would either the UK or the US worry if Turkey in July 1974 had failed to achieve its expected aims? If Callaghan and the FCO were ready to acquiesce to Turkey occupying a third of Cyprus up to 22 July, why did they ‘change their mind’ just shortly afterwards? Why did Callaghan in particular go to such lengths over Cyprus during virtually the whole of the period from 22 July to 14 August 1974?

\[10.\textbf{Explanations I: Callaghan and the change in policy}\]

It could be argued that, by 22 July 1974 Callaghan was actively assuming the role of the representative of the guarantor power and going into ‘fair play mode’: once the expected Turkish success did not materialise, Britain opted for negotiations and chose to stick by them, through thick and thin in order to

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\(^{64}\) According to Nicolet (2001: 439), citing Research Project no. 1099: “United States Diplomacy in the Cyprus Crisis of July 15-August 22, 1974: A Narrative Account”, February 1975, a CIA report of 27 July 1974 included the information that the Turkish invasion was planned as a 5-day operation, stopped half-way; it also predicted a further offensive and advance.
avoid further military confrontation; what is important to note here is the tenacity by which James Callaghan in particular persevered, regardless of the (real or perceived) duplicity of friend and fellow conversant alike: the Turks would have to accept the limits their military venture produced and pursue their aims through negotiations.

There are also additional possible explanations. According to one school of thought, Callaghan’s ‘pro-Greek’ position was due to his concern to protect the fragile democratic regime in Greece and prevent war between Greece and Turkey (Asmussen, 2008:295). However, on its own, this fails to explain why Callaghan went to such lengths over Cyprus during virtually the whole of the period from 22 July to 14 August 1974. In particular it fails to explain his return time and again to the possibility of use of military forces to control the reinforcement of the Turkish bridgehead and later, before the second phase of the invasion, to contain the expected Turkish advance.

One other explanation could lie in Callaghan’s personal involvement. As Hartman reported on 9 August, failure or bowing to Turkish tactics could not meet his “minimal political needs at home where he, as Chairman of a Labor Party approaching elections, simply cannot afford to be seen as completely selling out the new Greek Govt.” Foreign Secretary pride and the cost of failure are always important factors, particularly for aspiring front-bench politicians, such as Callaghan was at the time. In turn, these may have led him to try to play his hand strongly during the Cyprus crisis, aiming for a foreign policy victory.

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65 See FRUS pp. 416-7, Telegram from the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, for the Secretary from Hartman, Aug. 9, 1974, 1940Z.
11. Explanations II: the US and territory for Turkey in Cyprus

When, in July 1974, Britain was apparently abandoning the expectation that the Turkish invasion would lead to the partition of Cyprus under ‘the rule of thirds’, the US was adopting it. The problem was that the US (read: Kissinger, since to a large extent by this point this was the Secretary’ own game) failed to make this clear to Callaghan, leaving the latter vulnerable, the proverbial ‘dummy in the middle’ (a phrase that James Callaghan himself used). However, as regards Cyprus, the ‘dummy’ was neither ignorant nor entirely powerless. Indeed it was endowed with considerable local knowledge, a degree of freedom of action given by the existence of its Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) on the island and its (admittedly, restricted) military capability; it also seemed to have at least some ethical considerations, if not a wide diplomatic experience (Kissinger, 2000:209 and Polyviou, 2010:164-165).

Both the Australian telegram (for the British) and evidence of the US documents seems to imply that both countries were aware that Turkey ultimately aimed for a third of the territory of Cyprus. In the case of the US, knowledge of the ‘final’ line of the Turkish advance apparently even extended (at some stage) to information marked on a map. On the other hand, Britain

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66 Callaghan first seems to have used the phrase on 11 August 1974, in a conversation with Joseph Sisco, US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; see TNA, FCO 9/1922, Record of a telephone conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the United States Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Sisco, at 1720 on 11 August 1974. The same words were repeated in TNA, PREM 16/20, Tel. no. 4, UKMIS Geneva to Washington, 12 August 1974, Personal for Ambassador from Secretary of State, para. 6.

67 According to Venizelos and Ignatiou (2002: p.236), a map detailing the areas the Turkish army would occupy, was handed to Henry Kissinger by the “Director of Secret Services and Research” on 13 August 1974. Cf. Central Intelligence Agency, August 17, 1974, Intelligence Memorandum, Cyprus, Situation Report Number 11, p. 2, in http://www.foia.cia.gov: “The Turkish advance […] places Turkish Forces far south of the ‘Attila Line’ which supposedly delimits the southern boundary of Turkish territorial claims on the island”.

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was apparently left to guess, on the basis of the Günes plan map\(^68\). However, awareness cannot be translated to either collusion or cooperation: Britain may have suspected (even expected) the territorial outcome, but does not seem to have been fully convinced of a two-stage planning for the Turkish operation, at least not in the beginning (Asmussen, 2008:294 and Polyviou, 2010:170-171)\(^69\). Did the Turkish army put into effect contingency plans, after the ‘failure’ (real or perceived) of the first stage of the invasion? Or did the plan provide for a two stage campaign from the start? At this stage no clear answer is available.

In this context, another related question is why was Henry Kissinger so strongly against a military option (in any form) to avert the invasion during the period under consideration. In the first volume of his memoirs, after conceding that “only the threat of American military action could have prevented a Turkish landing on the island”, he claims that Nixon’s resignation and the accession of Gerald Ford to the US presidency prevented the US from making “credible threats or credible promises”; he reinforces this point by stating that unanimous advice of the congressional leaders was against US involvement,

\(^68\) See DEFE 11/908, Draft Signal to the CBFNE from Acting CDS, Ref. A. COSCYP 13. The signal was sent on 14 August 1974, under ref. KYO 141340Z Aug/ COSCYP 13: “2. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary had been given by the Turks at Geneva a map indicating that the limit of the political objective of the Turkish Phase II would in general be athwart the new road from Nicosia to Famagusta. Even though in some places it came south of the road it would clearly pass to the north of the Ayios Nicolaos extension of the Dhekelia SBA. Hopefully the Turkish military movements will follow their political objectives […].” We can speculate that the map referred to in the text above is the map TNA, FCO 9/1907; a note pinned on the map reads that this map was “handed to S[ecretary] of S[tate] by Turkish F[oreign] M[inister], 12/8/74”. The line drawn on the map, marking roughly the limit of the larger of the Turkish enclaves in the north of Cyprus seems to agree with the description of the Turkish “political objectives” referred to in the telegram.

\(^69\) Polyviou, himself a member of the Greek Cypriot delegation at the Second Geneva Conference, writes that Callaghan became aware of a possible second stage of Turkish operations gradually, after 30 July. Callaghan himself asserts that the Turks misled him into believing that they were sincere in their will to negotiate. The uncertainty of the British as regards Turkish plans is obvious in a JIC assessment of 9 August 1974, in TNA, FCO 9/1921 JICTEL 582, London, 092130Z to Geneva (UKMIS 382). An “intelligence report” of very similar content was read to Hartman on the afternoon of 9 Aug., see FRUS, pp. 415-416. Cf. Polyviou, p. 234, where he includes extensive quotes from two memoranda by Callaghan, both composed post-Geneva.
though his view was that the US “could not avoid diplomatic engagement in a NATO crisis” (Kissinger, 2000) \(^70\). Why then was he against military action by the British? Early on in the crisis, he had told the British Ambassador in Washington that, “he would like to procrastinate until he could see clearly how the forces were balanced”\(^71\). However, what remains, unclear is the point at which the optimal balance of forces would be reached. In a conversation with President Ford, on 10 August, after declaring the British forces in Cyprus inadequate (in fact he informs Ford there are only 1000 British troops in Cyprus, thus giving a figure under a quarter of the correct number, “and a few Phantoms”) he claims that the British plan to use force “[… is purely a political thing. They [the British] could not pull it off. They want to get a crisis started and we would then have to settle it and they would claim credit.”\(^72\)

Is this contradictory? Probably not. It may well be that Henry Kissinger’s policy evolved through the crisis. One could argue (as Asmussen does) that “Kissinger’s crisis diplomacy in Cyprus was a disaster to anybody save himself” (Asmussen, 2008:291), a line Miller also espouses when he states that

\(^70\) According to the Cyprus Task Force, Special Action Group, “Paper No. 1, Cyprus: Issues and Options”, in FRUS, p. 366-374, attached to the Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger, dated Washington, July 22, 1974, the US could deploy in Cyprus approx. 2000 marines (p. 368) and other military forces in under 17 hours -to help with evacuation and protection of US facilities tasks- and another 19,000 men within about a week (pp. 368-9) -to impose a ceasefire. The US Sixth Fleet could also impose a naval blockade around Cyprus within three days (p. 368). However, with the exception of the first option, the other proposals were considered “emphatically undesirable” and “highly undesirable” respectively. What the report appears to judge only the strictly military value of such gestures and seems to fail to take into account the fact that these would be US troops, with high deterrence value. Callaghan, on the contrary, was aware of the military limitations of the British forces in Cyprus, but fully aware of their high deterrence value.

\(^71\) TNA, FCO 9/1898, Washington to FCO tel. no. 2476, 23 July 1974.

\(^72\) Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 10, 1974, 3:40 p.m. in FRUS, pp. 419-20.
“incompetence, not malevolence was the persistent hallmark of his [Kissinger’s] eastern Mediterranean policy”\(^{73}\).

However, one could also consider an alternative approach: the coup against Makarios and –more importantly– the Turkish invasion that followed, presented Kissinger (and initially, the British) with an opportunity to alter the ‘balance of forces’ in Cyprus –and perhaps create a new balance. Kissinger’s agonising about how the new balance of forces\(^{74}\) is shaping up in Cyprus –and how it could be influenced through negotiations– is an indication of such an approach. However, the basic precondition of a new balance (causing a world to be not ‘restored’ but ‘reshaped’, to paraphrase the title of Kissinger’s doctoral dissertation), were the new facts on the ground, i.e. a successful Turkish invasion that did not, at the same time, lead to a strengthened mainland Greek presence on Cyprus. This would explain Kissinger’s approach as regards the Turkish military operations (at least once it was clear Greece could not reinforce Cyprus or go to war with Turkey); the intensive US efforts to prevent the Greek junta from declaring war; and it would also shed light on the US standing largely aloof from the negotiations in Geneva. In this context, it could even be argued that (besides the pressure the US brought to bear to achieve a ceasefire in July), the other occasion when Kissinger really exerted his influence was in Geneva Stage II (in August 1974), in order to make sure the Günes plan (in which 34% of Cyprus passed under Turkish control) was put forward by Turkey; and this again proposed a territorial division along the lines


\(^{74}\) Kissinger uses the phrase “balance of forces” nine times in relation to Cyprus in the minutes of the WSAG meetings of 21 and 22 July 1974 published in the FRUS.
of the ‘rule of thirds’. Acceptance of Turkish territorial aims would also explain his refusal to sanction any initiative even remotely verging on the military by any external actor (the US, Britain, the UN and of course the USSR) – a fact that allowed Turkey, to attain its territorial goals, either by negotiations or, as happened, by military force.

It is true that (as he claims in his memoirs) military action of any sort would antagonise Turkey; it is also true that absence of such moves gave Turkey a free hand in Cyprus. Thus, faced with no military reaction from West or East, the ‘rule of thirds’ was forcibly applied by the Turkish Army, three weeks after the date ‘predicted’ in the Australian telegram and after the US had essentially accepted the territorial division of Cyprus. Thus, notwithstanding the later (September 1974) claim of the US ambassador to Greece that “… the US did not tilt toward the Turks –the balance of forces had tilted in favor of the Turks”, US actions did help shape the balance in Cyprus; neither the military nor the territorial balance, have been essentially altered since then.

Was there an international conspiracy in Cyprus in 1974? The answer lies in the relationship between morality, behavioural norms and realism as a school of international relations. It is true that sometimes we all expect statespersons

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75 According to both British archival material and published sources, the Günes plan was submitted at the request of Henry Kissinger. See TNA, PREM 16/20, UK Miss Geneva to FCO, tel. no. 817, 11 August 1974, particularly paras. 3 and 4. Cf. TNA, FCO 9/1929 ‘Stage III Talks. Negotiations on Cyprus Problems’, 194, letter A. Goodison, FCO to J.E. Conish, British Embassy in Washington, 24 Dec 1974: “At the urging of Dr Kissinger, a solution of this kind [multi-cantonal solution], was tried by Mr Günes in the middle stage of Geneva II”. Cf. Birand (n.d.: 27); Birand does not give the source of his information.

76 Obvious e.g. in his conversation with President Ford, on 9 August 1974: “They have about 15 percent of the island and want 30 percent”, FRUS, p. 419. It is interesting that in the same conversation with Gerald Ford, after under-representing the figure of UK troops (by a factor of 4), Kissinger inflated (by about the same factor) the estimate of land the Turkish army controlled at the time (it was about 4% of Cyprus, See footnote 43, above).

77 The claim was made in the course of a conversation with Constantine Karamanlis. See FRUS, p. 481, Tel. no. 6541, From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State, September 9, 1974.
(statesmen in this case) to behave in a responsible and moral way; however, according to at least one school of international relations, the main aim of foreign affairs is the successful pursuit of security and the national interests. This is what Kissinger expressed when he told President Ford on 13 August that “There is no American reason why the Turks should not have one-third of Cyprus”\textsuperscript{78}. The new ‘balance of forces’ created (or at least, shaped to an extent) by Kissinger’s actions in Cyprus has been the cause of war with all its accompanying stories of pain, dislocation, missing persons and death for both sides in Cyprus. Furthermore, in the self-seeking sphere, it has also created a source of leverage for the USA that has yet to dry up. Immoral as this thought may be considered, this leverage is a resource for any practitioner of international affairs (Fouskas, 2005:45-63 and Lindley, 2007:224-241).

The last point has to be the effect the Cyprus crisis and the developments described above have had on the standing of Britain in Cyprus. It could be argued that Callaghan’s efforts were the last instance when Britain actively took the lead in the efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. This is something that Callaghan himself seems to have realised. Shortly after the events, in a meeting to debate British policy, Callaghan remarked succinctly both on the new British position and on its future standing:

1. \textit{Mr. Callaghan} said that he saw no particular interest in Britain remaining in the forefront of the search for a settlement in Cyprus. He accepted that we had certain obligations but we should move out of the centre of the stage as soon as we could do so honourably. Dr. Kissinger thought Mr. Callaghan should continue to take the lead in the next round of talks. However, he did not like

\textsuperscript{78} Memorandum of conversation between Ford and Kissinger, Washington, August 13, 1974, in FRUS, pp. 423-424.
responsibility without power and for his own part he would not mind moving out from a central position before the next round.  

It may well be that Britain, at the touchline was prepared to accept ‘pragmatic’ solutions as regards territory in Cyprus; however, it subsequently tried to act responsibly, even morally. Since the effect of whatever power it had was negated by external forces, responsibility was a hollow shell. The year 1974 saw the eclipse of Britain from the main Cypriot stage and its official replacement by the US, in a quiet change of guard in Cyprus. Despite the continued existence of the British Sovereign Bases, the situation remains largely unchanged to this day.

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79 Meeting Note, Record of a meeting held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 10 September 1974 at 3.00 p.m. Mr. Callaghan and his officials debate British policy towards Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, [WSC 3/548/3] in Hamilton and Salmon (2006; Item no.89).
Appendix

The Australian Telegram – page 1

Transcript of the handwritten note: “This is Glafkos Klerides [sic] who, I gathered when in Athens is a very good type – not a thing like Sampson. Query, however, whether Klerides would wish to supplant Makarios. He might agree to be “Acting President” [underline and quotes in the original] for a period of time till the dust settled. Kleridis is respected in Athens and Ankara. He would need pretty cast-iron assurances of local support, even as Acting Head. [Sgd] H. Gilchrist.”
6. A major operation is underway to move to the SBA's British citizens and others for whom the British government has accepted responsibility. There are estimated to be about 26,000 civilians involved, including some 2000 tourists. The evacuation today of about 4000, including some Australians by road from Nicosia to Dikela, is reported to have been successfully completed. Another evacuation operation in the Kyrenia area is planned for tomorrow (22 July).

7. The FCO today undertook to ask the Libyan Government on our behalf for permission for Qantas to overfly Libyan territory whilst the crisis in Cyprus continues.

PRIME MINISTER
FOREIGN MINISTER
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MIN AND DEPT DEFENCE
J0
PMS

ACTION: MR MEL Huey/MR SCHULZ
MR RENOUF MR BORDER MR WOOLCOTT MR CURTIS MCO MR PEAKES
MR COOK MR HILL MR HOYLE MR COOPER MR ROGERS MR WILSON
MR PEACHEY MR LAURIE DR CUMES MR PIPES MR GILCHRIST
MR SMITH MR IRUSCOTT MR FOOG MR ROBERTSON
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