Still Europeanised?
Greek Foreign Policy During the Eurozone Crisis

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## Contents

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Europeanisation as De-Politicisation

3. Crisis as Re-Politicisation

4. Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy as Aspect of State Transformation

5. Greek Foreign Policy and the Balkans: From Thwarted to Inadvertent Europeanisation

6. Greek Foreign Policy and European Energy Security: From Challenge to Confirmation of Greece’s European Orientation

7. Conclusion

References

Appendix
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ABSTRACT

This working paper examines tendencies in Greek foreign policy during the Eurozone crisis. Existing analyses of the impact of the crisis on Greek foreign policy have focused primarily on its fiscal/economic effects. Here I shift the focus to the question whether the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy has been affected by the crisis. Given that the EU has been the main strategic anchor of Greek foreign policy since the late-1990s, and that the Eurozone crisis put into question the overall alignment of Greece with Europe, the question of foreign policy Europeanization under conditions of a major crisis of EU governance remains surprisingly understudied. Apart from the mainstream foreign policy Europeanization literature, I also draw on critical works that view Europeanization as a process that de-politicizes state-society relations in Europe and insulates policymakers from public scrutiny. In this framework, I conceptualize the Eurozone crisis as a factor of re-politicization, opening policymaking (incl. in foreign policy) to contestation by mobilized political communities. I apply this conceptualization to the study of Greece’s Balkan and energy security policy between 2010 and 2015.

The findings point to contradictory effects of the crisis on Greek foreign policy. Pro-EU governments in this period largely maintained the EU framework as their reference, but sought to project more forcefully national interests within it to demonstrate the usefulness of the EU for Greek goals and deflect public pressure. An anti-austerity coalition that came to power in early 2015 sought more forcefully to re-politicize some aspects of Greek foreign policy as part of its efforts to ‘renegotiate’ Greece’s relationship with the Eurozone. At the same time however, the overall image of Europeanized Greek foreign policy remained largely unaltered under the Syriza-ANEL coalition, and continuity was even more emphatic after it signed a new bailout agreement with the EU in the summer of 2015. The overall image then is one of continuity that however emerged out of a period of contestation that revealed deep tensions in what had always been an imperfect and instrumental embedding of Greek foreign policy in the EU framework. A de-Europeanization and re-politicization effect in 2010-15 crisis gave place to a renewed foreign policy practice within the EU framework, one however that is even more transparently than during the pre-crisis era the outcome of instrumental and national interest calculations. Europe remains the most effective and most readily available tool of Greek foreign policy, albeit one burdened with even more contradictions than in the past.

Keywords:
Greek foreign policy; Europeanization; state transformation; politicization; Balkans; energy

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1. Introduction

This paper examines how the relationship between Greek foreign policy and the EU has evolved in the years since Greece entered a prolonged economic and political crisis in 2010. Scholarship of Greek foreign policy showed early interest in the impact of the Eurozone crisis on Greece’s external relations. Yet the focus was mostly on the financial constraints on Greek foreign policy (Kouskouvelis 2012; Tziampiris 2013). But as the economic crisis unleashed a debate about Greece’s overall relationship with Europe, enquiring about whether and how Greek foreign policy can remain seamlessly aligned to its main strategic anchor of the last 20 years becomes an important question.

From an analytical perspective, an obvious frame through which to answer this question is the foreign policy Europeanisation literature that has been somewhat dormant since a cascade of interest in the 2000s. The cautious conclusion of the most recent comprehensive collection of texts on the issue was that ‘there is a trend, albeit broad and slow, towards convergence [even if it is] stronger at the level of procedure and of general orientation than it is at the level of detailed policy’ (Wong and Hill 2012: 232). But that volume covered developments only up to the eruption of the Eurozone crisis. Comparative analyses of the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the Europeanisation of national foreign policies have begun to appear. A recent journal special issue that explores this question in Southern member states is an important addition (Stavridis et al 2015). The case study of Greece explored the ways the economic crisis increased domestic resistances to EU pressure for reform of policymaking structures in the area of economic diplomacy (Tsardanidis 2015). Here, I aim to broaden the research focus to include the political and societal context of foreign policy in Greece. This is a point acknowledged by Stavridis et al (2015) in their discussion of a ‘double [democratic] deficit’ in foreign policy, usually far removed from public scrutiny not only at the EU but also the national level.

Consequently, this paper will move beyond the mainstream Europeanisation literature and will draw on critical perspectives on state transformation under the influence of EU membership. Building on this, I view Europeanisation of foreign policy as a process of de-politicisation of national policymaking via its transference to a supranational setting occupied by political and administrative elite networks. Europeanisation is not a neutral process of institutional change, but it signals fundamental shifts in long-standing arrangements linking the state with society. Viewed in this way, Europeanisation of foreign policy is one dimension of a broader phenomenon, namely state transformation under EU membership, and the Eurozone crisis is a juncture in which the accommodation between the state and the EU can well become re-politicised in areas beyond the economy.

This paper examines the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy during the crisis in two policy areas, one regional (relations with the Western Balkans) and one thematic (energy security). These are areas of high salience for EU and Greek foreign policy, and
they both experienced significant developments since 2010. The analysis shows that the Eurozone crisis challenged the Europeanised patterns of Greek foreign policy, mirroring the rapid loss of legitimacy of pro-EU elites and the emergence of Euroscepticism in Greece (Clements et al 2014). But, as the unfolding of the crisis forced the anti-austerity camp to accept the conditions of the financing of the Greek state by the EU, Greek foreign policy’s alignment with EU policymaking processes and priorities was reasserted.

2. Europeanisation as De-Politicisation

‘Europeanisation’ is one of the most used concepts in EU studies (Cowles et al 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Olsen 2002). It denotes the impact of the EU on a state’s domestic institutions, policymaking structures, and politics (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Goetz and Hix 2000). Europeanisation thus takes place in a range of policy areas, and comparative analyses of Europeanisation have indeed examined the cross-policy impact of EU membership.

The current conjuncture in EU politics however, with the Eurozone crisis brewing since 2010, followed by the migration crisis and Brexit in 2015-16, creates the need to study the transformation of the European state under EU membership in a way that acknowledges the political and contested nature of this phenomenon – thus allowing also to examine how foreign policy Europeanisation may be affected when the relationship between EU and member states becomes tense in other policy areas. Europeanisation of foreign policy does not just signify policy change, but it rather represents a deep transformation in an area that has long been considered synonymous with modern statehood.

Here, I draw on Bickerton’s conceptualisation of Europeanised foreign policy as a dimension of state transformation in Europe from the nation-state to the ‘member state’ (Bickerton 2011, 2015). This transformation reflects a process of insulation of political and administrative elites from domestic societal constraints. Whereas in the nation-state sovereignty is exercised with reference to a territorially defined political community, member states legitimise their rule with reference to their elites’ participation in arenas of negotiation and consensus seeking among likeminded experts in EU institutions (Bickerton 2015: 54-55).

The transformation of nation-states into member-states developed in parallel with the emergence of a hybrid form of integration combining supranational with intergovernmental characteristics. As it tried to promote integration in areas close to national sovereignty, the EU developed since Maastricht, next to the supranational first pillar, modes of governance that rely on the voluntary coordination of national governments. Thus, it has increased the ‘intergovernmental character’ of policymaking in the EU, ‘mitigated by a process of socialisation between national civil servants and ministers’ (Fabbrini 2014: 178). Works that see this mode of integration reflected primarily in the work of technocrats and experts describe it as ‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ (Wallace and Wallace 2007). Scholars who focus on the
increased role of national political leaders in EU settings, like the European Council, speak of a ‘new intergovernmentalism’ (Puetter 2014).

Foreign policy in Europe is more Europeanised than what a formal reading of EU foreign policy as intergovernmental veto-driven area would suggest. EU institutions have expanded their capacity since the 1980s, forming an institutional and ideational arena that influences the conduct of national foreign policies (Wong and Hill 2012: 218). Foreign policy in the EU is a dense field, containing intergovernmental institutional characteristics but within a thick framework of norms and practices that, filtered through national interest calculations, inform the style and content of national foreign policy (Alecu de Flers and Müller 2012; Smith 2004; Wong and Hill 2012: 9). As a result, foreign policy Europeanisation is characterised by complexity and contingency (Wong and Hill 2012: 4-5).

Procedurally, national diplomats have become accustomed to informing other EU partners about their views and movements – the so-called ‘coordination reflex’ (Glarbo 1999). Foreign policy style also adapts to the EU preference for liberal and pacified international politics. Sometimes seen as a ‘modernisation’ effect (Wong and Hill 2012: 8), this adaptation causes members to align their rhetoric and foreign policy instruments to those of the EU. Europeanisation can also induce member-states to look in the EU solutions to challenges they would otherwise tackle alone (Economides 2005: 472-482; Moumoutzis 2011: 619). Finally, national foreign policy may be Europeanised when member-states must formulate positions on international issues on which they have little interest or expertise, but which the EU is becoming involved in (Nasra 2011; Wong and Hill 2012: 215).

Central to the mainstream literature on foreign policy Europeanisation are the concepts of ‘downloading’ and ‘uploading’. Downloading refers to member-states adopting EU norms, practices, styles, modes of foreign policymaking and, ultimately, formulations of goals and interests. In this sense, ‘Europeanisation’ concerns EU-induced change at the national level. The second aspect of EU/member-state interaction is the projection of national interests to the European level and the foreign policy outputs of the EU to achieve national goals more effectively – ‘uploading’.

The highest level of EU impact on national foreign policies is when national foreign policies become sincere propagators of EU interests and values – ‘socialisation’ (Larsen 2014: 371). In practice, however, national foreign policies in Europe maintain a significant degree of instrumentality in their engagement with the EU. Socialisation may come about through interactions in bureaucratic settings (e.g. between diplomats in Brussels), and this informs the coordination and information sharing ‘reflex’ that makes up a major part of observable Europeanisation (Wong and Hill 2012: 10).

But member-states can also approach the EU framework with national goals and preferences in mind. For some authors, states adopt EU norms, values and formulations of interest precisely because they see them as beneficial for the attainment of specific
national goals (Moumoutzis 2011: 622-624; Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005). Generally, this analytical divide between sincere and instrumental Europeanisation – when the one or the other occurs, and which one is strongest – is a central problematique of the mainstream literature on EU Europeanisation.

But Bickerton’s framework goes beyond a binary view of foreign policy Europeanisation as an empirical or analytical choice between unabashed pursuit of national interests and sincere adherence to EU norms. Elite negotiations are spaces within which uploading and downloading take place. But while member states have preferences and interests, the EU is a space within which the practice of national foreign policy is transformed under the pressure of routines, communication and interaction at the expert level (Bickerton 2011: 180-181). Thus, Europeanisation of national foreign policy is an aspect of overall state transformation in Europe. In foreign policy as in other policy areas, state sovereignty has disaggregated in the ‘curious drifting apart of politics and bureaucracy’, with elites conducting policy in EU institutions while political communities become deprived of their capacity for control and scrutiny (Bickerton 2015: 58).

3. Crisis as Re-Politicisation

Just like economic policymaking, foreign policy has increasingly become depoliticised by political and administrative elites who prioritise technical negotiation in supranational settings amongst themselves (Bickerton 2011). Thus, Europeanisation of foreign policy raises normative questions similar to those that emerged during the Eurozone crisis: how deepening integration constrains the options of national governments; how the mutual monitoring of elites at the supranational level helps them escape domestic scrutiny; how national representative politics is becoming depoliticised via deliberations on the supranational level (Schmidt 2006) etc.

The Eurozone crisis has been viewed as a challenge to democratic politics in Europe. The ways bailouts divided the EU into creditors and debtors and ‘called into question the principle of voluntary coordination’ (Fabbrini 2014: 192) made evident that the space for independent national policymaking had been reduced by the commonly agreed rules and policies of economic governance in the EU. Consequently, the Eurozone crisis has been linked with reaction to this abrupt and visible loss of national sovereignty, expressed in the rise of protest politics (Kaldor and Selchow 2013) and populist/Eurosceptic parties.

Generally governance crises like the Eurozone and migration crises can be seen as crises of state transformation in Europe that politicise the passage from the nation-state to the member state as conceptualised by Bickerton (2015). They are accentuated expressions of the EU’s ‘state of disequilibrium’ since Maastricht: as national representative politics cannot anymore control and hold accountable political and administrative elites embedded in sheltered settings of supranational deliberation,
popular disenchantment with integration increases (Bickerton et al 2015). Resistance to further disaggregation of representative politics from administration and elite interactions extends to other policy areas if they are also seen as insulated from scrutiny and overtly unrepresentative. The rise of populist parties (anti-immigration in the North, anti-austerity in the South) and the Brexit vote in 2016 are tangible consequences of this ‘state of disequilibrium’.

This perspective dovetails with the key insight in the mainstream Europeanisation literature that domestic politics is a major determining factor of EU’s influence in member-states, countries in the EU’s enlargement zone, and states in the neighbourhood (Pridham 2002; Schimmelfenning 2005; Vachudova 2014). The role of party politics is also addressed in the literature on foreign policy Europeanisation (Smith 2004: 752), yet, as in most other parts of the Europeanisation literature, it has received scant attention (Carbone and Quartapelle 2015: 4; Ladrech 2010). This may be because up until recently party politics in most European countries revolved around a centripetal right-left competition that did not offer itself to contestation of foreign policy (Wong and Hill 2012: 216-217).

An effect of the Eurozone crisis on foreign policy Europeanisation is the change of the domestic context and the increased partisan and ideological contestation of foreign policy and its alignment with Europe. In EU states severely hit by the economic crisis like Greece party competition has realigned around the question of their relationship with the EU, thus making Europeanisation itself a stake of party competition (Bickerton 2015: 60; Katsanidou and Otjes 2015). Parties demanding more popular control over policy outputs will normally question the adaptation of national foreign policy to the norms and processes of the EU framework and will pursue narrowly defined national goals; and pro-European parties will maintain reference to the EU, but be increasingly forced to demonstrate that EU integration serves national interests (Juncos and Whitman 2015).

In this challenging context, the renewed awareness of the tensions between national interests and the coordination outcomes achieved by elites in EU settings should produce a slow veering away from features of EU foreign policy that a national foreign policy had internalised – a process described as ‘de-Europeanisation’ (Stavridis et al 2015; Wong and Hill 2012: 214). There will be less patience, of governments and public opinions alike, with the demands of EU membership. Uploading becomes less frequent or more contentious, as member-states will be more intransigent with regards to the preferences they want to see reflected in EU foreign policy outputs. A weaker EU foreign policy in turn reflects back on the national level, as EU rules, norms, practices and prescriptions that national foreign policies can take recourse to become poorer – i.e. downloading becomes weaker.
4. Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy as Aspect of State Transformation

A view of Europeanised foreign policy as depoliticised consensus-driven technocratic policy pursued among elites and experts of EU member states allows us to conceptualise Greece’s Europeanised foreign policy since the late-1990s as a conscious effort by Greek elites to shelter themselves from a society that had traditionally been very energised over foreign policy; as a way to depoliticise and reformulate political and public debate around foreign policy without compromising core interests of Greece; and as a way to underpin a project of state transformation by demonstrating its effectiveness in a policy area most associated with traditional conceptions of sovereignty.

Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy in the late 1990s was never dissociated from a broader project of ‘modernisation’ of the Greek state (Economides 2005: 475-476). It took place at a time of a conscious decision to anchor Greece to the hard core of European integration, chiefly by participating in the budding Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Ioakimidis 2000). The links between Europeanisation of domestic structures and foreign policy were more than symbolic. For the first 15 years of its EU membership, Greece was seen as a problematic partner due to its insistence in importing its difficult foreign policy issues to Community proceedings. Greek public opinion was also divided, aspiring to join the ‘civilised West’ but also being unsure of the degree to which Greece’s allies understood and supported its interests (Tsakonas 2010; Tsardanidis 2015). Foreign policy always had the potential to disrupt domestic politics and Greece’s relations with the EU (as had happened e.g. with the mobilisation in the early-90s over the Macedonia name-issue).

Domestic and foreign policy Europeanisation proceeded in parallel but closely intertwined. In the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 Greece accepted Turkey as EU accession candidate (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012). This change was presented domestically as a sophisticated way to pursue the national interest, as Greece would make use of the leverage of EU foreign policy to apply conditionality on Turkey (Tsardanidis and Stavridis 2005). The success of making Greek policy goals part of EU considerations allowed the Greek government to legitimise alignment with Europe. But the relationship worked the other way around as well: Europeanisation of foreign policy drew on the popularity of modernisation of domestic structures to be justified. At the time a majority of Greek public opinion was opposed to Turkish EU membership (Tsakonas 2010: 216). Yet the prospect of positive domestic change via the EU was so popular that a foreign policy change presented as commensurate with Greece’s entry to the Eurozone was easily accepted.

Europeanisation of Greece’s Balkan policy, whereby it saw its political and security considerations best served by the Western Balkans’ EU accession, was less controversial but still entailed tensions. Given how much Greece was seen as a difficult EU member during the Yugoslav wars due to its attachment to Serbia, and also given its historically and diplomatically delicate relations with Albania, Kosovo and FYROM, the choice of
Greek elites to pursue relations (and leverage) with the Balkans via the framework of EU (and NATO) enlargement (Mavromatidis 2010: 55) contributed to the depoliticisation of this part of Greek foreign policy as well.

Greece’s alignment to Europe during the 2000s was supported by a convergent and stable two-party system dominated by pro-EU parties (Pappas 2001). The competition between the centre-left PASOK and the centre-right New Democracy effectively preempted any contestation of the domestic agenda of modernisation and the external agenda of Europeanised foreign policy (Chryssogelos 2015). And yet, cracks had begun to appear in this consensus already some years before the Eurozone crisis. In domestic politics, there were increasing signs in 2007-08 that the two major parties were losing their hold over Greek society (Voulgaris and Nicolacopoulos 2014).

In foreign policy, already in 2008 developments in the policy areas examined in this paper demonstrated that the equilibrium of Europeanised foreign policy was becoming shakier2. The government of New Democracy vetoed FYROM’s entry into NATO and made resolution of the name dispute a precondition for FYROM beginning EU accession negotiations (Mavromatidis 2010: 52, 56-57). It also initiated an activist energy policy by partaking in a Russian-backed pipeline project connecting the Bulgarian Black Sea coast with the Aegean Sea. Both moves were popular with public opinion even though they were in tension with the European framework of Greek foreign policy. As mainstream politics were becoming increasingly challenged already before the crisis, big parts of Greek society did not recognise themselves in the Europeanised member state Greece had become.

With the advent of the Eurozone crisis, these pre-existing tendencies intensified. The years after 2010 were a period of rabid contestation not just of austerity but also of Europeanised state-society relations in Greece more generally. The focus of this contestation was of course the economy, but, as has been well documented, anti-austerity politics in Greece did not just concern economic preferences, but also included visions of nationalism (Halikiopoulou et. al. 2012) and radical demands for unmediated representation of popular demands (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). In essence, austerity brought about a re-politicisation of a whole range of state-society relations that, under the influence of EU membership, had entailed (or intended) the insulation of Greek political and administrative elites. As foreign policy had traditionally been a prominent topic of public contestation in Greece, it would be normal for it to become subject to renewed scrutiny and politicisation as the Europeanisation of the Greek state became contested.

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2 Interview with Greek foreign policy expert, Athens, 15 June 2016.
5. Greek Foreign Policy and the Balkans: From Thwarted to Inadvertent Europeanisation

In October 2009 the centre-left PASOK won a snap election and formed a new government led by George Papandreou, foreign minister in the governments that between 1996 and 2004 instituted Greek foreign policy’s turn towards Europe. Papandreou was one of the architects of Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy, and upon assuming office he sought to reenergise the initiatives that PASOK had promoted before its electoral defeat in 2004.

Papandreou had been one of the main promoters of the Western Balkans’ ‘European perspective’ in the early 2000s and was well known to be a moderate in the question of FYROM’s name. In Skopje there was optimism that, with him in power, Greece would soften its stance on the question of FYROM’s membership of NATO and the EU. But these hopes were mirrored by fears in Greece that, as the country was entering economic tutelage, international pressure would spill over into questions of foreign policy and would force Greece into painful compromises. These fears were informed by older tendencies in Greek society that mistrusted the adaptation of Greek foreign policy to the norms, style and tone of EU foreign policy.

These hopes and fears were not unfounded. Apparently, Papandreou explored the potential of a solution and moderated Greece’s stance towards Skopje in 2009-10, frequently meeting with FYROM’s Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. Perhaps not unlike his own efforts to change important aspects of Greek foreign policy at the time of Greece’s convergence towards EMU in the late 1990s, Papandreou saw again foreign policy as linked with Greece’s renewed effort to remain anchored to the euro amidst a mounting financial crisis. But for the anti-austerity front, that combined a rhetoric of economic justice with a patriotic (even nationalistic) logic, this linkage worked in the opposite way: any compromise on foreign policy was not seen as a way to reaffirm Greece’s European orientation, but the result of undue pressures at a time of weakness.

This linkage was forcefully articulated by the new leader of New Democracy Antonis Samaras. Samaras’ political career was inextricably tied with the Macedonian question, as it was he as foreign minister who in the early 1990s put forth a hardline policy of non-recognition of Skopje that ultimately led to his split from New Democracy. Having returned to the party in 2004, Samaras won a surprise victory in its leadership primary in 2009. Even more surprisingly, when Papandreou brought the bailout and austerity program to parliament in 2010, New Democracy voted against it, despite its long pedigree as a pro-European party. For 18 months in 2010-11, New Democracy under

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3 Interview with diplomat, FYROM mission to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2016.
4 According to a European diplomat compromise was much nearer than what was then reported, but Gruevski stepped back. Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 14 May 2016.
5 Interview with diplomat, FYROM mission to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2016. Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 13 June 2016.
6 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016.
Samaras became the main exponent of the ‘anti-memorandum’ camp. Samaras made the link between foreign policy and the economic crisis explicit: in a debate in parliament devoted to foreign policy in January 2011 for example, he warned Papandreou that he would never acquiesce to compromises on foreign policy due to outside pressure on economic matters.

As the crisis and political volatility in Greece deepened from 2011 onwards however, the dynamics changed. Diplomatic observers of developments at the time are in agreement that Greece managed to effectively shelter itself from pressures to be more accommodative towards FYROM precisely because its governments were facing such a domestic uproar over austerity. With the EU interested first and foremost in Greece making it through its reform program, the appetite for initiatives in other fronts decreased.

The changing nature of the Greek party system also contributed to this. Until 2011 party competition was dominated by two big pro-European parties. After 2011 Greece experienced successively a technocratic government, a caretaker government, and finally in 2012 the rise to power of a pro-austerity, ideologically heterogeneous coalition facing an anti-austerity opposition made up of radical far-left and far-right forces. Fragmentation and polarisation meant that there was very little political space for compromises in foreign policy. Thus, as far as relations with FYROM were concerned, the crisis had the paradoxical effect of sheltering Greece from further EU pressures to depart from its long-held positions. The consumption of Greece and its EU partners with the crisis probably contributed to Greece sustaining any pressure created by a ruling of the ICJ in late 2011 in favour of FYROM concerning Greece’s veto of FYROM’s entry to international organisations.

Under the pro-EU coalition of New Democracy and PASOK led by Samaras in 2012-15, initiatives towards the Balkans were limited. This was due to a combination of factors: the bigger attention devoted to other foreign policy portfolios (the US, the Eastern Mediterranean); and the fact that the foreign ministry was led by Evangelos Venizelos, leader of PASOK and vice-president of the government who was much more consumed with domestic politics and the management of the austerity program.

During this time Greece did not depart from its support for the European perspective of the Balkans, but its approach became more selective and utilitarian. The pro-EU coalition’s policy towards the Balkans was consumed with issues touching directly upon the national interest, such as the complications of the ratification of a treaty with Albania on demarcation of the two countries’ Exclusive Economic Zone by the government in Tirana. Reflecting however the embedding of Greek foreign policy in

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8 Interview with diplomat, FYROM mission to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2016. Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 13 May 2016.
9 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016.
10 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 13 June 2016.
European processes and considerations and the government’s overall pro-EU bent, Athens also displayed elements of mounting Europeisation of some of its policies, evidenced for example in Venizelos’ initiatives in warming relations with Kosovo11.

The change of government in early 2015 from a pro-EU to an anti-austerity coalition of the radical left Syriza and the nationalist right Independent Greeks (ANEL) brought about major changes in a variety of policy areas. The new coalition’s expressed intention was to rebalance the relationship between Greece and the EU. By making direct references to national sovereignty, the Syriza-ANEL coalition expressed a far-reaching agenda of undoing the embedding of Greek policymaking in the European framework. The economy was of course the main area where this rebalancing was to take place, but during the same period a mistrust of European and external constraints, norms and procedures became evident in a wide range of public policy domains. The theme running through the new government’s actions was that Europeisation of various policy areas did not just insulate elites from popular scrutiny, but compromised core interests of Greece.

The appointment of Nikos Kotzias as the new foreign minister seemed to follow this logic of re-politicisation and scrutiny of Europeisation of Greek policies. Kotzias, an ex-advisor of George Papandreou who neither belonged to Syriza nor was an elected member of parliament, had positioned himself as a strong intellectual voice of the anti-austerity camp. With regards to foreign policy, he had scrutinised Greece’s dependence on Europe and the West and had advocated for an ‘energetic and independent foreign policy’ to embrace the emergence of new poles in the international system (Kotzias 2010). This attitude dovetailed with Syriza’s intention to explore alternative sources of financing and leverage vis-à-vis the EU, be it from Russia, China or elsewhere.

High-profile foreign policy initiatives of the Syriza-ANEL government that interlinked with its opposition to austerity in the first half of 2015, such as Tsipras’ visit to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin, dovetailed with Kotzias’ earlier advocacy of a more independent foreign policy. A closer view at Kotzias’ actions however reveals a different picture, particularly as concerns areas that remained far from political scrutiny and contestation, such as the Balkans. Here Kotzias followed a policy that did not challenge Greece’s embedding in the EU framework.

Indeed, Kotzias undertook initiatives particularly towards the two Balkan countries that Greece has the most complicated relations with – FYROM and Kosovo. With FYROM, Kotzias succeeded in establishing a dialogue process and agreeing on a set of confidence building measures. He also became the first Greek foreign minister to visit Skopje in 11 years in June 2015. With Kosovo, Kotzias undertook even more impressive initiatives by becoming in July 2015 the first Greek foreign minister to visit Pristina and generally building on Venizelos’ cultivation of this relationship (Maksimovic 2016: 14-16). The Balkans has been the region where Kotzias has demonstrated the greatest activism.

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11 According to a Greek diplomat, Venizelos seriously revisited Greece’s policy of non-recognition of Kosovo. Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 13 June 2016.
It is doubtful whether Kotzias’ policies reflect a sincere socialisation in the tenets of a Europeanised foreign policy and not his personal reading of the diplomatic situation. But the fact remains that his initiatives aligned with Greece’s prior commitments and references to the EU framework, which privileges a careful promotion of national interests framed by an overall support for stability and the region’s European perspective. In both style and substance, Kotzias’ Balkan policy demonstrated an impressive degree of continuity with policies embedded in the EU framework of the previous 15 years, exhibited for example in the reserved tone with which Greece has responded to the heightened nationalist rhetoric of Rama and other elements in Tirana, which has received broad press coverage in Greece (Maksimovic 2016: 13-14), or the explosive political situation in Skopje.

To be sure, Kotzias is trying to reestablish some degree of Greek influence in the region that was severely damaged due to economic weakness and political instability in Athens. But, as already discussed, Europeanisation of foreign policy does not mean a state giving up on its goals or national interests. What distinguishes Kotzias is that, unlike other policy areas during the first Syriza-ANEL coalition, he pursued the national interest largely in conjunction with EU procedures and principles even before Tsipras caved in to the EU in financing negotiations in summer 2015. Given challenges in the region, Kotzias’ diplomacy is much more careful than what an ‘independent and forceful foreign policy’ favoured by the anti-memorandum front’s nationalist ethos (present in ANEL, but also in parts of Syriza) would imply.

On relations with FYROM in particular the sequence of events has been quite interesting. While in the beginning of the Eurozone crisis one could see the prospects of normalisation between Athens and Skopje as thwarted by the domestic situation in Greece, the emergence of political instability in FYROM turned the tables. The authoritarianism of the Gruevski regime alerted the EU to the fact that severe resistances to FYROM’s European course exist inside the country as well, and that Greece’s obstruction had also been used as an excuse by a regime that was more nationalistic and illiberal than pro-European to begin with. As the EU position evolved against Gruevski, it suddenly approached Greek understandings of the problem. In the words of a Greek diplomat, Greek policy on FYROM became ‘inadvertently Europeanised’. For the Syriza-ANEL coalition that since the summer of 2015 has succumbed to Eurozone pressures and is implementing a new austerity package, this alignment between Greek interests and EU positions was a welcome development.

12 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016.
13 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016.
14 Interview with DG NEAR official, Brussels, 12 May 2016. Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 14 May 2016.
15 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 13 May 2016.
16 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 15 June 2016.
17 However, with Gruevski removed from power in May 2017 and a new government in Skopje willing to discuss compromises on the name-issue in order to advance its EU and NATO bids, pressure may begin to mount on Greece again to soften its stance.
Kotzias’ policies towards the Balkans may seem contradictory from the perspective of the social embedding of foreign policy in Greece. His careful cultivation of difficult neighbors like Rama, the deepening of relations with Kosovo, and his dispassionate diplomacy towards the deep political crisis in FYROM may be seen as reflecting Syriza’s rejection of nationalism in the Balkans. But his overtures towards Kosovo contradict the earlier positions of Syriza against any recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral independence, a legacy of the Greek left’s opposition to US interventions in the Balkans in the 1990s (Syriza 2015). His initiatives have also evaded any intense scrutiny from Syriza’s coalition partner ANEL, a party with nationalistic positions on all foreign policy issues including relations with FYROM and Albania18. Whether Kotzias’ policies would enjoy public support if Greece’s Balkan policy were more present and actively scrutinised in the public realm is unclear.

What all this seems to amount to is to reaffirm the insulation of Greek foreign policy from public scrutiny. Again, this may be less due to sincere acceptance of EU norms and priorities and more to Kotzias’ personalised leadership in a zealously demarcated policy fief – an effect further accentuated by the fact that he is neither an MP nor a member of Syriza. The fact that Greece’s Balkan policy had already been depoliticised and bureaucratised by pro-EU governments created a safe space within which Kotzias’ personalised and activist diplomacy could feed in. Here as well, we can speak of inadvertent Europeanisation of the foreign policy of an initially Eurosceptic government, and of a high degree of continuity of policy content and style towards the Balkans (Maksimovic 2016: 17).

All these testify more generally to the steady process of downgrading of the post of Greek foreign minister during the crisis. Traditionally, a high-profile position in Greek politics that was usually occupied by politicians with high ambitions, the post of foreign minister has been banalised since 2010, due to the high turnover of holders (seven different foreign ministers from PASOK, New Democracy and Syriza, including one serving two separate one-month terms in caretaker governments), and its occupation by politicians of lower profile (with the exception of Venizelos). Kotzias represents some continuity with regards to the fact that foreign ministers have always had a high degree of discretion in their actions – a reflection of the personalisation and weakness of institutional procedures in the Greek state. But the high public salience of foreign policy was historically a major check on foreign ministers’ personal agendas. Today, however, what was once one of the most scrutinised domains of Greek public policy has receded substantially from public view and press coverage as attention shifted to economic and public policy issues, allowing the foreign minister to implement policy with little to no reference to broader public considerations.

18 Interview with DG NEAR official, Brussels, 12 May 2016.
6. Greek Foreign Policy and European Energy Security: From Challenge to Confirmation of Greece’s European Orientation

An external dimension of European energy policy became increasingly relevant after the 2006 Russia/Ukraine crisis, when Russia interrupted the supply of gas to Ukraine and by extension to the EU (Tekin and Williams 2009: 419; Umbach 2010: 1230). This raised the question of EU energy security, especially because the new member-states of Central-Eastern Europe were overwhelmingly orientated towards Russia for their gas supplies (Correlje and van der Linde 2006: 532). Energy is an example of the post-Maastricht hybrid governance whereby intergovernmental characteristics were retained – EU member-states are allowed to develop their own energy policies with regards to type and sources of energy they prefer (Goldthau and Sitter 2014: 1455).

But the EU has also developed a growing regulatory framework aimed at the liberalisation of the internal energy market. Thus, national priorities and preferences coexist with common European rules and norms. External energy policy is considered one of the least Europeanised among EU external policies (Wong and Hill 2012: 222). But the external dimension played a crucial role in expanding the EU’s visibility in a policy area where even its domestic liberalisation drives are met with national reticence (Jegen and Merand 2014: 189-190). Europeanisation of a policy area, like energy, may ultimately represent an instrumental view of the EU as promoter of national interests that member-states cannot fulfil (Kuzemko 2014: 67-68), and as a shaper of the EU’s periphery according to the standards and rules that member states already adhere to (Abbasov 2014).

Energy policy in Greece contained tensions between Europeanised market-based and geopolitical visions of foreign policy from early on. The geopolitical vision of Greece’s energy policy as a zero-sum effort to increase Greece’s strategic importance vis-à-vis regional competitors and its European partners has been prominent in journalistic commentary and lay analyses of Greek foreign policy since energy began to emerge as an important issue in the late-2000s – perhaps because it tapped on antagonistic perceptions of Greece’s relations with its neighbors that had been subdued by the Europeanisation project but remained popular in Greek public opinion.

Contrary to this view, policymakers and mainstream analysts (see e.g. Grigoriadis 2008) have held a more nuanced view of the significance of energy for Greek foreign policy. For them Greece’s importance lies in its function as a player of EU energy security, serving goals like the diversification of energy sources and supply routes into the EU. This strand of analysis has seen Greek goals as better served if couched within EU norms of ‘competition’, ‘markets’ and ‘efficiency’. This means that the chief goal of increasing Greece’s importance can very well be achieved in cooperation with Greece’s neighbours, or accepting that that ambitious plans for participation in pipeline projects can be undercut by EU regulations on energy supply, market competition etc.

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19 Interview with Greek energy policymaker, Athens, 14 June 2016.
The juxtaposition of the Europeanised and the geopolitical energy perspectives highlights the contradictions of the ambition of turning Greece into an ‘energy hub’, a goal with broad political support. This goal entails Greece participating in all major pipeline projects in its region – EU-supported ones like TAP or Russia-led ones like South Stream – even if their ulterior political goals are competing. But policymakers conscious of the framework within which Greece operates have embedded the ‘energy hub’ goal within the broader agenda of reliability of energy supply for the EU, despite the geopolitical connotations it evokes among Greek public opinion. In this sense, pursuing Russian cooperation (even after deterioration of EU-Russia relations in 2014) is good for Greece’s international standing as long as it takes place within the confines of EU policy and rules. The EU itself sees no problem in Greece wanting to become an energy hub, as long as its principle of differentiation of sources and routes is respected.

The popularity of the geopolitical energy narrative in Greece rested among others on its adversarial view of Turkey (Tsakiris 2014a: 17) and its implying a strategic alignment with Russia, a country that has long maintained an appeal among broad swaths of Greek society (on the importance of ‘special relationships’ of EU member states with third countries as antagonistic to Europeanisation see Wong and Hill 2012: 226). This contradicted the technical and largely bureaucratised nature of Europeanised energy policy. The Eurozone crisis only increased this tension. From early on in the crisis it was common for anti-austerity politicians and commentators to call on the Greek government to exploit (allegedly) massive energy resources in the Aegean and Ionian seas in order for Greece to escape its financial quandary. On the other side of the divide, it became imperative for pro-EU governments to show that Greece’s alignment with EU goals and norms could produce tangible economic benefits for the country as it plunged into depression.

Next to existing questions regarding pipeline politics in South-eastern Europe that cut across Greece’s relations with the EU, Russia and Turkey, from 2010 onwards the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean entered the calculations of EU energy policy. For Greece, the Eastern Mediterranean energy politics interacted with long-standing foreign policy considerations like the security of Cyprus and the regional influence of Turkey, as well as novel developments like the fallout between Turkey and Israel after the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 (Tsakiris 2014b).

Here as well, the goals of increasing Greece’s influence as transit country for EU supplies and of increasing its geopolitical weight partially overlapped, but also partially contradicted each other. For example, there is a pertinent debate concerning the most efficient way to exploit EastMed energy resources. Some in Greece support the idea of

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20 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 16 June 2016.
21 Interview with Greek foreign policy expert, Athens, 15 June 2015.
22 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016. Interview with Greek energy policymaker, Athens, 14 June 2016.
23 Interview with DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016. Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 16 June 2016.
24 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 16 June 2016.
a pipeline connecting Cyprus with Greece (or alternatively of shipments of LNG from Cyprus to near Athens). But it is unclear if Cyprus has the amount of energy resources to support such a project (Tsakiris 2014a: 11-15). Instead, the EU may see as most efficient to foster a regional energy market that would include Turkey, which could also serve as the main transit country of the region’s gas into Europe. This could make the most commercial sense and agree with principles of market efficiency that the EU is trying to externalise beyond its borders (Abbasov, 2014). But it also would contradict geopolitical readings of Greek energy policy that hold a more adversarial view of Turkey and constitute part of official Greek calculations.

For pro-EU governments in Athens during the crisis it became important to visibly and assertively pursue energy politics, while also maintaining a sensitive balance between public expectations of immediate geopolitical gains cultivated by the ‘energy hub’ rhetoric, and the limitations arising from the framework of EU energy policy. Energy became a way to demonstrate that a cultivation of the EU framework can help Greece achieve its goals, while it also was a way to bolster Greece’s standing among its EU partners. The importance of energy considerations can be gauged by the fact that, unlike the high turnaround of foreign ministers, successive governments in 2009-15, from PASOK’s government of George Papandreou to the technocratic government of Lucas Papademos to Antonis Samaras’s New Democracy-PASOK coalition, maintained the same minister for energy affairs (PASOK MP Giannis Maniatis, with a break in 2012-13 when PASOK did not provide ministers to the government).

With Antonis Samaras as Prime Minister, Greece pursued a particularly active energy policy in its neighbourhood and in the Eastern Mediterranean (Tsakiris 2014a). This was part of Samaras’ effort to construct a narrative of Greece as a beacon of stability in its region in order to offset its loss of status and clout among its EU partners. It entailed positioning Greece as an important transit country for Eastern Mediterranean energy resources, as well as pursuing opportunities both with EU-backed and Russia-backed pipeline projects. In some cases, the Greek government could showcase that an energy policy closely aligned with EU priorities indeed delivered dividends to Greece. This was the case when the TAP pipeline favoured by Greece was ultimately chosen by Azerbaijan as its preferred means of transportation of its gas to Europe. This was a major coup and a great example of how Greece could score points in the ‘pipeline wars’ (as Greek newspapers often call them) in South-eastern Europe by cultivating EU institutions and market players, as well as by acting upon EU market-based principles and norms.

25 Interview with energy policy expert, Brussels, 10 May 2016.
26 Interview with DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016. Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016.
27 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 16 June 2016.
28 Of course TAP also dovetails with the Europeanised framework of Greek foreign policy that views a reformed Turkey as a potential partner in a liberal regional order (Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016). This contradicts the purely geopolitical understanding of energy politics (particularly as expressed by nationalistic circles in Greece). But to the extent that the alternative pipeline to TAP (Nabucco) was completely unpalatable to Greece, the choice for TAP was ultimately a success for Greece regarding transportation of Azeri gas into the EU.
Indeed, the victory of TAP over its rival pipeline project (Nabucco) could be seen as the victory of sound market-based principles (Mikhelidze 2013).29

In other cases, however, the tension between Greek and EU energy policy became palpable, particularly with regards to EU objections to Russian-backed projects like the South Stream pipeline or the (ultimately aborted) purchase of the Greek gas utility by Gazprom (Tsakiris 2013). For the pro-EU elites that guided Greece through the crisis in 2010-15 these apparently contradictory moves were part and parcel of a constant process of interaction and bargaining in EU settings. As one official deeply involved in energy policymaking during this period put it, ‘Europe is an arena of negotiation where you have to pursue your interests and strike bargains; nobody is a priori for or against you’30. For pro-EU governments during this period the EU offered a framework within which the importance of Greece as an energy player could be highlighted, and hence its strategic importance augmented. This entailed however also living with the fact that sometimes EU priorities or regulations contravened immediate Greek material and geopolitical priorities.

The anti-austerity coalition of Syriza and ANEL that entered power in early 2015 took a very different view of energy policy. This was expected, particularly as the leader of ANEL Panos Kammenos had been one of the main proponents of the idea that energy resources, if cultivated purposefully and without interference by outsiders, could deliver Greece out of its economic conundrum. Kammenos expressed essentially an unabashed version of the geopolitical argument, including transparent nods to Russia as Greece’s preferred partner. The picture was further complicated by the fact that the new minister responsible for energy was Panagiotis Lafazanis, the leader of the hard-line anti-euro faction within Syriza. As in various other policy areas, the Syriza-ANEL coalition entered office with the aim of a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between national policymaking and EU membership, looking for immediate gains and assertion of independence.

The new government made it clear that energy would become a way to help Greece escape austerity. This became particularly evident in the much-publicised visit of Alexis Tsipras to Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin in April 2015. While Putin did not commit any serious sum of money to help Greece’s finances, perhaps the most important agreement signed was Greece’s participation in the new Turkish Stream pipeline project, which replaced South Stream as the main avenue of Russian gas into South-eastern Europe (Tagliapietra and Zachmann 2014). The rhetoric of Lafazanis at the time was explicitly antagonistic to EU principles and priorities31. Relevant EU policymakers were highly alarmed at his rhetoric.32

Developments in Greece’s renegotiation with the Eurozone over the terms of its financing however changed the dynamics of energy policy as well. With Tsipras

29 Interview with Greek energy policymaker, Athens, 14 June 2016.
30 Interview with Greek energy policymaker, Athens, 14 June 2016.
32 Interview with DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016.
ultimately accepting a new austerity package, the faction under Lafazanis left Syriza and formed a new anti-austerity party that failed to enter parliament in the September 2015 snap elections. The Syriza-ANEL coalition was re-elected, only this time it was forced to accept a severe undercutting of national independence much like previous governments. In these new dynamics, the importance of energy policy changed again.

Just like previous pro-EU governments, the government of Tsipras now saw the need to showcase that Europeanised policy had benefits for Greece after all. This became strikingly evident in the fanfare with which Tsipras inaugurated the Greek part of the TAP pipeline in Thessaloniki in May 2016, with many EU officials present. The change in tone was drastic, and as a high-ranking EEAS official noted, ‘Tsipras read Samaras’ speech at the inauguration’33. New Democracy, now in opposition, slyly remarked that Tsipras sought ownership of a project for which pro-EU governments had doggedly fought for in the years before Syriza came to power.

In sum, in energy policy during the crisis pro-EU elites feeling the pressure from a worsening economy and a more Eurosceptic public opinion tried to pursue national goals in a more assertive manner, but by cultivating the EU framework in order to highlight Greece’s geopolitical role. This meant accepting limitations on national policymaking in the knowledge that Greece could maximise its influence and gains if it still managed to present its preferences as compatible with those of the EU – a classical process of back-and-forth between uploading and downloading. Anti-austerity forces on the other hand, took a much more voluntaristic view of energy policy as a tool of geopolitics and a bargaining chip in Greece’s relationship with the Eurozone. This was very much the approach of the Tsipras government during its ‘renegotiation’ phase in the first half of 2015. But once it succumbed to austerity, it felt the need to use energy as a positive example of Europeanisation after all, lauding the benefits of EU projects like TAP for Greece’s position as a regional energy player.

7. Conclusion

This paper conceptualised Europeanisation of foreign policy as an aspect of the overall Europeanisation of European states, whose main implication is the de-politicisation of state-society relations. I have argued that the Eurozone crisis, beyond its very tangible economic consequences, can also be seen as an instance of intense re-politicisation and contestation of national political and administrative elites’ embedding in transnational and supranational policymaking processes in the EU and of their sheltering from domestic societal demands. This conceptualisation makes it easier to think how developments in economic policy affect other policy areas, and how dynamics of popular contestation and re-politicisation spill over from one area to the other.

At the same time, this paper also speaks to the mainstream literature on Europeanisation, particularly as this literature has always acknowledged the importance

33 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016.
of domestic political and social dynamics for the pace, depth and content of 
Europeanisation of national structures. The Eurozone crisis has upset much of the pro-
European permissive consensus in many EU member states. These new political and 
social dynamics cut across uploading and downloading in foreign policy, making foreign 
policy-specific mechanisms more complex and open-ended.

The findings on Greece’s Balkan and energy security policies agree generally with the 
findings of Stavridis et al (2015) about a discernible de-Europeanisation of Greek foreign 
policy in the first five years of the crisis. But I understand here this de-Europeanisation 
less in terms of concrete policy outcomes that signal a retreat from EU standards and 
norms, than as a complication of policymaking in the context of partisan realignment, 
social polarisation and intensified scrutiny by a society sceptical once again of whether 
national interests and European commitments truly align.

Under pro-EU pro-austerity governments in 2010-15, this was expressed in a variety of 
ways: curtailing the space for compromise with FYROM, or pursuing a multifaceted 
energy security policy with clear geopolitical overtones that clashed with EU norms and 
priorities on various occasions. The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy had always 
been less a sincere socialisation than a more sophisticated way to pursue the national 
interest, but in the years of the crisis even pro-European elites had to reassert that Greek 
goals can (and must) be served via the EU framework. This was important in the face of 
a public opinion that was induced by the crisis to think once again of foreign policy in 
terms of ‘outside pressures’ on Greece to accept unwarranted ‘compromises’.

At this point, however, I would qualify and go beyond the de-Europeanisation argument 
of Stavridis et al. First, even during the Eurozone crisis, processes of Europeanisation in 
depoliticised policy realms continued. Greece instituted a rapprochement with Kosovo, 
and took great care to embed its energy ambitions in South-eastern Europe and the 
Eastern Mediterranean within the framework of EU energy security needs. Second, one 
can observe instances of inadvertent Europeanisation. What was once considered in the 
EU intransigent Greek policy towards FYROM suddenly became mainstream EU analysis 
in the face of severe democratic backsliding and nationalism in Skopje. And TAP, once a 
marginal project desperately promoted by Greece and Italy, was ultimately chosen over 
the EU-sponsored Nabucco pipeline, thus making Greece an integral part of the EU’s 
Southern Corridor.

Third, and most important, the dynamics of the Eurozone crisis itself pulled Greek 
foreign policy back towards the logic of Europeanised policymaking. The coming to 
power of an anti-austerity coalition in early 2015 signalled the apex of the re-
politicisation of the relationship between Greece and the EU. In foreign policy, this was 
expressed in the instrumentality with which foreign policy issues were pursued within 
the general framework of ‘renegotiation’ of Greece’s financing from the Eurozone. 
Energy was the most visible area of this, with the Syriza-ANEL coalition expressly seeing 
Russian-backed energy projects as leverage in its relationship with the EU.
Yet, even in this early phase the new coalition did not move full-steam toward complete de-Europeanisation of foreign policy. In another case of inadvertent Europeanisation, Syriza’s ideological legacy of leftist internationalism informed a cooperative approach towards the Balkans, which was generally in line with Greece’s Europeanised policy towards the region as had existed before the crisis. This created space for new foreign minister Kotzias to deepen contacts with the region and talk up its European perspective.

More dramatically, the surrender of Tsipras to Greece’s creditors and the re-election of the Syriza-ANEL coalition on an austerity platform in September 2015 created the conditions for a re-Europeanisation effect. The re-politicisation experiment of 2015 and its failure intensified the impression that had set in since the beginning of the crisis that foreign policy was derivative and dependent on Greece’s economic relations with the EU. The Syriza-ANEL coalition intensified the subordination of foreign policy to economic ends, so much so that with its capitulation on the economic front the main parameters of foreign policy fell again in line with the EU, in some cases even more pronouncedly than in the past. Foreign policy thus turned from a field of contestation to a legitimising mechanism, where the benefits of ‘Europe’ can be demonstrated and underpin Greece’s continuous (although never seamless) adaptation to the demands of EU membership. Tsipras’s celebration of the TAP pipeline in May 2016 in Thessaloniki was a visible example of this.

For Greece of course re-Europeanisation is not synonymous to ‘European policy’. Rather, ostensibly radical and populist forces have been successfully absorbed into the logic of the pursuit of national goals in and via Europe. Ironically, this presages further conflict with the EU framework further down the line and does not solve any of the historical contradictions between Greek and EU foreign policy. A left-wing party such as Syriza for example could be well-placed to cultivate the EU’s increasing shift of focus towards decarbonisation and away from mega-projects like pipelines. But Syriza’s legacy of instrumentalising energy for political purposes, along with the Greek state’s longstanding geopolitical goals, ensure that Greek foreign policy will remain focused on pipeline politics and the ambition to turn Greece into an energy hub for a long time. By the same token, Syriza would be ideologically better-placed to pursue a solution of the Macedonia name issue, but this looks impossible given the coalition’s reliance on ANEL support.

Given the complicated matrix created by the goals of the Greek state and its commitment to EU integration, once anti-austerity parties now in office have few tools in their disposal to manage the contradictions of complex policy issues outside of Europeanised — i.e. depoliticised and bureaucratised — policymaking. As one Greek diplomat put it, ‘it was the crisis that brought Syriza to power and it was the crisis that tamed it’.

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34 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016.
35 Interview with DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016.
36 Interview with Greek diplomat, Athens, 13 June 2016.


Tsakiris, Theodoros (2013): ‘Cries and Whispers: Why Did the Russians Withdraw from the DEPA/DESFA Tender and What Does This Mean for Greece’s Position in the Southern Corridor?’ Athens: ELIAMEP Briefing Note 20/2013 [in Greek].


Appendix

INTERVIEWS

1. Diplomat, FYROM mission to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2016.
2. Energy policy expert, Brussels, 10 May 2016.
3. DG NEAR official, Brussels, 12 May 2016.
4. DG ENER official, Brussels, 12 May 2016.
5. EEAS official, Brussels, 13 May 2016.
7. EEAS official, Brussels, 31 May 2016.