

Greece and Spain from the Dictatorship to the European Economic Community: The Bilateral Relations During the Negotiations for EEC Entry, 1975-1984.*

Sethelos Isidoros Balios
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Abstract.

Just after the beginning of the democratization of Greece and Spain, the EEC membership became the main objective of the foreign policy of both governments. Konstantinos Karamanlis' government presented the Greek application in the summer of 1975, shortly after the approval of the new Constitution. His Spanish counterpart, Adolfo Suarez, did the same two years later, in July 1977, after the first democratic elections. Greece joined the EEC in January 1981 and Spain five years later, in 1986. Using unpublished primary material and other available sources, this paper will focus on the way that the common aim of the recently democratized countries affected the relation of the Greek and Spanish governments. Starting point will be the presentation of the Greek application and the paper will conclude with the facts of December 1984, when the Greek socialist government threatened to veto the Spanish and Portuguese accession.

The democratic transition and the EEC membership.

In less than a week after the approval of the new Constitution, Konstantinos Karamanlis' government officially applied for full EEC membership, on 12 June 1975. In his address to the ambassadors of the "nine" and to the Greek people, the prime minister emphasized the political reasons that led his government to apply for full membership, mainly the need to secure the newly established democratic institutions (Svolopoulos 1996). Moreover, other reasons that made the EEC desirable, was the necessity to secure the international position of Greece, after its exit from the military section of NATO, although the American and German government warned that the EEC should not be seen as alternative to the NATO membership (Economides 2014; Rizas 2008). Greece of course had an Association Agreement with the EEC, dated from 1961, making it the first associated country. Karamanlis had already chosen the EEC instead of EFTA in 1959, two years prior to the aforementioned agreement, mainly because of the presence of France and Germany and the more positive aspects for the Greek agricultural economy.

Francoist Spain also applied for an association agreement with the EEC in 1962, only after the eventual success of the EEC over the EFTA (Moreno Juste 1998). Moreover, it only achieved the Preferential Agreement of 1970 of economical nature, which was politically much inferior to the Athens Agreement. The main reasons for the different treatment of the two countries by the Community were mainly political, that is, the

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dictatorial regime of Spain which initiated the discussion of the political limits that an association agreement should have (Fernandez Soriano 2010). Additionally, the geostrategic position of Greece and the necessities of the Cold War must also be taken into account for the generally better treatment of Greece compared to Spain, not only during the 1960s, but also over the next decade. In 1962, moderate politicians that had supported Franco's regime and exiled opponents, made a common declaration in Munich, asking the EEC to turn down the Spanish application due to the lack of democracy. Gradually, the EEC was perceived in Spain as equivalent to democracy and, even for moderate members of the regime, the existence of the dictatorship was an obstacle for the relation between Spain and Europe.

Shortly after the first democratic elections, the democratically elected government of Adolfo Suárez applied for full membership to the EEC, on 28 July 1977. The reasons were mostly political and, as in the Greek case, the incorporation to the EEC was considered important in order to secure the new democratic institutions and it actually became the main objective of the Spanish foreign policy (Nuñez Peña 2013). In Spain, there was general consensus among the political parties with parliamentary representation, while in Greece the socialist and orthodox communist party (PASOK and KKE, respectively), rejected the EEC membership as being a negative evolution for the national interests (Alvarez de Miranda 1996; Verney 1989). Furthermore, it is in our belief that the main difference between the two countries lies on the different position of the socialist parties, taking into consideration that Spain lacked a pro-soviet communist party with parliamentary representation. In any case, the EEC membership was the principal target of the southern European governments.

Global approach or individual candidates?

On 20 July 1977, the Spanish foreign minister Marcelino Oreja called the Greek ambassador Georgios Gavvas at his office at Santa Cruz Palace. Oreja told the Greek diplomat that he was very disappointed at receiving the information that the Greek government was upset with the forthcoming Spanish application. Gavvas denied this information and added that the Greek application was totally different, due to the Association Agreement and the advanced stage of the negotiations¹. Meanwhile, the Greek government was aware that in January 1976 the predecessor of Oreja, Jose Maria de Areilza, who was the first minister of the Juan Carlos' Monarchy that visited the EEC capitals, expressed the opinion to the German foreign minister that once Spain presents its application to join the EEC, it has to be considered with the Greek application concurrently². In February 1977, the president of the European Commission Roy Jenkins stated that a global approach of Greece, Spain and Portugal would be the best way for the EEC to deal with the new enlargement, (Karamouzi 2014: 90). But the

¹ Τηλεγράφημα από ΥΠΕΞ προς ΜΑ ΕΟΚ, πρεσβείες Παρισίων, Ρώμης, Βόννης, Λονδίνου, Κοπεγχάγης, Χάγης, Βρυξελλών, ΑΠ 6422.1/94/ΑΣ2365, 21 Ιουλίου 1977, ΥΠΕΞ, ΥΔΙΑ, πρεσβεία Λονδίνου 1979, 2.5, Σχέσεις ΕΟΚ-Ισπανίας.

² Τηλεγράφημα ΥΠΕΞ προς πρεσβείες Βρυξελλών, Κοπεγχάγης, Λονδίνου, Παρισίων, Ρώμης, Χάγης και Μόνιμη Αντιπροσωπεία ΕΟΚ, ΑΠ 6422.1/ΑΣ59, 16/1/76, *ibid*.

Greek government, even before 1977, would use the aforementioned arguments to separate Greece from the Iberian countries.

Raimundo Bassols, the permanent representative of Spain to the EEC, in two telegrams sent in 1977 and 1980 to Marcelino Oreja and the newly appointed EEC minister Eduardo Punset respectively, explained why July 1977 was the best moment to present the application for full membership. Among other things, he mentioned to the former the necessity to “globalize the problem” of the enlargement, while he explained to the latter that the government didn’t wish to distance Spain from the other applications (Portugal presented its application in March 1977). He also added that there were “practical and prestigious reasons” (Bassols 2007: 268-71). It is evident that Spain was trying to benefit from the mainly political significance of the Greek application. The Greek government, with the fear that the connection to Spain would have unknown but certainly negative implications, made an extensive diplomatic and political effort to separate the Greek application from the Iberian countries and managed to officially separate the Greek case in February 1978 (Karamouzi 2014: 127). As Rizas (2013: 90) points out, the main reasons for the eventual separation of the Greek candidacy were the existence of the Association Agreement, the presentation of the application two years ahead of the Iberian countries which created an important political advantage, the election of 1977 that made the Eurosceptic PASOK the main opposition party and the realization that the experience with Greece could be used as precedent for the Iberian enlargement.

Greece member-state of EEC and Spain candidate country.

When Greece signed the Association Agreement on 28th of May 1979, Konstantinos Karamanlis declared to the Spanish journalists that he wanted to see Spain as Community member the soonest possible (ABC, 29 May 1979). The very next day, the Spanish minister of Relations with the EEC Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, informed the Spanish *Cortes* that the Greek accession would not have significant impact on the Spanish case, estimating that the conclusion of the negotiations would be before 1981. He also said that his department would study the Greek treaty in order to take some lessons for their own negotiation process³. Even before the final separation of the three applications, the prime minister Adolfo Suarez, in August 1977, told the Spanish ambassador in Rome that while Greece had almost succeeded in separating itself, the two countries should cooperate closely for the common aim⁴. Until then, the two countries didn’t have any significant bilateral relationships at governmental level and after the abolition of the monarchy in Greece, even the official union the two Royal Houses, ceased to exist. But after 1977, the relationship between the Greek and Spanish government, gradually strengthened.

³ Diario de las Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores, 29 de mayo de 1979.

⁴ Τηλεγράφημα από Δ/ση ΕΟΚ προς ΜΑ ΕΟΚ, πρεσβείες Μαδρίτης, Χάγης, Λονδίνου, Βόννης, Βρυξελλών, Παρισίων, Κοπενχάγης, Λισσαβώνας, Δουβλίνου, ΑΦΦ 5015.1/29/ ΑΣ 135, 2 Σεπτεμβρίου 1977. ΥΠΕΞ, ΥΔΙΑ, *ibid*.

Moreover, until the general elections of 1981 in Greece, the two countries exchanged several official visits at ministerial level. For instance, Calvo-Sotelo made an official visit to Greece in the summer of 1979 and his Greek counterpart returned the visit in September 1980. Georgios Rallis was the first Greek foreign minister who officially visited Madrid after the fall of the dictatorships. Hence a visit of certain symbolism that also included a non-protocolary audience at the royal palace. Marcelino Oreja's successor, José Pedro Pérez-Llorca, visited Athens in summer 1981. During these visits, Spaniards asked for the Greek official's guidance at technical and political level and, of course, they frequently asked for the Greek support. A good example is the discussion between Raimundo Bassols – who, as Secretary of State for the EEC accompanied Pérez-Llorca to Athens - and the Greek diplomat Byron Theodoropoulos. The experienced Spanish diplomat asked his interlocutor for his advice about the problems that they had with the EEC negotiations. Theodoropoulos gave him his assistance but said that it would be difficult for his government to justify the Spanish treaty of accession in the Hellenic Parliament, in case it included much more positive terms than the Greek ones⁵.

In the occasion of the visit of Georgios Rallis in Madrid, the Greek Foreign ministry elaborated a report on the bilateral relationship. Regarding the Spanish entry to the Community, it was emphasized that despite the negative economic aspects for Greece due to the very similar agricultural products and the size of the Spanish productivity, the Spanish accession should receive the Greek support, mainly for political reasons and the strengthening of the Mediterranean region in the Community. But it was emphasized that the Spaniards should understand that their application caused several problems to Greece, which has already “paid the price” to them. Moreover, it was said that, contrary to the Spanish desire, Greece would participate in the negotiations and should give its parliament approval of the enlargement⁶. These arguments along with the necessity for more financial support by the EEC, would be central during the bilateral visits exchanged.

The socialists in government: Solidarity or national interests above all?

In the elections of 1981, PASOK won with the 48% of the votes. Twelve months later, in October 1982, PSOE won the majority on the *Cortes* with a similar percentage. For the Spanish socialists the road to European social-democracy proved to be an easier path to follow compared to PASOK (Pappas 2009) and they had supported the European project from very beginning. On the contrary, PASOK had officially an antieuropean stance. The two parties managed to sustain a notable relationship, mostly in the *Conferences of the Socialist Parties of Southern Europe* and to exchange bilateral visits. Moreover, although PASOK maintained its antieuropeanism till late 1980s, after the elections of 1977 a turn to proeuropean positions was noticeable, especially in meetings between Andreas Papandreou and foreign officials (Nafpliotis 2019). This

⁵ Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών, Δ' Διεύθυνση Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων, 17 Ιουλίου 1981, ΑΠ 3510/98/ΑΣ1533, ΥΔΙΑ, ΥΠΕΞ, Πρεσβεία Λονδίνου 1980 4.5, τμ. 2/2.

⁶ Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών, Διεύθυνση Ευρωπαϊκών Κοινοτήτων, «Η ένταξη της Ισπανίας στην Κοινότητα», ΙΚΚ, Αρχείο Κωνσταντίου Καραμανλή, 130^a521604-521615.

shift was accompanied by an intention of strengthening the relationships with the socialist parties of southern Europe, especially from 1980 and onwards. Additionally, the financial support that Greece was receiving from the EEC, was instrumental to justify the turn to proeuropeanism (Botsiou 2015).

During the bilateral visits exchanged between Athens and Madrid, Papandreou declared his support to the Spanish accession, expressing the view that it would change the internal balance of the Community for the better. In 1983, as the first prime minister that visited Madrid, he added that the reform of the economic policy of the EEC was connected to the enlargement. Therefore, a continuity of the arguments between the conservative and socialist governments is noticeable. While in the second half of 1984 the conclusion of the Spanish negotiations seemed to be rather a question of months, the Greek government was highlighting to the member states that the final approval of the Integrated Mediterranean Programs was connected to the enlargement. During the Dublin Summit held on 4-5 December 1984, Andreas Papandreou unexpectedly announced that his government would veto the Iberian enlargement in the next summit, if the EEC did not approve the IMPs. On the same day, his Spanish and Portuguese counterparts received a letter, where the Greek prime minister informed them that while Greece was fully supporting the enlargement, his government was unwilling to accept any impact on the economy and therefore to the Greek people. When this issue was discussed in the Hellenic Parliament, *New Democracy* criticized the strategy used by the government rather than the connection between the IMPs and the enlargement. Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate on the consequences that the Greek attitude had on the outcome of the enlargement and generally Spain's reaction was temperate⁷. But the correspondent of the newspaper *La Vanguardia* in Dublin was very disappointed by the unknown implications of the Greek attitude. According to Costas Simitis (2015: 300-01), the entrance of the Iberian countries in the EEC and the establishment of the IMPs, marked the final acceptance of the EEC by PASOK.

Conclusions.

In late 1988, shortly before the end of the Greek presidency of the European Council and the beginning of the first Spanish one, the Spanish ministry of Foreign Affairs elaborated a report, which was delivered to the cabinet of Felipe Gonzalez. It said that, despite the fact that Greece and Spain shared common interests regarding the Community, Greece had the tendency to secure its own, when necessary⁸. The integration to the EEC, common objective of the two newly established democracies, had a significant impact on the bilateral relationships of Greece and Spain. The two countries started to exchange frequent governmental visits and Greece offered significant help to the Spanish negotiation team⁹. Therefore, despite PASOK's veto threat and the problems caused to the Greek government by the Spanish application, the impact was not necessarily negative. On the other hand, the EEC membership and

⁷ Interview of the author with Mr. Theodoros Pangalos, Athens 19 January 2018.

⁸ Proyecto informe al Consejo de Ministros sobre la presidencia española CEE, AGA, AMAE legajo 64/03775, 507, carpeta 2.

⁹ Interview of the author with Mr. Raimundo Bassols, Madrid 26 March 2018.

the need to secure national interests, eventually put limits to the solidarity between these two socialist parties.

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Ioannis Chalkos, PhD Researcher, Department of History and Civilization, European University Institute.

Title: Adjusting Greece to a Novel Era: Dilemmas of the Cold War, European Integration and the new international agenda, 1974-83.

Abstract

This project takes Greece as a case study of Southern Europe in the last phase of the Cold War and places emphasis on interactions between national foreign policy priorities and international developments involving the adjustment of a small state to the trends of the new post-industrial era. The working hypothesis is that the modernization of foreign policy and the democratic transition were interactive processes. They involved Cold-War related issues, Greek-US and Greek-NATO relations, participation in European integration, but also the rising international agenda of human rights, scientific and environmental cooperation with its profound impact on modernization. With the existing literature focusing more on problematiques such as the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy or its dependence on the US, this study aspires to historicise the period of Metapolitefsi and put it in an international historical perspective.

Although the 1970s are widely perceived as an era of crisis in the Western world, recent literature has pointed out that this decade was primarily a period of transition of the industrial societies to a new post-industrial era, which entailed systemic changes in the models of governance and in international affairs (Ferguson 2010; Pons and Romero 2011). These changes involved a variety of fields: the growing importance of economic and monetary issues, the energy crisis after 1973, the rise of the human rights agenda, technological advancements, and the environment (Krige 2006; McNeill 2000). They also called for a widening of international cooperation going much beyond the traditional confines of the international system of states. Consequently, interdependence among nation-states increased, while the role of the nation-state as the prime international actor was being diluted by the emergence of new challenges and supranational actors. Thus, international relations underwent deep qualitative changes and the overarching Cold War could not be left unaffected. In this all-encompassing struggle for “the soul of mankind” (Leffler 2007), the West had to prove that it was capable of meeting the challenges of late modernity in order to win the approval and legitimacy of its citizens. At the same time, détente and the globalization of the Cold War through its expansion to the Third World posed new challenges to the relations between the two blocs, and also among their members.

By taking this background into account my research project aims at contributing to the rapidly growing discussion on the evolution of Europe in the 1970s. It takes Greece as a case study of Southern Europe in the last phase of the Cold War and places emphasis on the interactions between national foreign policy goals and international developments that involved the adjustment of a small country to the trends and the demands of this new era. Interestingly, in the case of Greece, this adjustment had to take place under unusual conditions; after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the subsequent fall of the military regime. These processes of adjustment and transition to democracy were linked with the general problem of Western legitimization, since Greece along with Spain and Portugal became test cases for the

viability of the Western model, thus, adding a strong Cold War dimension to the process. The chronological scope of the study will be from the fall of the junta in 1974 until 1983, when a consensus was achieved on foreign policy objectives by the political leadership of the country - after a short period in which its external orientation (EEC and NATO) was disputed by the new socialist government of Andreas Papandreou.

My hypothesis is that the democratic transition and the modernization of foreign policy were interactive processes, involving the adjustment to major international trends. In fact, Greece's domestic structures and the evolution of its internal politics have always been in close correlation with its external orientation and its place in the international system. The fact that the major internal conflicts of the 20th century, the National Schism and the Civil War, were disputes over the country's international position is very telling. As recent literature has shown, Greece's modernization had been connected with its position in the Cold War as a "front-line state" since the 1940s (Hatzivassileiou 2006). The dual nature of the Cold War as a strategic and ideological confrontation and Greece's military and economic dependence on the West (mainly on the US) affected its internal development profoundly, and sometimes at the expense of Greek democracy (Papahelas 1997). The fall of the military regime was instigated again by an external factor, the Cyprus debacle, which upset the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance, while instability prevailed all over the Mediterranean because of the parallel transitions in Portugal and Spain, the rise of the Left in Italy, the Soviet naval presence in the area and the fragile balance in the Middle East. The importance of the external factor in the Greek transition was also evident in the internal discourse. After the shock of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, the country's position in the Western camp was criticized harshly by the public opinion, which demanded a more "independent" stance in the international arena. Although Konstantinos Karamanlis, the Greek Premier, was powerful enough to secure Greece's Western orientation, the prevailing anti-Americanism and anti-westernism "served" as Susannah Verney notes "to reopen the problem apparently settled by the Civil War: what was Greece and where did it belong?" (Verney 1990: 219).

However, it is not my intention to give a detailed account of particular specific issues of Greek foreign policy (for example, the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean and Cyprus), but to delve into issues concerning the adaptation of Greece to the new trends of the 1970s, and to discuss the extent that these formed integral parts of the transition to democracy. Thus, two levels of analysis will be employed; one related to the strategic decisions vis-à-vis the West and the East (high politics) and one that entailed lower-level cooperation (mostly, multilateral) in fields such as the "new frontier issues" involving modernization and consequently a close identification to the value system of the West, in which Greece anticipated to become an integral part. In a few words, adjustment had to be comprehensive, not a la carte, and to cover all aspects of the new international agenda.

First of all, some clarifications are necessary regarding two principal processes in which Greece was deeply involved: European integration and the Cold War. Although the two historiographies rarely communicate with each other, these were autonomous but intertwined phenomena with constant interactions between them

(Ludlow 2010). This is most evident in the examination of the Western approach towards Greece, where the security considerations of both the Americans and the Europeans were dominant in their course of action (Karamouzi 2014). Consequently, European integration became consciously or unconsciously a Cold War tool in the hands of the West with large influence on the “periphery” of Western Europe. Additionally, Greece was a European “front-line state” with its domestic institutions and its foreign policy shaped to a large extent by the Cold War. This could not change within some years after 1974 because the strategic considerations of the Greek policymakers moved from the North (Warsaw Pact) to the East (Turkey). Ioannis Stefanidis argues that since nationalism was more powerful than Atlanticism in Greek society and the Greek strategic considerations changed after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Cold War ended for Greece in 1974 (Stefanidis 2018). However, the country continued to function within the same framework as in the pre-1974 period, even though important changes occurred both domestically and internationally. Moreover, as I hope to prove in my dissertation, the Greek policymakers continued to be preoccupied with the ‘Soviet threat’ and thus to safeguard Greece’s links with NATO. Thus, the Cold War ended for Greece in 1991, as it did for every other country involved. Nevertheless, it could be argued that with the establishment of democracy and the extinction of the repressive anti-Communist state Greece’s position in the Cold War was ‘normalized’ and started resembling that of the other Western European States.

The studies that focus on Greek foreign policy usually adopt a narrower national approach, which although has its own merits, fails to grasp the fluidity of the international environment and the transnational nature of the challenges posed in the Cold-War or European context. These works emphasize on two different but interrelated problematiqués: the dependence-independence dichotomy and the debate on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy. According to the former, Greece’s economic and military dependence on the US until 1974 did not leave any space for political maneuver and compromised Greece’s national interests, which had to be submitted to the wider US Cold War considerations. Although literature has proved that there were specific limits in the US hegemonic power (Iatrides 2003), the post-1974 period is considered as a permanent quest for independence for Greek foreign policy, which now had to deal with a direct threat to the country’s national integrity emanating from Turkey’s revisionist policies (Van Coufoudakis 1988; Kassimeris 2010; Veremis 1982). Although this approach is not far from reality, it fails to include the wider changes in the international system. However, it highlights the primacy that the triangle among Greece, Turkey and the US had for Greek security, namely for the preservation of the balance of power in the Aegean (Couloumbis 1983). Furthermore, the goal of independence was prevalent both in the political discourse and in the minds of Greek policy-makers after their disappointment from their allies due to their stance in the Cyprus debacle. It has to be noted that the majority of these studies were published only some years after the events without relying on primary sources, and thus reflect the political debates of their time.

The dependence-independence debate can be considered as the other side of the coin of the discussion whether Karamanlis’ domestic policies constituted a break with the past or it was just a continuation of the foreign interventions and of the post-

civil war ‘guided democracy’. For example, Andreas Papandreou described the surrender of power to Karamanlis as a mere ‘change of NATOic guard’. However, literature contends that the policies implemented constituted a radical departure from past practices and gradually established the most openly democratic regime in Greek history (Diamandouros 1986; Voulgaris 2002). It is evident that this dimension of foreign interventions in domestic politics permeates both bodies of literature and highlights the blurred relationship between the domestic and the external realms of policy.

The debate on the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy also exhibits a strong presentist dimension. Conducted mainly by political scientists, it attempts to evaluate the influence of EEC/EU in Greek policy and vice versa. Even though scholars disagree on the degree of Europeanization (Economides 2005; Kalaitzidis 2010; Stavridis 2003), there are some interesting aspects of this approach. Spyros Economides argues that during the period 1974-81 there was an evident process of bottom-up Europeanization of Greek foreign policy. This means that Greece used the power of the EC both to promote its own foreign policy goals, as every member state did, and also to make its national interests important issues in the context of EC itself (Botsiou 2005; Economides 2007). On the other hand, Panayotis Ioakimides suggests that Greece obtained a complete foreign policy only after its accession to the EEC in 1981. Thus, according to this argument after 1981, Greek foreign policy experienced an unprecedented sectoral expansion, institutionalization, it maximized its negotiating power, and accepted constraints which confined it to rational and moderate choices (Ioakimides 2007). Without disputing Ioakimides’ argument this study will test and hopefully prove that these characteristics became manifest in Greek foreign policy immediately after the restoration of democracy as part of Greece’s adjustment to the international system.

It is evident that both the “dependence” and “Europeanization” approaches emerged as scholarly responses to contemporary events and discourses. This study aspires to historicize the period of Metapolitefsi (regime change) and to put it in context with the wider historical processes that took place in international affairs. By historicizing Metapolitefsi I do not only deal with the foreign events that happened during this period, but I also attempt to historicize the mindsets and the worldviews that produced the aforementioned explanations of Greek foreign policy. Thus, it could be integrated not in a strict Europeanizing process or into an adventure to safeguard Greek independence, but into a modernizing process which was closely interrelated with the stabilization of democracy. In Cold War terms, democracy meant political stabilization and thus Western external orientation. In terms of foreign policy, modernization meant multilateralization, security, and also acceptance of the interdependence among nation-states.

The bibliography on specific themes of Greek foreign policy could be compared to a map of the Aegean: a lot of islets of literature but the dark sea occupies the majority of the map. Therefore, a comprehensive study on Greece’s international strategy and on its interactions with the major actors and trends of the international system is still missing. This bibliographical gap I aspire to fill through my dissertation. The main research question could be summarized as follows: how a small country like Greece tried to be integrated into the international system and

particularly the West when at the same time its national interests encouraged confrontation (withdrawal from NATO, imminent war with Turkey), how it sought more autonomy in an increasingly interdependent world by entering a supranational organization, and finally how this process was perceived and dealt with by the most important actors of the system (both nation-states and international organizations).

Methodology

As argued, this is not intended to be a national history, but a holistic approach which sets Greece as the locus of the study and tries to interpret the attitudes of the various actors involved. Thus, the subject of the study falls into the rather vague field of international history. It is true that International History has experienced an impressive expansion during the last decades. It benefited greatly from the cultural and global turns, and from new linguistic and post-modern approaches, which although questioned its epistemological foundations, gave also the impetus for the development of new research agendas and fresh approaches that contributed both to its renewal and to shake off its characterization as a conservative field (Finney 2005). However, the rush with which many historians celebrated the extinction of the nation-state as an analytical tool and their overemphasis on transnational and supranational historical narratives sometimes lead to a diluted picture of many historical processes in which the nation-state, even though weakened, continued to play a decisive role.

With the debate on the essence of International History being still alive, some historians emphasize the importance of the systemic approaches and call for a return of the field to its roots, namely the conditions of war and peace (Maiolo 2018), others apply transnational and supranational approaches (Clavin 2005), and others argue that the history of the foreign relations of a given state must comprise both a 'national history' – focused on 'the internal constellation of forces'—and an 'international history' - focused on the external forces that influence and constrain its encounter with the wider world (McMahon 2004). Based on the assumption that the nation-state as an analytical tool has still much to offer in explaining international affairs in the era of globalization, this study contends that the 'national lenses' of the primary actors are equally important with the inter/transnational ones in understanding international developments. Thus, this project aims at transcending the limitations of traditional diplomatic history and, thus, merging international with European history, while examining them from different angles. Through a multi-level analysis, it will present a prime emphasis on interactions between various national actors and international organizations, with the aim to point to the complexity of the adjustment of a small state in the international system of the 1970s. The study will also try to avoid as much as possible simple overviews of diplomatic fronts, something very common in traditional diplomatic history. Instead, I opt for a synthetic approach which will allow to draw the main lines of an interpretative scheme that goes deeper than the diplomatic events or the visits of statesmen and puts foreign policy issues and perceptions in their wider historical perspective.

Through this approach I aspire to reintegrate the nation-state in International History, but not in the traditional way of examining bilateral relations or presenting

the foreign policy of a single country, but by presenting an “international history of Greece” with all its complexities and interactions.

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Culture and Political Identity: Communist Parties and their effort to win the hearts and minds of voters in the 70's and 80's

Charalampos Panagiotidis, PhD Student, University of Peloponnese, Department of Political Science and International Relations

The Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the Greek Communist Party-Interior (KKE-interior) and their youths organized annual festivals where they expressed their cultural orientation, creating a bipolar set. On the one hand was the progressive way, which was of high quality represented by the communists and generally the left political spectrum, and on the other mass culture, both imported and domestic. The latter caused alienation from the original will of the people. By promoting their way of thinking, they also promoted their view of how economy should work. In this aspect, culture and political statements were considered as one and handled as a unified body.

Introduction

In the mid 1970's, communist parties, both interior and exterior, were legalized in Greece, after almost half a century of illegal political engagement. Both had great influence among the youth, as the traditional political elite was much more conservative in various aspects of social life. The wide depth of organizational skills their members acquired over the previous years were used to attract new members, especially future voters. They set in motion their youth organizations, ie KNE (Communist Youth of Greece) and EKON (Greek Communist Youth)-Rigas Fereos (EKON-RF). Annual festivals were held by both parties-youth organizations, among other cultural events and efforts to influence the public. Those festivals included pre-festival or local festival activities throughout the country and ended with major events in Athens, such as music stages, political discussions, poetry reading, various exhibitions and special features. Even though both parties shared a common ideology, their approach to cultural matters was different. They both tried to motivate a turn to tradition to oppose the imported American way and to help the cultural expression of individuals in every community. For KKE, entertainment was class-oriented and thus the working class had a distinguished cultural expression, unlike mass-culture imposed by the media. On the other side, KKE-interior faced a lot of problems in attracting new voters and members and for that reason they tried to increase their appeal via cultural events and cultural organizations. The objective for both was to develop class consciousness to all workers.

KKE-interior

The struggle between KKE and KKE-interior over the hegemony in matters of communist ideology was fierce and sometimes even violent. Culture was an aspect of this struggle and was expressed through cultural and youth organizations and their annual festivals. For KKE-interior it was important to approach youth in order to have an advantage against KKE in attracting more future voters. Establishing and getting involved in cultural organizations was a discreet way to approach people in a non-political way (ASKI¹, EKON RF's Archive Box 1 File 3). There was a major discussion about how to handle cultural orientation and membership at such organizations among members of EKON RF in their first party congress. There were voices which called for a distinguished membership role between EKON RF and various cultural organizations its members might have been involved in. On the other hand, there was a call for mass cultural activities which would cultivate a progressive view of culture with a turn to tradition, opposed to mass and bourgeois one. Bars, discos and even pool tables, which were quite popular at the time, were seen as intruders. EKON RF had to intervene and show to the youth a different way of having fun and spend their spare time. All in all, it seems that they considered themselves as the authority everyone else had to follow in order to comply with what they perceived as the right way of entertainment.

The conclusions of EKON-RF's first conference included a section on free time, culture and youth, with a fierce criticism against KKE, whose actions according to EKON RF, drove the youth away from cultural activities, as a result of ideologically and politically focused actions. The main goal of EKON-RF was to take advantage of all municipal forms of cultural clubs, such as cultural and youth centres, in order to engage people in local administration. Furthermore, they considered cinema as a higher form of cultural activity and therefore they wanted to organize cinema clubs. Their objectives were constructed on three levels: first to criticize western culture, second to enhance amateur cultural activities and third to broaden the

¹ Archives of Contemporary Social History (Archia Sinchronis Kinonikis Istorias [In Greek])

activities of cultural organizations, so that all free time activities were linked to them (ASKI, EKON RF's Archive Box 1 File 5). In order to succeed, it was suggested to publish magazines, organize free or open universities, special activities, such as stamp exhibitions and poetry nights or even discussion panels. Sports were also included since there was limited avocation by the broader masses.

The festival of Avgis-Thourios was the main annual event of KKE interior, where cultural events were combined with political issues and statements, especially during election years. The first festival of Avgis-Thourios coincided with KKE-interior's 10 years of existence. In this aspect the festivities included a political and historical part, with a theoretical approach of their identity (ASKI, Antoni Brillaki's Archive Box 20 File 1). A scientific part was also included, where professors, both Marxists and not, conducted lectures. The challenge KKE-interior faced was to simplify their agenda in order to make it understandable by everyone, as a means to attract voters and members. They also sat a goal of doubling their members during all the events.

The framework of the festivals during the 1980's consisted mainly of environmental and quality of life policy agenda, since that period Athens faced a major environmental crisis. Furthermore, they focused their attention to matters of military enlistment, women's rights and education. The festival of 1980 itself and the local festival activities, that preceded the major event, had a political substance and consisted of three different policy areas. Members of the KKE interior and EKON-R.F. would be able to communicate with people and youth in an effort to strengthen their ties, they would reconnect with old comrades and finally a discussion among people of the reforming political spectrum would be held. The problem was that their expectations were bigger than their capacity to organize such an extended event and to keep it up with a consistent way (ASKI, EKON RF's Archive Box 28 File 1). All in all, the activities included a program for children, speeches, open discussions, concerts, and various exhibitions of cultural content, theatre and film projections.

1981 and 1982 were election years. In 1981 there were general elections and in this aspect the festival was a great opportunity to explain the party's agenda, among which working conditions, women's rights, youth, democratization of the army and the peace movement played a big part (ASKI, EKON RF's Archive Box 28 File 2). Local administration's elections were held in 1982, something that covered a major part in that year's festival. The major issue was pollution, mainly because Athens faced smog for the first-time, and there was the lasting pollution of Thermaikos Bay in Thessaloniki (ASKI, EKON RF's Archive Box 28 File 3; ASKI, EKON RF's Archive Box 29 File 1). Education was once again an issue. Party executives believed that some of the internal problems Greece was facing would have been resolved just by implementing European legislature, especially in relation to environmental protection. This was a clear indication that KKE-interior was aligned with the Eurocommunism movement and had a different agenda than KKE, although both parties believed in socializing means of production. Among other things a manual can be found regarding the way local festivals should organize the area where the festivities would take place. After all, KKE interior's policy program should be stated in a clear manner using images and slogans.

As a conclusion we can observe that year after year KKE interior and EKON RF furthered apart from what can be called as orthodox communism. Being an active member of the independent peace movement lead to criticism both against the USA and the USSR, which was very clear in the 1983 festival. In relation to internal policy the main issues addressed in the instructions were urban planning, agriculture, workers problems, quality of life and cultural life in suburban areas. Finally, the two years of EEC membership should be criticised, since much of the Greek legislation had not yet been aligned with European (ASKI, EKON RF's Archive Box 29 File 3).

KNE-Odigiti Festival

On the other side, KKE and KNE tried to organize their activities while being a legal political party for the first time after at least 4 decades. They viewed the first festival of KNE-Odigitis as a chance to attract broad masses of the youth in order to spread “the revolutionary ideals” of communist ideology. The basis of the festival was the anti-imperialistic struggle (Rizospastis 1975a: 1). The objective was to create a cultural movement, so that tradition, folklore and art would be side by side with workers, creating all social values. This movement, in order to be successful, had to find its origins in the broader masses (nn 1984: 10).

The first festival took place in September 1975 at the Zografou Field in Athens. Each day had a specific theme. The first day was dedicated to the seven years since Odigitis’ first edition. The second day was committed to international solidarity and foreign delegates had the opportunity to present themselves. The third day was dedicated to the 7 years of KNE and their first party conference. The festivities ended with a speech from Florakis, the secretary general of KKE (Rizospastis 1975a: 1). The festivities included plays, folk plays (Karagiozis), films, bands and exhibitions. Through these activities they wanted to let the visitors come close to the socialist ideals and to align contemporary art with the progressive movement (Rizospastis 1975b: 1). Youths from Chile, Cyprus, France, Czechoslovakia and a delegation from the World Federation of Democratic Youth attended (Rizospastis 1975c: 1). The cultural programme included two films from Chile, Trikala’s Choir and folk-dance groups. Among other things, visitors listened to songs from the civil war. Moreover, there were stands from international delegations like the USSR, Cyprus and Portugal, and stands where books and folk-art could be purchased (Rizospastis 1975c: 1).

The 1981 festival was important since it was an election year, and the polls were to open about a month later, and so the secretary general of KKE had a relevant speech, where he argued that the right wingers had to be defeated (Rizospastis 1981e: 3). Furthermore, a discussion among members of the party about the importance of the elections was organized. In a more cultural aspect, doll theatre was organized, a Hungarian jazz band played music, songs from the Free German Youth were sang, a dance group from Kesiariani was invited and a tribute was paid to Mayiakovsky. A tribute was also paid to EAM and the fights of the working class (Rizospastis 1981d: 11). After all, that year was the 40th anniversary from the foundation of EAM (Rizospastis 1981a: 1). Satlanof, a soviet cosmonaut, attended the festival, and visitors had the opportunity to talk with him about the peaceful use of technology during the space race (Rizospastis 1981d: 11). Furthermore, events included concerts of new musicians, and solidarity events to the people of Turkey, Salvador, Namibia and South Africa (Rizospastis 1981a: 1). A quite interesting fact was the participation of Gus Hall, the secretary general of the Communist Party of the USA (Rizospastis 1981b: 1). That day, the organizers had a three heterogenous part conversation set. On the first one, people talked about the right to work in capitalist countries, on the second, the socialistic, a tribute was paid to the Bulgarian poet Lev Tsef. The last set was the liberation front with a tribute to Neruda and a conversation about the situation in the Middle East and how the capitalists inflamed the dispute. The festival also included chess games and ping pong (Rizospastis 1981c: 11).

In the 1983 festival the political orientation was expressed mainly through the peace movement. Theatre, sketches, movies, pupils’ music bands, dance groups and songs from Latin America were the actual cultural part of the festival. Side events included discussions about the ideological struggle in factories and the mass movement for the democratization of armed forces. They also paid tribute to the 10 years since the events in Politechnio (Rizospastis 1983a: 1; Rizospastis 1983b: 9).

Conclusion

Both parties, KKE and KKE-interior, valued culture and had a common basis on what it represented, but the way each tried to exploit its benefits was different. For both parties culture was the expression of ordinary people, and thus a basic necessity for everyone. All people had the right to access high quality cultural products. In this aspect, both parties opposed imported western products, and especially American mass culture. It was seen as an imperialistic way to conquer the hearts and minds of the masses, just by providing them with low quality culture and taking them away from tradition and folklore. In the political sphere, they argued that change should come, but folklore was/is the genuine expression of the people, thus the working class. What divided KKE and KKE interior in matters of cultural policy was the fact that KKE interior admittedly tried to exploit cultural organizations in order to acquire new members and voters. On the other hand, KKE called people to join forces with them in order to change Greece by joining the progressive part of the world.

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Rizospastis (1981e) "Η ομιλία του σ. Χαρίλαου Φλωράκη στο 7^ο Φεστιβάλ ΚΝΕ-οδηγητή", 15 September
Rizospastis (1983a) "Γιορτή της χαράς και του αγώνα", 8 September
Rizospastis (1983b) "Έτσι χτίζουμε το αύριο μέσα στο δύσκολο σήμερα", 8 September

Party – Trade Union relations in Greece during the 80’s
The case of the Communist Party of Greece

Aimilia Vilou
PhD Candidate of Political Science
School of Political Science, Department of Political Science and History
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences
aimilia.vilou@gmail.com ; aimilia.vilou@panteion.gr

Abstract

In this paper we examine the linkage between Communist Party of Greece, an “orthodox” communist party and Trade Unions, during the eighties.* It is well established that the CPG unfolds its intervention towards society utilizing, in parallel, Anti-imperialistic (peace) and Trade Union movement. Especially during Greece’s transition to democracy (1974) and due to a hectic civil society, parties’ intervention to every aspect of social life was a given. In this vein, Trade Union movement has been highly politicized and major political parties were, and still are, represented to it, and compete within it, through political groupings called “parataxi”. CPG’s political grouping, the ESAK-S, was articulated respectively to the party. We find linkages, a strong dependency, between CPG’s theses and “parataxi’s” stance. “Parataxi” is appeared to follow the party’s line making demands and proposals that exceeded Trade Unionist demands. We applied discourse analysis over: the party documents, CPG’s “parataxi”, ESAK-S, documents, the party’s newspaper “Rizospastis”, the communist youth’s newspaper “Odigitis” and anonymous in-depth interviews with former cadres of the party.

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Abbreviations

ADEDY	: Civil Servants' Confederation	The confederation of the workers of the civil servants
CPG	: Communist Party of Greece	Greece's "orthodox" communist party
CPG(int)	: Communist Party of Greece (interior)	Greece's "euro-communist" party
CYG	: Communist Youth of Greece	A youth's organization affiliated to the CPG
I Foni ton Ergazomenon	: Workers' Voice	ESAK-S's newspaper (1974-1976)
Ergatoipalikiki foni	: Workers' and Employees' Voice	ESAK's newspaper (1976-1991)
ESAK-S	: Unified Trade-unionist Militant Movement - and Collaborators	CPG's political grouping intervening into the Trade Union
GSEE	: General Confederation of Workers of Greece	The confederation of the workers of the private sector
ND	: New Democracy	The conservative party
Odigitis	: The Guider	CYG's newspaper
O Palmos ton Oikodomon	: The builders' Pulse	Athenian Construction workers Trade Union's newspaper
Parataxi	A political grouping used by Greek parties in order to participate and intervene into the Trade Union's function.	
PASOK	: Panhellenic Socialist Movement	The socialist party
Rizospastis	: The Radical	CPG's newspaper
Synaspismos	: Coalition of the Left and the Progress	A left coalition, consisted mainly of CPG and CPG(int)

Introduction

This paper is a part of an ongoing doctoral research, under the working title: “The twofold split of the Communist Party of Greece (CPG) and the re-identification of the Greek Left during the eighties”. In order to understand the primary factors that led to the splits of the CPG, in 1989 and 1991, we have to explore and record the evolvement of the party at the previous period (Duverger 1978; Sartori 1976). During Greece’s transition to democracy in 1974, after a seven-years imposed dictatorship, the party system’s reinforcement was a necessity. At this point we have to mention that the Greece’s civil society was extremely weak, especially after the restoration of democracy, as a result the social institutions were highly politicized (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2003; Tsakatika and Eleftheriou: 2013). Therefore, in order an inclusive transition to democracy to be achieved, every party should participate (Clogg 2012; Voulgaris 2013). In this vein CPG’s legalization, after 30 years of clandestine activity, was a prerequisite.¹ The CPG upholds the democratization process from the beginning, alongside with the expansion of its organization (Karpozilos 2019; Theochatos 2003; Zagaras 2019). As an “orthodox” communist party (Bull 1994; Kapetanyannis 1987; March 2008), identifies itself as the “working class party” and plans its actions towards the needs of the working strata (Eleftheriou 2017). Consequently, its basic voters’ pools are the working spaces and therefore the Trade Unions are, among others, “boot camps” for recruiting and training members. Subsequently Trade Union movement was highly politicized as well, so major political parties were, and still are, represented in it through political grouping called “parataxi”. The CPG’s “parataxi”, ESAK-S, was “the voice and the eye” of the party inside the Trade Union movement, stating the party’s policy and following the “party’s line”. In order to find evidence on this we analyzed the party documents, the “parataxi” documents, the party’s newspaper “Rizospastis”, the communist youth’s newspaper “Odigitis” and anonymous, semi-structured, in-depth interviews with former cadres of the party.

The articulation of Greek Trade Union

The Trade Union’s history in Greece is rather sort and unique. Usually, either an established Trade Union forms a party, or a party (socialist or/and communist) founds a Trade Union. In Greece the CPG was founded in November 1918,² only a few weeks after the GSEE’s foundation, almost simultaneously (CPG 2018; Katsoridas 2008; Mavrikos 2001). A socialist or a labour party hadn’t preexisted the foundation of the communist party, in fact a party that resembles to a socialist wasn’t part of the Greek party system until 1974.³ GSEE’s formation stated the advent of a modern era for the

¹ Since its foundation, in 1918, the CPG faced multiple challenges, as the party was: semi-legal during 1918-1936, illegal from 1936 to 1944, legal between the years 1944-1947 and illegal, again, for the period 1947 to 1974.


² The CPG was founded as SEKE (Sosialistiko Ergatiko Komma Ellaldos - Socialist Labour Party of Greece) in 1918 from small socialist organizations and grouping, it was renamed in 1924 in order to accede to the 3rd International – The Communist International, Comintern.

³ In 3rd of September 1974 Andreas Papandreou addressed the people of Greece announcing the foundation of PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement - Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima). A socialist party that thrived and managed to gain power within only 7 years, to win the 1981’s elections.

working class' movement and the foundation of CPG stated the formation of a collective political subject, for the working class, as well. Almost the same men (an all men party, at the beginning, but not for long) participated in both processes, but there are no evidences that the party affected the Trade Union's articulation or the other way around. We believe that this was a parallel and in mutual support process. Additionally, in Greece Trade Unions, since the official foundation of the Trade Union institutions, were, and still are, unified. There were neither "Red Trade Unions", nor "Conservatives". So, CPG is the only West European, non euro-communist party that had to put up with other political actors, within the same trade union. Furthermore, Greece's transition to Democracy at 1974 needed a minimum democratic consensus in every aspect of political and social life. It's a "Greek exceptionalism" that the theory is not preparing us about.

The Greek Trade Unions are represented by two confederation and each one of those articulates in three bodies. The Trade Union levels can be described as followed.

- A Primary level Trade Union. Usually an occupationally or company based organization. In this vein any worker practicing a specific profession is eligible to be member of the corresponding union, and any worker in a workplace that there is a Trade Union can be a member.
- A Second Level, federations: those are based, mainly, in geographical criteria: e.g. all the Athenian based Trade Unions are members of the Athenian federation Trade Union. There are also occupationally based federations; all the Primary levels Trade Unions are subjected to the Panhellenic federation of the occupation in question.
- A Third level, consisted by two main confederations: GSEE, which organizes private sector employees and employees in firms and sectors under public control, and ADEDY which is covering civil servants, working in central, local and regional government (etui 2019; Livieratos 1997).⁴



⁴ In April 1981, at GSEE's 20th Congress, 43 federations occupationally based and 79 federations with geographical criteria participated. In August 1981, at GSEE's 21st Congress 51 federations occupationally based and 79 federations with geographical criteria participated. In December 1983, at GSEE's 22nd Congress, 77 federations occupationally based and 84 federations with geographical criteria participated (Livieratos 1997).

The Primary level Trade Unions are intervening in their “realm” expressing everyday demands. Each federation gathers the acquired, by Primary level Trade Unions, experience, generalizes the results and the knowledge. In addition to the previous, federations can negotiate and sign collective agreements, for a profession or a geographic area. The Third level Trade Unions, the confederations, are entitled to participate in collective bargaining with the state (ADEDY 2019; Katsoridas 2008; GSEE 2019).


The hierarchy was strict and unavoidable. Every political party intervenes to the trade union movement through political groupings called “parataxi”, after all Greek’s civil society was highly politicized, especially the first years after the restoration of democracy. Therefore, all the Greek parties were -and still are- holding a disciplined “parataxi”. Each “parataxi” engages to the trade union’s everyday life and participates to the elections for the control of the Trade Unions. We can trace political groupings that are not affiliated to any party, but only at the Premier level Trade Unions.

CPG’s political grouping “parataxi”

The “parataxi” of CPG, ESAK-S, is articulated respectively to the party. Each Trade Union level is politically guided by the corresponding bodies of the party (CPG 1978b).

- The Primary level by: (a) an occupationally based party cell (b) by a party cell that is workplace based.
- The Secondary level, in case of a geographically based federation, is guided by the regional committee of the party, or by a group of experts, in case of an occupationally based federation.
- The Third level is guided directly by the Central Committee of the party.

CPG and Trade Unions bodies




The ESAK-S didn’t have certified members, anyone could participate to the monthly assembly, take the floor and vote. The monthly assembly was the ultimate body for the function of the ESAK-S, all the decision making was extracted after a, fairly, democratic process. Naturally, all the CPG’s members should follow the party’s instructions and implement its decisions. Each trade union’s assembly elects their representatives to the second level and the second level conferences elect


representatives for the ESAK-S's Panhellenic conference. Each conference elects, at the same time, administrative board. The CPG used to influence those bodies through its cadres, in an organized and framed way (CPG 1978b).

The CPG through its documents and its “parataxi” is proposing a Trade Union’s articulation that should be occupationally and geographically based. This Trade Union’s articulation was questioned, by the CPG, in 1987, when the party’s 12th congress took place. Within the confines of the “new way of development” -the CPG’s economic plan based on perestroika project and Gorbatshev’s reforms- the CPG was proposing the “necessity of reinforcing the Primary level Trade Unions” (CPG 1987). Eventually, in 1991, the articulation of the Greek Trade Union was characterized as “outdated”, and the party was proposing to be substituted by a radical mass movement that would represent the working strata and could address directly to the institutions (CPG 1991a). During its 13^{nt} congress (1991), the CPG abolished the medium level bodies of the party, leaving only isolated cells and a collective leadership (CPG 1991b; Vilou 2018). The interparty changes into the articulation, the function, the decision making was being exported to the mass movement, mainly through CPG’s “parataxi”.⁵

CPG's Articulation 1974-1991



CPG's Articulation 1991 - 1995



⁵ Accordingly, there were proposal for the articulation of the peace movement, the student unions and the women’s right federation.

CPG's timetable

It is expected that any change in CPG's strategy has great impact on every aspect of the party's intervention. The CPG'S thesis shifts rather rapidly and significantly, during the period 1974-1991; either trying to stabilize its position to the Greek party system or trying to face the new challenges (Verney 1988; Vilou 2019a). CPG's "parataxi's", ESAK-S, demands were shifting as well.

1974-1981

*The genesis / rebirth of the party*⁶: We can trace the beginning of a new era for the communist party, as emerged the need to recruit members, to construct cells, to form coalition(s). It is a period of re-birth for the party, as the party formed a new modern –bolshevik- identity, participated to the building of democratic institutions and tried to adjust to a promising democratic party system (Kalyvas Marantzidis 2002). In this vein the CPG grew rapidly to a massive party taking a hegemonic role at the left spectrum, but at this time the nascent PASOK was an outstanding player in the Greek political arena as well. The social-democratic party introduced itself as "left" and "progressive" by using a revolutionary vocabulary and by demanding some serious political reforms of the state (Spourdalakis 1988). As a result, all the parties of the left spectrum allied with it. In the 1981's elections PASOK was the winner⁷ and CPG gained almost 11% of the votes, the other parties of the left spectrum couldn't surpass the threshold of 3% (Kapetanyannis 1993; Koustenis 2018; Nikolakopoulos 1990).

The political demands were mostly concerning institutional reformations (CPG 1978a; CPG 1982) and the CPG's "parataxi" was trying to participate in the stabilization of a political and social consensus. Therefore, ESAK-S was narrowing its agenda into Trade Union's rights, as a prerequisite for the formation of a firm and steady Trade Union movement. The aim was the democratization of the society (ESAK-S 1977; ESAK-S 1980).

1982-1987

The institutionalization / The stabilization of the party: The story goes on with the gradual transformation of the CPG into a stable political force in the Greek party system, the third pillar to a two-party system consensus. The party controlled, through its cadres, several municipalities, Trade Unions, a variety of ancillary organizations and the Communist Youth of Greece – CYG was dominant within the young people. The leftist parties, in general, and CPG, in particular, did not constrain PASOK from implementing its agenda, until 1985. The CPG's-PASOK's days of mutual tolerance

⁶ A.Panebianco is discerning an evolution circle of party's life: genesis, institutionalization and maturity, (Panebianco 1988: 17-20). We are using the same theoretical frame to describe CPG's evolution, but we discern several circles of CPG's lifespan (Vilou 2019b).

⁷ PASOK 48,07%, ND 35,88%, CPG 10,94%, CPG(int) 1,35% (Koustenis 2018 ; Nikolakopoulos 1990).

(1981-1985) were over. After the 1985 election⁸ the government's attempt to stabilize the economy by applying harsh fiscal rules, disproportionately affecting the working class, led to a two-year period of strikes and police oppression (Asimakopoulos and Tassis 2018; Kapetanyannis 1993; Theocharatos 2003). The stabilization of the CPG and the period of total legitimacy pacified the party members and allowed the different tendencies to express themselves and start to form cohesive groups. The Soviet Reforms and Perestroika affected the Greek politics as well, but the "liberalization" of the party found the CYG and some party cadres, opposing. The imminent changes, inspired by perestroika project, would find this group strongly against (Vilou 2019a).

In 1982 a law regulating the Trade Union articulation and function passed by the government⁹ and a partial democratization of the Trade Unions was possible. A new Trade Union's leadership, at all levels, was elected and the ESAK-S started to state demands related to international politics, peace movement, disarmament, denuclearization. Those were political demands, in general, connected to antiimperialistic views, strong anti-Americanism¹⁰ and supporting the eastern socialist democratic states. (ESAK-S 1982; ESAK-S 1985)

1987-1991

The maturity and the crisis of the party: Already, by the pre-congress period of the 12th congress of the CPG (1987), different cohesive opinions were exposed along with adhesive groupings expressing them. It seems that vast ideological political and strategical interparty differences were growing. The CPG was growing stronger when, at 1988, proposed the formation of a coalition "top-down" between the two communist parties and a number of independent socialists; the proposal was based on the "12th Congress' resolution of CPG". A number of members of the CPG and the CYG opposed to it, ignoring the opposing voices the CPG proceeded into building the coalition of "Synaspismos" at April 1989. CPG had to deal with the conservative turn of the PASOK and the empty political space found left of the socialist party. It was asked to join in the government giving the opportunity to fulfil historical public demands¹¹ and to satisfy the demand of "katharsis",¹² as a Greek interpretation of glasnost. Eventually the CPG estimated that the coalition, Synaspismos could substitute PASOK to the Greek two-party system and eventually assume power using the parliamentary path (Zagaras 2019). The building of Synaspismos, along with the participation to the collaboration government with the conservative party of ND, led to CPG's, first, split

⁸ PASOK 45,82%, ND 40,85%, CPG 9,89%, CPG(int) 1,84% (Koustenis 2018; Nikolakopoulos 1990).

⁹ N 1284/82 the regulatory law of the trade unions, still current

¹⁰ Anti – Americanism, as a political and cultural phenomenon in post war Greece, was a normality in Greece politics and affected the political agenda strongly during the 80's (Lialiouti 2016).

¹¹ The lift of the civil war consequences and imposition of proportional representation to the parliament.

¹² Katharsis: "cleaning" in ancient Greek and was depicting the process of bringing into justice members of the parliament, of the cabinet and former pm A. Papandreou facing charges of multiple financial misconduct.

(1989).¹³ Synaspismos' impact was declining, but this was the least of its problems.¹⁴ The CPG members were decreasing rapidly and in June 1990 the Central Committee of the CPG could not reach an agreement on the "Thesis" paper for the 13th congress of the party. The tension, between cohesive interparty groups, during the pre-congress discussion was obvious. "Renewers" and "Orthodox" members of the party disputed over the evolvement of the party, eventually the "orthodox" part won by a narrow majority and the party split again (Doukas 1991; Karabakakis 1997).

As a result, ESAK-S demands were about governance, asking for political than social reforms. This did not last for long because it was self-dissolved in favor of a new grouping affiliated to the new political frontal formation of Synaspismos. The Trade Unionists opposed strongly to this decision, but the party proceeded anyway. In September of 1991 the "parataxi" was rehabilitated, after the major split of the party.

"ESAK-S" Main Axes during the period 1974-1991.

During the period in question the ESAK-S was bringing forward demands that effected the function of the Trade Union movement. The following axes were permanent, stable and were extracted from party's and "parataxi's" newspapers and resolutions.

Unity: there is a twofold meaning enclosed. Referring to the class unity, the necessity of exceeding the inner-class stratification, within the working strata, and the divisions that was coming out of the nature of labour. It was also a reference to "unity in action", an accordance of all working strata in a minimum of claims, aiming to the politicization of the social protest.

Democratization: Meaning the demand of a democratic function of the Trade Unions. The democratization of the Trade Union officially started in 1982 by a law (1264/82) introduced by the socialist government of PASOK. The ESAK-S participated to this effort and succeeded to marginalize the dictatorship's supporters by running a big campaign and recruiting workers as members to the Primary Trade Unions, crosschecking the existing members of the Trade Unions and monitoring the electoral process. In other words, utilizing methods inherited by the international communist movement (Lenin 2002). Nevertheless, the democratization process was still at stake, given that the socialist government of PASOK, during its second governmental incumbency, tried to take over the GSEE, using false pretenses.

Independence. The request for independency of the Trade Union was the CPG's answer to the allegations of extreme politicization of the Trade Unions. Almost all "parataxis" participating to the Trade Union institutions agreed to that, choosing to ignore the way that the Greek Trade Union movement was constituted in the first place,

¹³ Almost 80% of the CYG and several cadres, including members of the Central Committee of the party, seceded. A few months later, due to the same reasons, two more members of the Central Committee seceded as well (Doukas 1991; Kotzias and Batikas 1989; Zagaras 2019).

¹⁴ June 1989 Elections ND 44,28%, PASOK 39,13%, Syn 13,13%.
November 1989 Elections ND 46,19%, PASOK 40,67%, Syn 10,97%, Greens 0,58%.
April 1990 Elections ND 46,89%, PASOK 38,61%, Syn 10,28%.

and forgetting the fact that they were, as well, ancillary organizations of Greek parties. The CPG was pointing out that the Trade Unions are means for working class' organization, in this context any working class' organization should be able to have an internal operating procedure, democratic statute and economic autonomy. Nevertheless, according to the CPG, all the above should relate to a collaboration with the "working class' party", (CPG is referring to itself) that any social process is contextualized in a political frame.

Employees participation to company's administration. It was proposed that workers' representative(s) should be members of the directing board of large enterprises, public enterprises and enterprises that was partly nationalized.¹⁵ The representatives would be (s)elected by the workers, but the workers' body would maintain the rights of eligibility and annulment.

Change: The socialist party of PASOK was promising the advent of a new political era and its main slogan was "Allagi" (change), in order to summarize its intentions (Eleftheriou 2018). The CPG stated that, no real change could occur without CPG' involvement. Until 1991 "Change", according CPG, was a demand and a procedure and PASOK was criticized for not complying with its promise. The CPG's parataxis was also accusing the socialist government for slow, inefficient and moderate changes in the Trade Union setting.

CPG's assessment on the impact of "parataxi" to inner party politics

The Trade Unionism is deemed, by the CPG, as a process of working class's politicization and an opportunity of intergenerational osmosis. Especially during the period in question mature Trade Unionists, former partisans, and "newbies" were coexisting in the same Trade Union body and co-deciding, reinforcing experience with enthusiasm. The intervention methods, used by the party, shows the bridging of the generation gap, utilizing older technics updated to the present needs. Undoubtedly the discipline and commitment needed to meet the expectations of being a Trade Union's member acts as a preparational stage in recruiting to the party. The party and the "parataxi" were interacting, cross-fertilizing one another. The "parataxi" was gathering the claims, and society's trends and channeled them to the CPG. The party concentrated the intelligence and generalized the findings, a suggestion would be made to the "parataxi", after inseminated politically. The "parataxi" was acting as a "conveyor belt" between the party and the Trade Unions. In an interview with a former party cadre that activity was described as "If ESAK-S was the heart of the Trade Union movement then the CPG was the mind".

¹⁵ In order to stimulate the economy and preserve work places, after the restoration of democracy, the government took over the administration of large and almost bankrupted enterprises. It is hard to believe but it was the conservative party of ND, in 1975, that started this nationalization project, the socialist PASOK maintained the projects and added a few more.

Synopsis

The CPG is establishing ancillary organizations which are loosely connected with the party, nevertheless there are characterized by highly social and political commitment. The Trade Unions are constituting a pool of voters and future party members. Basically, there are “boot camps”, a threshold to the inner circle, the party membership. Essentially there is a twofold intervention method into the Trade Union which is an expression of the party’s strategy. At the Primary level Trade Unions CPG’s “parataxi” are participating expressing the party’s politics and making specific demands. At the next levels, the federation and the confederation, the “parataxi” is approaching the demands by deducing them to the primary causes and articulating a thorough proposal to the state, trying to transform the social protest to political demands. However, the detailed proposal or demand exceeds the frame of a Trade Union’s political grouping, in the context of this level of Trade Unionism the “parataxi” is acting quasi political. The party’s demands and proposals were articulating in the same way. The party cells would articulate local or work place based demands, while the regional committees or the central committee would generalize and summarize the experience acquired and articulate a more radical and political discourse. This is not the first time CPG is pursuing frontal formations which bring forward broad assertions, generalizing the claims and trying to politicize a social movement. Furthermore, we have not detected an equivalent activity by other political groupings. We come across this twofold outcome very often when examining communist history, it is described in “Lenin’s 21 conditions” (Lenin 1920) and it is one of the characteristics that a Leninist party should acquire. Apparently, party’s methods are mirrored to the ancillary organizations’ practices. And the changes at the party’s strategy are reflected in party’s political groupings, “parataxi”, and to the Trade Union movement in general.

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