The Republic of Cyprus' strategic challenges: averting the legitimization of a secessionist state in its North

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Abstract

This paper explores the strategic challenge of the small state of Cyprus in the context of averting the legitimization of the secessionist state, the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, “TRNC”, in its occupied northern territories. Cyprus’ strategy will be examined in two periods: the first, unveils the events from independence and the Turkish invasion to the illegal declaration of the TRNC. The second covers the decades after the establishment of the TRNC till today’s efforts to reunify the Island and to avert the legitimization of the TRNC. The examination of Cyprus’ strategy in every period intertwined with regional and international developments will showcase the challenges, the opportunities, and the limitations of the international system in addition to the impact of leadership’s choices. The outcomes will assess Cyprus’ margins on strategy formation aiming at averting Turkey’s invasion consequences and a de jure recognition of the illegally established TRNC.

Introduction

“The Greek Cypriots should realize that their borders end at the Ledra Palace checkpoint”  
Rauf Denktash.¹

The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was established in 1960 after an intense anti-colonial struggle against Britain (1955-59). Cyprus was under the British rule from 1878 to 1960 when, under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey relinquished all of its rights to Cyprus, and in 1925 was declared a Crown colony. In 1959 the Zurich-London Agreements were signed by the Great Britain, Greece and Turkey as well as representatives of the Greek Cypriots (G/C) and Turkish Cypriots (T/C) thus leading to Cyprus’ independence (August 16th, 1960). In 1963, President Makarios III proposed the so-called, “thirteen amendments” to the constitution to improve the functionality of the Republic. Severe intercommunal clashes erupted, thus giving the T/C and Turkey a golden opportunity to question the co-existence of the two communities and the functionality of the Treaty.

In 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus as a response to the coup of the Greek Junta against Makarios. Under the pretext of a “peace operation”, Turkey violated all rules of international legality, including the UN Charter. Apart from war crimes, Turkey followed a policy of “ethnic cleansing”: forcible mass displacement, deportation, expulsion, and forced evacuations of persons from their homes. Torture and execution of prisoners and innocent civilians, murders in cold blood, mass rapes, an ongoing refugee and usurped property problem, and, finally, and most tragically, a very long list of missing persons.

The Cyprus issue has six main protagonists: the Turks, Greeks, G/C, T/C, the Americans and the British. Since its inception, Cyprus is encircled by the intervention of various international and regional actors, as well as by significant events that took place at these periods
that prompted the superpowers’ antagonism in the Cold War era and after. Today, despite the good omen of significant finds in gas reserves, Cyprus’ blooming external affairs and economic recovery, the RoC still faces a conundrum: a revisionist Turkey and a T/C leadership that claims an international role for its secessionist state in the occupied Northern Cyprus.

This research traces Cyprus’ strategy in two periods: from 1960 to 1983 and from 1983 to today. In every period the international system (IS), the regional subsystem are the catalysts for presenting and explaining phenomena as well as and how they effect on Cyprus’ fate. The analyses of the international and regional developments will extract conclusions on the impact of the IS on a small state’s strategy. Hence, the Anglo-American perspectives, Turkey’s strategy and RoC’s challenges will be analyzed. However, to comprehend the impact of leadership on the outcomes either positive or negative, this research aspires to show how leadership’s capabilities can form a strategy to efficiently confront the revisionist Turkey and to preserve Cyprus' national interest.

1. From Independence to the unilateral and illegal declaration of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) in the occupied area

The Anglo-American Perspective

The RoC presents to the IR scholar exactly how vulnerable and significant a small state is. The British military chiefs pinpointed the importance of Cyprus to Britain since the 1950s as a vital link through the Mediterranean and to the Middle East. Apart from the British bases, the Americans were particularly interested in consolidating their presence in the region for strategic purposes. After the Greek and Turkish NATO membership, the importance of the Cyprus issue skyrocketed, particularly in their fear of a possible intra-alliance conflict. Hence, the role of Britain, and the USA is pivotal for Cyprus’ division and occupation. Mixed interests provoked a crisis that ended in the Cyprus’ tragedy. The British diminution in the Middle East, the Yom Kippur War, the OPEC crisis and the European dependence from the Middle East oil, the USSR influence in Eastern Mediterranean upgraded Turkey’s role as an impediment to Soviet expansion in the region. When Britain lost its dominant role in the Middle East, the US undertook the leading role to restore the balance of power.

When the military coup in Athens came to power, the USA faced “a strong possibility that the Turks might be going to invade Cyprus…” (Secretary Cyrus R. Vance 1969:31-32). This was not the first time that Ankara threatened to create chaos. From December 1963 to August 1964 the USA managed to avert Turkish aggressions at least on five occasions. Hence, when on July 20th, 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus, London and Washington were well informed on Turkish intentions. Ecevit visited London for aid, however Britain declined. The US stance is far more interesting. Joseph Sisco, the US Undersecretary of State, undertook the task to prevent a Turkish invasion that may lead to a generalized Greco-Turkish bloodshed. Sisco’s effort met Kissinger’s apathy. Cyprus’ fate was undoubtedly determined by the Great Powers as well as by one man: Henry Kissinger (Venizelos and Ignatiou, 2002 vol.1:165-221).

After two Turkish invasions (July 20th and August 15th) and the occupation of the 36,7% of the RoC, in 1983, Turkey unilaterally declared the establishment of the TRNC.

Turkish Policy on Cyprus

Long before Cyprus’ independence Turkey favored a dynamic solution to the Cyprus Problem and partition seemed the finest one. While unravelling Turkish strategy since the decade of 50s one can observe that expansionism is its goal. The first step towards the implementation of
Turkish expansionism was on February 13th, 1975, when the “Turkish Federated State of Kibris” was declared amounting to the continuation of the “provisional Turkish Administration” established with Turkish aid in 1967. The plan to invade was under implementation.

Turkish invasion was neither unintended and impulsive nor a non-designed operation veiled by peaceful intentions. When Britain showed signs to withdraw from the area, Turkey focused on consolidating its presence on the island by any means. Turkey exploited its importance for the West. From the Harding proposals of 1955 to Acheson’s plans and the intercommunal talks that followed the invasion, Turkey and the T/C leadership, empowered as they felt, arrogantly declined any peace effort and were obsessively aiming at their goal: the division of the island and the creation of an independent state.

2. Cyprus Predicament: averting the legitimization of the secessionist state

The Strategic Environment

Despite the 1977-79 agreements on establishing a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation, the condemnation of the Turkish invasion by the UN, USA, UK and the non-recognition of the secessionist state and a constant array of Security Council Resolutions as well as other supportive decisions and statements in numerous international fora, the RoC, due to international and regional developments, did not benefit from the EU, UN and international court resolutions that were in favor of Cyprus. The end of the Cold War left the USA as the “sole administrator” to handle protracted conflicts and new warfronts. The Iraqi wars, the Kurdish issue, Bosnia, Cyprus were America’s foreign policy problems to be dealt with. The attempts of the Hellenes to exploit the tensed Turkish-Americans relations in achieving positive outcomes fell into the void. “Turkey is at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent.”

The United States of America

The Americans were seeing the Cyprus problem as one that has to be solved immediately without internationalizing the issue, fearing of an out of NATO state intervention. It focused on keeping calm and avoiding tensions above the Aegean and in Cyprus, having calculated diligently American interests. The type of solution did not concern the Americans even if it had to ignore fundamental human rights and UN Resolutions. Ultimately resulting in a need to press upon Greece to engage in bilateral talks with Turkey and resolve the issue as two “countries-allies” that had differences to be resolved.

The United Kingdom

After condemning partition as “unthinkable… and would never recognize the Denktash regime” (Vassiliou 2010:14) Britain favored a federal state that would safeguard democratic freedoms and human rights. British policy did not move an inch since the 50s: British interests on the Island had to be ensured but also to drive the talks to a peace plan that will also satisfy British perceptions on the Cyprus solution.
After the illegal declaration of TRNC the UN aimed at bringing the two opponents at the negotiating table. However, Turkey intensified its efforts on altering the UN stance towards a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Denktash and successive T/C leaders facilitated the idea of disengaging from any negotiation under the auspices of the UN. Turkey did everything to avoid internationalization and fervently preferred to find a solution in the frame of an intercommunal conflict. The USA, UK were also positive in that respect.

This period was marked by the Cyprus’ EU membership. Despite all the UN’s and EU’s resolutions and summits on reuniting the island, the secessionist state perfectly fits the profile of an accomplished Turkish aspiration. A federation provides less room for maneuver since it entails the establishment of a central governance. Furthermore, its foreign affairs are bounded by the “Federated Republic of Cyprus”. Henceforth begins the great struggle for legalizing the secessionist state. Till today no one penalized Turkey, who is also an EU candidate, for the atrocities and crimes of the illegal invasion by the Turkish army, the ongoing occupation of one third of the island, the flagrant violation of human rights and the massive destruction of cultural heritage, the usurpation of G/C property, the systematic policy of demographic change, and the heavy militarization of the island with more than 40,000 permanent troops, making Cyprus by analogy, possibly the most heavily militarized area in the world.

Cyprus’ predicament

Cyprus’ strategy from Archbishop Makarios III to President Anastasiades is based on the creation of a Federal state with single sovereignty, international personality, free of troops and guarantees. All were selected to fight for the repatriation of the refugees and the removal of settlers, committed to the UN and the EU resolutions to reach a viable if not a just solution. Cyprus saw the EU as a prospect that would safeguard the three freedoms (freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property). Cyprus did reap fruits from the EU rules and regulations (acquis communautaire) since it recognizes the RoC as the sole legal entity over the entire island, notwithstanding the fact that the acquis is suspended in areas in the occupied areas, aka where the government does not exercise effective control.

For decades, the Cyprus problem was the core of the Cypriot foreign policy. There was a belief that the world powers’ interests revolve around the Cyprus problem. Hence, the RoC’s strategy was based on internationalizing the issue so that the UN and the great powers would press Turkey to comply with the international law and the UN resolutions.

Cyprus’ strategy was based on a fallacy. The outcomes of the negotiations proved a different reality. The great powers were not willing to make Turkey to comply. Meanwhile the T/C plan to legitimize the secessionist state was unraveling steadily, quietly and elaborately. On March 2nd, 1990 the T/C’s preconditions included a significant change in terminology. The term “communities” was equated to “peoples” so that self-determination would apply as a right to the two “peoples” (S/21183). Henceforth, a race commenced. On one hand the G/C efforts to prevent legitimation by any means: diplomacy, international fora, creating strong relations with neighboring states. On the other, Turkey and its “puppet statelet” attempt to consolidate its presence as a legitimate actor in the IS on security grounds.

No one denies the effective control of the so-called TRNC authorities over the population and territory of northern Cyprus. Yet, Turkey pushed for the entity's military and economic dependency as well as from vital resources such as water and energy since the latter's establishment. The so-called de facto regime grew demands for legitimization of a separate territory that is already illegally 'governed' and started profiting from tourism and education. (Smith 2019). Denktash and successive leaders focused at establishing “a new partnership state
in Cyprus, based on the political equality of the two peoples and the equal status of two constituent states” (Talat 2008).

“Hungry neighbors always pose trouble. Unfortunately, poverty is often cynically employed by authoritarian regimes… as a foreign policy tool to gain attention and financial aid (Inbar 2019). Any modification of the agreed process to resolve the Cyprus conflict under the auspices of the UNSG by reaching a just and viable solution with the format of a bizonal, bicomunal federation based on agreed parameters, relevant Security Council Resolutions, European norms and relevant EU Council should not be accommodated.

Turkey and the T/C leadership are to be blamed for the so-called isolation, exclusion, or economic inequality in the breakaway entity. States do not come into existence by simply being granted de facto recognition by other states. International law prevails based on fundamental principles such as the right of self-determination, territorial integrity and most importantly sufficing legal justification. In the case of TRNC none of the above is a point in case. Denktash fought fiercely, to achieve the recognition of two “peoples”. However, the T/C never lived isolated in the areas of Northern Cyprus. Consequently, the right to “self-determination” fades. When it comes to territorial integrity, TRNC is the outcome of an illegal invasion and ongoing occupation of the one third of the RoC. Expatriation of the G/C and the systemic influx of illegal settlers from Turkey brought to completion the ethnic division, internal displacement and the demographic change of a significant part of the island.

Conclusion

After 45 years of occupation the government of the RoC is engaged in intercommunal talks showing to the involved great powers and to the UN its goodwill. Painful concessions on behalf of the G/C, and UN’s affirmations that will safeguard fundamental rights did not alter Turkish intransigence. Nevertheless, new developments shape today’s politics in the Eastern Mediterranean and most likely will prevail for years to come. The gas explorations and the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the littoral states flare on and re-arrange the regional politics. The RoC is currently actively engaged and promotes partnerships of geopolitical value with friendly states such as Greece, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon. These bilateral and trilateral partnerships aim at collectively addressing common challenges in security, terrorism, defense, energy and other fields as well as in creating shared interests and opportunities with tangible benefits that provide a competitive advantage to and highlight its role as a credible security provider, a geopolitical bridge and a pillar of stability in the very volatile region of the Eastern Mediterranean. Through such partnerships the government of RoC empowers itself to deal with the revisionist appetite of neo-ottoman Turkey and its crave for geostrategic hegemony while not leaving aside its prime goal which is none else than to reunify the island and its people, G/Cs and T/Cs in the context of a viable, independent and functional, bizonal, bicomunal federation with one sovereignty, one international personality and one citizenship.
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Affective stories of belonging from North Cyprus: Questioning on the borders of nation, state and dispossession

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Abstract

When the borders/checkpoints opened in 2003 in Cyprus, it was followed with a moment of questions. Disruptions that these questions create can lead to an enunciative split that opens up any narrative for cultural analysis (Bhabha, 1994:36). In that sense, I conceptualise North Cyprus on the margins of Turkish nation-state as a third-space leading to my question on how the role of memory and the emergence of subjective alternatives to dominant ideologies could influence political activism. Can remembering Blueband margarine help to forget the memory of gunshots? Can human bodies appearing in peace become a source of resistance? Can tactical forms transcend the nation-state as it makes a spectral appearance? My aim is to draw attention to the critical lens that questions the normalised quotidian reality, producing a contrapuntal crack in Edward Said (1993)’s terms that allows interpreting the notes in-between law and unlawfulness, order and disorder, displacement and belonging.
An aporetic junction of (hi)stories

A sandwich stand is settled in Nicosia in front of the Turkish Cypriot law courts. The historic Law Courts designed during the British Colonial Rule stand over the ruins of a Lusignan Palace which later on served as the Ottoman Governor’s house and prison. At the sandwich stand, people of North Cyprus pause for a split from their dealings with the law and order. They share stories that criticise the state, the unorderly order or how things used to be in Cyprus while listening to songs often about the impossibility of love from an old plastic radio that is placed on a yellow and black post box with embossed writing that reads GR from a bygone era. Can the sandwich stand be considered as a mediating material element between everyday conversations and the affective songs coming from a radio on a post box that monumentalises colonial legacy? Is it possible that historical trauma makes a spectral presence through these songs that voice an unnameable pain? Can the sandwich stand then be interpreted as a mediating third space in Homi Bhabha (1994)’s terms producing a disjunctive temporality where the past interrupts the present encountering the liminal in what is now history. Ranjana Khanna (2003:29) argues that, “the notion of the spectral is conceived as affect, which refers to the inability of introjecting the lost ideal of nation-statehood in the period after colonialism where what cannot be mourned gives rise to a critical agency: melancholic postcoloniality”. According to Abraham and Torok (in Khanna 2003), this incorporation through haunting manifests itself in language which can be transmitted through generations, appearing at specific historical junctures triggered by certain episodes that result in the phantom to come to light through performative acts and narratives.

A gathering by an Alevi cultural association near a crossing point in Nicosia presents the haunting element of nation-state and negotiating narratives of existence. The appearance awakens the memories of the Madımak massacre in Sivas, Turkey where 33 people who had gathered for an Alevi festival were burned in a hotel. The act had taken place after heavy propaganda regarding the translation of Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie to Turkish by Aziz Nesin, accentuating antagonistic arguments that haunt the text as well as the populations. After a similar gathering, Zafer who moved to North Cyprus from Diyarbakır in Eastern Turkey all of a sudden stopped and asked if I knew why Kurdish people talk with their eyes. I said I have no clue so he went on explaining:

After the coup in 1980, it became forbidden to talk in Kurdish in public. However, for my mother and of course for many others it was the only language they knew. As I grew up, our teachers were constantly warning us for speaking in Kurdish amongst each other. Afterwards, my Turkish did improve and I accompanied my mother at every public institution or hospital so that I could translate for her. So, what do you do when you are forbidden to express yourself in your own language, you start to speak with your eyes.

For Zafer, North Cyprus is a place he can express himself without oppression. On a similar note, Mehmet with origins from Syria born and raised in Turkey explains that he was often mocked for being a dirty Arab in Turkey. He moved to North Cyprus 20 years ago, adapting to the Cypriot dialect, he underlines that he does not understand Turkish well despite being born and raised in Turkey. The way a story is told characterises one’s relationship to the past, to the imagined community, to home, to one’s own self-perception. According to Arendt (in Kristeva 2001), only when narrated, life, thought or action are human, thus, I aim to explore affective ways of belonging or not belonging through these narratives at this particular temporality. The emergence of these narratives also require questioning whether perceiving North Cyprus as an unrecognised state amongst the official international state structure and constant debating of its lack of sovereign power and future enables the appearance and the articulation of what the Turkish state power occludes. Young (1990) illustrates third space taking on from Homi Bhabha as a moment of anxiety, a place of appearance and disappearance distinguished as an
enunciative split that allows to open up any narrative for cultural analysis through a temporal disjunction (Bhabha 1994:36). When the borders/checkpoints opened in 2003 in Cyprus, it was followed with a moment of questions: what will happen now? What will happen if Cyprus issue is resolved? Who is the other? Who are we? What will happen to people who came from Turkey after 1974? It is not necessarily the answers to these questions that matter but the meaning of disruptions that these questions create is my main focus. Visiting lost homes, a new citizenship and access to the “global” world as well as border politics that do not allow people who have come to the island after 1974 from Turkey to cross creates a rupture in everyday life leading to new forms of remembering, forgetting and emergence of new “identities”. Hence, considering North Cyprus as a third space of questions can bring to the fore aporetic questions, criticisms and cracks.

Who are the ‘Cypriots’?

Border as a mechanism of controlling recognition and as a performative form of power taking on from Butler (1990) produces subjects who are “legal” and “illegal” and defines who the “people” are. A park placed on a bastion in North Nicosia overlooks at South Nicosia. The last time I had been there was probably around 2002 with my family to look at the “other” side which was a common habit amongst a high number of Turkish Cypriots at the time. Nowadays, the park has become a common attraction for most tourists who come from Turkey to visit North Cyprus. Ahmet who runs the place explains that tourists want to come here to have tea and observe “Europe”. As we chatted more, he was very surprised with me wanting to sit and have tea at the park as a “local Cypriot would never do that”, then he went on to tell me his story:

I came to Cyprus around 40 years ago, life was very difficult in our village in Turkey. I did not want to get North Cyprus citizenship back then, I didn’t see the need as I was Turkish. Now, I realise that I have made a big mistake. I had children and now they do not have citizenship either because I have some missing months in my work permit. I like to run this park because it has a very nice view, you can observe the buses, the order, the cleanliness of the South. It would be nice to be able to cross but you know we are not allowed. Now my son is getting married to a local Turkish Cypriot so he will be able to cross, I am happy for him.

In that sense, it is useful to investigate the role of the border not as an indexical physical space of separation between North and South, but instead as a space through which different relational categorisations such as “moderns” or “backwards”, “settlers” or “locals”, “Cypriots” or “from Turkey” are generated and performed.

Remembering Blueband margarine to forget the gunshots?

On the other hand, when the borders/checkpoints first opened, a high number of “local” Turkish Cypriots rushed to cross to the “other” side. Some went to their old homes, some to supermarkets to look for Morning Coffee biscuits and Blueband margarine. These tastes reminded them of a yester year, there was conflict, nonetheless their hopes were high and solidarity amongst the community was strong. According to Khanna (in Byrne 2009: 121), Bhabha’s conceptualisation of third space implies that there is often an invisible element that has to be remembered in melancholic comebacks of all histories, political gestures or narratives. After going to the supermarket and not finding Blueband margarine Hayriye recounted:
Our house was in Nicosia in Göçmen Köy ([Migrant village], a housing project to accommodate internal Turkish Cypriot refugees), our fathers were fighting, our mothers used to work. On the weekends, we would gather and warm bread on the heater to eat with some Blueband margarine and some olives.

This is one of the countless stories I have heard increasingly over the course of past years. There are also increasing stories of how not only Greek Cypriot neighbours helped to save their lives but also of how other Turkish Cypriots took part in murdering people of their own community. Kemal in his 80s explained:

I used to work in Varosha at a hotel construction in 1974, one day my boss whispered not to come to work tomorrow because they would close the barricades and I would not be able to go back. He dropped me with his car that night to a safe region. It was indeed true, next day the attacks started again.

According to Hall (in Davis 2004:185) “communities will search for a more beautiful vision of themselves before the distortion and oppression of the colonial period which gives an imaginary coherence to a broken and fragmented sense of identity”. After the establishment of Northern Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots realised that their new state neither provided them with self-determination nor provided them equal rights with the rest of the world, instead it led to feelings that they have become unseen by the rest of the world. I believe that in order to obtain the gaze of the rest of the world combined with the fear of hegemonic policies of Turkey, emergence of “Cypriotness” made way. However, as Turkish Cypriots started to remember aspects of a past which did not necessarily match with dominant ideologies, they started to question the nation-state structure as well as their official history. I believe that these subjective alternatives have both had an impact on political activism and have helped face historical trauma and repression as they constitute a past that extends beyond conflict which also has a place for other’s mourning.

From a “weird place”

During the last ten years, Nicosia’s old town has increasingly started to transform, new cafes and bars are opening and the buildings with gun shots are being painted with colourful images, attracting “multicultural” individuals from both sides of the divide aiming to recreate the old city away from the nationalist influences that led to its division. Firstly, I am thinking whether we could talk about melancholia leaving itself to reflective nostalgia in Boym (2001)’s conceptualisation as it seems that while the actual trauma is at no time fully recollected, the come back to the area is linked to the loss of collective frameworks of memory. Can we talk about a try to overcome the memory of absence which lingered for years through nostalgia with the help of global trends as the rise of the local in global gains importance? When historical memory gets enmeshed with nostalgia, does it allow for a certain return of the repressed, for a space where a certain mourning can be performed for what the politics of nationalism has occluded during the last century? Edward Said (2000) in Reflections of Exile draws attention to alternative communities that retain their private subjectivity which can encourage critical thinking instead of mourning. Regarding memory and alternative subjectivities, Said concludes his review of Another way of telling in the Nation (in Attwell et al. 2013) questioning the future ramifications of these new frameworks of remembering asking Berger how the role of memory and subjective alternatives to dominant ideologies could influence political activism.

According to Butler (2015), acting together is an embodiment that challenges dominant political perspectives as “the claim of equality is not only spoken or written, but is made precisely when bodies appear together, or rather, when through their action, they bring the space of appearance into being” (Butler 2015: 89). Anti-militarist peace operation which is a festival with live music organised every year since 2010 aims to create a mass movement from
below for a united Cyprus. The festival emphasises that a true peace operation cannot take place using violent means where human bodies appearing in peace become a source of resistance. On another note, de-Certeau (1984) underlines the role tactical forms and creativity play to resist social norms entangled in disciplinary mechanisms. Tactical practises of everyday life enable ordinary users to perform an act of “resistance” by way of reconstructing certain practises, as the mere utilisation is also an act of “reproduction” which brings about adaptation, manipulation and appropriation of the act. Indeed, in North Cyprus, cross border connections, shopping from wherever it is cheap, multiple identity cards or ways to get around citizenship policies resist disciplinary mechanisms through these tactical forms and transcend the nation state. Last but not least, Berger (2003) in the Shape of a Pocket, focuses on art as resistance, arguing that the act of resistance is not only the rejection of what we are constantly being presented including political and ideological lies but it is also to voice the invalidity of this picture which is something that can be accomplished through art. A theatre performance at the burned ruins of the state theatre building in Nicosia which has not been fixed in the past 20 years I think is a very good example of showing resilience to the existing order through art. The name of the performance From a weird place draws attention to the critical lens that has arisen in the community that questions the normalised quotidian reality, producing a contrapuntal crack in Edward Said (1993)’s terms that allows interpreting the notes in-between authority and alienation, law and unlawfulness, order and disorder, displacement and belonging.
Bibliography:


TOURISM AS A MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
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Abstract

Individuals, since their birth and later as a result of their choices, belong to different groups and much of their lives take place within them. Occasional or permanent affiliation and participation in groups of different types satisfies the need of belonging and provides ways of interpreting and understanding the world (Hatzouli, 2009).

The belief that individuals belong to a group and its recognition by non-members belongs to the two basic dimensions of the group definition (Brown, 2000). This definition can include all kinds of groups. Where groups are composed of a large number of members, for example in a nation, individuals can not know all the other members and therefore their participation is at a fantasy level (Anderson, 1991). The members of large-scale groups are in continuous symbolic interaction or in reference to groups of others as represented in our inner worlds. Through symbolic interaction, the person impersonates the outside world and organizes his actions (Blumer, 1998).

Key words: tourism, attitudes, stereotypes, prejudice, collective narrative

Introduction

The evaluation that runs through the positions we have mentioned and the hierarchy formed within the group is best perceived through the attitudes. The favorable or negative attitude towards individual / group members of a particular position is based on the pre-existing position assessment. We understand, therefore, attitudes to the favorable or unfavorable attitude of the individual towards social objects of value (Navrides, 1994).

The brief assessment of an object, according to Bohner (2007), interferes with the stimulus and the reaction to it. Therefore, attitudes are not inherent but acquired (Maisonneuve, 2001) and are perceived through their result, as they show the person's predisposition towards an object, a condition prior to action or reaction. The attitudes are usually of an integrative nature, i.e. the attitude of a person towards a social value object will activate a series of behaviors related to it (Maisonneuve, 2001).

Attitudes towards social value objects have three dimensions on the basis of which we can study them: (a) cognitive, (b) emotional and (c) behavioral or regulatory (Bohner, 2007; Maisonneuve, 2001; Navrides, 1994).

The cognitive dimension or function of attitudes, i.e. the person's knowledge of the object of attitude, forms his assessments about this (Maisonneuve, 2001; Bohner, 2007). In addition, Potter (1989) talks about the intention of action/behavior, based on the rational evaluation of its results, and it concerns not only a certain material benefit, but also social expectations of attitude and behavior, as "decisions are not taken in a social vacuum. What other people think is appropriate is important. People calculate the benefits and costs, but they also want to protect their reputation. Issues such as
maintaining dignity are often as important as material rewards and economic gains "(p. 127). Based on the above cognitive functions, the processes of selectivity, information, deformation and stereotyping are activated.

The second function -the emotional- refers to the feelings that are created on the person about the subject, positively or negatively, and they are distinguished by their degree of intensity, stability and the duration of the behaviors that are manifested. Finally, the behavioral or regulatory function of attitudes directs the individual towards specific actions and includes movements, actions and behaviors in response to the object (Bohner, 2007; Maisonneuve, 2001).

**Group beliefs and collective narrative**

In this dynamic process of symbolic interaction, the resulting intelligence is based on pre-existing diffused beliefs, which of course can be transformed through the same process. The Bar-Tal (1990a) defines collective beliefs as knowledge shared in team members and the public social context through which they perceive and interpret the world around them. According to him, the basic group belief is the people's belief that they belong to a group, while the content of the other beliefs can cover a wide range of issues related to the identity of the group and its function. The core beliefs of a group, Bar-Tal (1990a) continues, are its rules, values, goals and ideology as they mark its peculiarity to other out-groups. Essential characteristics of beliefs are confidence in their content as well as their centrality and functionality within the group. Trust in the content of group beliefs and their validity arises from their consideration as essential elements of the group itself and its participation in it. According to Bar-Tal (1990a), people often choose to become members of a group precisely because of group beliefs, while challenging them may lead to the group itself being challenged and withdrawing from it. The centrality of group beliefs is evidenced by the frequency of their recall by members for the assessment of many different situations and the formation of specific behavior as a result of these evaluations. "The most central group beliefs are considered to be prototype in the characterization of the group, and so they are called basic group beliefs" (Bar-Tal, 1990a, p. 58). By continuing, the two main functions of group beliefs are identity and information. The first one, the matching function, is the basis for group membership, unity and uniformity among members, as the similarities resulting from common beliefs and differentiation with other groups whose belief system is different are emphasized. Based on this, Bar-Tal (1990a) proposes an understanding of the process of differentiation and categorization through group beliefs: since group beliefs categorize and differentiate, they are also a source of information for team members. Through beliefs, members gain knowledge about the group itself, its past, present, but also its future.

Where group beliefs are central and relate to lifetime, they are the only criterion for building up stored knowledge and incoming information. In this situation, group beliefs shape the reality of the members of the group and act as a frame of reference for the organization of all knowledge (Bar-Tal, 1990a).

Group beliefs, when fulfilling the above functions, become necessary and central to the group identity, so it is necessary to disseminate them, especially to the new members, for the continuation of the group itself. In the case of large-scale groups such as nations, the diffusion of group beliefs, according to Bar-Tal (1990a), takes place through institutions such as education, the media and rituals. The latter, in fact, achieve not only
the diffusion of beliefs but also their confirmation within the group, the rewarding of identity with the group and its beliefs, and the punishment of their violations (Hermanowicz & Morgan, 1999). Of course, group beliefs do not remain static but change, causing new beliefs, and hence sub-groups, which may lead to breakdown or conflict. Also, not all group beliefs are as prominent as ever and at the same time but, depending on needs and circumstances, some beliefs become more central.

All group beliefs are represented and disseminated, as we mentioned above, through the symbolic interaction of individuals, institutions and the media. Through the representations, the unknown information about a social object is transformed into familiar, as it is anchored to one of the existing categories and described on familiar terms, while incorporating any new terms and sublimation ideas (Moscovici, 1984). In order to manage the strange/weird/open idea or concept, the process of anchoring it into an already existing representation is activated. Already existing images and concepts are used to describe the novel and unimportant until it becomes part of the representation (Moscovici, 1988).

Representations cover the need to understand and transform the unknown into a known through communication, but they also achieve the very communication between the people. Through the system of social representations, that is, the commonly accepted symbols of all the members of a group, individuals can interact and communicate, understand the world, interpret it and act according to this knowledge (Doise et al., 1999). They construct an intelligent image of the world and find their place in it (Christakis, 2010).

According to Potter (2004), "social representations have a specific structure: they are usually built around a nucleus, consisting of a central image" (p. 202) and interfering with the social object they represent, and the attitudes that shape people about it. This metaphorical "piece", according to Moscovici (1988), is more stable and is more directly related to the social process of shaping representations than to cognitive and intellectual ones. "Images have the advantage of linking us to the past and making predictions about the shape of what will come, the real when it happens" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 236).

Social representations of group beliefs have a direct impact on intra-group processes, as the promotion of common consciousness and worldview forms a common identity (Breakwell, 1993). By choosing and representing specific social beliefs that relate to the identity of the group and events from its history, the team constructs a narrative that links it to the past, explains the present and prepares or organizes the future. In this context, the out-groups are also evaluated and the relations with them are formed. Depending on the group's needs, different specific representations can be activated or used. Social representations of the group's central beliefs are of prime importance: they are more easily accessible, more easily recalled by individuals and are more difficult to change. Representations of the central elements of a group's identity compose the collective narrative and provide individuals with the necessary coherence, order and security they seek, reducing the discomfort caused by uncertainty (Bauman, 2002).

The concept of narrative has become one of the most important in the social sciences, for the approach of identity, individual and collective, usually with memory. At an individual level, by the term narration we mean the story of the individual, as he constructs it, always interacting with others through speech (Crossley, 2000). The narrative form connects events, information, beliefs, interpretations and values, and is essentially a representation of the individual's identity and aims at its meaningful and
coherent performance for the individual, but also in communicating and interacting with others (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006). The narrative structure functions as a form of comprehension of the new information, while it is influenced and remodeled by them (Crossley, 2000). The timing of the narrative gives the individual the sense of self-consistency and the ability to evaluate the past, understand the present and partly anticipate the future (we are referring to the future planning and the possible course of action for the individual). The narrative, as a representation of identity, satisfies the need to maintain continuity and consistency in relation to oneself and the connection with others or, as Erikson (1980) states, "a persistent internal resemblance and a persistent sharing of some kind of essential character with others" (p. 109).

The Crossley (2000) connects the collective narrative of the rituals, the tales and myths, used by small groups to preserve the memory and knowledge diffusion, extending the concept to the club level. The Bar-Tal and Salomon (2006) define the collective narrative as:

A social construction that connects coherently with a series of historical and contemporary events; it is a testimony of the experiences of a community, embodied in the belief system, and represents the symbolically constructed common identity of collectivity. The collective narrative of a society provides the basis for common understanding, good communication, interdependence and co-ordination of social activities that are essential to the functioning of social systems (p. 20).

The incorporation of elements of the group's narrative into the personal narrative of the individual reveals a high commitment to the team, acceptance and compliance both with its functional and structural elements, as well as with values, attitudes and generally the common perception of the group and the outside world.

Tourism as a communication tool

Tourism seems to have a long tradition being hailed as “the global peace industry”, and a tendency exists in literature of a direct link between tourism and peace (D’Amore, 1988a,b; Hall, 1994; Hobson & Ko, 1994; Jafari, 1989; Matthews, 1978; Matthews & Ritcher, 1991; Richter, 1989, 1996; Var, Brayley, & Korsay, 1989; Var, Schluter, Ankomah, & Lee, 1989). The notion of peace through tourism has been discussed since the 1920s, with ‘Travel for Peace’ as the theme of the 1929 British Travel and Holidays Association’s inaugural conference (Wohlmuther & Wintersteiner, 2014). However, it was in that year when the peace tourism movement began, at least from a literary standpoint (Kelly, 2006a; McIntosh et al, 1995; Khamouna and Zeiger, 1995; Litvin, 1998; Tomljenovic and Faulkner, 2000). Prior to the first global conference on peace through tourism in 1988, the conference founder, Louis D’Amore published two articles; ‘Tourism: A Vital Force for Peace’ and Tourism: The World’s Peace Industry’ (D’Amore, 1988a, 1988b), both of them arguing that tourism could be regarded as a force for world peace. However, empirical testing has not always supported this position (Anastasopoulous, 1992; Milman, Reichel, & Pizam, 1990; Pizam, Milman, & Jafari, 1991).

The vast majority of the pro-peace tourism literature focuses on the notion that tourism, through contact with other cultures, leads to greater understanding and affection between cultural groups, which remains principally a utopian idea and open to critique. However, building on the claim by D’Amore, there is a growing trend towards
recognition of tourism’s potential to aid peace through economic development and poverty alleviation. The most evidenced strategy that has drawn recent attention has been pro poor tourism; ‘tourism that results in increased net benefits for poor people’. Using a case study approach, a significant number of authors also argued that tourism could be indeed a healing force between divided nations.

As with any balanced debate, there exists substantial argument against those advocating tourism as a contributor to peace. Arguments about tourism’s exploitative nature are common including its tendencies to commoditization, museumisation and, finally, considering it as a form of neo-colonialism. Within the peace tourism literature there are a number of views from those denying tourism’s ability as a force for peace, arguing that tourism does not create peace but simply benefits from it. Litvin writes, “tourism is clearly a beneficiary of peace, but as tourism is never successful in the absence of peace, it cannot, therefore, be a generator of peace” (1998:64). Tomljenovic and Faulkner (2000) argue neither one way nor the other, claiming that both schools of thought legitimize their argument by emphasizing the form of tourism that is most congruent and then generalize for tourism as a whole because “while tourism has the potential to promote intercultural understanding and tolerance, it has an equally strong potential to have the opposite effects” (p. 31).

Conclusion

Developing a pedagogical environment in the context of tourism that cultivates respect for diversity and promotes dialogue can help reduce negative attitudes and foster positive attitudes towards ethnic "other". Through a process of constant reflection, their perceptions and their transformation are sought. The upcoming change can be both personal and social (Mezirow, 2009). Learning through tourism is enriched with the individual load of knowledge and experience and transforms into a fluid, ever-renewed process with "open", non-objectively measurable results (Bruner, 1997).

The national, linguistic, cultural and intellectual barriers are shattered with the knowledge, with the will of communicating with the others, to better understand the differences and the links that are related to the different cultures. In order to create disciplinarian thinking and personality, able to resist and limit separations, uniformities, cultural stereotypes, causes and consequences of the massification and utopian tendency, in order to transform the cultural and social systems, we must offer to the visitors a multitude of knowledge (Shor & Freire, 1987).

References


