
By Foteini Kalantzi

I. General Framework

The developing and increasing immigrants’ influx to Greece, part of the increased immigration movement towards the Western world and especially Europe, has created a new map for exploration, analysis and debate in academia and in political circles, but most importantly it has created the need for new initiatives and formation of laws. The EU realisation for the rise of immigration in the European continent created the need for a common migration policy. An approach on a common migration policy was set out at the October 1999 European Council in Tampere, Finland and was confirmed in 2004 with the adoption of the Hague programme, which sets the objectives for strengthening freedom, security and justice in the EU for the period 2005-2010.

No matter how Greek governments’ policies are set out regarding immigration issues, the fact remains the same; Greece is transforming from a mono-cultural to a multi-cultural society. Also, beyond the ever-changing situation of immigration and the mass waves of immigrants from Central Europe, Asia, Africa and the Balkans, there is already a solid situation formed by settled immigrants and of course second-generation immigrants.

Therefore multiculturalism is a reality within the Helladic state. Greek society is going through a typical phase of fears and steps that a society goes through when facing the immigration and cultural diversity issues. Other European countries, like for example Germany, France and the U.K have been through similar phases in the 1950s and 1960s. In Greece, multiculturalism is a relatively new phenomenon and the Greek society is still trying to find its balance on the particular matter. The numbers manifest the importance of the matter. 10% of the population residing in Greece are immigrants; which means not Greek nationals and not Greek orthodox. We can describe this as demographic renewal and a new social reality, as Greece has been transformed from a labour exporting country to a labour importing country.

II. The 90s change & the EU

The geo-political changes at the end of the 80s have played a massive role to the dynamics of European societies. Greek society has been affected as well. The collapse of the iron curtain
transformed immigration to an uncontrollable phenomenon. As a result, although Greece was at that time still one of the less-developed EU states, in the 1990s it received the highest percentage of immigrants in relation to its labour force. Actually, the 1990s is an important chronological point, as first steps are taken towards formal management of diversity in the Greek state. There is a transition towards new management policies on diversity and there is an adoption of differentiated wording in the public sphere regarding diversity and of practices regarding multiculturalism. The role of the EU in this respect is very significant and Greece’s necessity to coordinate its policies with the rest of Europe is apparent. Funding from the EU, bilateral and multilateral cooperation on projects, as well as initiatives co-ordinated with EU’s policies for tackling illegal immigration highlight the twist in Greek strategy and mentality on the particular issue and of course the transnational character of the problem.

The sudden influx of immigrants in the beginning of the 90s hit the reflex of the Greeks; fear and anxiety was created. More so, these feelings were strengthened by Greek governments’ inability or difficulty to control undocumented immigrants and media’s negative depiction of immigrants. There are several estimations on the numbers of undocumented and therefore illegal immigrants. People have started demonising immigrants for all the evils of the Greek society, like unemployment and criminality. Immigrants have become the ‘Other’.

The nationals have been put in front of social, moral and cultural dilemmas. Unquestionable certainties and principles before, have been doubted and questioned. National and hence cultural identity has been put under the microscope. Greekness has been heavily discussed in the framework of multiculturalism. In addition, nationalistic and extreme right-wing movements and parties gained public support. The new givens create a new era of internal conflict and questions arise regarding the relation between multiculturalism and Greek identity. Certainly there is a diversity of opinions, representing different social and political groups.

III. **Research Goal & Outcome**

The goal of the particular research is to examine what has been written in the selected newspapers on the wider subject of the immigration in Greece and immigration policies
applied by the Greek government. The newspapers that have been analysed are the following: TA NEA, TO VIMA, KATHIMERINI and ELEFTHEROTYPIA.

The research has been carried out through the websites of the newspapers, using the following words: Immigrant, immigration, immigration policy, illegal immigrants, national identity, refugee, foreigner, multiculturalism.

The immigration topic and related ones are often present in the Greek press, in an increasing mode. The way Greek newspapers depict the particular topics is closely related with the newspapers’ ideological profile and the journalistic level.

The general impression in Greece is that crimes have increased dramatically since 1990 due to the presence of illegal immigrants. The public opinion has been influenced mainly by TV (which magnified the crimes’ significance, when immigrants were involved), and partly by newspapers.

IV. Methodology

The particular paper following the path of constructivist theory will lay emphasis on the crucial mediating role of social agents in the construction of social reality. The view and hence the role of the media and in particular the Greek press in the period 2000-10, as an effective social and political mechanism will be analysed. The paper will examine the stance of the Greek press towards immigration and multiculturalism issues.

This analysis will give a notion of the press’s stance in a homogenous, mono-ethnic and mono-religious country, like Greece towards the particular socio-economic and cultural change. It will also provide an insight about media’s influence on Greek public opinion and social and cultural identity.

The analysis takes into account the fact that newspapers do not only report facts, but they report facts on certain issues (depending on the profile of the newspaper, intensity of the issue) and not on others, constructing a certain view of the public on the particular subject matter.
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Political Elites, propagandization and the presentation of the MoU in Greece

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Keywords: political elites, political discourse, propaganda, MoU, Greece, political parties

Propaganda is a phenomenon closely related to the social, economic and political context within which it takes place, being a basic ingredient of the social, economic and political procedures of modernity and late modernity. Propaganda, far from being used in specific occasions, exists and is being constantly developed in many aspects of contemporary life. Propagandistic practices take place under any government and at any given time. The formation of public opinion cannot be an instant operation, but a rather constant procedure.

Although propaganda is used long before the 1900’s, its implementation range was dramatically increased in the beginning of the 20th century, following the constantly increasing political participation and the need of elected governments to justify their policies to an increasing number of individuals-citizens. Propaganda becomes an essential tool for conducting politics, as since the WWI the public opinion cannot be ignored as a formation factor for the governments’ implemented policies.

All propaganda definitions stress out the attempt of the propagandist to influence, using a rather wide variety of ways (from lies and deception to unilateral opinions and half-truths, and from rational to sentimental arguments). At its basis propaganda is a procedure of generation and communication of ideas and opinions in favor of the propagandist. Propaganda as a structural ingredient of reality is at the same time discourse and action, thought and implementation. It’s a constant and deliberate communication procedure, practiced through the dissemination of information through the media, trying to form political, economic and social realities.

Propagandistic practices include publication of specific stories, which are presented as general truths, unilaterally presented facts, specific attention to threats or dangers, a rather restricted number of experts supposed to provide detailed information and a narrow frame of expressing opinions, by using arguments invoking the rationality as well as the feelings of the propagandees.

Under this aspect, we will try to examine in the current research whether the presentation of the MoU through political discourse contains propagandistic elements, as well as the nature of the propaganda involved in the dissemination of information on the MoU.

Political elites, constituted a major pattern for the research of political parties from the early 20th century when the first monographies regarding the party phenomenon were published. This evolution was somewhat strange if we take into consideration the fact that the first researches regarding political elites were published even earlier, at the end of the 19th century.

Several terms referring to the definition of political elites have been adopted from the philosophers, each one of them influenced from the aspects of the elites they tried to analyze. In general, political elites could be defined as small minorities that manage to concentrate at their disposal more power than the great majority of a
population, influencing through that power the policies adopted to a much greater extent.

Political elites, were a fundamental ingredient of the political system from the ancient years, when the first institutional organization of the societies took place, regardless of the form of the polity.

It is obvious that, such a tendency in practice means a lack of equally sharing of power or in other words a lack of democracy. An observation that holds also for democratic regimes, especially due to the fact that only representative forms of governments have been adopted, in our era. This lack of democratic participation is even higher during periods of crises. During those periods, elites tend to homogenize and concentrate at their disposal even higher power jurisdictions and functions. Party elites tend to function with a rather undemocratic way, while simple members of the parties, not to mention the great majority of population, cannot influence the decisions taken at all.

The overall procedure has significant impact to the elite institutions of the political system. The most powerful of them, the prime minister and the cabinet, concentrate more jurisdictions, while several other institutions such as the political parties or the parliament seems to have a more limited role to the procedure of the political performance. Moreover, during periods of crises new political elites or new personnel from the already existing elites tends to emerge, while serious doubts regarding the legitimation of the government to receive so serious decisions is also evident.

Under those circumstances, we will try examine through our research the way that political elites choose to act, before and after the announcement of the MoU.

The targeted presentation of the issues included to the MoU, was monitored in order to evaluate the detailed estimation to the policies needed to be adopted. The presentation of
the issues was separated in three different categories, according to the level of targeted reference. In most cases (almost 50% of total cases) there was a simple issue reference without any further detail. Moreover, one out of three cases presented a reference to the MoU without any specific reference to an issue, while only 17% of the cases were including a detail presentation of an issue.

According to the MoU basic directives there were 16 main categories of policies that the Greek government should adopt, each one of them including several different and more detailed policies. The political system, in our research, focused its attention to a great extent to the way the cooperation and negotiation of the Greek government with the E.E., ECB and IMF should be founded (60% of cases). The only other category that was presented in several cases was that of the wages and pensions (almost 16%), while limited presentation is obvious in three other categories (expenditures and function of government 6,1%, credit-monetary section 5,6%, and labour insurance 5,1%). It is worth mentioning that 3 categories were not referred at all (transportation, energy, zoning plan).
A more detailed presentation of the MoU was needed to be monitored in order to be evaluated the extent of the complete propagandization of the actions needed to be adopted. The MoU was including 98 actions that the greek government should apply. Only 40 of them were mentioned even once, from the political elites. But even in those cases most of them were referred only once. The party members had estimated their attention only in five actions: the pensions reductions, the decrease of public sector wages, private sector wages/reduction of wages, the loan conditions of the country and the increased jurisdictions of the minister of Economy. This observation drives us to the conclusion that only a very limited presentation of the actions of the MoU was referred from the political elites.
A six categories index was adopted in order to evaluate the consequences of the MoU to the Greek society as presented both from the Greek party elites and foreign politicians. The index was referring to positive or negative consequences separated in the economic, social or political field. According to our findings almost one out of two (46.7%) positive consequences, were presenting the positive economic impact to the Greek society. On the other side the negative views were referring both to society and economy (almost 23% of the cases were presenting a negative economic impact and a 16.7% a negative social impact). Quite noteworthy is the fact that the political consequences either positive or negative were monitored in limited cases.

One of the main research targets of our paper was to present the causes that led us to the adoption of the MoU. Through this variable we wanted to monitor the propagandization from the political spectrum regarding the necessity or not for the MoU to be adopted. Seven different parameters were included to our analysis. The most common was that the MoU was “the only solution due to financial circumstances” observed to the 43.2% of cases. The
second was unexpectedly that “it was a fault of the present government of PASOK” (31.1%), while only a 13.7% thought it was a fault of the last government of ND. Limited cases (less than 4%) were presenting as causes that it was a result of “unconditional negotiation”, “responsibility of the Greek mentality”, failure of the party system” and “a fault of all governments after the coup’ d’ etat.

A scale was adopted to evaluate the degree of agreement regarding the MoU with 1 to be the higher disagree mark and 5 the higher agree mark. As expected, the political elite of PASOK, presents the higher mark of approval of the MoU. However the approval is higher among the prime minister and the cabinet members which had the basic jurisdiction to negotiate and propagandize the MoU, in contrast to the parliamentary members. Left parties presented the lower mark of approval among the party spectrum. Especially in the case of KKE, no fluctuation is observed, since all the party members regardless their status were strongly dissaproving the MoU. ND also presented a higher mark of disapproval which is more evident in the case of the party leader and less to the party members. LAOS presented a more neutral face with no significant differentiations between the leader and the party members. Foreign politicians also referred with high supportive views to the MoU.
Party elites were also evaluated in total, regardless of their status in the parties which belong. The general trend is similar to the one described above. PASOK party members were the most prominent supporters of the MoU since in most cases they propagandized the advantages from the adoption of that “solution” for the financial problems of Greece (general mark 4.17 out of 5). The second party with the higher mark of support was that of LAOS with the general tendency to present a rather neutral opinion (2.64/5). ND presented a moderate disagree face while the two parties presented a strongly disagree opinion of the MoU were that of the left (namely KKE and SYRIZA).
The fact that the present economic crisis seems to constitute one major pattern influencing the political system made us focus our attention to the political personnel, that communicated the MoU to the public. Our hypothesis is that due to the fact that the most prominent cause for the emerging crises was a blame of the previous governments, would constitute a parameter for a newly recruited personnel. Our hypothesis was verified in the case of PASOK mainly due to the fact that a great number of the cabinet are newly recruited personnel (51% statements from new members). Surprisingly enough, also due to the fact that it had a new leadership, ND almost exclusively presented opinions deriving from old members of the party. Similar tendencies were also observed in the case of KKE (100% old members) and LAOS (almost 75%). Only SYRIZA presented new members to a great majority (76.6%).

The location of the statements was also monitored, in order to find out the way the political elites choose to present their views. With the exception of KKE all the parties choose in most cases the mass media or a studio to make their statements (depending on the party the percentages were between 35.5% ND and 40.6% SYRIZA, in contrast to only 20% for KKE), confirming for one more time that it is the party with the smallest presentation from the mass media. Press conference was the second most common location for the presentation of the MoU among the two competitive parties of the power, while it was the first location among the members of KKE. In the case of LAOS and SYRIZA the second location was that of parliament which in the rest partes was the third. A noteworthy notification is the
fact that the statements deriving from party organs was almost absent, confirming one of our research hypothesis.

Concludingly, based on the findings of our research, we could argue that the presentation of the MoU through the discourse of political elites had significant propagandistic elements. These elements can be traced in the significant percentage of the general references on the MoU, along with the high percentage of reference to issues of the MoU and not specific actions. In addition, the causes of the MoU were focused mainly around the “only solution” argument, without justifying this “only solution” rationale (qualitative observation from the research), urging the consumers of this message to rather “feel” the MoU solution as necessary, than to critically evaluate it.

Regarding political elites, the MoU appears to have a significant effect on the intra-party consensus of the government party of PASOK, within which a significant variance of support for the MoU can be traced (ranging from almost total support on behalf of the prime minister, to rather neutral position of the parliament members). The position of major and minor opposition was expected, due to the institutional role of the parties and their ideological orientations. Hence, ND appeared against the adoption of the MoU (mostly its leader), LAOS expressed a rather neutral position (and voted for the MoU), whereas the parties of the left (KKE and SYRIZA) appear to be the most critical ones against the MoU.

The political actors expressing opinions on the MoU were in most cases “old” ones (being part of former governments or parliaments), despite the blame on previous governments for the fiscal situation of the country. An exception to this observation was- marginally- PASOK (many of its cabinet members are newly recruited politicians) and SYRIZA, which used new party members in order to communicate its anti-MoU rhetoric. Closely related to this fact is the location of the statements made by political actors regarding the MoU. The media rationale (through interviews and press conferences) seems to dominate the ways in which parties and political elites choose to present their arguments, verifying the division of political discourse from the institutional places of its articulation (parliament or party organs).
PORNFICATION AND NEW MEDIA IN GREECE
THE ‘JULIA_PORN’ HASHTAG
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Pornification and new media in Greece

The ‘julia_porn’ hashtag

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The polysemic concept of pornification, as all key concepts in the social sciences, is also a contentious and controversial one. It has recently been brought to the fore of analysis - especially in the context of cultural and media studies - and it basically indicates the integration of discourses and discursive practices which are associated with pornography into the mainstream culture and media (McNair 1996, 2002). The, otherwise called, pornographication of the mainstream is related to the usually more frequently reported social phenomenon of the sexualisation of culture which mainly refers to the continuously growing presence of mediated sexual representations in the public sphere (Attwood 2006, 2009).

In this context, while a more recent set of academic writings has focused on the notion of the pornification of everyday life (Paul 2005; Paasonen et al. 2007), which for some has resulted in the prevalence of the raunch culture (Levy 2005) and the hypersexualisation of society (Kammeyer 2008), there are relatively few attempts to apply the concept to the everyday use of new/social media, and particularly to social networks and microblogging platforms. Having that in mind, this paper tries to examine, in a preliminary fashion, some of the ways with which Greek individual internet users faced a concrete case of provisional domination of the public sphere by pornographic discourses and sexually explicit materials.

More specifically, following Ramage et al. (2010) scalable implementation of the partially supervised learning model Labeled LDA (Latent Dirichlet Allocation) (Ramage et al. 2009) mapping the content of Twitter feed, this paper examines the commenting on the release of a porn DVD by the famous Greek starlet Julia Alexandratou through Twitter; the focus will be on the ‘julia_porn’ hashtag (#julia_porn, March 2010). The implementation of the Labeled LDA model will be complemented with a critical discourse analysis (CDA) in order to figure out what are, if any, the key, latent or not, messages that users want to spread via Twitter (Letierce et al. 2010: 281).

From Labeled LDA to CDA

The usefulness of latent variable topic models is about effectively modeling content on any collection of texts and producing sets of related words, which are usually referred to

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1 It is useful to provide some information about the Twitter platform. Nagarajan et al.’s description is an enlightening one: “A user post on Twitter (i.e., a tweet) comprises of the poster’s unique identifier, a time stamp reflecting when the tweet was posted and a 140 byte long content itself. Users of Twitter have directed ‘follower’ connections with other users of the site that allows them to keep track or ‘follow’ those users. Members can post tweets, respond to a tweet or forward a tweet. Replies to any tweet are directed to a user (not the conversation thread) utilizing the @user reference while retweets are means of participating in a diffuse conversation. The content of a tweet typically also contains text and hashtags (e.g., #iranelection) that indicate explicit topic categorization and links to other multi-media content that promote spread of information from all over the Web. Tweets are generally available as feeds from follower networks and also via a searchable interface” (2010: 295).
as ‘topics’ and constitute automatic methods for organizing and categorizing all the texts by content. What the Labeled LDA model offers more is that it gives us the opportunity by incorporating supervision where available to model any collection of texts as a mixture of some labeled dimensions that go with particular topics; in the case of Twitter ‘tweets’ and ‘hashtags’ respectively (Ramage et al. 2010: 130-2).

According to Ramage et al., “the latent topics can be roughly categorized into four types: substance topics about events and ideas, social topics recognizing language used toward a social end, status topics denoting personal updates, […] style topics that embody broader trends in language usage”; the 4S categories (2010: 130, emphasis mine). So, besides the fact that Labeled LDA model can be used to discover which words are best associated with each hashtag, in this paper it will only be used to map tweets from the ‘julia_porn’ hashtag into the learned latent and labeled dimensions which Ramage et al. (2010: 134-5) have grouped into the 4S categories. Thus, by mapping the sets of tweets into the substance, status, social, and style dimensions, and conducting a discourse analysis on the available meta-data, there will be an opportunity to detect any, latent or not, social trends.

In this context, a sample of 312 tweets (N₁=312) from the ‘julia_porn’ hashtag (#julia_porn, March 2010)² was manually labeled “as any combination of substance, status, style, social, or other - i.e. each dimension may have more than one 4S category assignment” and other topics include the non-classifiable texts (Ramage et al. 2010: 133). Table 1 summarizes the number of tweets associated with each category. Therefore, in order to see how the Greek individual internet users commented on the release of Julia Alexandratou’s porn we should apply discourse analysis to the 267 tweets (N₂=267) of the substance category. The focus will be on the latter category because it contains the tweets that, for the most part, refer to ideas and stands.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Tweets</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Substance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>40/312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>27/312</td>
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<td>Style</td>
<td>12/312</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10/312</td>
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Table 1. Tweets associated with the 4S categories

As far as the use of critical discourse analysis as methodological tool is concerned, it has been preferred because it will give us the opportunity to study the often opaque/latent relationships of causality and determination between discursive practices and texts (tweets) on the one hand, and wider social and cultural structures and processes

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² Due to the well-known problems which Twitter faces with the storing of older tweets, the data were collected from the Friendfeed platform. As Sørensen (2009) puts it, “Friendfeed aggregates and stores all the activity that is fed into the system. [So,] most FF users bring in their Twitter feed, in effect storing all their tweets. […] Thus[,] the advanced search features of Friendfeed makes it a pretty good twitter search alternative”. Although this may raise some serious problems as far as the data sampling is concerned, it is acceptable to consider the N₁=312 sample adequate because there was no random selection but inclusion of all the tweets from the Friendfeed search feature. Whatever the case may be, this paper is still a preliminary research.
on the other. Hence, we will be able, as Fairclough (1995: 132-3) puts it, to explore how the opacity/latency of these relationships between discourse and society is itself an empowering factor; a factor securing power.

**Hipster irony and postfeminist sexism**

The first and foremost conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of the 267 tweets of the substance category is that the overwhelming majority of them falls under another, more specific category; that of texts with an ironic tone (see Appendix A). Even though we could not derive some generalizable results due to the issues raised about the significance of the sample (see footnote 2), the fact that the individual new/social media users adopted this kind of discourse to comment on an associated with pornography event could be indicative of the ways in which irony is embraced as a certain element of the pornographication of the mainstream. This being so, we may proceed to some introductory thoughts about this.

More analytically, irony, as particularly described by Hutcheon (1994), is a complex concept which, because of “its semantic and syntactic dimensions, cannot be considered separately from the social, historical and cultural aspects of its contexts of deployment and attribution” (1994: 17). The latter means that the discursive aspects of irony indicate an open interpretation process which is basically attributed in the eye of the beholder (Hutcheon 1994: 111-8; Phiddian 1995). In view of that, on the one hand there is the strategy of ironic redeployment which gives the opportunity through the ‘restaging and resignifying’ of meanings to parody the hurtful discourses in order to target every hate speech, but on the other hand irony may well serve the purpose of distancing from commitment or engagement (Hull 2003: 524, 530).

In this context, the establishment of a safe distance from anything that seems to be ‘uncool’ and the ‘doesn’t mean what you think it means’ perspective of irony, despite its liberating potential, function through the very extremeness of the sexism as evidence that there is no sexism (Gill 2007: 159-60), as well as through the unsettling of the codes of pornography (McRobbie 2004). It is precisely in this sense that irony becomes “a way of ‘having it both ways’, of expressing sexist, homophobic or otherwise unpalatable sentiments in an ironized form, while claiming this was not actually ‘meant’” (Gill 2007: 159).

Furthermore, one should also stress that irony, as Hutcheon puts it, “happens because what could be called ‘discursive communities’ already exist and provide the context for both the deployment and attribution of irony” in conjunction with the exclusion of those who don’t get the ironic intentions (1994: 17). According to Epley (2007: 54), such a discursive community which is characterized by its ironic embrace is the hipsters’ one. The latter, by articulating no-collar labour practices to cultural practices of taste, place their culture above and apart from the mainstream (Epley 2007: 52-3).

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3 Although there is a widespread, but at the same time not scientifically established, rhetoric about the hipster logic/aesthetic that characterizes the fragmentary/detached discourse of Twitter because of its limited to 140 characters posts, we could raise some first round thoughts on how irony may well be associated, through postfeminist media culture, with a hipster oriented sexism.
The key point here is the different consumption practices of this ‘class fraction’ which depend on irony. Hipsters consume commodities and media texts in an ironic orientation so as to be free to choose whatever they want but at the same time still holding on to their values (Epley 2007: 53-5). It is at this point that the ‘I know it is sexist and because I know, I can enjoy’ hipsters’ logic (Epley 2007: 55) matches perfectly with the rhetoric of autonomy which is cultivated through postfeminist media culture (Gill 2007)\(^4\).

For Gill (2007: 161), contemporary media culture should be characterized as postfeminist due to the entanglement of feminist and anti-feminist ideas. To stress this, she invokes McRobbie’s idea of the ‘double entanglement’ which on the one hand refers to “the co-existence of neo-conservative values in relation to gender, sexuality and family life […] with processes of liberalisation in regard to choice and diversity in domestic, sexual and kinship relations” and on the other hand “encompasses the co-existence of feminism as at some level transformed into a form of Gramscian common sense, while also fiercely repudiated, indeed almost hated” (2006: 60).

Having all these in mind, one can easily understand that the issues which are raised here have to do with the ability of the hipster Twitter users to express sexist and anti-feminist claims under the guise of irony in a postfeminist environment which legitimizes the former on the basis of a partial acceptance of feminist ideas and a discourse of individuation, freedom to choose and self-empowerment. Above all, what is most troubling is the objectifying nature of the ironic, hipster oriented comments through Twitter. In order to figure out this, one should recall Gill (2003) and Attwood’s (2006) work.

For the latter, the ‘new woman’ figure of the autonomous, active, assertive subject has become the dominant figure representing young women (Attwood 2006: 86; Gill 2003: 105). Furthermore, parallel to the construction of the neo-liberal feminine subject where sex is stylish, a means of creating identity, and a quest for individual fulfillment (Attwood 2006: 86), we are witnessing, as Gill (2003: 103) argues, a shift from sexual objectification to ‘sexual subjectification’. From this point of view, sexual objectification can be presented as a freely chosen wish of female agents who can somehow choose to use beauty and sex to construct, in Anthony Giddens’ (1994) terms, their biography.

However, even if this ‘sexual subjectification’ appears to be the result of ‘rational actors’ will’, it should still be rejected as profoundly objectifying any sexist, anti-feminist, sweeping claims regarding women in general and any woman in particular. Nonetheless, it would also be misleading to adopt, in aprioristic fashion, a universalistic and categorical reasoning that the Twitter users of the sample who are men (i.e. the majority of the sample) depersonalize women on the basis of exercising power due to sex/gender differences. What seems to mediate women’s, and specifically Julia Alexandratou’s, depersonalization in this case is the apparently sexist/anti-feminist social construction of the new femininity in Greece.

\(^4\) For the purposes of this article, we adopt Gill’s approach to postfeminism. For the latter, “postfeminism is best understood as a distinctive sensibility, made up of a number of interrelated themes. These include the notion that femininity is a bodily property; the shift from objectification to subjectification; an emphasis upon self surveillance, monitoring and self discipline; a focus on individualism, choice and empowerment; the dominance of a makeover paradigm; and a resurgence of ideas about natural sexual difference” (2007: 147).
To conclude, as far as the objectifying character of the comments through Twitter is concerned, one could generally point out that while the concept of objectification can be used in an essentialist manner as a pre-constituted anti-feminist reality, it can also be used in a non-essentialist manner as symbolically constructed by both the first-order discourses of those directly involved in consumption of sex/porn media texts and by the second order discourse of intellectuals, feminists, opinion leaders, policy makers, etc. (Mouzelis 2008: 30). In this sense, it is fair to say that besides the liberating aspects of humor and irony, one should bear in mind that the, latent or not, expressions of sexist, anti-feminist, objectifying stands lead, somewhat, to the construction of hostile to women societies.

References


**Appendix A**

Indicative list of tweets with an ironic tone (in Greek; users’ names are omitted):

- Τζούλια Αλεξανδράτου: Η πιο εντυπωσιακή σα πανιέρα του κόσμου. Μα αναπτέλεσ ατική: Την κρατάει ζεστή. #julia_porn
- Πάνω από χθες νομίζω ότι τη νιώθουμε όλοι πιο κοντά μας. Πιο οικεία μας. Σαν την πουτάνα της διπλανή πόρτα #julia_porn
- Έχω μια φράση προς Σάσα, Όλγα, Πετρούλα κ λοιπές που θέλουν να πάρουν ρεβάνς: Ισχύ Εν Τη Ενώσει #Julia_Porn
- Απουσία σοβαρού επαγγελματικού προσανατολισμού στην Ελλάδα του 2010 όταν μια κοπέλα βρίσκει την κλίση της στα 23! #julia_porn
- Την κατακυλάει την http://www.moet.com/ το Τζουλάκι... #julia_porn
- Στα απόστεις την πειρατεία του βίντεο τη Τζούλια ... χάνει λεπτά το κορίτσι #julia_porn
- Μετά το αγγούρι τώρα και η σα πάνια: "Αλλο την πίνει και δροσιζεται, άλλο την πίνει και ζορίζετα!" #julia_porn
- Πολλές ελληνίδες τη σαμπάνια: "Άλλος την πίνει και δροσίζεται, άλλος την πίνει και ζορίζεται." #julia_porn
- Θέλω να δω πόσες θα ζηλέψουν την επιτυχία της Τζούλια τώρα ε το νέο βίντεο και θα την αντιγράψουμε! #julia_porn
- Η Τζούλια πορεί να όρισε πάνω. Το πουκάλι τη σα πάνια ω όχι #julia_porn
- Ενας ποτέ έναν κρυφωβιζούλι δότη πάνω δεν ασχολού σα! Όποια έχει αρχίδια ανάλ(ε)τε καλύτερη τσόντα! #juliaporn #julia_porn #julia #tsonta
- Η #julia_porn έχει και οικολογική συνείδηση... Το πουκάλι τη σα πάνια είναι βιοδιασπώμενο όχι σαν αυτές τις αηδίες τους δονητές από pvc
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- Τί πορεί να ακούσεις αν παρακολουθείς απρόσεκτα το #julia_porn : "Με πονάει ο Μήτρογλου"
- υπήρχε Camera ε ου και του ιδiou !! χαχαχαχα #julia_porn
- κάλα και αυτό που την πηδάει πό να ιζει ότι έπαιζε, σε ταινία του Θ. Αγγελόπουλου και δεν έβγαλε τα σαμπάνια #julia_porn
- Επί Ανδρέα είχα "τα πάνια του λαού"! Επί Γιώργου έχουν ε "σα πάνια του λαού"... #julia_porn
- Αλλάζει και η φράσειολογία α σιγά σιγά. Πχ Αν ένα ατ άλτης 4-0 θα λέγει «Πώπω, η σα πάνια ήταν αυτή!» #Julia_Porn
- Το βίντεο της Τζούλια δεν με ενθουσίασε. Ίσως επειδή έχω διαβάσει το βιβλίο και ήξερα τι θα γίνει στο τέλο #Julia_Porn
- Αγαπημένο παιχνίδι της Τζούλια στο σχολείο; Η "μπουκάλα" #julia_porn #fb
- Η Μ, είναι Αλβανίδα; προφορά και λεξιλόγιο κατευθείαν από το Μπεράτ #julia_porn #star_interview
- Το κατάλαβαίνει ότι γράφω ικρότερο συντροφό ΜΟΝΟ για σεξ(54%)=Πουτάνακι! RT @[…] http://twitpic.com/17i48c #julia_porn