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Abstract :

An island in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus finds itself at the intersection of histories, continents, and religions: it is the crossroads of Africa, Europe, the Middle East and in some ways of the Caucasus. The endless conflicts in which Cyprus is bogged down, which began when anti-colonial struggles crystallised in the form of opposition between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, have caused presence of other communities on the island, small yet equally rooted in its history, to be forgotten. Cyprus is no less a part of their history. Only three of these communities, all of them too often forgotten or passed over in silence, the Armenians, Maronites, and Latins, have received the privileged title of "religious groups." This situation is the result of history being re-read through the lens of strategy, leaves visible only select elements of human geography.

Cyprus' integration into the EU in 2004 will, however, allow all of these communities to make their voice heard and thus step out of the shadows. As a result the post-communist phenomenon of ethnic splintering, which is now approaching its climax, the Europe of Nations must from now on come face to face with its "nations." While Europe does indeed proclaim the post-nationalist era, the actual program it offers is less sure. The Cypriot question, which should have been resolved as part of the integration process, is from now on a European question, a war of nerves and words.

The very term *minority*, rejected by the Turkish Cypriot community, poses not only the problem of its definition, for no proposition has yet been universally accepted among international institutions, but also that of the legislation which results from it. With the Rights of Man, from which proceed the Rights for the Protection of Minorities, the semantic field narrows, since the whole question is placed within this framework by the European Council. The term *protection* (of minorities) often places the member states, or those whose candidature is under consideration, in an uncomfortable position, for to speak of protection is to say that something is being done against something or someone, and the culprit is most often understood to be the state.

We will thus reconsider the role of minorities in the mosaic of communities living in Cyprus. Our approach will consist in studying the use of the term *minorities*, the ideological struggles surrounding it, and also the dependence on history of the emerging question of minorities. We will then examine the European engagement for the Protection of Minorities, and its significance for Cyprus' minorities: we intend to paint a picture of the different communities, and to examine their history while putting their future into perspective. Finally, in guise of a conclusion, we will turn to a little studied aspect of the question of minorities: their geopolitical role in the choice of political positions, both at the domestic and international levels, of the countries in which they are present. In sum, we propose to study minorities as actors on the global scene.

Cyprus, European crossroads of Minorities

Introduction

Cyprus: a Mediterranean island, 9250 km² of land, a country about the size of Corsica (8717 km²), but nevertheless a country. The Turkish coast is 70 km away to the north, and Syria 100 km to the east ; it is 3000 km from Athens. To sum up its position, Cyprus is a tiny bit of land located between the Middle East and Asia Minor. Nor is Africa far away: Egypt is just across from it. Cyprus is Europe's antechamber, at the doors of the rest of the world, a veritable crossroads of people, of stories, of History.

To dominate Cyprus, whether one is Roman or Byzantine, the fallen King of Jerusalem or a Venetian in the pay of the Vatican, a Sultan, or even a colonial administrator, is to protect and control a crossroads of the highest strategic interest. But not one of these succeeding dominations could erase all previous influence, creating a clean slate. Instead, peoples and cultures have mixed over the years on the island. For example, in Cyprus it is not unusual to find yourself in front of a gothic church, which today has become a mosque. In the same way, the presence of minority communities of Cyprus constitutes the very symbol of the island's multi-ethnicity. The weight of this symbol is also the weight of the island's history.

In this presentation, we will examine the role of minorities in Cyprus, given the island's context as a crossroads. We will also consider how its geographical situation influences the situation of its minorities, not only in its regional context, but also, and above all, in its context as a part of Europe.

In order to do this, we will first examine the emergence of the question of minorities in a bi-polar and anti-colonial context. We will then discuss the situation of minorities, known as "religious groups," at the time of Cyprus' independence in 1960. Finally, we will examine the emergence of minorities as actors on the European scene.

I. Cyprus : the Turkish minority becomes a republic

The maps speak for themselves of Cyprus' physical nature as a crossroads, but it is above all a human and strategic crossroads.

Cyprus came under British administration in 1878, due to the English crown's agreement to come to the aid of the Ottoman Empire in its conflict with Russia. The events of the first world war, particularly Turkey's decision to align itself with Germany, reinforced English domination : in 1914, Cyprus was proclaimed a Crown colony. It was not until the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, however, that Turkey resigned itself to accepting this state of affairs.

Under British control, the emergence of the minority question in Cyprus took on a new dimension. The British administration, which had inherited the Ottoman system of *millet*, that is to say the organisation of ethno-religious communities under the leadership of their religious authority, was able to profit from this division of the population. To quote

Gilles Bertrand, "it [the British administration] simply applied its policy of *Divide and Rule*, playing the two main communities against each other."¹

A Mediterranean crossroads, Cyprus was nevertheless British. From then on, it would be considered not only in its regional context, but as a part of the Empire on which the sun never set.

The island's numerous communities, Greeks, Turks, Maronites, Armenians, Latins, and Jews, had, over time, learned to live together. But starting at the end of the 19th century, the breezes of nationalism began to blow in the island's Greek community (its largest community), which did not please British interests in the region. Cyprus, crossroads and colony, was to become a strange and terribly explosive cocktail.

This, then, is the context in which the question of minorities would become a stake in its own right, rather than a shield for the irrendentist dreams of the Greek Cypriots who demanded *Enosis* (union with Greece) through both their armed branch, the EOKA, and their religious head, the archbishop Makarios III. The emergence of the question of minorities and its instrumentalisation, as well as its relative autonomy were in fact a manifest expression of a geopolitical strategy at the service of British interests².

Nevertheless, we have chosen to go beyond the purely political implications of what has become the Cypriot question, and favour a territorial approach. That is to say, we shall consider how distance from the origins of identity, and the reorientation and redefinition of that identity have imprinted themselves on the insular space.

To use Jean Gottmann's image, taken from his *La Politique des États et leur Géographie*, a crossroads is swept by the changing winds of circulation of people and ideas. This circulation is in turn resisted by means of "partitions," symbols of identity described by the generic term "iconography." Thus Cyprus, crossroads *par excellence* is a textbook case of the combination and mutual nourishment of circulation and iconography. This phenomenon favours movement while at the same time causing the development of identities, which imprint themselves on the territory in question³. The geopolitician François Thual, for his part, has created the neologism "identitarisation"⁴, that is to say the process of giving a territory an identity on the same level as that of the community, to describe this process. This is true not only of the Greek community of Cyprus, whose identity could find its true consummation only in union with Greece, but also of the Turkish Cypriot minority.

While this community, which represents 18% of the island's population, was overused in the anti-colonial struggles of the 1950s, it is nevertheless true that it was able to respond to one movement after another by progressively creating its own symbols. The circulation of one group conditions the other's iconography, and thus also a new perspective on territory. Even their slogans are in opposition: *Enosis* against *Taksim*, Union against Partition. I shall willingly set aside numerous aspects of the Cypriot Question in order to focus on one aspect in particular: the "territorialisation" of minorities.

Cyprus' geographical position, and its situation as a crossroads, along with certain multipolar strategic questions, determine the collusion of messages of identity and thus of territorial claims. The Turkish Cypriots' opposition to union with Greece was due not only to the trauma of the Cretan precedent set in the early 20th century, but also to the ever-greater role in Cyprus' fate given to Turkey by England.

¹ Bertrand, G. (2003), p.71

² Cf. Attalides, M. A. (2003)

³ Gottmann, J. (2007²), p.222

⁴ Cf. Thual, F. (2004).

The Muslim minority, which had become consciously Turkish, was granted status as a community in the new nation in 1960, considered equal to the Greek Cypriot community. According to Jean-François Drevet, "The fact that power was weighted in favour of the Turkish community is accentuated by the existence of numerous arrangements of equal partnership... In many cases the Constitution put the two communities on equal footing, forcing them to reach a mutual decision."⁵

Since the Turkish Cypriot community was a minority as long as it was dispersed over the island, its constitutional authority could only be fully realized if it controlled a territory. In fact, it could not really function as a community at all before the creation of enclaves, starting in 1963, under the 13 amendments proposed by Makarios III, which aimed at simplifying the workings of the State to the detriment of the island's Turkish community. Thus Marie-Pierre Richarte justly notes : "A large part of the Turkish Cypriots' struggle was consecrated to forcing their admission as a separate community with equal rights, outside of all statistical considerations."⁶

The growth of violence between the two communities, which the launch of a UN mission (UNFICYP) was powerless to stop, as well as the events of 1974, made definitive the solitary path of a community, once a minority, which today calls itself a "republic." This independence movement can only be examined through the lens of territorial control: 38% of the north of Cyprus is under the domination of the Turkish army. It is here that the discussion becomes a paradox. For the Turkish community of Cyprus, inasmuch as it is considered a minority, requires Turkey's protection, yet at the same time its territorial discourse is sovereignist, even republican.

The term of "minority" can thus no longer be used in any case to describe the Turkish Cypriot community, although it often escapes the mouth of Greek Cypriots, particularly politicians, when questioned. This change of scale has, however, brought to light the great diversity, not to say heterogeneity, of the Turkish community since 1974. Since the events of 1974, a large number of new arrivals from Turkey have disembarked on the island. Greek Cypriots tend to emphasize the conflict between Turkish Cypriots and those they call "colonists", whereas the reality of the north is far less divided according to locals. There is, nonetheless, a difference in their origin: some are from a village of Pentadaktylos, others from Asia Minor. Demographic evolution raises yet another question. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots of the south have started to appeal to Europe for protection of their rights, under the Framework Convention for the protection of National Minorities in Europe (FCNM). What a paradox!

II. Independence and the official minorities known as "religious groups"

The term "religious group," unique in constitutional law and unknown in international law, requires a n examination of the expression itself.

Consider Cyprus' situation on the eve of its independence: anti-colonial struggles, the desire for union with Greece, and inter-communal clashes, which would, after bitter quarrels between the new republic's guarantors (England, Greece, and Turkey) lead to the 1959 signing of the London-Zurich Accords. The Republic of Cyprus was declared on August 16, 1960. But the first wave of violence was not long in coming: it began in 1963.

⁵ Drevet, J.-F. (2000)., p.113

⁶ Richarte, M.-P. (1995)., p.259

In his autopsy of the Cypriot constitution, Jean-François Drevet emphasizes its inapplicability. The Turkish Cypriot minority having become a community, the country functioned on a bi-communal basis, in which the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities shared all levels of power. This, however, meant it was necessary to do something with the island's other minorities, all the while preserving its essential bilateral communal division.

Table 1 : Population by community in 1960

	ORTHODOX	MUSLIM	MARONITE	LATIN	ARMENIAN	OTHERS	TOTAL
1960	441,656	104,942	2,752	4,505	3,378	16,333	573,566
Proportion (%)	77	18.3	0.5	0.8	0.6	2.8	100

Source: Republic of Cyprus, Census 1960

Since their numbers were small and they had no particular claims, it was decided that in accordance with the Cypriot Constitution, rather than giving these minorities an autonomous status, like that of the Greek and Turkish communities, each of these three "religious groups" would be asked which of the two communities it wished to belong to. The presence of alien minorities would thus be dealt with by integrating them into one or the other of the communities by means of a referendum. This allowed bi-communalism to be preserved, nationalism affirmed, and the minorities integrated.

As we have already mentioned, the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes "religious groups." But how are these defined?

Article 2.3 of the constitution designates as a religious group: any group of persons belonging to the same religion, or adhering to the same dogmas, or under the same religious administration, whose numbers were greater than 1,000 on the day the Constitution became effective. Moreover at least 500 of these 1,000 persons must have Cypriot citizenship. While all of these actors continue to insist vehemently that the Cypriot Question is not religious, there is nonetheless a permanent distinction based on religion. Even today, anyone who wishes to be a Cypriot citizen but is neither Muslim nor a member of an Orthodox church must choose between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities in a collective as well as private manner, that is to say through his own religious affiliation, after a period of implementation of the constitution.

The rights of "religious groups" were granted to three confessions: Armenian, Latin, and Maronite. Note that there is no mention made by name of any of these communities in the 1960 constitution; furthermore, given the population placed under the label "others" it is fairly clear that other communities could have benefited from such rights.

Table 2 : 1960 referendum results by religious group

	ARMENIAN	MARONITE	LATIN
Total / GC	1,077	1,046	322
Total / TC	5	0	1

Source : Dr. Ashdjian, A.

Certain observations must be made about this referendum. First, there is the enthusiasm with which the figures indicate the univocal preference of the minorities for the Greek community of Cyprus. Furthermore, there is the fact that only Cypriot citizens could participate in the referendum. But in that case, the Latin community is underrepresented, and

does not meet the conditions to be a religious group, the minimum number of Cypriot citizens having been set at 500.

The three religious groups, which had decided to adhere to the Greek community, also obtained certain rights due to their status as minorities. In addition to being allowed to continue administrating their internal affairs according to their own laws (art.110.3), art. 109 granted them the right to have their own representative in the Communal Chamber⁷. Each of the two main communities, Greek and Turkish, had such a chamber, which dealt mainly with the community's internal problems. Within the Communal Chamber, the representatives of the three religious groups had the right to be seated, to address the chamber, and to vote on questions involving their own community. Greeks and Turks met in the Chamber of Representatives, where their representatives had a 70-30 ratio. Sergy adds that in the Chamber of representatives, one seat was reserved for the three religious minorities as a group. Their representative was Yamakis, of the Maronite community.

After the inter-communal clashes of 1963 and the Turkish Cypriots' exit from the Chamber of Representatives, however, the Greek Communal Chamber was dissolved and the Armenian and Latin representatives were transferred in 1965 to the Chamber of Representatives⁸. When we met with the representative of the Latin community, he emphasized the difficulties which resulted from this transfer, and the unconstitutional nature of their presence in the Chamber, which reduces their ability to act. On this subject, Mr Mandovani remarked that "...my presence here is unconstitutional." These three representatives' only right is to be seated in the chamber. They are forbidden to speak except in response to a question, and they may not propose laws. The Constitution remains at the core of the problem, and these difficulties are in effect a form of assimilation.

Costa Constantinou, for his part, remarks that: "The current status of the Parliamentary Representatives of the 'Religious Groups' is a clear indication of the structural bias and the attempt to keep them low and ineffective. [...] Symbolically, their low status is reflected in the position their Parliamentary Representatives have in the official protocol of the Republic of Cyprus : they are not only far below other Parliamentarians, but also well below former Parliamentarians !"⁹

III. Europe and the protection of minorities

Not only does Cyprus' 2004 integration into the European Union represent acceptance of new political, economic, and security regulations, it also profoundly changes the island's geopolitical setting. With the entry of Cyprus into the EU, all of Europe has been drawn closer to the Middle East, implanting itself in the eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus' membership in Europe is in fact a turning point for Europe's role in the region, and for its interest in other countries. This new geopolitical fact also strengthens the role of minorities on the island. In addition to the Cypriot Question, the question of minorities must now be taken seriously by the Republic of Cyprus. As a signatory of the 1995 Framework Convention for the protection of National Minorities (FCNM), Cyprus is obligated to pay particular attention to its minorities.

We will mention here one of the many themes elaborated in the framework of the body for the protection of minorities, which we consider to be fundamental, developed in

⁷ Cf. Drevet, J.-F. (2000), p.114

⁸ Sergy, P. (1976). pp.77-78

⁹ Constantinou, C., « Introduction », in Varnavas, A. (ed.) (2009)

article 3. “ Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such, and no disadvantage shall result from this choice, or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice.”

If Cyprus is to be from now on a European crossroads, its minorities must be treated according to European standards. And here again, the terminology is problematic. In its initial opinions, the Council of Europe indicated changes to be made to the expression "religious group" as well as the impact of such terminology on the choices these minorities were required to make about joining one or the other of the two main communities. Although the FCNM intentionally does not give a clear definition of "national minority," the Cypriot government does consider the expression "religious group" as part of the framework of the FCNM, which thus affects the three corresponding religious groups. The term "religious groups" would then correspond to the term "national minorities" used by the Council of Europe, meaning that these three groups are covered by the protection of national minorities, in spite of the fact that Cyprus is constitutionally held to the terminology established in 1960. This terminology cannot be revised due to the requirement that all changes be accepted by the three signatories of the aforementioned 1959 accords. In effect, since Makarios III's 1963 adaptations of the Constitution by Makarios III which led to the first separation of the Turkish Cypriot community and its withdrawal into enclaves, all attempts to adapt it may only be considered due to the "exceptional state of affairs" which resulted from these initial adaptations, and even today permits the Republic of Cyprus to function.

The alignment of the Cypriot Constitution with European norms for the protection of minorities does not go without raising a question about the correct title to use for these three minorities. For although the titles of the Latins, Maronites, and Armenians were given to them in 1960, they intend to complete this definition themselves, through the FCNM. However, for the FCNM, the first, not to say primordial, stake for the minorities of Cyprus is their ability to define themselves as such. As we said earlier, the religious groups were required to decide by referendum to which of the two communities they wished to adhere.

It is the fact that these three groups were required to choose to join one of the two main communities in order to have a legal status in the country that causes a problem for the actors of the FCNM. The Council of Europe's recommendation on this subject is clear: “The Latins, the Maronites and the Armenians decided, by an overwhelming majority, to become members of the Greek Cypriot community. It is to be noted that each person belonging to a religious group is, as an individual, entitled to make use of an opting out. However, in so doing, an individual may only choose to belong to the other community, that is to the Turkish Cypriot community. The Advisory Committee considers that such arrangements, provided for by Article 2 of the Constitution, are not compatible with Article 3 of the Framework Convention, according to which every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such.”¹⁰

The Cypriot government's reaction remains the same: the question is above all constitutional, and as long as no solution is found for the island's reunification, no such change can take place.

So Europe is in the process of creating, little by little, new conditions for the crossroads of Cyprus. The FCNM favours the emergence of autonomous minority communities, and

¹⁰ *Opinion on Cyprus adopted on 6 April 2001* [ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)004] p.6

calls for Cyprus to move past the communal framework of 1960 in order to favour the emergence of a "people" on a "territory."

Conclusion

In conclusion, this overview, doubtless too rapid and succinct, was intended to present the stakes of the question of minorities in a precise context, that of Cyprus. This study, the central theme of my dissertation, is intended to produce through the examination of the different regional contexts of Cyprus a transitory model of the role of minorities, transitory because developed at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, and Africa. As we remarked, Cyprus' geographical location creates a set of varied geopolitical environments, which although contradictory, will, in the future tend to unify themselves. Europe has thus become the catalyst of communal histories in the rediscovery of the history of Cyprus, the history of a territory. Finally, our goal in this brief presentation was to shed light on the angle of the question of minorities in the study of Cyprus, an angle which totally changes the scale of the study, and complicates it by creating a holistic view of the situation. The concept of minorities is complex and overused, but at the same time deeply exciting when it is used to further cohesion rather than division and confrontation. Minorities in Cyprus exist, and they must be discovered or rather rediscovered. Their role is far greater than their number, their value highly symbolic, and their action a new geopolitical fact. The only remaining question is the resolution of the Cypriot question, which is from now on dealt with in the context of Europe-a story to follow closely.

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Abstract

Pakistani immigrants in Greece: from changing pattern of migration to Diaspora politics and transnationalism

Pakistanis are one of the wide variety of recently established immigrants groups in Greece, analysed here as an example of the intersection of changing pattern of migration, Diaspora politics to transnationalism. Until recently, Pakistani emigration followed established patterns directed to UK, Middle East and other places in the West. Pakistanis now travel to wide variety of new destinations like Greece. This article analyses the changing pattern of Pakistani migration in Greece. Diaspora politics involves politics of recognition, issues like Mosque controversy in Athens, Immigration law and alleged abductions of Pakistani immigrants in Greece etc. transnationalism concerns the transnational religious networks like Sufi orders (tariqas) and missionary network of Tablighi jama'at among Pakistani immigrants in Athens.

Key words: Immigration Greece Pakistan diaspora politics of recognition transnational Islam

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Introduction

In this age of new migration (Castle and Miller 1993) all societies have become more porous involving globalization and acceleration of worldwide global migratory flows. Despite the growing attitude of a “fortress Europe” policy among many European countries, the migratory flows may seem to continue for some time for the reasons to do with growing inequalities between Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs) and rich countries. While economical, demographic and political pressures from the Lesser Developed Countries (LDCs) will cause the south-north and east-west flows.

Greece along with its Southern European counterparts like Italy, Spain, Portugal until recently (early 1970s) used to be source of significant emigration became target and outburst of immigration originating in a wide variety of countries around the world. Majority of the source countries of immigrants in Greece are relatively close by such as Balkan countries like Albania, Bulgaria, Romania. Other are situated much more far away like Asian immigrants originating from China, Philippines, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and even places from Africa. These countries share no religious, cultural and colonial linkages with Greece. The presence of these immigrants in Greece is clear indicator and shift from Immigrant¹ sending to immigrant receiving country. Foreign workers and immigrants in Greece until the late 1970s and early 90s were relatively low in numbers. However, with the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Eastern block, Greece has become a more multicultural and pluralistic society with the influx of economic migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries.

Sometimes in the early 1990s Greeks started to feel that Greece was no longer (as it had been more than a century) a country of emigration but has become country of immigration. Greece along with other countries like (Italy, Spain, and Portugal) is caught up in the so-called second (post war) wave of international migration. The shock and surprise of immigration also brought the uncomfortable feelings of presence of Cultural other (immigrants) in Greek society which used to be considered as non pluralistic in the past. Thus the substantial increase in the number of immigrant and refugees, in particular the Albanians, has affected the public perceptions. Racism, xenophobia and ethnic stereotyping have become widespread.

Mass migration to Greece is relatively new phenomenon though Greece started to attract Asian and African immigrants since 1970s. There may be several reasons of mass migration to Greece. These reasons are

- (a) Diversion effects initially contributed to immigration in Greece because of stricter controls in North Western Europe since the mid-1970.
- (b) Greece is accessible because of the centrality of its location and weaker border controls. It has 6,800km of vast coastline and 2,800km of mountain border which is difficult to patrol.
- (c) It is situated in the close proximity of developing countries from Asia, Africa and Balkans. These places were centre of international changes and conflicts.

¹ All over the world, there are 6 millions people of Greek origin in 140 countries. There are 3 million Greeks in USA, 700,000 in Australia, 350,000 in Canada and 354,000 Greeks in Germany (Athens News, 23rd, January 2004).

- (d) Improving conditions of Greek economy, development of labour shortages and low birth rate means immigrants are needed to do the jobs which native workers seem no longer willing to do like construction work etc.
- (e) The specific character of Greek economy with a large underground and informal sector offers spaces and potential for irregular migration.

The current paper is about Pakistani migration in Greece. Pakistanis are one of the wide variety of recently established immigrants groups in Greece. Until recently, Pakistani emigration followed established patterns directed to UK, Middle East and other places in the West. Pakistanis now travel to wide variety of new destinations like Greece. The Pakistani immigrant diaspora community in Greece is still small compared to Pakistanis in UK but they are beginning to have impact on socio cultural landscape at least at local level.

This ²paper which is based on ethnographic research in Athens analyses the changing pattern of Pakistani migration in Greece. Diaspora politics involves politics of recognition, issues like Mosque controversy in Athens, Immigration law and alleged abductions of Pakistani immigrants in Greece etc. Transnationalism concerns the transnational religious networks like Sufi orders (tariqas) and missionary network of Tablighi Jama'at among Pakistani immigrants in Athens.

Context of migration:-

To understand Pakistani migration in Greece, we should see shortly the historical sequence of Pakistani emigrations to other destinations and the changing pattern of Pakistani migration to other new destinations like Greece.

Pakistan as a nation has existed only since 1947, when India was portioned to provide a Muslim homeland for Muslims of India. Pakistan was formed from Muslim majority areas in India's' East and west wings, while other predominantly Muslim territories, such as Hyderabad in the South and Kashmir in the North, became part of India. Despite massive population exchange in 1947 that particularly affected Punjab and Sindh, many Muslims remained in India (Alavi cited in Ballard 1996).

Thus from its inception, migration has been very important in the history of Pakistan. International migration from the area which is known as Pakistan started during British Raj. The first emigration was based on colonial linkages with Britain. A few ex sailors with in British merchant navy were the pioneers of the contemporary Pakistani migration to UK. It formed the basis of rapid increase through post war reconstruction and labour recruitment schemes in the 1950s and 1960s. Pakistani diaspora in UK is considered most established and biggest in Europe. In the context of tightening British restrictions since the 1960s, Pakistanis have been diverted first towards Middle East, Scandinavia, continental Europe, North America and Australia and even to Greece.

National perspective

² The paper draws on ethnographic research conducted for my PhD studies. I would like to offer my thanks to IKY(Greek State Scholarship foundation)for four year Scholarship for my PhD studies in Greece.

Contemporary Pakistan, a post colonial society seems characterized by different crosscutting cleavages: Islam, ethnicity, caste (Biraderi or kinship group). It is also characterized by uneven development, political instability, civil unrest, long history of military rule and governance problems. The population (176,242,949 (July 2009 est.)³ is growing rapidly, while agricultural and Industrial production is declining. Investment on infrastructure and social sector is minimal particularly in rural areas. Urban population which consists of 36 percent of total population is provided well while the rural majority lacks basic infrastructure and facilities. In addition to this rural urban divide, Pakistan is also an in egalitarian society in terms of class, power and wealth. The ruling elites are composed of senior military officers, civil bureaucrats, and feudal classes, industrial and religious elites. These elites have bent the economy to their own interests. Pakistan ever since its independence and partition from India since 1947 has been ruled by military more than half period of its existence. Its politics has been marred by ethnic, religious violence and political repression. In response to Indian nuclear weapon testing in 1998, Pakistan tested its nuclear weapons. It has the seventh-largest army in the world - a major drain on the national resources. The government justifies high spending on the military because of the need to counter India in disputed Kashmir. In managing the economy, the elite has not only sought to protect its economic interests but also to sustain its political dominance (see also Ballards, 1989). Like many Asian and African post colonial developing countries within the contemporary globalized economy, Pakistan is in state of economic crises facing problems of energy crises and declining foreign exchange reserves. It is consequently under the control of IMF and World Bank, whilst the chances for recovery remain distant.

Beguiled by all this, many young men are drifting to the towns or migrating internationally to improve their socio-economic condition. Pakistani migration produces the following historical pattern:

First, internal, rural-urban migration in Pakistan, then emigration to UK starting from colonial times. In the context of tightening British restrictions since the 1960s, then, Pakistanis have been diverted first towards Middle East, Scandinavia, continental Europe, North America and Australia.

However relevance of these factors for explaining the patterning of migration is not enough. It is obvious that Pakistani migration to Greece is never that of self propelled individuals intent upon improving the socio-economic condition of for themselves but as migrants representative of their biradaris(kinship groups) intent upon improving the position of their ghar(household) and other close relatives at home. This may involve remittances and savings earned through migration. Thus Pakistanis migrate to improve their socio-economic conditions. However the more poor areas of Baluchistan province, rural Sindh and even South Punjab are not represented among Pakistani immigrants in Greece and elsewhere in Europe.

Pakistani migrants in Greece have regional character originating from some regional areas of Punjab. The majority, according to the key informants approximately 60 to 70 percent of immigrants come from the villages of Gujrat and other barani areas (rain fed) like Kharian, Jhehlum. However there is no exact data available. The other areas from which immigrants come are Sialkot and Gujranwala. It is important to note that the Pakistani immigrants from three big cities like Karachi,

³ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>

Lahore and Faisalabad are nominal here in Greece. When I asked about the reasons of this area specific migration of Pakistani to Greece

An informant stated:

“Most of the Pakistanis in Yoonan (Greece) come from the villages of Gujrat and it's and surrounding areas. Emigration in the beginning, took place from a context of poverty; in the latter, it was encouraged by economic dynamism and competition to become rich. This competition can be with in village or biraderi(kinship group) level. So many villagers came here because of the “rees or dekha dikhi”(emulation) of other immigrants who went to other European countries and became rich. The other reason is returnee migrants with their ostentation which plays the imagination of those staying at home, in this way forms the symbolic push factor underlying the emigration from rural Punjab. Moreover, most of the agents who arrange for the Donkey or Game (Human smuggling) are also from Gujrat and its surrounding areas like Kharian. The agents also know that people from Gujrat and surrounding Barani areas are ready to pay large sum of money because now migration to Europe has become a trend in these areas and most young man dream of going to Europe. ”

The success of returnees and of migrants stimulates emulation as well as the popular imagination (Appadurai 1996).

It is important to note these above mentioned regions shared cultures of internal movement fostered in the colonial period, and powerful traditions of employment as lascars along British shipping lines, or in the British army. After the mutiny of the Bengal army in 1857, British preferred and favoured Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims in Indian Army. They considered them as loyal and martial races. Over half of the Indian Army was drawn from the Punjab and during First World War, the Punjab with population of 20 millions provided with 350,000 combatants while Bengal with population of 45 million, supplied only 7,000(Davis cited in Shaw,1988).

The structural roots of migration from Punjab to Greece, which was stimulated almost exclusively from those regions which had existing traditions of migration and transnational connections, can be traced before partition in colonial policies. Moreover, areas of Northern Punjab such as Gujarat, Gujuranwala and rain fed areas (barani) of Jhelum, Kharian where irrigation is difficult and the population pressure on land compel locals to migrate. This area has always been densely populated. Because of the small size of agricultural holdings, and the conventional division of labour between the sexes, many households have long had a surplus of male labour. There is a longstanding local history of tradition for men from such households to supplement their incomes by working as immigrants in other countries.

Thus key sources of emigration from Pakistan to Europe remain remarkably close to the places that connected Kashmir and specific areas of Punjab like Gujrat and near by barani areas (rain fed) and its villages.

If migration from Pakistan to the West once meant exclusively going to the UK, it can now mean going to Canada, Australia Italy, Spain, or even Greece. In this way Pakistani migration has diversified selecting new destinations like Greece which has been an area of transit migration for a long period of time. Pakistani migration to Greece can be explained by number of factors diversion effects generated by stricter controls in North Western Europe, centrality of location, weaker border controls and rapid economic development. Living in Greece helps them foot hold in European Union. Greece also became important as destination as a result of amnesty and immigration laws of 1998,2001 and 2005. The attraction of immigration law, amnesty

seems also obvious. The news of immigration law was quickly spread through social networks in Pakistani diaspora living in different parts of Europe and back in Pakistan. The chances of getting Greek residence permit and legal stay in European Union also caused inflows of Pakistanis living illegally in other parts of Europe and back in Pakistan.

Pakistani immigrant population in Greece and a brief profile

Greece has been a tourist economy for the rich parts of world; in the present, the tourism sector is a significant sector of Greek economy. The wealthy tourist is welcome type of foreigner in Greece as compared to the mixed reactions in recent years of immigrants and refugees from developing societies. The boundaries between the two types of foreigner groups have been the subject of conflict for Greek policy makers

Compared to Pakistani migration to UK, the migratory flows to Greece is relatively recent development. If we go back to the history of Pakistani immigrants in Greece, they started coming to Greece as sailors or workers in the shipyards of Sikaramangas in the early Seventies according to bilateral treaties between two countries. However, their number was less than few hundred. Thus Pakistanis are one of the old immigrants in Greece as compared with new post 1990 arrivals.

The exact number of Pakistani immigrants is still unknown because of non availability of exact data. Official statistics give limited information about the exact number of immigrants in Greece partly because many immigrants arrived clandestinely and hence un recorded. We can have some idea about total number of Pakistani immigrants by 2001 Census. According to this Census, about 60 percent immigrants are from Albania. The second nationality is Bulgarians followed by Georgia and Romania. According to 2001 Census total Pakistani immigrants consist of 11,192 which is 1.4% of total immigrants in Greece. However, according to figures of the ministry of interior, the total number of Pakistanis is 20,331, which are 2.53 percent of the total number of immigrants who have been issued work and residence permit by the ministry of interior (Eleftheros Typos, Sabbato 25 Iouniou,2005).

According to different estimates though, the actual figure may be much higher. According to one rough estimate the total number of Pakistanis living in Greece is approximately 50,000 while according to another one there are more than 70,000 Pakistanis in Greece. However these figures are difficult to confirm.

Gradually and slowly, in the late eighties and early nineties the number of Pakistani immigrants increased in Greece. They arrived in Greece as young adults and their inflow reached its peak in the Nineties. They arrived as workers, hence although they also hoped to make their fortunes; their starting point was that most found they had little alternative but to accept manual employment and odd jobs which most of them do till today. These are kinds of jobs which the Greeks do not want to do. These are kinds of jobs which include most of the time poor conditions of employment such as long hours, low pay, social or physical isolation. Majority of them have been incorporated regularly or irregularly into manufacturing industries as welders, masons, labourers, mechanics etc

These immigrants are largely uneducated, rural young labour migrants who live in poor and overcrowded bachelor housing and occupy the lower tiers of Greek labour market. These immigrants use social networks to find job and settle in new environment. Being male immigrants, Pakistani immigrants have less demand on

health, education, schooling and other social services as there are very few Pakistani females and children in Athens. This situation also reflects the overall general trend and situation of Pakistanis in Greece. This situation raises question of Gender and migration.

Diaspora Politics or Politics of recognition:-

Generally in a new environment in diaspora and displacement situation, immigrants often soon set about collectively organizing themselves. The formation of immigrant associations is one prominent kind of socio-religious organization, established to raise and distribute funds and coordinate activities (Rex, Joly and Wilpert 1987). This is especially seen today in the ever more effective and organised expressions of immigrant concerns often described as ethnic mobilisation or the politics of recognition etc

The immigrant associations may negotiate, protect, advance their legal, cultural, religious economical rights while mediating, lobbying policy makers and power brokers in the receiving society.

Majority of Pakistani immigrants in Athens have a very poor knowledge of Greek and face great difficulty in dealing with Greek bureaucracy, immigration authorities and Greek offices. In this context, these immigrant turn to their fellow villagers or immigrant welfare associations for help. In this way, these welfare and immigrant associations gain positions of influence among fellow Pakistanis. Leadership question is not a monolithic whole among Pakistanis as there are wide varieties of leaders in different immigrant welfare associations to leaders of political parties. These associations and their leaders may invoke support from communal causes (like mosque and cricket teams) to individual issues. Sometimes they compete or conflict with one another to gain influence or power (as, for example, different factional groups with in Pakistani immigrant association and their leaders. There were allegations and counter accusations of election rigging in the previous elections of main immigrant association).

Main Pakistani immigrant association which is called “Pakistan community of Greece, unity was established in 2000. The main motive and purpose behind its formation was to make arrangements in case of death to send back dead bodies of immigrants to Pakistan and to provide platform to solve problems. So the fear of death has caused the immediate reason for the formation of Pakistani immigrant association. The immigrants association is non religious form of mobilization and organization.

During 2000, because of unavailability of resources, Pakistan Embassy refused to send back the dead bodies of immigrants. So in this context, Pakistani immigrant association was established. Pakistani community association has approximately 8 regional units in different areas of Athens. The president of immigrant association is elected through voting by Pakistani immigrants taking place every three years. Pakistani immigrant association also arranged protests with the help of immigrants associations against the immigration law.

In Athens, there is no official mosque for the Muslim immigrants. So the Muslim immigrants have to negotiate the proper place of worship in diapora situation in Athens. Pakistani immigrant associations engage campaigns that proper place of worship should be allowed to them.

In this context, Pakistani immigrant associations like Pakistan community Ittehad Greece (Pakistan community alliance Greece) and Pak-Hellenic Cultural and welfare Society along with visiting Sufi saint from Pakistan arranged meetings differently with the head of the powerful Church of Greece, Archbishop Christodoulos. The purpose of this meeting was to engage campaign for religious rights and a formal mosque to be allowed in Athens.

The other example is the alleged case of abductions of 28 Pakistani immigrants by Greek and British Secret services after London bombing. This alleged claim was made by 28 Pakistani immigrants and whole issue was made to public and media by Pakistani immigrant association.

Alleged abductions of 28 immigrants was a major issue and there was a great concern among Pakistani diaspora but also among Greeks. This issue was highlighted again and again in Greek and international media. Pakistani immigrant association and its President has close relations with sympathetic political parties and groups like PASOK, Synaspismos, KKE, trade unions, anti Fascist, anti racist groups, human rights organizations and stop the war coalition. These parties and groups protested on the issue of alleged abductions of Pakistanis in Athens.. While the Greek, British government and Pakistani Embassy staff denied the claims of kidnappings.

Informal mosques, migrants:-

Making place of worship, changing factory store into place of worship

Upon settling in a new and alien environment, immigrants and religious groups often try collectively to organize themselves for purposes of religious worship. Historically, the places of worship in alien environment have constituted the most controversial and symbolically laden arenas with respect to religious outsiders and cultural others. In many cases in European societies, initiatives to build new purposely built mosques have aroused controversies and debates and place of Islam in Europe. In Greece, the Muslims (consisting of autochthonous populations and economic immigrants) are second largest religious group and their efforts to built first official and formal mosque in Athens have aroused controversies and debates in Greece. Formal mosque is an intended claim on public space and public sphere. This claim on the construction of formal approved mosque has been part of process of making new demands upon public sphere, a process that has become embroiled with non Muslim (Greek) concerns over visible Muslim presence. The mosque is also becoming a place where Pakistani immigrants are negotiating a communal identity that has both religious and socio-cultural facets. The religious practice of Muslim immigrants in Athens is largely hidden from the public view because it is practiced in prayers rooms located in the cellars of apartment blocks as there is no official mosque or place of worship in Athens. Athens is the only capital in the old European Union which does not has a formal approved mosque. In this back ground, the Muslim migrants in Athens pray at so called “informal, underground or make shift mosques” which are not properly licensed. Dozens of make shift mosques have been set up in the capital in apartment, shops and garages, factories and stores intended for quite different purposes and often not confirming to safety regulations. Mosque in Kolonos is one of them. When these underground, makeshift or store front mosques are established in buildings originally designed for other purposes, only the interiors of these buildings

are transformed into recognizably Islamic places. In the terminology of vernacular architecture, the storefront or makeshift is extended to housing stock, such as apartments, suburban homes when it is transformed into markedly different spaces and new uses---in this case, to sacred space functioning as mosque. The storefront mosque comes under the rubric of “non-pedigreed architecture” a label designating the “vernacular, anonymous, spontaneous, indigenous” constructions of the informal, undocumented sector (Rudofsky 1964 cited in Susan 1996:204).

However, Plans were made for a mosque to be built [with foreign money] near to Athens Airport and the 2004 Olympic residences, in order to provide places of worship for competitors. These plans ran into trouble. In case of my locale in Kolonos, a big hall which used to be abandoned factory is hired on the name of library and then it is changed into mosque. Mosque in Kolonos is called Masjid-i-Quba and was established in August 1994. It belongs to Sunni Hanafi Islam. The name given to the mosque in Kolonos reminds the first Mosque (Masjid-i-Quba) in Islam which Prophet established during his hijra (migration) to Medina. Thus mosques are also seen as a site of hijra and known as mahjars (migrant) and given names like Masjadi-i-Quba (to recall the first mosque established by prophet during hijra to Medina). This reminds us how the founding event of Muslim community, the hijra (migration) a charged spatial metaphor in itself is reconstructed again in Kolonos. It is considered to be the first ever underground or informal mosque established by Pakistani immigrants in Athens. Authorities are aware of this mosque and some times these Pakistani Muslims are checked and monitored by the authorities. Especially it was done during for the security of Olympic Games. The monthly rent for the mosque is 300 Euros per month which is paid by mutual funding from the immigrant community members. The affairs of the mosque are run by a mosque committee.

For the immigrants, mosque in western context fulfils a much wider range of functions than in their country of origin. It is a physical space, meeting place in which sojourners gather collectively allowing reconstitution of social networks disrupted by emigration. In addition to their basic purposes as a site for Ibadat (worships) mosque is also gathering point to meet, to socialize and exchange information. Religion may become important for Immigrants faced with insecure, precarious tenure in the receiving society, problems of belong and identity, marginality, minority status, racism, stigmatization and discrimination. Reassertion of global Muslim identity and its broader understanding among immigrant groups in the West may be simply back lash and reaction to these conditions. In this context, mosque may provide source of companionship, social community, and spiritual comfort. It is also a mark of Islamic identity and of the difference between identity of Pakistani immigrants and that of Greek society. Mosque is differentiation of one religious group from an other within the same ethnic community e.g. Mosque in Kolonos is more close to Barelvi Islam as compared to Deobandis. Although some of Deobandi key informants also pray in this mosque.

Transnational Dawa missionary movements for example Tablighi Jama'at foster (Deobandi) or Da'wat-e Islāmī (Barelvi) make attempts at proselytizing in the mosques by visiting them often and providing islah (guidance) to immigrants. Thus mosque as a social space and arena is the meeting place for different religious interests, whether conflicting or converging. Besides this, when a deadly earthquake hit Pakistan in which 70,000 people were killed, mosque in Kolonos served as

platform for collecting money and relief effort for earthquake hit people back to homeland.

Religious composition:-

Among the Pakistani immigrants in Athens, there is wide variety of religious denominations evident in Pakistan has been transposed to Greece.

The majority of Pakistanis in Greece tend to identify with Barelvi movement and come from villages and rural areas of Punjab. After Barelvis, more numerous are Deobandis. They are followers of Hanafi Islam. Within the Sunni Muslim tradition, Hanafi is one of four "schools of law". Both these sects have their origins in the reformist movement set in motion by Shah Waliullah but came into existence in post war 1857 British India. For Muslims of India, it was a period of political weakness and threatening to their culture after being defeated, repressed in the mutiny of 1857 against British. In the after of the mutiny several religious trends emerged among Indian Muslims in a bid to revive their standing. They ranged from Deobandis, Barelvis to pro western reforms. All these reformers saw education as key to their reforms. Deobandis came to focus mainly on education and on keeping alive in the seminaries Muslim medieval and theological doctrines. The Deobandis take their name from the Indian town of Deoband, 90 miles northeast of New Delhi where the first Deobandi learning centre, Darul Uloom ("House of Knowledge") was started in 1866. Deobandis have puritanical bent in their interpretations of Islam and claim to represent Islam as founded in the Quran and Sunnah. In Athens, they are represented by a transnational missionary and Dawa movement called Tablighi Jama'at. Deobandis are opposed to customs such as sama (musical sessions to induce ecstasy), Urs (festival commemorating birth and death of Sufi saint) pilgrimage and shrine based Sufi Islam.

The Barelvis derive their name from Ahmed Raza Khan of Bareilly, India (1856-1921). Barelvi Islam is heavily influenced by the mystical Sufi and mystical traditions that have always been widely prevalent in South Asian Islam. Barelvi religious ideology is based on folk Islam with emphasis on Sufism, veneration of saints, idolization of the prophet and one's spiritual preceptors and popular and festive display of syncretic religious rituals. A key difference between Barelvi and Deobandi is that Barelvis believe in the intercession between humans and Divine Grace. This consists of the intervention of an ascending, linked and unbroken chain of holy personages, pirs (sheikh), reaching ultimately to Prophet Mohammad, who intercede on their behalf with Allah. For the Barelvis, the holy Prophet is a superhuman figure whose presence is all around us at all times; he is *hazir*, present; he is not *bashar*, material or flesh, but *nur*, light. The Deobandis, who also revere the Prophet, argue he was the *insan-i-kamil*, the perfect person, but still only a man, a mortal. Barelvis emphasise a *Hub-e-Rasul* (love of Muhammad), a semi-divine figure with unique foreknowledge of *ilmu, l-ghaib*. The Deobandis reject this idea of Muhammad. Veneration of the prophet has long history in Sufi and popular devotionism. Their critics claim that Barelvis are guilty of committing innovation (*Bid'at*) and therefore, they are deviated from the true path - the path of Sunnah.

The Barelvis groups in Athens are represented by three kinds of tendencies like *Da'wat-e Islami* (2) *Minhajul Quran* (MUQ - the method of Quran) and Athens based branch of the transnational Qadiriyya Sufi order (Pir Sahibzada pirsada Sultan Fiaz-ul-Hassan). These groups have their own informal mosques in Athens.

Transnational religious networks: Sufis and Tablighis

Transnational networks are one of the main topics of globalization and transnational studies. Current writings on globalization and transnationalism have focused on labour and capital flows. A focus on the religious dimensions especially South Asian missionary movement like Tablighi jama'at and Sufi orders (tariqas) have been marginally constructed around migration and transnationalism.

Transnationalism is an effort to understand the implications of multiplicity of social relations, ties, involvements and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states. The phrase "transnational" can be used to refer and explain to a variety of Phenomena. Smith, Guarnizo (1998) and Portes (Portes et al. 1999) ask us to specify the levels of transnationalism which scholars analyse. I suggest that I will refer to transnational Sufi religious social formation (Werbner 1999) and transnational missionary network of Tablighī Jamā'at (Kepel 1991; Masud 2000; Metcalf 1996, 2002) among Pakistani diaspora in Athens.

Tablighi Jama'at :-

Tablighi Jama'at is a missionary movement of Sunni Islam which was founded by Maulana Ilyas (1885-1944). Its emergence in 1926 in India is also important that traditional Islam did not know have organized missionary movement until Tablighi Jama'at was formed. Although before the start of Tablighi Jama'at which is institutionalized form of Tabligh and Dawa in the 20th century Islam, there were Sufi orders which defined conversion as Tawba, meaning to return were primarily concerned to make Muslims true, better Muslims and involved education, welfare, and health in the form of charms, amulets and prayers for the sick and needy and also fear of divine wrath who denied the Sufis.⁴

Marc Gaborieau(1999) describes its modus operandi :“The invitation (tabligh) to Islam is not the affair of religious specialists, but the responsibility of all Muslims who must devote their time and money to it; one should not wait for people to come to hear the preaching, but ether preachers should travel to reach the people; preaching is done by self-financing itinerant groups; the mingling of all social classes is obligatory within these groups; the primary objective is to deepen the faith of those who are already Muslims, proselytism toward non-Muslims being marginal; and the promotion of the unity of Muslims being a primary objective, theological as well as political controversies are prohibited inside the movement” (Gaborieau, ISIM Newsletter 1999).

Its world headquarters is in Delhi and European headquarters of Tablighī Jamā'at is in Dewsbury in England. With regard to worldwide network of Tablghi Jama'at, Britain represents important link between the subcontinent and Europe. Tablighi missionary work is carried out global level across Europe, Africa and Asia and functions not merely among Pakistani diaspora but also among other Muslim immigrants from Arabic and African back ground.

⁴ See also Masud, M.K. (ed.) (2000) Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jamaat as a transnational Islamic Movement for faith renewal. Leiden

Tablighi Jama'at has today emerged as a transnational and global religious movement and has now supporters all over the Muslim world and the West. The movement has spread widely by Muslim migration to Europe and other parts of world. For the Muslim immigrants living in the west, the biggest challenges comes how to preserve their faith while facing modernity, minority status, racism, marginalization, uncertainty of livelihood, belonging and identity crises. Many Islamic movements capitalize upon this situation, among them Tablighī Jamā'at. For Tablighis, Muslim migrants and their souls have to be rescued from corruptions of materialistic West like promiscuity, family patterns, and consumption. This can be done by going out with Jamaat for Khruj fi sabeel Allah (travel for preaching of Islam).

The current situation of Pakistani immigrants in Greece resembles a lot with post second world war (during sixties) immigrants in Britain who used to live in male neighbourhoods. The religious sentiments have been expressed in avoiding non halal meat (ritually slaughtered meet) but for the rest the men are preoccupied with survival, which leaves little time for religious devotions.

In Athens, I met many Tablighis who were providing immigrants with ritually slaughtered (Halal meat) in their shops. The Tablighī Jamā'at tries to change every Muslim into preacher and teacher of other Muslims, preaching others (thus preaching himself) to correct Islamic practices.

There are six principles (chhai batein) which form the fundamentals of Tablighi Jama'at

(1) kalamah tayyiba(declaration of faith)(2)salaat(offering prayers with full concentration and prescribed rituals)(3)-ilm and zikre(knowledge and remembrance) 4- ikram-i-muslim(respect for Muslims) (5)-ikhlas-i-niyyat (sincerity of purpose)(6)tafrigh-waqt(sparing of time for the tabligh).

Besides disseminating its ideology of reviving a puritan and practical Islam, Tablighis in Greece are instrumental in urging and preaching the increased religiosity and devotion among Pakistani immigrants in terms of literal imitation of the conduct, attitudes and practices of the Prophet Mohammed. It generally keeps low profile in Athens and elsewhere in the world avoiding formal organization and eschewing media. Unlike other Islamic organizations, its most important feature is the focus on the islah(reform) of individual self rather than on state. It propagates regime of self – discipline and pious life style among immigrants. It is instrumental in the change regarding the behavioural patterns of immigrants connected with a creation of public sphere of gatherings (ijtima) and taking time off to go with (Jama'at) one day a week, three days a month, forty days a year or four months in a life time. The main centre of their activity is mosque. Their methodology is to organize mobile units of volunteer missionary preachers mostly from working class back ground and send them to various places in Athens in immigrant neighborhoods. These lay preachers stay at mosques. They invite and preach local Muslims to come in a local mosque while presenting their message in the form of bayan(talk) and six points described earlier.

Response from immigrant side may vary. Some of the immigrants refuse to come to the mosque as they say they are tired from the work and they have to cook food and take shower, while others may go to the mosque to perform prayer and listen to the bayan. Bayan is an inspirational religious talk in which instances from the Quran and the Prophetic traditions (hadit) are described. After that usually a session of reading from a book written by Muhammad Zakariya (1898-1982), “The Virtues of Good Deeds” (*Fazail-a Amal*) takes place. Then the immigrants are asked to volunteer for future preaching tours (*tashkil*).Some of the immigrants will give their

name. When the preaching group goes back it will report to the local Tabligh centre either in oral or written form (Karguzari). In Athens there is no Tablighi centre as such. Tablighī Jamā'at following Deobandi precepts is opposed to the Barelvi tradition and faces strong competition in Dawa activity in Athens from Barelvi groups. These Barelvi groups in Athens are represented by three kinds of organizations like Da'wat-e Islāmī, Minhajul⁵ Quran (MUQ-the method of Quran) and Athens based branch of the transnational Qadiriyya Sufi order (Pir Sahibzada pirzada Sultan Fiaz-ul-Hassan). These Barelvi groups cooperate together especially to celebrate the Eid milad-un nabi (the commemoration of prophet's birth and death) and during "Urs" rituals at the celebrations commemorating the birth or death of Abdul Qadir Gillani, Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi, Sultan Bahu, Data Hajweri and Pir Golra Sharif etc.

The Da'wat-e Islāmī (invitation to Islam) which is a Barelvi missionary movement started under the Muhammad Ilyas Qadri (b1950) in 1981 at Karachi, Pakistan but has spread widely by Muslim migration to Europe and other parts of the world. In Athens, it has established four centers and is very active among Pakistani immigrants in its preaching activities.

There may be similarities in the preaching methods of both missionary organizations as preaching is done by volunteers and self-financing itinerant groups who travel to mosques and immigrants neighbourhoods while inviting, urging Muslims to become good and better Muslims. However their definition what it means to be a good and better Muslims may vary. During its missionary programme Da'wat-e Islāmī keeping true to its Sufi Barelvi devotional precepts, promotes glorification and love of Prophet (Hub-e-Rasul). Madni prefixes are used in its every day terminologies like madani qafla (madni caravan), madni Tahreek (madni movement), madni gifts (madanī in'amat) etc. Da'wat-e Islāmī and its popular pietism also promote intercession of Sufi saints. The patron saint of Barelvi Islam is Abd al-Qadir Jilani, the celebrated saint and father of the Qadiriyya order. One can become mureed (disciple) of Qadiriyya order by email, post or through website of Da'wat-e Islāmī or via its centre in Athens.

Despite the similarities in methods of preaching, Tablighi Jama'at and Da'wat-e Islāmī are two competing models of Dawa expansion and ideological activity.

It will be interesting here to note that Tablighī Jamā'at differs from Dawat-e-Islami in its avoidance to modern means of communication and media like TV, cassettes, audio and video tapes, CDs, internet and website, such as are used almost by Dawat-e-Islami. According to Eickelman and Anderson, a transnational Muslim public sphere is being opened up through the use of Information and Communication Technologies (Eickelman and Anderson, 1999). The Tablighis generally avoid this trend. Their method of preaching is oral (zabani) and preaching of movement takes place through words of mouth without using media. On the other hand, the Da'wat-e Islāmī has a strong presence in the media. It uses different forms of digital, cyber and electronic religiosity to disseminate its message. It has its own web site (www.dawateislami.net) and its TV channel (www.madanichannel.com). It uses internet for granting discipleship and distributing amulets (Tawizat).

Athens based branch of the transnational Qadiriyya Sufi order (Pir Sahibzada pirzada Sultan Fiaz-ul-Hassan) is also very active among Pakistani immigrants.

⁵ Founded in Jhang, Pakistan in 1981 by charismatic leader Tahirul Qadri is also popular among Pakistani diaspora and Greece and elsewhere in Europe.

Tablighi Jama'at and its activities are marginalized by the above mentioned Barelvi groups in Athens.

In the following, I will describe Athens based branch of the transnational Qadiriyya Sufi order (Pir Sahibzada pirzada Sultan Fiaz-ul-Hassan).

Sufis:-

In the contemporary research as well as in common perception, Islam is viewed in one dimensional and monolithic Islamic fundamentalism or political Islam framework. Sufi tradition seems to be important for majority of Muslims. Sufi tariqas are one of the most important channels for the social expression of the transnational nature of Islam. First it has to be said that there is nothing new about Sufism as a global religious movement. Sufis began their itinerant existence in the tenth century AD, and have carried the Message of Islam from the Near East to South Asia, Indonesia, and West Africa .It can be argued that religious communities are among the oldest of the transnationals: Sufi orders, Catholic missionaries, and Buddhist monks carried work and praxis across vast spaces before those places became nation states or even states (Rudolph 1997: 1).

Tassouf is a term applied to the mystical tradition within Islam which emphasises the love of God and the grasp of divine realities. It tells that "Sufis are God's friends (Aulia), perpetually engaged in remembrance [zIKr] of Him. Sufism also constitutes a Path [tariqat]. A Sufi on the path under goes transformations in personal ethics linked to a denial of the self (nafs) through annihilation in one's shaikh and after him in the prophet and God. This transformation is conceptualized in notions such as tauba (repentance) or tawakkul (trust) in God. Thus Sufi salik (traveller on Sufi path) passes through different "stations or stages", representing virtues such as absolute trust in God, to a higher series of ecstatic states. Sufi is believed to be Wali or friend of God physically and mentally purified of all mundane desires. Sufi saint (Pir, Wali) is considered a means (Wasila) to reach God and is widely believed to have powers of divine light (nur), grace (faiz) and blessing (barkat) emanating from Allah.

Sufis are organized hierarchically, the central role and adherence to the Sufi Shaykh, Pir or Wali, the murshid-murid (teacher-disciple) relationship and the concept of pir-bhai (community of followers and disciples).

The majority of Sufi followers in Athens belongs to Barelvi school of thought and come from villages and rural areas of Punjab. Barelvis believe in intercession between humans and Divine Grace and Barelvis emphasise Hub-e-Rasul (love of Muhammad), a semi-divine figure with unique foreknowledge of ilmu, l-ghaib. Many Punjabi Muslims prior to their immigration to Greece come from the families with affiliation to a particular Sufi saint in Pakistan. Sufi shrines (khanqah, mazar) in Pakistan remain centre of intense religious ,devotional activity and their burial places draw millions annually. But there are no obligations to perform pilgrimage to these places. These Sufi shrines are managed under the guardianship of descendants of the deceased saint (pir) who once lived there. These descendants are also pirs by taking part in the charisma of their ancestors and may acquire new fame crossing socio-cultural and geographical boundaries.

The tradition of Sufism is gaining currency among Pakistani immigrants and Murid movement seems to be developing continuously in Athens. Currently among Pakistani diaspora , there are three kinds of Sufi orders active in Athens and have murids (disciples). The majority of the Pakistanis immigrants are murids (disciples)

of Qadiriya (Sufi order said to be found by Abdul Qadir Jilani in eleventh century Baghdad) and than Chishtiyya (Sufi order originated in India) and third Sufi order which has murids here among Pakistani immigrants are Naqshbandis (A Sufi order originating in the Central Asia in the fourteenth century). While majority of Pakistanis do not belong to any Sufi Silsila (Sufi order) but they follow and respect all of the three above mentioned (Sufi orders) Silsilas They attend the lectures of visiting Sufi saints and ask for protective amulets, healing and baraka from visiting Pakistani Pirs as through them it is believed divine light (nur), grace (faiz) and power of blessing (barkat) emanating from Allah. They also participate in the processions on id milad al nabi (the prophet's birth day). The procession of id milad al nabi in Athens is organized by the main Barelvi organizations like Da'wat-e Islami, Sultan Bahu trust and Minhajul Quran.

In context of Athens among Pakistani immigrants, I will briefly describe and consider an important visit to Athens during September 2005. Sahibzada pirzada Sultan Fiaz-ul-Hassan is an important itinerant Sufi, Pir of Qadiriya Sufi order who visits Greece every year to give blessings and advice to immigrants. He has murids (disciples) not only in Pakistan but also in Greece, England among Pakistani diaspora. He is Sajjada nashin (descendant of originally Sufi saintly founder and guardian of tomb) of the famous shrine of Sultan Bahu situated in Jhang, Punjab. Sultan Bahu (ca 1628-1691) was famous a Sufi saint, a great writer, belonging to Qadiriya Sufi order.

He visited different informal mosques in Athens including mosque in Kolonos where he met many groups of Pakistanis immigrants who had come from different parts of Athens and Greece.

The mulaqat: meeting with Pir

The mulaqat or meeting was conducted in the small hall of the informal mosque in Kolonos. The hall was full of murids and followers of the Sufi saint. The immigrants from working class background and belonging to different parts of Athens and even from villages outside Athens have gathered there. They were waiting anxiously for the arrival of the Sufi saint. Awaiting the pir, they were praying and chanting Zikr of God. One of his murid informed about the arrival of the pir and an impressive silence filled the hall of the mosque. Everybody stood up as a sign of respect. During his bayan (speech) he gave advice to immigrants on different matters from learning Greek language to become good human beings and good Muslims in alien environment. He also stressed that Islam teaches peace and peaceful coexistence with all the religions of the world and it has nothing to do with terrorism which is generally being presented these days. He advised his murids that they should prove by deeds and acts that Islam is religion of peace and peaceful coexistence. In this context, he also mentioned his meeting with Archbishop of Greece Christodoulos, he called the meeting as the inter religious and inter cultural dialogue between civilizations. In this meeting, the problem of formal mosque and other problems regarding Pakistani immigrants were discussed with him. So Archbishop of Greece Christodoulos promised to help and cooperate with Pakistani immigrants for the mosque and other problems. This meeting suggests that, Pakistani Sufis play the role of community leaders by engaging in campaign for the rights of places of worship. During meeting, there were many immigrants who asked help and healing on different matters.

Healing, miracles and Barakat:

Sufi saint (wali, pir) is considered a miracle man who has great powers (barakat), some of which such as healing powers are in demand in Punjab, Pakistan but also in Athens among Pakistani immigrants. Healing, solutions to problems and baraka is widely asked from Pir among Pakistanis both in Athens and in Pakistan. In Mulaqat (meeting) with Pir or sheikh, I noted some of the problems which immigrants stated to pir like headache and pain in the whole body, problem of immigration papers, seeing bad dreams like snakes in the sleep, not finding work in Greece etc. He gave them tawiz (protective amulets) dam and darud. Thus not only in Pakistan but also in Athens, Pakistanis (Barelvi Sufis) turn to visiting Sufi saints for solutions to practical problems, healing and barakat.

After Pir (Sufi saint) did collective Bai'at (bai, a means literally the buying of the soul the soul of the adept or disciple by the saint) of the immigrants who want to become his murids. Within any Mulaqat (meeting) there were many immigrants who have come to do bai'at, that is, to be initiated into the order through a pledge of allegiance to the saint. There were many immigrants who became his new murids while there were others who had already did baiyat from some other Sufi saint, so they could become talib (seeker). Thus besides becoming murids (Disciples), many immigrants also became talibs (Seekers) in Kolonos

After the meeting, Langer (cooked food which is distributed freely at Sufi lodge in South Asia) was distributed. In Pakistan, most major Sufi shrines have langer arrangements. In Athens, langer is provided for the celebration of eid milad-un nabi (the commemoration of prophet's birth and death) and during "Urs" rituals at the celebrations commemorating the birth or death of Abdul Qadir Gillani, Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi, Sultan Bahu, Data Hajweri and Pir Golra Sharif. These rituals are called gharvin sharif, the eleventh of the month, and are held in almost all Barelvi mosques in Athens. The performance of *zikr*, the remembrance of God's name, is popular among Pakistani immigrants in Athens. In all the Barelvi mosques in Athens, *zikr* sessions are held once a week. Mosque in Kolonos is one of them

These events are very important for the Pakistani Barelvi Sufis during migration process. They also show transnational character of Sufi orders. Furthermore, they testify to the Murid's ability to sacralise space through ritual.

I would like to add that transnational social formations are kept alive by the visits of Sufi pirs from Pakistan. These visits are very important to keep the ethno-religious-scape (to paraphrase Appadurai 1990; 1996) alive from an organisational as well as a spiritual point of view. Werbner argues that the sacralizing of space is centrally embedded in Sufi Islam, Sufism being a missionizing, purificatory cult (Werbner 1996). As the event above suggests, a subtle ritual inscription in foreign western space is at stake, through which it is recreated through ritual which temporarily sacrilises space.

Conclusion:-

In this article I have tried to describe the changing pattern of Pakistani migration to Greece. If migration from Pakistan to the West once meant exclusively going to the UK, it can now mean going to Canada, Australia Italy, Spain, or even Greece. In this way Pakistani migration has diversified selecting new destinations like Greece. Pakistanis during the settlement process negotiate, protect, advance their legal,

religious and cultural rights while mediating, lobbying policy makers and power brokers in the receiving society. Moreover, transnational Sufi Tariqas and missionary Tablīghī Jamā'at are expression of transnational Islam and they provide immigrants with spiritual and ideological point of references and also give them feed back while controlling potentially deviant behaviour in an alien environment.

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Paper Title: displacement and the visibility of the invisibles, transit- zones and the emergence of political public space.

In this paper, our interest focuses on the reconfiguration of places that, migrant populations on the move pass through, during a journey with many “stops”. The transit places are the “stops” that they have to go throughout their displacement. More precisely our case study concerns those spontaneous groupings that appear in the city of Patras, a port city in southern Greece; one “stop” before Italy.

Those migrant populations in their path they come across two entries. Greece is one of the first European countries they enter that has sea borders with the rest of Europe. And this is important as these boundaries are more difficult to be crossed. At the same time, the Northern east coast of France also is a kind of a second hallway toward England. We consider the region of Calais as such because¹:

On the one hand the insular Britain is separated from the mainland of Europe by the Channel and the North Sea; and on the other refuses to belong to the “Schengen area” that allows free movement within European countries. Therefore the Channel appears as an external border of Europe guarded as if it adjacent non-European countries.

As a result, we meet in Greece as well as in France similar situations. The port city of Patras and the region of Calais are places whose territories have gone through important transformations in recent years. Transformations that emerge as consequences of the mobility and the migrant flows on the one hand; and the obstruction of this mobility on the other. They are the paradox result of the deadlock that the European policies whose basic concern is to keep foreigners at a distance.

A comparison of the two cases would be quite interesting, but we will not deal with it right now; this represents another part of our work.

¹ On the situation of Calais see, CFDA, *La loi des « jungles », la situation des exiles sur le littoral de la Manche et de la Mer du Nord*, Rapport de mission d’observation mai - juillet 2008
http://cfda.rezo.net/download/La%20loi%20de%20la%20jungle_12-09-2008.pdf

The area along the port of Patras for the last fifteen years has been turning to a “waiting room” for millions of displaced persons. It is a central area of the city where many disinfected buildings reflect a rich industrial past. The migrant populations find shelter among these buildings as their trajectory is related to the port. In the beginning they were Kurdish; followed by Afghans and during the last year we see more and more people coming from Sub-Saharan Africa.

Ariane Mnouchkine in her Play *Toutes les Odyssées du dernier caravansérail*, gives a definition of what caravanserai means :

Large courtyard surrounded by buildings where caravans stop. This place is frequented by foreigners of different origins. The caravanserai was born as a shelter that protects against looting that characterised the areas where nomadic and mountain populations were acting².

Our interest focuses on a squat that began approximately 8 years ago when a small afghan population occupied a disinfected house and made some tents around. Over the years the squat expanded and took the form of an informal camp. We consider this squat as a camp in the sense of place of camping and not in the sense of place of “confinement”. It is a caravanserai, a shelter to protect them from the dangers that their irregular situation exposes them to.

The camp is lodged in lands whose proprietary regime makes us consider them as brownfields. It lies in the extension of the port, in a wealthy residential district where many constructions are under way. Even though originated from Afghanistan, the population is not homogeneous³; we can find different divisions between Hazaras (the majority), Pashto, Uzbeks, and Tadjiks etc.

It is an area of 40-50 acres of private properties not built at the time that the squat begins to expand. In a very suitable location: near the port, surrounded by rich vegetation that was hiding the squat from view; and a river that runs along the south side of it. However, at the same time that the squat begins to enlarge and settle, the restructure of the district starts on. The area is being built gradually, lot of luxurious structures emerge and therefore the district takes value. In a paradox way the construction of a block of flats highlights the existence of this place in the “eyes of the city”.

² Théâtre du soleil, *Le dernier caravansérail/ odyssées*, programme de toutes les odyssées.

³ We should mention that there are no women in the camp and in Patras generally. In Athens we find some living in hotels, but still their number is very small.

Currently the number of the huts in the camp varies between 200 and 300 and the occupancy is expanded to sites under construction or disinfected of the surroundings. Usually each hut can accommodate 4 to 10 persons. The building materials usually are: wooden planks, tissue, paper, plastic and pieces found discarded in their path; or others that they remove from yards and reuse them. Sometimes they even buy their material.

The equipment used to build their shelters shows the provisional character of their constructions. At the same time when we look at their edifice as a whole we recognize in it a more permanent mark. To emphasise this contradiction we imagine that it is as if we are looking at an aerial photo where we distinguish a kind of village, but when we zoom we are surprised by its perishable substance.

Many times we are seen groups of 3-4 persons on their way back from the port, or the truck parking areas – a few kilometres away from the camp -, once they failed “going on board” returning with material to built their shelter.

The above description, illustrates in a way the creation of the camp and can be summed up as follows: in the beginning we tried to leave... we didn't make it this time so we tried to find a shelter...when we realised that our “departure” would take longer than expected we invested little more in our shelter, but always as a background to our main preoccupation that was the departure...

Each hut is inhabited by friends or people from the same region or family, or sometimes “recommended” by other friends. Generally these that don't know somebody inside the camp, in the beginning do not live inside but squat the surroundings⁴. Among the various ethnic groups spotted in this afghan population some are more privileged than others. The main groups are the Hazara and the Pashto that oppose; Hazaras been more numerous are more settled; we almost never see them living outside the camp, while the Pashto most of the times squat the surroundings.

It would be interesting to note that the different religious or ethnic conflicts are less significant in the camp of Patras than in the country of origin. However the image we have from the situation of Calais shows that the conflicts re-emerge more intense; for example the “Hazara jungle”⁵ (squat) is far from the Pashto one...

In the camp there is no electricity supply. Some huts have direct access to utility poles and “furnish” the others. Power cuts happen often and are a way of police repression. The

⁴ During the day most of them gather inside the camp, that is a kind of ‘downtown’ to them.

⁵ Jungle is the name that these populations give to the “squatted woods” that are found near the port area of Calais.

water supply actually is made by some fountains that are located near the river; they were built by the people of the camp with the help of volunteers. The volunteers also built a large and solid hut that was used as a class for language courses (English and Greek); since almost one year now a mission of Doctors without Borders is lodged there.

It would be interesting to proceed on a small description of the place in order to have a superficial idea of its structure.

A kind of central entry - that in the afternoon is transformed on a play room: football, cricket or volleyball – leads us inside the camp. Beside, a few huts that “are not always there”⁶ and are a bit scattered. Once inside the camp, we see a few little improvised shops held by the Afghans that live inside that are supplying basic things. In the centre of the camp we see a Mosque. It is a large building that distinguishes from the others; it exists for some years now and is made by solid materials. During the sunny or rainy days, many are those that are “sitting there standing” - legs and arms folded in front; position of waiting - under the shelter of the canvas of the Mosque.

The squat is a refuge for this irregular population; the police until now⁷ do not enter; either because the property regime does not allow entering or because they consider it as a sort of “state within a state”. The surrounding occupied area though often is the target of police raids. The number of people inside the camp⁸; and at the same time its constellation attributes to it a special regime that prevents police to evade it.

Until this point in our essay we refer to the notion of camp as a place; a squat in a vacant lot. However we cannot ignore the fact that we are dealing with migration flows and more precisely with transit areas. Thus we should seize the broader sense of the concept of camp; *that preoccupies scholars working on the issue of places of confinement and forced grouping of those exiled that turn to Europe in seek for refuge.*⁹

The concept of camps has re-emerged in order to describe all these places of confinement for foreigners and to disclose their character of distance and exclusion. The choice of the word camp is not random; it is an ideological position which aims to reveal *the reality of non-volunteer grouping of exiled as a result of a systemic policy of impediment of free circulation and installation of those fleeing war, persecution or poverty*¹⁰.

⁶ They often become target of police raids.

⁷ The last days a lot of things changed, for the first time police entered and arrested 80 persons...

⁸ The number depends on the period; it varies from 400 to 700 or 1000.

⁹ Valluy, J. (2007). Introduction, in *Le retour des camps ? Sangatte, Lampedusa, Guantanamo...*, Paris, Autrement,

¹⁰ Migreurop, *Derrière le mot camp*, <http://www.migreurop.org/article675.html?lang=en>,

Through the *Migreurop*¹¹ Network – which exists since 2001 and works on European policies on asylum and immigration – we are trying to follow the concept of camps. The concept does not refer only to a definition of a place, does not describe simply an area but in a larger sense it refers to a situation, a process whose functions are: *to keep away, to hide from view and to eliminate*.

The concept of camps is a concept of keeping in distance throughout a process of “externalisation”. What is new in this reading is exactly this notion of “externalisation”. For Danièle Lochak *individual freedom in the strict sense, which is the right not to be detained against a court decision, was challenged by the possibility of placing inside those centres in various appellations – waiting areas, detention centres etc. – foreigners who are being denied access to the territory or those who are subject to expulsion*.

“Externalise” means in this case to both relocate and subcontract: relocate the controls and the examination of asylum applications far from the European borders, so that they do allow access in the European territory only to those that have been authorised to. Subcontract to third countries the control of the borders as well as the responsibility of reception of asylum seekers and the processing of their applications... “Externalisation” inevitably leads to the confinement of asylum seekers and irregular migrants.¹²

Thus, the term “externalisation” reveals a contradiction; we are talking about procedures’ that intend to keep in distance, to exclude throughout strategies of confinement and inclusion. Michel Agier in an article entitled *the chaos and the camps* remarks how those “enclosed outside” are also people who have been “marginalized inside”, within each state representing the outside of the one that excludes. *The extraterritoriality of the outcasts...is therefore defined within this tension between an “inside” that has become inaccessible from the viewpoint of national citizenship categories, and an “outside” experienced as a way of life that is as loosely undefined as it tightly constrained*¹³.

We want to come back to the notion of camps and distinguish through their logic a “police function”. In the words of Agier *whatever the management, it remains that the camps*

¹¹ To see more : Caroline Intrand et Pierre-Arnaud Perrouy, « La diversité des camps d'étrangers en Europe : présentation de la carte des camps de Migreurop », *Cultures & Conflits*, 57, printemps 2005, [En ligne], mis en ligne le 02 juin 2005. URL : <http://www.conflits.org/index1727.html>. Consulté le 10 juin 2009.

¹² Lochak, D., (2007). Etrangers, réfugiés, migrants : « Hannah Arendt aujourd'hui », in A. Kupiec (éd), *Hannah Arendt crises de l'état-nation*. Paris : Sens&tonka, 181-194.

¹³ Agier, M., (2006). The chaos and the camps. Fragments of a humanitarian government, dans Biemann, U., Holmes, B., (éd), *The Maghreb connection. Movements of life across North Africa*. Barcelona: Actar, 260-283.

are always a **police** response to the question of the stateless: the camp is a **police** solution, in the sense that it pushes aside, delays or suspends any recognition of political equality¹⁴.

The Migreurop Network has attempted to make an inventory of the camps, create a map¹⁵ and through a typology¹⁶ analyse the logics behind. According to this typology the *closed places, geographically identified, and reserved for the confinement of undesirable people*, can be devised in open or closed camps; at the same time another category that is not exactly in the same logic is that of informal camps.

The sub-divisions of open camps are:

The reception centres for asylum seekers; and the less formal groupings that emerge because of a specific situation. They pass most of the times under the “discreet” control of authorities.

The closed camps are those waiting transit zones. They are located in proximity of points of passage in borderlines; people there, are maintained and not exactly prisoners; they are free to return back to their countries or to every other country that accepts them.

Other closed camps are the detention centres that concern those persons already entered in European territory; and the exclusion camps where migrants are maintained for deportation.

The distinction between open and closed camps is not always clear. The inner function of open centres is similar to close: *it is about keeping control over potentially expelling persons in the near future*¹⁷.

The informal camps are those that get away from the logic of confinement as they escape completely to the above framework. *Far from legislations on the use of empty spaces, these places escape from any specific legal framework that affects the reception of asylum seekers or migrants*¹⁸.

Our intention is to look at these spontaneous groupings in order to seize a different character from that of the logic of camps; the informal camps could give us the opportunity to approach these places through the perspective of the trajectory with many stops.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Migreurop, *carte des camps*, <http://www.migreurop.org/IMG/pdf/carte-en.pdf>,

¹⁶ Caroline Intrand et Pierre-Arnaud Perrouy, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

We would like to distinguish two different argumentations. The first leans on the formal open or closed camps in order to see there *the materialization of a security approach to migration, to the detriment of the fundamental right of free movement*¹⁹.

The second based on spontaneous camps has the intention to consider them as savages²⁰. The term refers to “heterotopy” and “heterochrony”. The quality savage is not simply attributed to a place or a location; but in a larger sense it signifies the dynamic of displacement, mobility and space reconfiguration.

We borrow the term savage from Gilles Clément²¹ that uses it in order to describe urban voids and he argues that by naming them savage we can seize the potential and the dynamic of their character²².

We refer to two different geographies that are been mobilized for different reasons. The first-one derives from the notion of state-nation. As the borders of traditional state-nations are been threatened, subsequently a need for protection and security is emerging. Opposite to that reactions are organised against the protective policies concerning borders and exclusion vis-à-vis the displaced populations. The reaction though responds to the same geography and is likely to ignore an alternative intra-national emerging geography; one that cannot be perceived by the “native” population. The displaced show not much interest on the city, they just use some parts of it. They are undertaking a certain trajectory in the city in the same way they are undertaking a certain trajectory among the European states. In a way they make the city, they participate in an alternative urbanity²³.

The quality of savage is assigned to these places not because they are...but for the reason that they create something: an alternative transnational and interstitial urbanity. It is a concept of time and space and not only the morphological description of a place.

We would like to consider the existence of islets in an archipelago; a complex that runs from Kabul to England, Sweden etc. Through the concept of islets we try to grasp the stateless dimension of these locations. There is a set of connections among the various cities of their trajectory, a network of different “waiting rooms”. It is a question of representation and therefore it is a different geography.

¹⁹ Migreurop, *carte des camps*, op. cit.

²⁰ We are using this term knowing what risks this suggests; for that reason we would like to consider it far from a context of culturalism that ignores the conflict character of these places that is a whole situation that unhinges.

²¹ Clément, G. (2006), « Où en est l’herbe ? », Les cahiers de l’école de Blois, 4 : autour des friches, January 2006

²² On « abandoned » territories and the dynamics they offer, we have been based in the work of the group STALKER. See : *Stalker, à travers les territoires actuels*, Jean Michel place/in visu, in situ.

²³ Urbanity is here understood in a double sense: ways of being in the urban but at the same time socialisation processes, a kind of sociability in the city.

To an Afghan who was living in the camp of Patras at the period before December 2007, the city apart from the haimaga, - that is the name they give to the camp in Dari - would be: the discount super-market close to the camp, the Red Cross not very far either, the internet spots, the telephone booths, the two hospitals and whatever constitutes their trajectory until the gates of the port.

The camp is a refuge for those who failed²⁴ to leave. As one of its inhabitants was telling us: *It was better in the beginning that I was living outside the camp – in a construction next to it. Even if it was colder and the situation was much more difficult than sharing a hut with others. At that time I had nothing to keep me here, so I was going to the port all the time, I was trying to leave very hard. I was trying in the morning, in the afternoon, in the evening. These days I fear much more and I don't try that much, I am hanging around with friends, playing chess, preparing food, sleeping...*

On December 2007 an event was the occasion for the occupation of a boat from some of the Afghans. A truck driver stabled an underage when he found him hiding in his car. The underage resisted until the driver threatened to denounce him to the police. When the news arrived at the camp, about 150 men went to the port and tried to occupy a boat demanding from the driver to surrender to the police. This event led to a big protest when some of the inhabitants²⁵ of the city went to the port for support.

Major reactions begin by this time; reactions that were not new but for the first time to such extend. Some from the municipal authorities including the mayor supported a demonstration organised by residents of the area near the camp and entrepreneurs. The reason of this demonstration was to express their dismay regarding the existence of the camp and claim the demolition of it; seeking at the same time from the government to assume its responsibilities. Their main slogan was: *we are not going to leave the dream of the refugees become the nightmare of our city.*

On January an unsigned brochure was distributed to the Afghans entitled: *last warning on behalf of the local authorities to warn illegal immigrants to leave the camp.* After that the

²⁴ However, many of the Afghans that we run into in France keep good memories from Greece, we often hear them saying: once I have papers I will go back to Greece to find work and live there... The same thing remarks Lilly Boilet for Sudanese that actually are in England and look with nostalgia the “jungles” of Calais and Norrent-Fontes... Lilly Boilet, *Migration: l'errance ou l'asile/ Angleterre* Program: échanges et partenariats, GISTI (France) – MRN (Angleterre), session of 9 October 2008.

²⁵ More precisely, different groups of anarchists of the city.

police surrounded the camp and from the day after big demonstrations were organised in the centre of the city in order to support the afghan population. Three days after, a part of the camp was demolished by the municipality; those huts at the entry.

These operations, known as “sweep”, generated a lot of reactions and at the same time indicate a new era for the camp and its connections with the city. A few days later most of the population of the camp, about 1000 men participates in a protest claiming *the right to dignity and asylum*²⁶. This became a big local and national issue and provoked many others.

Therefore, the camp comes into view from that moment and this manifestation raises side reactions on the one and support on the other. Until that time the presence of volunteers was minimal or non existent. Humanitarian aid was limited to an almost insignificant contribution from the church or some other private initiatives. These events were the reason for the creation of two associations, with strong presence on the camp. Thereby, the “sweep” operation provokes a double reconnaissance, a negative of reactions and a positive of support.

The appearance is used here in a phenomenological register; it is a vision that provokes inconvenience to those who testify it. This appearance incites a double manifestation. On the one hand “what shall we do in order to disappear of our sight these people”; on the other, “how can we support them”.

Just after the events the camp becomes a controlled place. Its inhabitants cannot come and go easily, from that time police arrests them everywhere. Suddenly the image of the harbour area changes. We do not see them waiting around the port any more, several think that they have left. That is because they were no longer going by groups in the port, and they were avoiding it during the day.

They started going to the port one by one or in pairs, never in group anymore; in order not to be noticed. They started not to wear their backpacks anymore (which had become a landmark). They are also changing their trajectory to the port: not anymore the main street that leads to the gates; or if so it would be very early in the morning. They now take the path next to the railway station and the small streets near it.

²⁶ In fact most of the demands were the expressions of the associations that start intervene in the camp. It is interesting to see the misunderstandings between the Afghans of the camp and the associations that start to get involved to the camp. At the time of big demonstrations some people from the group of AK (a collective of anarchist groups) came to the camp in order to prepare the slogans of the demonstration with the Afghans. They put all the material in front of the Mosque, some people from the camp are gathered and a big discussion starts about what slogans we are going to write. The Afghans only care about slogans that concern more freedom in the port etc...the Greeks propose others that concern also asylum, dignity etc...After a while many Afghans , leave the place, others start to laugh and making jokes with the Greeks, others do not really interest, others wandering if after the demonstration the port will open, others insist to write down the slogans in Dari...

For an Afghan who lives in the camp of Patras, after December 2007, the places that constitute the city would be some more than before: the meeting place of the group AK in a central place of Patras, the school of Greek and English from another association and the two central squares where festivals and protests are organized.

The camp from that moment exposes to the inhabitants of Patras. This does not concern them as it overruns the local and emerges to a national and international level. The camp opens to the city; more precisely it's the city that starts to look over the camp and to get to know its population.

The indifference of the inhabitants until that moment, their ignorance in a way, of the situation that concerns a part of their city; is emerging from the fact that *these people do not belong to the same mankind as we do as Danièle Lochak mentions; in the camps we confine people that are not like ourselves. No doubt this is one of the reasons that explains the indifference of the western public opinion, that does not feel concerned by the plight of these people, not superfluous, but invisible*²⁷ ..

This opening of the camp towards the city and its inhabitants means changes for its population. We could distinguish there an opportunity for them to exist as an atypical community. Michel Agier defines it a *community of exodus, which is neither ethnic, nor religious, or national. It is a community or an ensemble of existential communities that took birth in local wars at once. This community for its accomplishment develops a full existential frame where refugees and displaced persons should be able to socialize their own experience of war, displacement or camps*²⁸.

The existence of this community relies on the narration of the exodus; it creates its networks during the exodus. People start to know each other during their trajectory, they share common experience. Most of the discussions among the population of the camp relate to the journey they have to do, information on the other countries, or better on the other cities they have to stop before reaching their destination. Also, information concerning which could be a good destination, or concerning the situation at the port or smugglers etc. *The testimony in its various forms can become a vector of emergence of a voice and socialization for an existential community of refugees*²⁹.

²⁷ Lochak, D., (2007). Etrangers, réfugiés, migrants : « Hannah Arendt aujourd'hui », in A. Kupiec (éd), *Hannah Arendt crises de l'état-nation*. Paris : Sens&tonka, 181-194.

²⁸ Agier, M., (2002). *Aux bords du monde les réfugiés*. Flammarion

²⁹ *Ibid.*

The 'opening' of the camp gives rise to recognition of its population. At the same time the camp starts to be more and more a controlled place and looks more now to a camp of confinement.

We have to do at that point with a kind of visibility that evokes the creation of non governmental associations of support; and at the same time reactions - that manifest in a more organized way than before- to the fact that that this situation is visible, and by which means will be eliminated.

The other side of this visibility is the function of tracking those that we have to hide as we cannot deport or sending them away. By tracking them we control them.

There is an oxymoron in the way that these populations exist in a world that "doesn't want them". The oxymoron is that these populations are not really interested directly on this world either; they only use him to find provisory shelters. They are volunteers and at the same time constraint to inhabit these heterotopias.

No matter how we will name them: Afghans, sometimes Kurdish (there are still some inhabitants of the city of Patras that think that we still have to do with a Kurdish population), refugees, illegal migrants, "Dubliners"; they are those *missing on a liberal regime* that Etienne Tassin refers to. *Those that the globalised economy condemns in forced and random migration; in been illegal in the country that their wandering brought them*³⁰.

Etienne Tassin proceeds to a genealogy of what in terms of political philosophy could signify the disappearance on a liberal regime. Based on the analysis of Hannah Arendt he distinguishes different regimes of disappearance.

By disappearance he refers to the process through which the liberal society deprives the migrants from their rights, or those pushed in clandestinity from all kinds of visibility; by erasing them from the public space of appearance and that way, leading them to an underground and obscure existence...

For Hannah Arendt politics is the name of a public space conceived as a space of appearance and visibility. As a space of appearance, politics articulate the community of actors, the revelation of the agent and its singularisation in the principle of visibility. The phenomenal nature of the political-public space defines the appearance not as the visible and superficial face of a theatre of operations that their hidden truth can be found backstage; but as the mode in which politics happen. In politics more than elsewhere we do not have the possibility of distinguishing among the being and its appearance. In the sector of human

³⁰ Tassin, E. (2007). « Visibilité et clandestinité : des « disparus » en régime libéral », unpublished paper, University of Paris VII Diderot.

affairs the being and its appearance are the same and one thing³¹. Exclusion and inclusion are both forms of disappearance; the excluded from all manifestations as well as those included deprived from been exposed in public are named disappeared.

Etienne Tassin therefore distinguishes three registers of disappearance, and three different operations of this disappearance: *the eliminated the erased* and those *out of sight*.

The *eliminated* are those that are missing, as a result of “police” operations. The *erased* are deprived of existence because they are not politically recognised; they have no political rights, or they do no longer have civil rights. The *out of sight* are those condemned in hiding because of their illegal entry to Europe or due to a loss of their rights resulting from legislative or regulatory changes.

Every process of disappearance refers to a different *form of social and political invisibility by which take their meaning and are revealed the group or community affiliations, the social recognitions and the public-political actions*³².

Invisibility primarily in a metaphorical sense means that *are invisible those that we are using but at the same time we ignore: I am invisible...because people refuse to see me. Far from registering the invisibility in a context of pathology of political or social phenomenology; the invisibility is reported to a phenomenology of the gaze. Thus, we are arguing in terms of recognition*³³.

Another form of invisibility is the one that *makes disappear; it is not a non-physical presence but rather a non-existence in a social sense*. In other words it is about fighting to be recognised as identities; combating for a visibility that would be *product of a practical configuration that wants to make sense socially*.

The last form of invisibility, that interests as in advance, is social and political and is been understood through the *anonymity* and “*clandestinity*”. Anonymity is the disappearance of a singularity, the disappearance of a name. Tassin based on Arendt³⁴ points how through

³¹ H. Arendt, *On Revolution*, Penguin Book, London, 1990, p. 98.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice. This disclosure of “who” in contradiction to “what” somebody is – his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide – is implicit in everything somebody says and does. It can be hidden only in complete silence and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never be achieved as a wilful purpose, as though one possessed and could dispose of this “who” in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities. On the contrary, it is more than likely that the “who”, which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person itself, like the*

anonymity we can distinguish both sides of the action: *the paradox of the anonymity characterises the author of the action (what he is), on the one hand and the disclosure of the actor, his “singularisation” (who he is) that emanates from his action on the other.*

Hence, we must not confuse the *anonymous generality of those who are acting and whose actions produce the distinctive singularity of actors...with the anonymity of the “operator” condemned in disappearance precisely because he is deprived of the disclosure of who he is; deprived of his own uniqueness; as he is deprived of action, banned to be hidden from the public scene of appearance, that is the political scene*³⁵.

The invisibility by means of “clandestinity” is the register where our population is located. *Clandestinity is not the simple condemnation to carry on a discrete life and non remarkable: clandestinity is deprivation of political existence*³⁶. Deprived from their fundamental rights they grow to become “outlaws”.

*The political “non-existence” of migrants deprived of civil and political rights in France and in almost all European countries is doubled when it comes to illegal immigrants.*³⁷ *They are invisible because they have no name or other signs and at the same time they are invisible as bodies and persons*³⁸.

Tassin proposes to wonder about what could possibly mean *exist invisibly*. We can question whether *it is possible to live in the invisibility; subsequently, what would be the form of a social and political non-existence, of a non-phenomenal existence in other words?*

Trough our presentation we are trying to figure out how clandestinity could manifest as mode of existence. We are interested in advance on the ways to exist in the invisibility because they arise in the “world” as a “neurosis» of this “world”. The illegal immigrants appear by “demonstrating” their invisibility; they even make use of their invisibility in order to fight for a political existence, or for a communitarian belonging later, at the end of their

daimon in Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those he encounters. Hanah Arendt, *The human condition*, university of Chicago Press, London, p 176.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ On the issue of « existence » Tassin refers to Abdelmalek Sayad « Exister, c’est exister politiquement » (1985), in *L’immigration ou les paradoxes de l’altérité*, vol.2, *Les enfants illégitimes*, Paris, Raison d’agir, 2006.

³⁷ To follow the discussion about how illegal immigrants could be distinguished from the “sans papier” see Catherine Quiminal, « Nouvelles mobilités et anciennes catégories », in Ville-Ecole-Intégration, *Enjeux*, n°131, décembre 2002, p. 5, also Cf. Smaïn Laacher, *Le peuple des clandestins*, Paris, Calman-Lévy, 2007, and precisely pp. 18-22 : « Le clandestin est à distinguer de l’immigré ordinaire, du demandeur d’asile, du réfugié et du sans-papiers. » Si ces termes sont souvent confondus, « il existe pourtant des différences structurales entre le monde des sans-papiers et le monde des clandestins. »

³⁸ *Ibid.*

trajectory. What interests us is the fact that this “life in several stages” can last for a long period. It is a way of life in being continuously in a trajectory that “coexists” with another more “coherent”. The trajectory as a way of existing in the world imposes itself to the world of state-nations and by that means controverts it.

Besides the logic of the camp that responds to security requirements of the world of nation states, lies this different logic of spontaneous camps seen as savages who in their turn responded to *the paradoxical condition of reciprocal extraterritoriality (or, better, aterritoriality)* to use Giorgio Agamben. For him *instead of two national states separated by uncertain and threatening boundaries, one could imagine two political communities dwelling in the same region and in exodus one into the other*³⁹.

Consequently, the status of Europe would mean the *citizen's being-in-exodus (obviously also immobile)*. *This space (Europe) would not coincide with any homogeneous national territory, nor with their topographical sum, but would act on these territories, making holes in them and dividing them topologically.*⁴⁰

Most of the Afghans do not seek for asylum in Greece, as they are willing to do it in other European countries once arrived there. But with the Dublin II Regulation⁴¹, they have the right to seek for asylum only in the first European country they arrive. In other words, to the first European country that they will be detected to.

The Dublin II regulation by denying free circulation encourages wandering, through different mechanisms of control such as fingerprinting. The fingerprints reflect on a paradox way – just like passports – a kind of identification; fingerprints inform on the trajectory these populations have followed and that way they indicate where to send them.

Fingerprints constitute a great concern for those illegal migrants and this becomes more and more apparent as we follow them further in their journey, and especially in France. Their response to fingerprinting is what Michel Agier⁴² calls *strategies of invisibility*. That means that most of them in order to continue their path unnoticed change their name, language, dress appearance etc. Agier suggests that this should not be considered as a loss of identity but rather as a kind of resistance.

³⁹ Agamben, G., In an article entitled *we refugees*, written in 1994, based on the homonymous article of Arendt. <http://www.egs.edu/faculty/agamben/agamben-we-refugees.html>

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ To see more in Dublin II Regulation see :

http://www.unhcr.ch/include/fckeditor/custom/File/Protection/EU%20Allemand/EU_AsyI_DublinII_UNHCRen gl.pdf

⁴² Agier, M., op. cit.

So we see how different strategies are being developed in order to avoid cataloguing. In Greece they usually lie about their age (as underage have a more privileged treatment). For that reason they circulate with no papers at all; papers that would reveal their real age or other things about their trajectory or about their identity. Sometimes they even burn on their fingers so that to make them “illegible” – a strategy that ultimately has boomerang effects, as illegible fingers mean fingerprints taken somewhere.

At this point it would be interesting to see how Tim Cresswell distinguishes movement from mobility, in his essay *on the move*⁴³. *Movement is the act of displacement that allows people to move among different locations. The movement is a dynamic equivalent of location and mobility is the dynamic equivalent of place. Place has come to signify meaningful segments of place – locations imbued with meaning and power. A place is a centre of meaning...we become attached to it; we fight over it and exclude people from it.*

The Afghan population, to which we are referring to throughout our essay, asserts in a less direct way their right to free circulation, their right to mobility. We distinguish between forced mobility such as wandering and a voluntary mobility. Voluntary mobility is what Tim Cresswell refers to in his article *The production of motilities*⁴⁴. He claims that in order to seize the various aspects of mobility we have to think of it as produced. Some kinds of mobility could then be regarded as acts of freedom, or transgression and resistance against states will to limit the mobility, protect the borders and put everything in order.

We would like to consider the appearance of the invisibles in the city of Patras, as an act of resistance just because their appearance reflects their commitment to mobility. This act of resistance is been manifest by the simple fact of occupation. In other words, provisional spatial reconfigurations made by those who do not plan to stay but finally are been made long-term. These populations don't really care about the precarious circumstances in which they live in; their main interest is at the port: *am I going to succeed today? Am I less constraint to move today?*

These ‘temporary presences’ have created something like a “reference point”. Even if this “reference point” is a transit territory, a place that they appropriate provisionally; its character is more permanent, just like a stop in a journey where people come and go. The camp of Patras is a reference for everyone who comes to Greece and looks forward to cross the harbour.

⁴³ Cresswell, T. (2006). “Mobility in the modern western world”, in Cresswell, T., *On the move*. New York: Routledge.

⁴⁴Tim Cresswell, *New formations no43*, spring 2001 : Mobilities

Our intention throughout this paper is to rely on these informal groupings in order to distinguish in them a savage character. We are moving in an “alternative geography” where these informal camps create those islets of resistance whose mode of being is paradox.

The paradox in them is that on the one they are the product of an obstacle to mobility; they exist in favour of failed attempts to leave...On the other, these places exist as long as there are people willing to leave. The fact that these constellations stay gathered and do not disperse shows that the populations that traverse them illustrate a willing to free movement.

The policies of exclusion are trying to control these places but they do not really manage to establish their power. For that reason the existence of such places bothers.

We refer to an atypical community of exodus; a population in displacement that coexists with a world of “established natives”. This community “appears as invisible» and lives in the savages that *at the same time, they “serve as guinea pig” to original and germinal urban*

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