Continuities and Change in Greek political culture: 
PASOK’s modernization paradigm 1996-2004

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ABSTRACT
Throughout the 90s, PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement), in common with the other European social democratic parties, has advocated a revisionist approach towards socialism and has placed the 'modernization' of the Greek society high on its political agenda. By focusing on the characteristics of PASOK’s transformation, this paper aims to exemplify the repercussion of this development on its political discourse i.e. the modernization paradigm (eksychronismos).

Key questions will be addressed: What is the significance of ‘modernization’ as a political discourse? What is its empirical documentation and how its methodological use will help us to study and to decipher the role of this political ideology in conjunction with PASOK’s new character, ideological agenda, social base.

The material composing the analysis of this paper derives from empirical research on the speeches delivered and interviews given by the Prime Minister Kostas Simitis and other members of the ‘modernizers group’ and by articles and texts which have been published in the daily press, periodicals and books.

INTRODUCTION
The discussion about the ideology, role and organization of political parties is continuous and classic. The scope and intensity of the challenges currently faced in Western European political parties is exceptionally great, threatening the viability of the manner in which they have traditionally operated and causing them to seek new behaviors and strategies. Ideologies and issues adopted by political parties are of central importance in this new epoch of conversion. Citizens’ preferences do not enter into political decision-making process directly, but are selected and aggregated by political parties into policy packages. The mediating role of the parties refers to this process of segregation and conversion of citizens’ preferences into binding decisions. The two central criteria in democratic theory are thus the responsiveness of parties to citizens’ preferences, and the accountability of parties in government to their pre-electoral pledges. However, the functions which democratic theory accords to political parties in respect of ideologies and issues are both more numerous and at times conflicting (Volkens and Klingemann, 2002, pp. 143-146).

Ideological distances between parties are pivotal to cleavage theory, which diagnosed a ‘freezing’ of major conflict lines after the extension of suffrage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Here, parties are primarily seen as differing in terms of ideologies based upon major and enduring conflicts. Ideologies in this sense represent the core identities of parties and provide blueprints of alternative solutions for current problems of societies. Thus, the party remains the basic component of modern representative society, the necessary entity for political representation and the crucial component that binds together citizens and political power in the quest for political interaction and active participation in the political sphere. The transformation of the character of parties today in the field of ideas, programs, initiatives, messages, symbols and political rhetoric constitutes an expression of societal change.
The shift from the industrial to the post-industrial society and the consequences of modernity in social, economic, political and particularly ideological sphere are paradigmatic in the way that we have to reinvent conceptual and methodological tools to study the changes that are taking place in the institutional and ideological realm of the parties. Moreover, in the Greek case we can add extra reasons that characterize that institutional makeover that is taking place especially in the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium: accession to European Monetary Union (EMU) (the so called European Project) as landmark, the completion of 31 years from the establishment of the Third Greek Republic (Metapolitefsi) in 1974 and also the wide societal demand for the need to modernize and enhance the political culture further are paradigmatic signs of this transformative spirit in Greece. At the beginning of the new millennium Greece stands poised between tradition and modernity, with some institutions, such as the Orthodox Church, rooted in the past, and others, such as the European Union, tugging toward the future. Greece is striving to modernize its economy, culture, party system as it confronts the aftermath of the cold war and the demands of European Union membership.

This paper, consequently, will try to decode and analyze the political discourse of the ‘modernization project’ (eksychronismos) of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) that started when Kostas Simitis was elected as the new party leader, after Papandreou’s death in June 1996, up until March 2004’s electoral victory of New Democracy Party (Nea Democratia). Under Simitis, PASOK presented a renewed image and managed to win the 1996 and subsequently the 2000 elections thus marking the end of millennium and the beginning of the twenty-first century with continuity in government. (Lyrintzis & Nikolopoulos, 1999). As a result, the new physiognomy of PASOK’s ideology can be analyzed in the following method: between its resolutely catch-all programmatic/ideological profile (the modernization paradigm) the interclassist structure of its organization and electorate and between its ‘programmatic minimalism’ and its ‘electoral maximalism’. I propose that because it is based on this schema, the ‘modernized identity’ of PASOK is not merely conjectural in character.

**HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

As mentioned above, with reference to the Greek case, there are special issues that one should account for when analyzing transitions and changes in the party system structures. Issues like the EMU accession as a benchmark for the new era, the need for the ‘Europeanization’ of the party system, the completion of 31 years after the political changeover (Metapolitefsi), the recent confirmation, through elections, of the two party system (i.e. dikommatiko systima), existing since 1977, and also the wide realization of the need for novel, more innovative things in political life which could mobilize the interest in politics and show its critical role in the outcome of vital issues. Greece, together with other countries, had to face a New World as soon as communism collapsed and the bipolar system ended. Citizens, parties, leaders were called to orient themselves in a new political and ideological horizon, based on their experiences and their course in history.
After the fall of the Military Dictatorship in 1974, this prowess of political parties, in combination with the absence of any other agencies with similar capacities, confirmed them as key actors in the strategy to the transition to democracy.

Since its foundation in 1974, PASOK was a party with strong cross-class electoral support, much more so than the socialist parties of central and northern Europe (Moschonas, 2001). PASOK began to mobilize using a radical third world rhetoric after the collapse of the Greek junta in 1974 that combined anti-imperialist populist and a few left-libertarian themes, including some demands of the peace and women’s movements (Clogg, 1987, p.122; Lyrintzis, 1989). When the party performed not so good according to its expectations in the 1974 elections, its leader Andreas Papandreou toned down its rhetoric and ousted several of his radical followers but did little to change the party's basic message (Spourdalakis, 1988, pp.135-9). The more important of the two communist parties, the Greek Communist Party-exterior (KKE-exterior), never represented a serious threat to Papandreou's emerging party because it was incapable of strategic innovation (Spourdalakis, 1988, pp.200-208). In the late 1970s when PASOK had established itself as the key competitor to the bourgeois governing party, New Democracy, and had wiped out other competitors, Papandreou veered to the center and won a parliamentary majority in 1981 after a period of deficit spending, winning another election, and overcoming resistance from the party's own ranks, PASOK was able to embark on a strict austerity policy. Although financial and patronage scandals weakened the party, it still retained enough popular support to give its bourgeois competitor only the thinnest of winning margins after three consecutive national elections between June 1989 and April 1990. Just as in other Mediterranean countries (Spanish Socialist Party-PSOE, Portuguese Socialists-PSP), PASOK’s strategic flexibility was built on a centralist system of personal leadership, buttressed by a growing patronage system in the public sector, a recipe for decline also in other socialist parties (Spourdalakis, 1988, pp. 150-159). Papandreou as party leader could not only anoint and fire members of his central committee (Clogg 1987, p.130), but also avoid holding frequent party conventions (Featherstone 1990, p.187), subduing the labour unions when they rebelled against austerity policy (Featherstone 1990, p.194), and subjecting the party organization to the government apparatus (Lyrintzis 1989; p.44). By the 1980s, the bulk of PASOK members were public employees and; party functionaries (Papadopoulos 1989, p.64). Papandreou ran a system of bureaucratic clientelism (Featherstone 1990, p.101) that tolerated no factional divisions employed the party purely as an electoral machine.

In its electoral history PASOK received a high level of support from the farmers and among the traditional petit bourgeois class, two classes that are particularly strong in Greece and often hostile towards the left in other European countries. But, during the 80s, and particularly after 1984 PASOK’s catch all character weakened. The vote became more class based. From 1981-1993, the structure of the party was of a catch-all nature that enjoyed heavy support within the lower classes. The elections of 1996 were a turning point as far as the sociological profile of the PASOK electorate and its political discourse was concerned. It increased its impact in the middle and upper classes, particularly among those with higher education and the business strata (Moschonas, 2001 and Lyrintzis, 1998). Its new political doctrine ‘modernization’ was presented as a very important characteristic of the new PASOK.
The election (January 1996) of Kostas Simitis, leader of the ‘modernizing wing’ of PASOK, as prime minister by the parliamentary caucus (in place of the seriously ill Papandreou), was the starting point for the overturning of internal party relations. It led to the election of Simitis as president of the party 4\textsuperscript{th} Congress (July 1996), after Papandreou’s death. The intense and passionate but democratic confrontation over succession between the ‘modernizing’ and ‘traditional’ factions during the 4\textsuperscript{th} congress symbolically ‘liberated’ the organization from its past. The ‘epoch of modernization’ (eksychronismos) and the age of Simitis mark a shift in the organizational and ideological tradition of PASOK. The end of the cult of leadership, the recognition of internal dissent and the logic of the majority and of the minority within party lines, shape the new organizational culture of the party. The party’s executive bodies function more collectively. The same applies to the governmental level, for the cabinet and the various collective, governmental organs, the role of which in a system of ‘prime minister-centrism’ has obviously been strengthened (Moschonas, 2002, pp. 357-358). With the election of Simitis the Greek socialists managed to convince society that they alone and not the conservative forces were the reliable expression of ‘modernization’ in the country. Modernization in Greece, as in other countries of southeastern Europe (Sassoon, 1998, p.140), is conceived as the reduction of the distance that separated the country from the, more developed societies of the European Union. After 1996, accession to the euro zone becomes a major goal of the nation upon whose realization the prestige of the country and its national pride depended. The governments of Andreas Papandreou (1993-1995) and of Simitis (from 1996) managed to significantly reduce the high rate of inflation (from 13.7 per cent on 1993 to 4.1 per cent in 2000), to restrict public deficit (103.9 in 2000), to enlarge the GNP (from -1 in 1993 to 4.1 in 2000). With regard to foreign policy, during 1999-2000, it took significant initiatives towards the smoothing out of relations with Turkey. Nevertheless, unemployment reached record levels (11.2 in 2004 as opposed to 8.6 in 1993) and PASOK came into conflict with social groups that formerly constituted its natural social base (farmers, pensioners, workers) mainly with its policy towards changes in the welfare and educational policies. The victory of PASOK in the elections of September 1996 contributed to the stabilization of the new power bloc of the party and the motto of modernization (eksychronismos) appeals as the new ideological drive of PASOK.

\textbf{THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY OF PASOK'S MODERNIZATION DISCOURSE}

Despite the fact that the concept for modernization of the political system –but also of the Greek society as a whole- is ‘artistically’ spread within the political rhetoric throughout the period following the political changeover (Metapolitefsi)\textsuperscript{3}, modernization is openly expressed as a request in the inside of a homonymous, active and par excellence political ideology only after the general elections in 1996. PASOK’s modernization policy, constructed around Greek membership in the European Union and programmatic and political priorities, inspired by the neo-liberal paradigm, strengthened its influence among higher social strata and an important section of capital, as well as intellectuals traditionally distrustful of Papandreou’s ‘populist and ‘demagogic’ discourse. (Lyrintzis 1987 & 1993, Fouskas, 1996). Thus,
Simitis’ ‘new PASOK’ has gradually become the party of the ‘contentment society’ (Moschonas, 2002, pp.167-168), while retaining a significant influence among disadvantaged sections of the population (the so called ‘non-privileged’ group; this term was a neologism created by Andreas Papandreou to describe its electoral base in the 1980s and distinguished it from the bourgeois ‘privileged’ social base of New Democracy party), even if it is significantly reduced. On the basis of this demand for political modernization, it appears also that not only the re-election of PASOK in government was effective (elections 2000), but also the initiation of the cognate attempt to renew the features and the party’s political program. Henceforth, the demand for political modernization is used not only as a discourse structure in the pre-election speech for PASOK, but mainly as a legitimizing reference of the state policy itself. But, despite the eight year tenure in office (1996-2004) and the frequent use of the term political modernization, its contents remain of dual meaning and on sight vague. Moreover, another methodological position which is vital for this analysis is the definition and maybe the elucidation not of the term political modernization itself, but of the contents that this term has acquired during its defined ideological use.

The bibliography of the 1960s, 1970s⁴ forms a primary source of notional delimitation for the modernization discourse. Even in that case, it is possible to say that the discovery of the notion of political modernization being created inside an expressly theoretical-sociological framework and that this notion is orientated to an equally clear area of reference: the underdeveloped societies. The fundamental distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ is meaningful only as differentiation between the ‘developed’ and the ‘underdeveloped’. The ideological use of the term political modernization today orientates and channels its legitimized reference to the political systems of the developed societies and this is how the strategic distinction between the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ interests these societies and especially their political systems. So, in the broader framework of a cold war ideology, if the demand for political modernization coincides with the ‘outreaching the West’⁵, then in the framework of a post-cold war ideology, the demand for political modernization corresponds to and is signaled by the demand of the ‘overcoming’ of the so-called industrial society and the transition to the ‘information-global society’⁶. So, the ideological use of the term ‘modernization’ and, in particular, ‘political modernization’ is distinct and differentiated.

Even though the above argument marks a discontinuity or some kind of sectioning in the ideological uses of the term ‘political modernization’, the function of any political discourse remains always the same as long as its main aim is its appearance under a united form. This aim, in turn, can be break down in the following objectives which constitutes the main arguments of the modernization schema:

(1) Re-formulation and re-definition of the general interest.
(2) Political mobilization of social forces
(3) Re-definition of the major social and political cleavages.

More specifically, as far as it concerns the first objective, the ideology of political modernization is called to rejoin different social interests under one hierarchical form in such a way that the hierarchical relationship appears and is anticipated as if it was the general interest of society (Gravaris, 2002). By adopting the Gramscian terminology, we could support the argument that this objective corresponds to the
'hegemonic function' of the political ideology of modernization. Under these presuppositions, one can consider the two remaining objectives as two separate levels of the first one. More specifically, the political mobilization of the social forces represents this hierarchical relationship of the various social interests as far it concerns the possible or probable ways of their participation in the political system, whereas the re-definition of the major socio-political cleavages represents this hierarchical relationship on its comparison to the ‘rival’- and for this reason they are regarded as pathogenic- hierarchical relationships. So, the ideology of the political modernization is identical to any other political ideology regarding its form. However, this is not the case, if the extension turns to the contents of the ideology of political modernization. In addition, the examination of these contents sheds light on the particular character of this ideology. The contents of the discourse of political modernization are initially presented as joint-statements of the term and crop up during the use of the request for political modernization (Gravaris, 2002). We are talking about partial and on sight self-contained references to aspects of society and also to essential aspects of the political system, which operate in the form of legitimized references. Such legitimizing references are observed during the conjunction of the demand for political modernization with phrases like ‘Information-Global Society’, ‘Civil Society’, ‘deepening of democratic structures’ ‘Governance’, ‘New Public Management’ and especially the use of the term ‘Centre-Left’ and its renewing meaning in the discourse schema, all parts of rhetoric commonly used and presented in the speeches delivered by the ‘modernizers’ group and prime minister Simitis.

The alterations of PASOK’s political rhetoric during the period in question (1996-2004) are various and determinative of its need/effort to create a new ideological-programmatic formula which attempts to synthesize and combine three basic thematic configurations: The first, which originates within the classical socialist tradition, is oriented towards development and the traditional values and goals of the left, including social equality, social justice the strengthening of the welfare state and the increase in employment. The second is inspired by the neo-liberal (priority to the market, currency stabilization, reform of the public sector, a rigorous discourse that encourages sacrifice). The third is inspired by the agenda of cultural liberalism and post-materialism (human rights discourse). The ‘modernizers’ attempt to correlate this new ideology with the ‘hard cell’ of the political system -i.e the state and state-society relations. Henceforth, the legitimizing reference which arises from the use of the term ‘Centre-Left’ attempts to correlate the ideology of modernization with the new political discourse that was adopted by most social democratic parties in Europe inspired by Antony Giddens project ‘the third way’ as a means of rethinking socialism. After coming to power 1997, New Labour Party with Tony Blair as its leader, embarked on an ambitious course of political reform and modernization. While maintaining a commitment to the values of social justice and solidarity, the government sought to engage with the realities of the new global order. It recognized that the old politics was out of line with the challenges of the new era. Like more than a dozen other European governments, New Labour wanted to move beyond the traditional political categories of left and right and embark on a new brand of centre-left politics. Because this approach tried to avoid customary political divides, it is often referred to as third way politics.

There are six main dimensions to third way politics (Giddens, 1998, pp. 11-28):
1 Reconstruction of government: Active government is required to meet the needs of a rapidly changing world, yet government should not be exclusively associated with top-down bureaucracies and national policies. Dynamic forms of management and administration, such as those sometimes found in the business sector, can work with government in defending and revitalizing the public sphere.

2. The cultivating of civil society: Government and the market alone are not enough to solve the many challenges in late modern societies. Civil society - the realm outside the state and market - must be strengthened and joined up with government and business. Voluntary groups, families and civic associations can play vital roles in addressing community issues from crime to education.

3. Reconstruction of the economy: The third way envisages a new mixed economy characterized by a balance between government regulation and deregulation. It rejects the neoliberal view that deregulation is the only way to ensure freedom and growth.

4. Reform of the welfare state: While it is essential to protect the vulnerable through the provision of effective welfare services, the welfare state must be reformed in order to become more efficient. Third way politics looks towards a 'society of care' while acknowledging that old forms of welfare were often unsuccessful in reducing inequalities, and controlled, rather than empowered, the poor.

5 Ecological modernization: Third way politics rejects the view that environmental protection and economic growth are incompatible. There are many ways that a commitment to defending the environment can generate jobs and stimulate economic development.

6. Reform of the global system: In an era of globalization, third way politics looks to new forms of global governance. Transnational associations can lead to democracy above the level of the nation-state and can allow greater governance of the volatile international economy.

Third way politics emerged against the backdrop of a double political crisis. The revolutions of 1989 revealed that socialism was not a viable approach to economic organization, yet the unchecked enthusiasm for the free market favoured by neo-liberal conservatives was also flawed. The modernizing agenda of third way politics adopted in Britain and elsewhere was an attempt to respond creatively to the forces of globalization. It sought to harness the energy behind these transformations to revitalize the workings of government and democracy. This idea of finding a third way in politics, however, has been widely criticized. Many Conservatives see the new politics as largely empty of content, political posturing rather than a policy program with real bite. Some on the more traditional left, on the other hand, believe that the third way does too little to deal with problems of inequality and insecurity. They believe that ‘Old Labour’ is still superior to the new
version. Giddens ‘Third Way’ agenda, posits new ideological ways for social
democratic parties to be achieved not by abandoning core positions of social
democracy, but by adding issues not included in the traditional left-right divide. A
renewed social democracy has to be left of centre, because social justice and
emancipatory politics remain at its core.

The new post 1996- PASOK tried to incorporate most of the above principles in its
agenda. It is characteristic the speech that Simitis gave in the conference for the
Progressive Governance for the XXI Century in Berlin, were in June 2000 the heads
of 14-reform-minded social democratic governments met in Berlin at the invitation of
Federal Chancellor Schröder, to share experiences in rethinking socialism and
discussing about Third Way Politics and Progressive Governance for the new
millennium. (See the summit resolution in Gerhard Schroder (ed.) Progressive
Governance for the XXI Century. Contributions to the Berlin Conference). Third way
politics was part of PASOK’s modernization project and one of the key issues for the
‘modernizers group’ was the effort to try to re-define the traditional left-right divide
which has always been perceived as the main dividing line in Greek Politics.

OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES: RE-DEFINING TRADITIONAL
POLITICAL CLEAVAGES -LEFT AND RIGHT-

The use of the term ‘Centre-Left’ is paradigmatic in the ideological core of the
modernization paradigm. Following the Left-Right divide (which have always been
perceived as the main dividing lines in Greek politics) one may obtain a first view of
the Greek party system. This view may be superficial and misleading to the extent
that these labels are used by the political actors and the parties for self identification
and the construction of political identities. Yet the use of these labels over a period of
three decades and the variations in emphasis and meaning provide a first account of
the development of Greek party politics (Lyrintzis, 2005). PASOK ideological shift
from classical socialism to modernized social democracy can be understood via this
methodological concept.

In the Greek political system of the post-war era until the end of the 1980s, the
competition between the political forces, the practices of the political parties and the
political behaviour of the citizens was over-defined by the major political cleavage
‘Right –Anti-Right’. Despite its simplistic character the segregation ‘Right-Anti-
Right’ echoed typical traits of the Greek political life, like the Civil War, the post-
civil war political system with its usual deviations from the rules of parliamentary
system, the seven-year dictatorship (1967–1974) and the demand for a functional
rehabilitation of a ‘fair’ and ‘democratic state’ with the elevation to the government of
the winners of the Second World War who, at the same time, were the losers of the
Civil War (Moschonas, 2000 pp.159-179 and Demertzis, 2000 pp.40-65) So, in the
divisional scheme of ‘Right-Anti-Right’ there exists the demand for democratization
of the Greek political system with the participation of all those who had been
excluded by the structures and the operation of the post-civil war state. This demand
appeared to be satisfied during ‘Allagi (Change)’ (Allagi was a motto that signified a
whole era, the 1980s and was used by Andreas Papandreou to denote the transition
from the old corrupted regime to the new, democratic political environment that he
had envisaged) period in 1981, with the rise of PASOK to government, which is what
the government called upon for the representation of these excluded forces. (Lyrintzis,
Democratization, however, was limited to the guarantee of the form of the fair state and to the smooth operation of parliamentary system, without expanding at the same time to the reforming of the structures of the state policy, inherited intact by the post-civil war political system. On the contrary, the practice of PASOK’s governments during the 1980s clearly showed the use of such state policy structures to achieve and realize its own, this time, targets.

The introduction of the term ‘Centre-Left’ as a political and ideological compass for PASOK from 1996, aims firstly to weaken and secondly to neutralize the major cleavage of ‘Right-Anti-Right’ as a ‘traditional’ trend and to shift the ideological pendulum in a new modern scale of reference.

A first differentiation in the ideological function of the two cleavages, the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ one, is that the ‘Right-Anti/Right’ divide, aimed at the mobilization of the party voters and the legitimation of PASOK’s rhetoric, irrespective of its governmental practice, while the divide ‘Centre-Left vs. Centre-Right’ aims primarily at the legitimation of the governmental choices of PASOK and secondly at the mobilization of its voters.

The two new elements that the term ‘Centre-Left’ brings to the ideology of political modernization are the following: first its self-definition as a post-cold war ideology and second, the semantic identification of the first synthetic ‘Centre-’ with the famous ‘New Social Centre-Neue Mitte’. The term was created by the Third Way thinkers (Giddens, Hombach, Beck) as a new class orientated paradigm for the renewed social democratic project of the 21st century. They argue that the ‘centre’ should not be regarded as empty of substance. Rather, they are talking of the alliances that social democrats can weave from the threads of lifestyle diversity. Traditional as well as novel political problems need to be thought about in this way. The concept of the Neue Mitte developed by Schröder (leader of the SPD party in Germany and chancellor since 1998), is of course, partly an electoral label aimed at eliciting a positive response from the mass media and increasing the reach of the SPD within the middle classes. But it also reflects the conviction that fresh ways of approaching deep-rooted political dilemmas had to be found once in government. One reason for this derives from the continuing demise of the politics of class. The traditional working class, defined in terms of attitude and political orientation, is now thought to represent less than five per cent of the German public (Meyer, 2001, pp.50-67). Working class communities with uniform political preferences have been replaced over the course of recent decades by large number of political groupings, none of which exhibits an automatic tendency to support social democratic policies (Meyer, 2001, pp.70-88) Both the working class and the middle class are now made of a range of socio-cultural groups with very different attitudes to life, work and politics. They are now classified as ‘materialists’, ‘post materialist’, ‘post-modernists’. It is widely thought that members of these new social groupings are liable to move between different parties depending on their political image and performance. In order to obtain more than forty per cent of the popular vote the SPD had to perform the political somersaults necessary to bind together a number of these different political groupings. In contrast, it is thought that other parties face a much less fragmented core vote like the post-1996 PASOK.
The self-definition of the ideological domain of reference of the term ‘Centre-Left’ as a post-cold war term contains the significant reasons why the cleavage ‘Right-Anti/Right’ is rejected as ‘traditional’ by Simitis and the ‘modernizers’. The first of these reasons lies on the fact that the end of the post-cold war era is exclusively defined by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and is thus internalized by the ideology of political modernization as a self-explained loss of the left or the old socialist ideology and policy. The second reason, which is a result of the first, lies on the fact that this same collapse leaves the ‘Right-Anti/Right’ cleavage without a meaning, and this is because the latter is conceived primarily by the events and the developments of the post-civil war period in Greece, which in turn is defined by the political and ideological expediencies of the Cold War period. Within this framework, the semantic meaning of the second synthetic ‘-left’ is weakened in favour of the first synthetic ‘Centre-’.

This ‘legitimatization deficit’ that characterizes the use of the term ‘Centre-Left’ in the context of modernization ideology becomes more evident, if the use of this term is approached regarding its correlation with the party organization structure. If there existed a ‘traditional’ form of party organization that coincided with the ‘mass-party’ type and which corresponded to the ‘traditional’ heretical cleavage ‘Right-Anti/Right’, then a ‘modern’ type of party corresponds to the modern political cleavage of ‘Centre Left-Centre Right’, which tends to coincide with the types of the ‘network-party’ or the ‘cartel-party’\(^9\) model. This equivalence implies two different forms of mobilization of the social forces. In this way, the mobilization of social forces for the ‘mass-party’ within the party organization is intense and dense. In spite of the oligarchic structure in which this massive participation\(^10\) is being finally crystallized, the operation of the mass-party requires the active participation of the citizens/party members in the political life. The cleavage ‘Right-Anti / Right’ and its cognate form of the mass-party type shows the need for the continuous mobilization of the party base, but also for the presence of such a type of party organization which would have primary functions to educate and appoint political executives, who would have initially been tested as party executives.

On the contrary, the party form of organization coinciding that of the party-network, is of a horizontal organization form without a broad party base. The latter is mobilized occasionally and only in a ceremonial manner (party conventions, pre-election manifestations). Allocated executives or organizations outside the party mechanism here perform the ceremonies that were organized and the roles played by the party basis in the case of the mass-party type. The latter is limited to top executives, while its relation with the citizens/voters are mediated by opinion poll companies, advertising offices, spin doctors and mass media. The participation of the citizens in the organization of the party is no longer required for the choice of political executives, as the latter are selected from a network, which is reachable for all the range of the party’s potential. The disregard to the ‘Right – Anti / Right’ cleavage as ‘traditional’ and its following distancing from the organizational form of the mass-party type, was attempted by the ideology of political modernization through the criticism that political modernization exerted on populism as a practice lacking clarity and defined targets and bypassing the institutions in the name of the people. However, even in this case, the exerted criticism was consumed in the forms rather than the essence of populism.
Finally, under the prism of the time distance that has been covered, popular radicalism which characterized PASOK from approximately the middle 1970s until the end of the 1980s was a distorted recognition of political rights, which had been limited with respect to their power by the governments of the ‘Right’ until that time. The limit and the truth in popular radicalism lies on the absence of mobilization of the social forces that had interests involved in the democratic modernization of the political system. On the other hand, the priorities inside PASOK’s ideology of political modernization seem to have been reversed, despite the fact that the political result is identical. So, even though the primary target is the modernization of the political system, this attempt shows that there is need of not only the mobilization of these social forces that would gain from the democratic modernization, but also of all the social forces, in general. This remains one of the basic elements that require substantiation and further interpretation that exceeds the limits of this paper.

PASOK can be described as an interesting paradigm one can use in order to assess Greece’s political culture and party system change. Ideological transformations and alternations can be identified in its socio-political profile, being a party of many faces from classical ‘centrist’ to classical ‘social democratic’ and so on. Populist components can be found in its historical past [(i.e the oversimplification of the domestic social ground, ‘the people’ against the ‘oligarchy’, the defensive nationalism the ‘people’ and the ‘nation’ threatened by ‘foreign’ powers the demagoguery, the all-powerful ‘plebiscite’ leadership of Andreas Papandreou around which the organization and electoral supply of the party was built (Moschonas, 1999)]. At the same time PASOK was a modern party that contributed significantly to the institutional and cultural modernization of Greece. (Moschonas, 1999).

IN CONCLUSION

PASOK’s political discourse has reinvented and flourished with euphemisms many times if one studies its history. One apparent example is the phrase ‘socialism with human face’ that contributed to its affiliation with the social strata. In the version of socialism, the ‘human face’ referred to the faith of PASOK of the 1980s, to the political pluralism of parliamentary democracy and the personal freedoms that were connected to it. In the case of modernization, the ‘human face’ was used as a declaration for the social sensitivity of the government for the effects that the stabilization policy (EMU) may have on the poor classes of the population.

Another element, which differentiates the ‘modernized’ PASOK from the one of the past, is the area of its social (base) reference. The concept of ‘the people’ as a subject for history is lost or re-invented too. The ‘nation’ now takes the place of the ‘people’. An elucidating example of the new ideology is the characterization of the policy regarding the accession to the EMU, as a national policy. Taking into account this perspective, the mutual recessions and the social compromises are considered as conditions for the salvage of the nation, rather than the people. Of course, we should note that the meaning of ‘the people’ has no clearer social substance than the one of ‘the nation’. However, it is unquestionable that the social segregations were self-obvious in the ‘old’ PASOK, which identified itself with only one part of the people, namely the non-privileged one. In the ‘modernizers’ political rhetoric such social divisions and references are rare. An additional element that characterizes PASOK today is its internal organizational reform. The aim of this attempt is the breaking of the old party structure, which was orientated towards the state power and its benefits.
This structure was organized in such a way that the easy communication between the party and the government power was guaranteed; this structure was responsible for the nepotism phenomena of the 1980s that were heavy criticized by the new party leadership (Simitis).

According to the ‘modernizers’ within PASOK, the modernization of the country requires the reform of the party itself and its transition into a ‘new’ modern party. The ‘modernization period’ proved a turning point in PASOK’s course; it marks a shift from the socialist-populist period to one characterized by the pragmatism, a managerial discourse and a technocratic approach all packed in a project for the modernization, rationalization and Europeanization of the Greek society and economy (Lyrintzis, 2005). The PASOK governments under Simitis, accomplished the main task which was the stabilization of the economy according to Maastricht criteria and the entry of the country in the European Monetary System. This effort was successful as also was the next target concerning Cyprus’ entry in the EU (Lyrintzis, 2005). But in contrast ‘modernization’ project was in fact defined in a negative rather than a positive manner. Modernization was opposed to the old populist practices as well as to the conservative block represented by the New Democracy (Nea Democratia) party. On the positive side it was identified with progress and PASOK was presented as the champion of the ‘progressive’ forces in Greek society. However, irrespective of the objections one may have with the evolutionary connotations of ‘modernization’ and its identification with progress, the fact is that it was not translated into concrete policies in major areas of public life. The areas of education and health provide good examples where contested reforms were introduced only to be later modified and partly implemented. (Lyrintzis, 2005).

The electoral result in 2004, the end of PASOK’s ‘reign’ and the electoral victory of New Democracy party (Nea Democratia) signals the start of a new project for further re-definition and modernization of its political ideology under the auspices of its new party leader, George Papandreou, the son of the founder of the movement Andreas Papandreou. The emergence of the idea of ‘associative democracy’ introduced by George Papandreou creates a new typology that is open for analysis and interpretation. Consequently, as Moschonas argues assessing PASOK political ideology, the dominance of radicalism gave way to the ‘national populism’ of the 1980s and the domination of European pragmatisms and modernization after 1993, and primarily in 1996, under Simitis leadership. PASOK has been a party of many faces -often giving the impression of a political chameleon -something that denotes its strong and dynamic identity. (Moschonas, 2002). The constant anxiety and agony in today’s party system in Greece especially in the identity struggle maybe constitutes the need for a new type of party to emerge.
REFERENCES


NOTES

1 One way of defining modernity or modernization is to see it in association with social processes and arrangements that were institutionalized on a large scale in Western Europe after the English Industrial and French Revolutions. These entailed unprecedented social mobilization as the various exiting pre-industrial localisms were weakened or destroyed and the majority of people brought into the more encompassing arenas of the national market and the nation state. The terms modernity and modernization are not used in this paper in the Parsonian, neo-evolutionist sense (i.e not in terms of structural functional differentiation on the way from simple/primitive to complex societies). But rather, they are used as historically oriented sociologists [R. Bendix, B. Moore] or sociologically-orientated historians [E. Hobsbawm] have used them in trying to identify the qualitative differences between industrial and pre-industrial societies. See R. Bendix, Nation building and Citizenship. New York: Action Books, 1970.

2 In this paper political culture is considered to be the complex set of orientations and discourses that actors use while trying to make sense of, to account for, or to legitimize/delegitimize prevailing political arrangements. See Mouzelis N. Sociological theory: What went wrong? Diagnosis and Remedies. London 1995. pp. 50-8.

3 During the initial phases of the period following the political changeover (Metapolitefsi), the demand for modernization was escorted and covered by co-ordinate requests like the one for the joining of the EEC and later, the request for “Allagi- Change”. In the middle of the 1980s and within the framework of the splitting of the KKE Esoterikou (Inland) and the formation of the EAR, the demand for modernization is placed in relation to the pre-election rhetoric of the reformative Left. The question remaining for further investigation is how much the political use of the “modernization demand” played an important role during the democratic consolidation period. See R. Gunther-N. Diamantouros-H.J.Puhle [eds], The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective, John Hopkins Uni. Press, Baltimore, 1995.

“traditional” on the one hand and the “modern” on the other form of political culture that dominates Greece since its formation as an independent state (cultural dualism).


9 A. Georgiadou, “From the party of the entrenched members to the network-party. Aspects of the organizational reform of the political parties in late-modernity”. Science and Society, autumn 2000 - spring 2001, issue 5-6, pp. 203-235, where the relevant bibliography is presented and examined.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

At present, I am concluding my PhD thesis at the University of Athens, Faculty of Law, Department of Political Science and Public Administration and my research topic is concerned with the Institutions and Political Culture in the ’90s in Greece with special reference to PASOK’s modernization process from 1996-2004. I followed my MPhil, MSc and Diploma in Political Sociology and Methods of Social Research at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Before that I did my first degree BA (Hons) on Sociology and Political Studies at the University of London. In 2005 I obtain a fellowship grant (2005-2008) for my PhD as Junior Researcher at the National Centre of Social Research (EKKE /NSCR) under the auspices of the “Reinforcement Programme of Human Research Manpower” (PENED 2003/ 3rd Community Support Programme) with the title “Political Action and Behaviour in the new European framework; elections, political parties and interest groups in modern Greece». During the academic year 2005-2006 I have lectured in the course of “Comparative Politics”- by Prof. Ch. Lyrintzis, in the NKUoA. My research interests focus on Contemporary Greek Politics; Contemporary Greek Public Policy; Economic & Monetary Union; European Union Politics; Cultural Change and Democracy; Global Civil Society; Processes of Europeanization. From 2007 I have obtain a Marshall Memorial Fellowship (European Memorial fellow) from the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Enosis in the Left Discourse: EDA’s Talks in the Greek Parliament

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Abstract

This presentation provides a first interpretation as to what extend the official left political stance differentiates itself from the dominant hegemonic national approach to the Cyprus issue, and more specifically in the rhetoric of Enosis, the Cypriot demand to unite with Greece. EDA’s parliamentary minutes, being the legal representative of the Greek left, will be used as the main archival body to be researched. However, party decisions, programmes, as well as its political organ, the newspaper Avgi and secondary sources will be used supplementary in order to make our arguments stronger.

This paper is offered as work in progress, at an early stage of a PhD, and no strong conclusions are made.
Enosis in the Left Discourse: EDA’s Talks in the Greek Parliament

Introduction

Cyprus became the keystone to Greek politics during the whole post civil-war period. All the parties sloganized and argued in favor of Enosis, the unification of Cyprus with Greece, placing Enosis as an immediate national claim. The Left, which was trying to reinstate itself within the Greek Nation, played a significant role in that respect. For EDA, being the legal representative of the Left, Enosis will take place as soon as the right for self-determination is achieved, because for the Left self-determination was considered as equivalent to Enosis. Therefore, as it will become obvious EDA is using self-determination and Enosis interchangeably. It is our main aim to show EDA’s approach to Enosis as this was depicted inside the Greek Parliament.

EDA (United Democratic Left)

EDA made its first appearance right before the second post civil-war elections. It was established in August 1951 and it presented itself as a coalition of parties and personalities, and right from the start, it was more than a simple electoral coalition. President of EDA was I. Pasalidis, while leader of the parliamentary team was Elias Eliou. Its emblem was Peace – Democracy – Amnesty, three words which were the goals the party was trying to achieve throughout its existence.

After 1956 EDA forms a united party, a decision that was ratified during the 1st Conference of the party. It was formed by three categories of parties and citizens: communists, socialists and left democrats, sharing a common cause, the National Democratic

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1 Jean Meynaud (2002), The Political Forces in Greece, 1946-1965, 2nd edition, Savvalas, Athens, p. 229; The parties and the personalities that merged were: The Socialist Party of Greece (Ioannis Pasalidis), The Democratic Alarm (that took part in the elections of April 1951, Dimitris Mariolis), The Left Liberals (Stamatis Hajibeys and Neoklis Grigoriaides), The Democratic Radical Party (Mihalis Kyrkos), and a few days later, on 5th August, it was announced the joining of a part of The Democratic Left Union (Ioannis Kokorelis and Heracles Papachristos). Kokorelis and Papachristos were representing the Democratic Left Union after the death of the founder of the party, Ioannis Sofianopoulos a few days before the joining with EDA. The record of the party founding was signed in 3/8/1951

2 EDA (1952), EDA Party Program, EDA, Athens

3 EDA (1956), 1st Pan-Hellenic Conference, EDA, Athens
Change. In other words, it was the legal representative of the left movement formed under a “Party coalition of EAM”.

EDA is a party that “functions within the frame of the democratic constitutional legality and parliamentary system”; a party principle which does not refrain from bringing it constantly up. As a party of the “national democratic change” that substitutes its socialist garment with respect to the will of the “majority of the People” and the rigorism to the “democratic methods”, EDA promises the “peaceful” waging of the “united struggle inside and outside the parliament” for the effectiveness of the “Change” which is recapitulated to the “minimum programme” of democratization of the structure of the Greek society.

The President of EDA, I. Passalidis, underlines in a session of the National Cabinet (1st December 1956), that the issue that is imposed by EDA is not a demand of a socialist transformation, but a change in direction which has as its aim the national, anti-imperialist and democratic inspiration. Thus, the political strategy which had to be followed consists of the attempt of the conceptualization of the support on all the national patriotic forces, for the accomplishment of deliverance from foreign dependency. The adaptation of such a tactic indicates that the path to the socialist transformation gets through national independence. EDA’s persistence on the non-socialist transformation of Greek society becomes apparent in later talks too. For example, during the 1st Pan-Hellenic Congress in 1959 Passalidis explicitly states that “... the content of Change that EDA is professing is anti-imperialistic, national and democratic. EDA does not pose a question of change of the social status quo. EDA does not program a Change of socialist character and the layout of our program emphasizes that we are a party of national democratic Change. It suggests however, measures on the economic and political field which will secure its headway according to the will of the majority of the People”.

EDA was the first and only party that during the campaign of the 1952 elections was against NATO, and although a pro-Soviet party it tried to keep equal distance from all the other powers proclaiming constantly the peaceful essence of the party and its neutrality. Thus,

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4 Takis Benas (1995), *A Conference that was Never Made*, Delfini, Athens, pp. 9-11 and 13-21; Manolis Glezos, “15 years of fights of EDA”, *Greek Left*, issue 38, September 1966, p. 15
6 EDA Party Programme, ibid
7 Jean Meynaud, *ibid*, p. 243 For example in the Party program of 1959 and later programmes too
8 Panagiotis Noutsos, *ibid*, p. 61
9 Avgi, 4th December 1956, p.1
10 EDA (1959), *1st Pan-Hellenic Congress*, Athens, EDA, Athens, p. 70
11 EDA (1952) *Programmatic Principles of EDA*, EDA, Athens
the main thesis of EDA can be summarized as follows: full independence to the island of Cyprus, abolition of the London-Zurich agreements, as well as of the various mechanisms which derive from them and unconditional rebuttal to the intervention of NATO for the solution to the problem.

EDA in the Greek Parliament

EDA is represented constantly, since its formation in 1951, in the Greek Parliament, by its leader I. Pasalidis, Ilias Iliou, K. Gavriilidis, L. Kyrkos and others, and it is not an exaggeration to claim that the Left was there to play anew a significant role in Greek politics, as it did in World War II and in the civil-war. As early as in 1951, EDA tried to show that it was as much patriotic as the rest of the parties and in that respect the Cyprus Issue would be the keystone in its politics.

Right from the start, EDA took a clear-cut position in the Greek parliament with K. Gavriilidis and coalesced with the student movement that was starting to be active in the beginning of the 1950s. The internationalization of the Issue was the reason behind the great student demonstrations (22/11/1951) at Propylaia, Athens that were suppressed by the police, and an incident that was discussed at length in the Greek Parliament. The next day, EDA deputy, suggested that, since the Cyprus Issue is a National Issue and it stirs everyone’s emotions, the Parliament should issue a decree in favor of Enosis and present it at meetings, demonstrations etc. however, without being anti-British.\(^{12}\) A few months later, EDA through its Parliamentary team pledged its “full solidarity to the Pan-national demand of enosis” and openly accused the government for not acting nationally to the Cyprus Issue. Moreover, it was the first party that called for immediate enosis to the U.N. with explicit proposals, \(^{13}\) in other words that of self-determination.

\(^{12}\) K Gavriilides (1997), 23 November 1951, vol. 1, Cyprus Issue in the Greek Parliament [hereafter CIGP], p. 33; Gavriilidis finishes his speech stating “This is our opinion, purely national, and no one can raise a point on that no matter how hard one shouts”. His suggestion was refuted by the anaplirwts Foreign Minister Varvoutis who claimed that the government should handle the issue “not with rallies and irresponsible demonstrations, but with diplomatic means”. Varvoutis, CIGP, p. 34; my emphasis

\(^{13}\) The declaration was prepared after the Pan-Athenian demonstrations in favor of enosis and signed by E. Mantakas, B. Efaimidis, Th. Vlamopoulos, G. Simos, L. Brilakas, G. Spiliopoulos, and P. Katerinis. EDA, 14 May 1952, CIGP, p. 36; my emphasis. The same views were expressed during the same session by V. Efaimidis who stated that “the Enosis of Cyprus with Greece bares the moral, the historical rational and the freedom with the sense of the sovereignty of the peoples. […] With special statute of the national Delegation to raise a point of claim from the British government”. V. Efaimidis, CIGP, p. 40; see also the speech of mistrust towards the
After the elections of 1952, where EDA managed to be represented in 62 voting districts (9.55%), it starts the “impressive expansion of EDA”\(^{14}\) with the repetitive and municipal elections of 1953 and 1954 respectively. Moreover, the “expanding” stage of the party coincides with the signing of the Agreement in 1953, between Greece and the U.S. with which the U.S. are authorized to use the Greek soil for their military tasks and the process by which the U.S. started their active intervention to Greek politics. EDA as a party that has among its main goals the independence of Greece from any foreign help went against the agreement issuing a declaration through its Organization Committee in 20.10.1953 which characterized the agreement “a fatal blow to the independence of the country”,\(^{15}\) and proclaimed that new elections should be conducted in order for the people to decide.

EDA’s increasing political influence on the people, and the launch of the EOKA struggle in 1955, made its political leader I. Pasalidis proceed with fierce criticism of the Karamanlis government in the Parliament concerning Cyprus. Specifically, he accused the governmental policies that “lay down the Cyprus Issue to ruin, as they lay down in general to all national interests”.\(^{16}\) He went on to state that the government transformed Cyprus “from an international issue to an issue that concerns Greece, Great Britain, Turkey and NATO”,\(^{17}\) to abandon the demand of self-determination and become loyal to NATO. Therefore, what needs to be done according to EDA is the re-examination of the Greek foreign policy in toto,\(^{18}\) to conclude on another session that “unfortunately, for us [EDA], the government transformed Greece to a non-independent state”.\(^{19}\) Moreover, EDA’s criticism did not limit itself in the Parliament. The Organization Committee of the party demanded the exit from NATO in 10.9.1955: “The events in Cyprus, the brutality of the British imperialism, the ferocity and the threats of the Turkish chauvinists testify to the general policy, that impose also in Greece the accession to NATO. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the immediate disengagement from the obligations that were imposed upon her in absentia of the Greek people”.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{14}\) Ilias Nikolakopoulos (2001), *The Cachectic Democracy*, Patakis, Athens, p. 176 where the author notes that the expansion is conducted through the Thessaloniki, Karditsa, Piraeus, Evros, Drama and Fthiotida districts. In that respect, the Centrist support can not be ignored since it was with their help that EDA managed to be expanded

\(^{15}\) As quoted in Tasos Trikkas, *ibid*, vol. 1, p. 224

\(^{16}\) I. Pasalidis, 5 April 1956, *CIGP*, p. 102

\(^{17}\) *ibid*

\(^{18}\) *ibid*

\(^{19}\) I. Pasalidis, 23 May 1956, *CIGP*, p. 229; On a previous session Pasalidis, with the occasion of not revealing the government “top secret” documents on Cyprus, accused the government for compromise. I. Pasalidis, 25 April 1956, *CIGP*, p. 176

\(^{20}\) O.C., 10/9/1955 as quoted in Trikkas, p. 309
EDA in the beginning of 1957 found fertile ground to accuse openly not only the government but the colonial powers also that “instigated the Turkish brutalities in Nicosia”. The Cyprus issue, Iliou declared once more, is an issue of “national need” and it should unite the whole Nation to the “sacred” cause of the Cypriot self-determination. EDA’s suggestions went in vein and two months later EDA accused the government of operating badly concerning Cyprus. In addition, Pasalidis, accused the government of lying to the Greek people and of compromising to the Cyprus cause, because he transformed Greece into a tributary country, transformed Greece to a slave country and thus, the government cannot decisively help the struggle of the people of Cyprus for self-determination. By the end of 1958, Pasalidis states that the “Cyprus Issue goes through extreme dangers”, not because of the British and U.S. policies, but because of the government that believes that nothing can be done unless these two powers change their policies, and he points out that “this is not the policy of the [Greek] Nation”. And the “policy of the [Greek] Nation” is the liberation of Cyprus through self-determination.

The following year the negotiations between the Greek Foreign Minister Averoff and his Turkish counterpart, Zorlu led to the signing of the London-Zurich Agreement. EDA, which managed to become the leading opposition party in the elections of 1958 obtaining 24,43% of the votes criticized the government policy fiercely both inside the Parliament and outside it through its newspaper Avgi.

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21 I. Iliou (1997), 25 January 1957, vol. 2, CIGP, p. 5; Moreover, he calls for the authorized police force of the UN in Cyprus to become the rallying pole for the whole nation, all the parties and constitute from today onwards the common national policy on the Cyprus issue.

22 The certain misgivings as regards to government policies however, were not introduced to the session to be debated since according to article 78 of the Constitution it needs at least 20 signatures. EDA’s proposal was signed only by 12; 6 March 1957, CIGP, p. 11

23 I. Pasalidis, 11 March 1957, CIGP, p. 30; On another session, he accused both the government as well as the leading opposition party, Papandreou’s Liberals. On the one hand, EDA accused the government for monopolizing the foreign affairs and deliberately does not disclose crucial documents because it owns the majority of the Parliament. On the other hand, openly accuses the Liberals because they falsely think that they can dominate the opposition voices in the Parliament. I. Pasalidis, 24 October 1957, CIGP, p. 154

24 I. Pasalidis, 13 December 1958, CIGP, p. 280

25 In the elections of 1958, EDA managed for the first time in the Greek history to become the leading opposition party. However, EDA was not accepted as a legitimate party within the Parliament, since the Greek political spectrum was still divided among “ethnikofrones” (loyal to the nation), and “communists”. The efforts of the Left party to be included again in the Greek society and prove its patriotism took place also through its newspaper Avgi with a series of articles referring to the national resistance in which the KKE contribution proved more than effective. This does not mean that the Left conduct its political fight based on the past, but the past, especially for the Left, “becomes the main axis of the identity of its party structure”; Eleni Pashaloudi, “Memory and Political Speech”, p. 152 in Alkis Rigos, Serafim I. Seferiadis and Evanthis Chajivasiliou, eds. (2008), The “Short” Decade of the 60s, Kastanioti, Athens

26 For the articles criticizing the Greek government concerning the London-Zurich Agreement, see the news report in Avgi, 13 March 1959 ff.
The government as soon as it returned from abroad signing the London-Zurich Agreement claimed that “all the Greeks of Constantinople and all the Greeks of diaspora” as well as “the Cypriot people, besides the Leftists” sided up with it and acquired further respect because of its policies. 27 Iliou urged to disconfirm Foreign Minister’s claims because they “lacked legitimization. He continued stating that “Cyprus is neither a Republic, nor independent”. 28 The London-Zurich Agreement is “diabolical, it will create dead-ends, obstacles which Greece will come up against” 29 and the constitutional status of Cyprus will be too “complicated” to function.

In addition, EDA deputies seem to adopt the official stereotypical historiographic approach, presenting the Turk as “eternally bad”, and therefore, the consequences of the Agreement on the Greek-Turkish relations will be “tragic”. “Nevertheless”, Iliou continues, “it will not only be on the relations per se, but on the security of the integrity of the independence of Greece also”. 30 However, the fierce criticism and his fighting spirit of the EDA deputy launched upon the government was restricted finally to say that “it is considered [the Agreement] powerless and not-binding the country” 31 and it “may be interrupted but it did not terminate the unalienable demand of self-determination of Cyprus” 32 to be supported a few days later by EDA deputies M. Kyrkos and A. Brillakis. 33

As noted, EDA’s critic was not limited to the Parliamentary talks, but through the publication of a booklet on the Agreement and through its newspaper Avgi. According to the booklet, which analyzes in extent the governmental policies even before the signing of the Agreements, it is stated that “all the oppositional parties condemned this agreement”, but the “fictitious Governmental majority of the Parliament approved them”. 34 In addition, the booklet is quite revealing in many respects.

It is argued that the Agreement, “while, in fact, it prolongs the colonial slavery in Cyprus, it adulterated the pure anti-colonial character of the Cypriot struggle which was confronting the British colonial power”, and therefore, the Issue does not concern only Cyprus and Great Britain anymore. 35 It concerns also the Turkish state, and the return of “Turkey in

27 Averoff-Tositsas, 25 February 1959, vol. 3, CIGP, p. 22-23; the word Constantinople is preferred because it is estimated that this would be the word, instead of that of Istanbul, if the speech was conducted in English
28 I. Iliou, 25 February 1959, CIGP, p. 23
29 ibid, p. 28
30 ibid
31 ibid, p. 36
32 I. Iliou, 18 March 1959, CIGP, p. 153
33 M. Kyrkos, 28 February 1959, CIGP, p. 131 and A. Brillakis, 28 February 1959, CIGP, p. 144 where they claim basically that “the Agreement should not be considered as final”
34 EDA (1959), The Cyprus Issue and the London-Zurich Agreement, Athens, p. 17
35 ibid, p. 18
Cyprus creates a new status full with dangers, both for Cyprus and Greece”. 36 Therefore, EDA claims that the London-Zurich Agreement does not provide a democratic solution to the issue. In the contrary, the self-determination of the Cypriot people is eliminated and the Agreement demonstrates the first victory of the British and the Turks. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that an independent state was born, but signing the Agreement is the actual signing of the partition of the island.

Avgi on its return codifies, as Trikkas rightly observes, the main reasons EDA is against the London-Zurich Agreement: 1) Self-determination is eliminated forever, 2) Independence is fake, and 3) it is not a democracy. The will of the majority will be depended upon the veto of the Ankara organs. 37 While two days later, on another article Iliou claims that “… the capitulators believe that accepting the humiliation they will close up a “disturbing issue”. It is obvious that they are opening an issue much more dangerous than the fixed Turkish blackmails, threats of war and frictions. Thus, it is a national salvation matter in the capitulate spirit of Zurich to go against to the unity of the national powers.” 38

However, EDA continued its criticism on the Karamanlis government for not disclosing the documents concerning the London-Zurich Agreement. According to Pasalidis, the government’s claim that it was in a hurry and therefore, it could not keep records on the Agreement signifies the lies on behalf of the government to the people, because actually, the Karamanlis government was working on behalf of the NATO. Moreover, he argued that “it is customary for a matter to be discussed in the Parliament first, and then the agreements to be signed. In the Cyprus case the reverse happened”. 39

During the 1963-1964 crisis caused mainly by Makarios’ proposals for constitutional amendment, EDA turned its criticisms towards the Centre Union party, led by G. Papandreou who won the elections of 1963. It has to be noted though, that EDA’s criticisms towards the Centre Union were milder, while at the same time they continued accusing ERE of the betrayal of the Cyprus cause.

After November 1963, the general social, political and cultural change allowed EDA to increase the number of its members and to create a lot of organizations that lend the party a mass character. While, at the same time it was argued that the electoral win of the Centre

36 ibid, p. 19; emphasis in the original
37 Avgi, 13 February 1959
38 I. Iliou, “To the Zurichists the Anti-Zurichists”, Avgi, 15 February 1959
39 I. Pasalidis, 22 March 1960, CIGP, p. 159
Union of G. Papandreou, managed to free people, in a way, and express their beliefs more freely than before.\textsuperscript{40}

George Papandreou and his party continued ERE’s policy and belief that a solution will be found within NATO. However, EDA consistent with its beliefs did not share the same views: they believed that the sooner the Greek government understood that, the better for the national interests of Greece. By stopping believing in NATO it would stop the “insolence of the imperialist Turkey”. In addition, deputy Merkouris, addressing to the Greek government and to all the parties of the Parliament stated that “it is time for the myth of the Greek-Turkish friendship to stop”. The Greek-Turkish friendship is a myth because of the “extermination of the Greeks in Constantinople and they [the Turks] conspire against the integrity of Greece”, and because of the 1957 Turkish threats of capturing the islands in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{41} Therefore, the only party that actually believes and shows reluctance and good faith in order for this friendship to work is Greece. The Turkish politics and diplomacy is driven by the Allies, and therefore, potential negotiations concerning the Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus Issue are impossible.\textsuperscript{42}

In 1964, during the period of renegotiating the fate of Cyprus, EDA criticized Papandreou, but at the same time urged him to “talk outright”. Moreover, EDA through its Executive Committee suggested a “national contract” of all the political forces, “full utilization of the support provided by the independent and socialist countries”, and the Greek recourse to the UN.\textsuperscript{43} The extensive anti-American feelings, now common not only in the Left but in the Right and Centre circles also, made the whole society turn to a more neutral, and perhaps to a Soviet friendly approach. EDA warned and suggested Papandreou not to confuse “a nationalist vision with the aspirations of the imperialist powers”.\textsuperscript{44} Besides, what the U.S. really wishes through its NATO alliance is to transform the island into a base for nuclear testing.\textsuperscript{45}


\textsuperscript{41} Sp. Merkouris, 31 March 1964, \textit{CIGP}, p. 171

\textsuperscript{42} I. Iliou, 24 April 1964, \textit{CIGP}, p. 200

\textsuperscript{43} As quoted in Evanthis Hatzivasilioú, “The Cyprus Issue, Summer 1964: Internal Options of the National Issues”, p. 316 in Alkis Rigos, \textit{ibid}

\textsuperscript{44} Ioannis Stefanidis, “Irredentism in the 1960s”, p. 293 in \textit{ibid}; see also for fuller account on irredentism and Greek political culture \textit{ibidem} (2007), \textit{Stirring the Greek Nation}, Ashgate, London

\textsuperscript{45} I. Iliou, 25 November 1964, \textit{CIGP}, p. 258
Conclusion

The post civil war period transformed Greek society and its requirements in such a way that there was yet another chasm between external demands and domestic needs. In this framework the Left, through EDA, looks “condemned” to continuously negotiate this contradiction.

The Greek nation (as it has been pointed out)\(^\text{46} \) is not identified with the Greek people because of reverberations of the “ethnikofrosyni” (loyal to the nation/national way of thinking). The hegemony of “ethnikofrosyni” was a result of the Greek civil war reality, clearly influenced by other countries’ experience, especially the USA, which was going through a “red scare” period. Moreover, “ethnikofrosyni” dictated a commitment to “national ideals” and continuous alert against the internal enemy, communism. Besides, its formation took place in order to counter the EAM coalition during the civil-war. However, during the Cold war, the hegemonic ideology continued uninterruptedly and became more intense. Additionally, we must note that it was institutionalized as well, by discriminating the citizens between the “ethnikofrones” and “non-ethnikofrones” (loyal and non-loyal ones).

Nevertheless, the Left did not manage to distance itself from this framework and disengage from the “ethnikofrosyni’s” consequences, which in a way feed semantically and practically the Left approach towards the Right, without eliminating the opposite.

Thus, we can detect in the speeches of EDA members of the Parliament, elements that could be argued to be of non-Left ideology. However the framework in which EDA was created justifies, or rather, explains the adoption of such a national stance first and foremost, and not an internationalist one, especially in relation to the Cyprus issue. One notable difference is that as far as the Cyprus issue is concerned its rhetoric is influenced by the island’s self-determination, which has a double character. On the one hand, EDA remains persistent and consistent with its left character and its initial programmatic principles and may actually be the only party that managed to do that, it denounces the London-Zurich agreements, as well as any kind of dependence from external factors, whether these are a country or an organization, which rightly are considered as an imperialism tool. On the other hand, anti-national, non-patriotic compromise politics are attacked. Moreover, EDA uses politically and takes advantage of the non-consistent politics of any government, placing itself as the only party that acts patrioically, and not anti-nationally as it had been accused during

the Civil War. Consequently this attack creates a unique opportunity for the legalization of EDA and the Left, legal or illegal. References to the glorious Greek civilization, and the geostrategic importance of Cyprus as well as the “insolence of Turkish Governments”, the reproduction of the “terrible Turk” imagery, from the Left and the Right alike, shows the struggle of all parties to appropriate ideologically the unification of the “Great National Whole”. In other words the Cyprus issue is a battlefield for popular dominance.
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When politicians talk. Political discourse and party change.

Abstract: Is it possible to offer a rich 'ideational' account of party transformation? Traditional political science has long been dominated by structuralist approaches that tend to exclude this possibility. Thus many analysts have sought to address this theoretical lacuna by producing 'ideational' theories that stress the decisive role of ideas in the study of party change. Engaging in a critical discussion of this recent literature, this paper will claim that as far as the 'ideational' goes these approaches fall far off the mark. It will also be our claim that 'modernist' constructivism also fails as the ground of such an ideational approach. Thus we will suggest that it is only in post-structuralist discourse theory that one can find the appropriate theoretical apparatus with which to build a truly 'ideational' approach towards the study of party change.

There is a line of argument dominant in mainstream political analysis that seeks to explain party change, or more accurately changes in the ideological and programmatic profiles of parties, by focusing on the wider socio-economic processes that are supposed to shape the environments within which parties operate. This kind of reasoning can, for example, be inferred from Ronald Inglehart’s classic ‘post-materialism’ thesis. According to the formulation of the theory, the citizens of western societies have come to be increasingly more preoccupied with less material goals (like improving the quality of the environment, increasing citizens’ participation in governing their communities) as they have reached levels of affluence that enabled them to satisfy their more immediate needs (such as survival). These changes do not only produce insurmountable obstacles for the dominant political organizations of the post-war era (giving thus strength to alternative post-material political parties, exemplified by the rise of the Green parties) but are also expected to lead to a transformation of the political arena whereby the post-materialist values would become the dominant ones in the electoral struggle. Obviously the predictions of the theory have been disproved by subsequent developments in the western industrialised societies. The cultural shift may to an extent have taken place, but the old dominant parties are still going on and politics is very much dominated by traditional ‘survival’ issues.

Of course, Inglehart’s argument has not been the only one to postulate a structural reasoning while attempting, explicitly or implicitly, to explain changes in the ideological set-ups of political parties. For Marxists or neo-Marxists, for example, the key factors that explain the ideological shifts of political parties in general and social-democratic ones in particular have been the changes in the economic sphere (production) and the consequent shrinking of the traditional working class. As affluent western nations have gone through a process of relevant de-industrialization (associated also with post-Fordism and other new patterns of production), the traditional electoral base of mass social democratic parties has shrunk. Thus, the parties of the left have had to make adjustments in their ideological profiles in order to reach out to new social strata whose economic interests do not coincide with those of the traditional working class. The catch in this process has been the need to balance these differing interests in one coherent ideological profile so as to achieve maximum electoral effectiveness. This balancing act

has had various outcomes depending on the historical circumstances of each party’s environment\(^2\).

For yet others the forces behind this process of ideological mutation have been the developments in the international economy. As interdependence and globalizing trends grew, so did the need for social democrats to adjust their ideologico-programmatic proposals in order to effectively address the new challenges. In an era of great capital mobility, globalization and European integration – marked by the replacement of the Keynesian compromise by neo-liberal supply policies after the economic crises of the 70s – the parties of the left cannot but follow these wider trends and reformulate their ideological goals and their programmatic commitments accordingly\(^3\). It is very interesting to note here that this line of reasoning has been adopted by most of the social democratic leaders who during the 90s led their parties towards such ideological and programmatic reconfigurations. Emblematic of course has been the case of Tony Blair and of New Labour, however much of his argumentation has been used previously by social democratic leaders like Felipe Gonzalez in Spain or A. Guterres of the Portuguese Socialist Party and K. Simitis of PASOK\(^4\).

Common to all these approaches, and of others that embark on a purely structural explanation, is their problematic conception of human agency; if not their complete disregard for it. Political transformation follows axiomatically from changed environments and human agency does not figure into this schema. More or less the actions of everyday political actors (may be party elites or the members participating in the political process) are inconsequential. Both the theoretical stipulations of this approach but also (and one could say more significantly) its moral implications regarding the effectiveness of everyday political praxis are disturbing. Furthermore such explanations have problems explaining variance in outcomes, a trend that has been constantly proved by developments that do not conform to the predictions made by the theories\(^5\).

This kind of lacuna and its implications for our everyday understanding of politics has led a series of scholars especially in the 80s and the 90s to challenge the theoretical grounds upon which such approaches were based and to seek to factor into their analysis a more dynamic understanding of the role of political actors. Thus this new approach was based on an understanding of political organizations as independent variables


\(^4\) This goes against comments made by authors like Gillespie who argue that the PSOE did not make any significant ideological contributions to social democracy. See Richard Gillespie ‘Programma 2000: The appearance and reality of socialist renewal in Spain’ in Richard Gillespie and William Paterson eds, *Rethinking Social Democracy in Western Europe*, (London, Franck Cass, 1993) pp. 78-97.

\(^5\) For example the more radical but successful strategy of the French and Greek Socialists in 1981 and the far more moderate but emphatically unsuccessful strategy of their West German counterparts at around that time.
actively shaping their environments as well as dependent variables being influenced by it. Hence parties do not just respond passively to external stimuli but they also consciously set out to shape their environments after they have perceived the challenges. Crucial to this reasoning is evidently the notion of perception. According to this model the wider structural processes set the limits and the challenges that parties face, but this does not prefigure the way they will respond. There is no direct link between the external environment and the responses of the political organizations. It is the way that political parties perceive their surrounding environment and the challenges it poses that will finally guide their responses to it. Thus it is perception that leads to ideologico-programmatic reconfigurations and hence different perceptions can lead to very different outcomes. What this approach also entails is a rediscovery of the active praxis of humans. Since it is political actors inside parties that do the perceiving, these approaches signal a return to the examination of the different ideas that these people have. Thus both people and their ideas matter when explaining political transformations.

Before moving on to a critical examination of what is involved in this new approach towards party transformation, we need to address another structural variable that has come to be seen by many as crucial when explaining the ideological mutations of parties, namely the party's organizational structure. Analysts started using this variable in order to address variances in outcomes, that is party changes, that did not fit well with the general socio-structural trends of the times. Thus according to this approach certain organizational structures prohibit or enable certain paths. Different parties, depending on the circumstances during their foundation have different internal structures. Usually parties of the left, especially social democratic parties but also communist ones are associated with a mass membership, a well developed bureaucracy that limits the prerogatives of the leaders and contributes to the making of programmatic commitments and with extensive ties to ancillary organizations (especially unions). On the other hand parties of greater ideological moderation usually exhibit a larger organizational flexibility and greater power centralization on the hands of the leadership. Thus according to many analysts, parties that show greater structural flexibility respond faster to the challenges of their environments (external stimuli) and adopt ideologico-programmatic profiles that guarantee greater electoral efficiency. This is usually associated with the ideological moderation of left-wing parties with more flexible structures (like the Spanish PSOE), that through successful mutations managed to capture the political centre, or the median voter (however why is it that some times moderation leads to electoral success but at other times not, is an issue that is not adequately addressed). The ideological reconfigurations are then deemed to be either 'good' and rational or something to be regretted according to the ideological preferences of the analysts – many of which assume that the party could have stayed the course and altered the preferences of the voters; something which however is also not further pursued by the theorists.

However the problems with such an approach are evident. Human agency is still lacking and the analysts have now two structures (one external and one internal) instead of a simple external one, that provide the explanation. Furthermore the theory has great

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trouble explaining changes in traditional social democratic mass parties like the Swedish SAP and others like it. Although one may suggest that these parties managed to overcome their organizational barriers and finally met the environmental challenges of their times (adoption of a more liberal programmatic profile in the 80s and early 90s), reality however shows that it was exactly after they enacted these changes that these parties showed greater electoral difficulties.

Electoral Performances (legislative elections) of Western European social democratic parties (averages)\(^8\).

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Structures, internal and external, the ideological actor and their combination.

The rise of institutionalism\(^9\), led many theorists to focus on the role of ideas in policy making in a series of fields, from political economy to foreign policy\(^10\). Around the same time a series of scholars in the field of International Relations wished to move beyond traditional analyses’ emphasis on structuralism or on rational choice and methodological individualism and sought to provide a theoretical approach that argued for the constructed nature of both the individual and her interests, thus leading to the rise of

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constructivism as a distinct ideational approach. Constructivist approaches, or in any case ideational ones, have ever since been in the forefront of political analysis being employed in an expanding number of areas like the Europeanization of national policy making or the construction of Europe itself.

Coming back to political parties, a series of scholars have attempted to provide a convincing account of party change that incorporates in a complex way a) the environmental challenges that parties face (socio-economic and/or institutional, electoral changes), b) their internal structural configurations and c) the role of political actors (usually leaders) and their perceptions. Usually the goal of such approaches has been to cast doubt on the explanatory power of the external structures and to place change inside the party mainly by making use of the role of political actors and their ideas and/or organizational structure.

Kitschelt’s ambitious book begins by criticising Marxist or neo-Marxist explanations of voter preferences. Instead he offers a very interesting alternative model of preference formation removed from a strict economic reductionism. He then goes on to analyse the changing environment that social democratic parties have had to face since the 70s. According to him in this new environment political preferences do not polarise between a distributionist, socialist left and a pro free-market right. Rather the deep socio-economic changes of modern capitalism have brought about a shift in preferences in a way that radical socialist solutions do not draw considerable support and on the other hand pro-market sentiments are embraced by a larger proportion of the voters.

Furthermore Kitschelt argues parties have also now to compete on another dimension which divides the people between those who embrace libertarian values and those who have authoritarian inclinations. Thus parties now have to compete on two different dimensions, the traditional left-right one and the libertarian-authoritarian one. New left-libertarian parties and right-authoritarian have thus good chances of succeeding because of this change in preferences. Kitschelt then goes on to argue that it is structural flexibility that mediates between the changing environment and attempts at meeting the new challenges. Organizationally ‘entrenched’ parties (like the mass social democratic parties described above) had trouble responding to challenges and therefore lost support.


13 Herbert Kitschelt The Transformation of European Social Democracy, (NY, Cambridge University Press, 1994a)

14 For a brief exposition ibid. 15-20

15 Ibid. 20-23.

16 Ibid. 20, 30-37
during the 80s (his main examples are the Swedish SAP and the Austrian SPO). However, he does not stop there but proceeds to add an ideational variable to his argument. Thus he argues, the ability of social democratic parties to opt for certain paths was: ‘limited by the ideological alternatives that had become part of each party’s political history of internal and external debate long before the strategic challenges of the 1970s and 1980s emerged’.

Nevertheless Kitschelt’s tentative turn to ideas is not at all convincing. First of all in his study it is the organizational structure that does most of the explaining (exemplified in his study of the Austrian and Swedish Social Democrats). The ideas, or rather the perceptions of the political actors only come in to explain variation in some cases. As such they are only a mediating factor. Secondly, the electoral landscape is so much fixed according to the two dimensions he elaborates that any other strategy than the one followed by his success cases (the Spanish PSOE being a good example) would pretty much amount to a long but stable political suicide. This is because voters in Kitschelt’s model have very determined interests and preferences which spring from their different market, occupational and consumer experiences in the new circumstances of modern capitalism. Party leaders or political actors may be influenced by ‘entrenched’ ideas that do not correspond to the new challenges, but voters are not. On the contrary they seem to develop their interests in correspondence to their new experiences. Political actors seem to be ideological but voters much less so, one wonders why that is. Of course Kitschelt is not a constructivist and interests in his approach are fixed exogenously, so he cannot be accused of not problematizing them. However he does add an ideational variable, thus making an ideational argument (granted a very timid one), which nevertheless ultimately fails. Kitschelt’s theory is very much a prisoner of the weaknesses of old approaches. His argument remains resolutely a structural one.

Another approach that shares many similarities with that of Kitschelt in its attempt to combine external and internal structures with the conscious agency of political actors (in this case leaders) is made by Wilson. This argument is interesting in the sense that the author makes an explicit claim to identify the processes of party transformation in the conscious, manipulative actions of the party leaders and as such provides for a much less structural argument than the one made by Kitschelt. As the author notes:

Despite pressure from socioeconomic change, institutional reforms and altered terms of party competition political parties do not respond with change unless their leaders order them to do so. Before parties respond to such incentives for reform, party leaders acting within their parties must perceive the changes in the political environment, recognize their significance for their parties and succeed in implementing party reform. If the leaders do not perceive the changes, if they perceive them incorrectly or if they decide that the changes are temporary, party transformation is not likely to occur no matter how badly it is needed. And when the need to change is acknowledged, the party leaders must be able to overcome the inertia and internal resistance of party bureaucrats and activists who may prefer the vielle maison to a mode modern but less familiar, renovated party.

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18 Kitschelt ibid. op. cit.: 256.
20 ibid: 275
The author accepts wider socio-economic changes (the crisis of the Keynesian compromise, the shrinking of the traditional working class and the growth of the tertiary sector) and deeper changes in political attitudes (the rise of post materialism, the rise of issue voting by well informed voters, the fall of the significance of class), but argues these do not prefigure party change. Institutional changes are equally not able to determine party changes and it is only changes in party competition (new tactics, shifts in voting balances, rise and fall of rival parties) that exert some pressure towards adaptation. But as mentioned above change rests ultimately with the leaders and their perception of the environmental challenges and the competitive situation. However again this approach is marred by a series of inconsistencies and weaknesses. If the author accepts, as he seems to be doing, that the socio-economic and cultural-political changes have an impact on the voters’ political preferences (and one can assume on their interests) then what explains the fascination of the French electorate with the radical strategy and political message of the Socialist Party? (This ‘Marxist delirium in which most of the world’s woes were blamed on imperialist exploitation, multinational enterprises and capitalist contradictions'). And how was it possible that the same party won with a rather different profile only a few years later. The author seems to imply that rather talented leaders, like Mitterrand, responded first to the challenges of party competition (undercutting communist support) and then to the challenges of the economy and of post materialism (by turning the party to policies of austerity). Failed leaders like the traditionalist socialist faction that controlled the British Labour party at the beginning of the 80s apparently did not manage to respond to any challenges. However the question remains how was it possible that the French PS came to power with a radical agenda? It would seem that the voters after all do not have such fixed preferences. Furthermore even though the author might be making a good point when highlighting the importance of talented leaders in shaping their parties successful directions, this on its own does not say much. To say that parties did well because they had good leaders is almost vacuous. One has to show how these leaders where able to affect these changes, that is one needs a theory of the relationship between the leaders, their ideas and their environment.

A more explicitly ideational approach to the study of political parties is the one offered by Berman. Although in her book she does not explicitly address the issue of party change, she does however offer a fully developed theoretical understanding of the relationship between ideas, political actors and their environment from which one can make certain assumptions regarding its application to party ideologico-programmatic change.

21 ibid: 265-270.
22 ibid. 270-275.
24 Somewhere between Kitschelt and Wilson are Harmel and Janda, who stress the importance of both internal (leadership change, factional change) and external (shocks relevant to a party’s primary goal) factors. Crucial for them seems also to be perception, namely whether actors perceive environmental changes as challenging the party’s primary goal. However their emphasis is on the catalytic role of the external shock. (See Harmel and Janda op. cit.).
26 See for example the author’s tentative attempt to explain the changes in the SAP and the SPD in the late 70s and early 80s, in Sheri Berman ‘The Life of the Party’, Comparative Politics, vol. 30, no. 1, (1997), pp. 101-123.
According to Berman:

*Developing an ideational theory requires two things: first showing that a particular idea can be considered an independent variable and second describing the mechanisms through which it influences the dependent variable. Once such a theory has been elaborated the ideational theorist must then develop a methodology for studying the role played by ideas in shaping political behaviour*. 27

Thus crucial to Berman is the need to show that ideas can function as independent variables and thus influence political behaviour. This entails showing how: ‘certain ideas are able to become and remain a powerful force in politics. It involves looking at how different conditions enable certain ideas to attain political salience and take on a life of their own, influencing political behaviour over an extended period – becoming in short independent variables’. 28 For the author ideas can also be dependent variables, and indeed other factors (material ones) can at some point lead to their development. But this does not matter, for as long as we can establish that ideas can ‘take on a life of their own’ separate from the context within which they arose, then we can show that they operate as independent variables in the system we examine. 29 The author identifies this process of ‘taking on a life of their own’ with the institutionalization of the ideas. 30 Thus, in the domain of party politics once ideas become institutionalised in party organisations and also in identities and self-understandings of leaders, activists and followers then they exert a causal influence across time.

After this has been achieved:

*We must examine how ideas influence political behaviour. This involves looking at the mechanisms by which ideas shape the motivations and choices of political actors driving the decision making process down one path rather than another*. 31

This involves two things. The first has to do with the actors’ motivations and the second with the environment or to be more precise with how the environmental factors influence the choices of political actors. 32 With regard to the first question the author argues that in ideational explanations (like hers) it is ideas which determine the goals towards which the actors strive. Therefore, she notes a crucial assertion of ideational analyses is that preferences are endogenous. According to March and Olsen ‘action is often based more on identifying the normatively appropriate behaviour than on calculating the return expected from alternative choices’. 33 Interests in ideational analyses, admits the author are neither given nor can they be inferred from the economic environment. They evolve out of the ideas the actors have. 34

Regarding the second issue, Berman argues that ideas play a crucial role in shaping how political actors perceive the world around them. Therefore, a second crucial proposition of her theory is that reality and actors’ perceptions of it are not synonymous. The social world is too complex and/or ambiguous to be dealt with directly, actors have to rely to

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27 Sheri Berman *The Social Democratic Moment* op. cit.: 24.
28 ibid: 24.
29 ibid: 18
30 ibid: 27
31 Ibid: 25.
33 James March and Johan Olsen op. cit: 20.
34 Sheri Berman *The Social Democratic Moment* op. cit.: 30.
‘cognitive shortcuts’ to make sense of it. According to author therefore political behaviour will often be influenced by incomplete or distorted information flows\textsuperscript{35}.

Thus according to the model actors’ behaviour will seek correspondence to ideas that they have, which also means that actors will make similar choices (striving for correspondence or appropriateness) even as environments change. Furthermore actors with different ideas will interpret environments differently and will engage in different courses of action\textsuperscript{36}.

Finally the author makes another attempt to analytical ‘clarity’ by discarding ‘fuzzy’ ideologies which explain ‘everything and nothing’ in favour of ‘programmatic beliefs’ which she finds to be neither too broad nor too narrow. On the contrary programmatic beliefs should be able to tell us what to expect from political actors and help us to establish causality\textsuperscript{37}.

Crucial to Berman is the ability to study ‘scientifically’ the social, to follow ‘proper social scientific procedures’\textsuperscript{38}. By scientifically she means employing a positivist epistemology in which we can provide clear cause and effect explanations of the phenomena being studied, ‘ideational theories… require a theory of causality\textsuperscript{39}. In other words explanation equals causal inference\textsuperscript{40}.

There are many problems with Berman’s approach. First of all one feels from the statements that she makes that ontologically she sees a sharp distinction between matter and ideas. Subjects for her have both material interests which they pursue at some points and ideational or normative goals that they also pursue at other points. So she writes ‘Ideational explanations… argue that rather than always maximizing income, the behaviour of political actors will often be motivated by an attempt to achieve the particular ends posited as paramount by the ideas they hold: the policy preferences of political actors will in other words be shaped primarily by the normative guidelines and criteria provided by their ideas’\textsuperscript{41}. From this one understands that subjects have both economic interests and ideational ones and they pursue them at different times. Berman’s point is that actors all things being equal will be mostly preoccupied with following the logic of ‘appropriateness’, that is with engaging in action that is consistent with their beliefs. However this casts considerable doubt on her ideational approach. Despite her claim to locate explanatory primacy in the ideational, this can only hold when the constraints of the environment are not so strong. Hence her claim that we should be able to study ideas better in times of uncertainty and crisis, when external constraints are weak. When external constraints are strong any idea of ideational primacy loses all sense. From this follows that indeed one can easily argue that ideational theorists have failed to appreciate adequately the degree of pressure posed by the external environment\textsuperscript{42}.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid: 30-31.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid: 33.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid: 21-22.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid: 19.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid: 15.
\textsuperscript{41} Sheri Berman \textit{The Social Democratic Moment} op. cit.: 30.
Furthermore her vision of change in the ideological profiles of parties, as presented in her book\(^43\) is somewhat underdeveloped. To act as independent variables Berman tells us, ideas have to become institutionalised in organizations. However the author also informs us that to become institutionalised these ideas need to gain salience, namely to win over other ideas so that we have an ideational (one could say paradigmatic) shift. The question then becomes how do ideas gain salience or in other words how do we have change in ideas. In her book the author argues that ideas gain salience when political entrepreneurs or 'carriers' inside parties promote them. ‘The greater the status of the carrier, the greater the chance that the idea will attain political importance’\(^44\). In the same way the lengthier and the more successful the career of the carrier the more likely it is that his vision will be embraced by others\(^45\).

However, here Berman seems to have in mind the formative moments of a political party and not so much periods where changes happen to ‘mature’ political organizations. That explains why her understanding of what gives salience to ideas (or what makes some ideas win over others) is so narrow and it includes only the action of significant carriers, whereas in fact changes in parties happen often against significant carriers, in short time spans and are promoted by individuals that have less access to channels of patronage than significant others. Having realised these deficiencies Berman in a review article\(^46\) attempts to address the problem by making the ‘rise in salience’ dependent on three things: a) significant carriers, b) the similarity of the new ideas to those of the party (fit of ideas) and c) the power of ideas to explain crises better than other ideas\(^47\).

However, these are all terribly problematic. First of all she seems to accept the argument, at least partially, that certain ideas correspond better to certain objective conditions and thus are better equipped to survive. Ideas prevail because they are better at explaining and providing solutions to problems than other ideas. Of course according to this argument the power of ideas stems out of its correspondence to the objective reality which makes one wonder whether it was not that same objective reality that in a sense ‘demanded’ these ideas in the first place, thus making completely redundant the whole ‘ideational’ enterprise. Secondly the notion of the fit of ideas as has been noted by other authors is very problematic\(^48\). Fitness of ideas can be constructed, and indeed it almost inevitably always is through processes of articulation\(^49\). Furthermore if one accepts the proposition that it is the fit of ideas that facilitates changes in identities then this essentially means that parties with ideologies that are more open to new ideas will change. Those that have ideologies not open to new ideas will not change\(^50\). Aside from a commonsensical element of truth included in this proposition, the problem remains that even parties that seem not open to change do change in ways that are deemed by many inside them or outside them to be drastic or even as violating traditional identities.

\(^{43}\) Sheri Berman *The Social Democratic Moment* op. cit.  
\(^{44}\) Ibid: 25.  
\(^{45}\) Ibid: 25.  
\(^{47}\) Ibid: 233-237.  
\(^{50}\) See for example the comments she makes regarding the changes in ideological profiles of the SAP and SPD in the late 70s, in Sheri Berman ‘The Life of the Party’ op. cit.: 112.
There are some other hazy areas in Berman’s argument. Significantly despite the fact that she explicitly wishes to cast her ideational approach in terms of independent and dependent variables she makes a series of comments which give weight to a more constructivist view of subjects. Characteristically she makes the claim that: ‘In addition to becoming institutionalised in the organizational structures of European Social Democratic parties, ideas also became embedded in these parties’ self-understanding and identity’. And again ‘unlike political economy approaches (and rational choice analyses in general) ideational explanations do not merely posit or assume interests but instead investigate how they develop. Ideational analysts argue that interests are neither given nor can they be inferred from the (economic) environment; instead they evolve out of the ideas and beliefs held by actors themselves’. In the notes to the text she concedes that also ‘economic’ interests can be constructed by ideas. For ideational theories she says preferences are endogenous. According to the logic of these comments the material only acquires its meaning through its constitution by ideas. Thus there is no sense in talking about the material interests as opposed to ideas. The first are constituted by the latter.

Nevertheless, what is crucial for the author is that explanation in social theory only takes the form of causal relations. However, this doesn’t sit well with what she has previously mentioned. If ideas constitute identities and thus the preferences of agents (leading to actions according to the logic of appropriateness) then we cannot talk about causal relations but about constitutive ones. However, the status of these relations in her schema remains unclear. Do these relations explain? If not what is their role in the framework of such ideational approaches? What is more, if they don’t even explain as relations that allow the constitution of certain preferences or predispositions, then these preferences must have a different source (probably material). What seems to be the case is that the author is not able to overcome the ontological distinction between the economic on the one hand and the logic of appropriateness on the other. It seems to us that she still believes that agents are mainly driven by their material/economic interests and that only in some cases do they follow certain normative rules (not related to a strictly cost-benefit behaviour).

Of course ‘modernist’ or ‘thin’ constructivists like Alexander Wendt, in their attempt to find a via media between rationalism/individualism and radical constructivism/post modernism, have argued that ideas have both constitutive and causal effects and that significantly both constitutive theories – that study the first – and causal ones – that study the second – explain (albeit in different ways). For Wendt ideas sometimes have constitutive effects and thus lead to construction of the properties of agents. And at other times they have causal effects and thus lead to action or to a process of identity transformation (transition). It is crucial, Wendt argues, to note that the first case requires theories that study stasis and the second one requires an examination of change.

In Wendt’s own words:

51 Sheri Berman *The social democratic moment* op. cit.: 28.
52 Ibid.: 30.
53 Ibid.: 238.
55 Alexander Wendt *Social Theory of International Politics* op. cit. p. 86.
Cummins refers to causal theories as transition theories. In order to explain transition it is necessary that the factors to which we appeal be independent of and temporally prior to the transitions themselves. Constitutive theories account for the properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist. Cummins calls such theories ‘property’ theories… property theories are static. When dispositions, made possible by properties, are actualized then we are in the domain of causal rather than constitutive theories since we are dealing with transitions, changes of state, rather than properties.

However, as Steve Smith has observed Wendt is actually making use of constitutive theorizing only as a prior condition or as an adjunct to causal theorizing. On its own it cannot account for, or in Wendt’s terminology, explain much. It needs to be tied in with causal theory in order to lead towards ‘real’ explanation (namely transition and not stasis). Furthermore, equally necessary for Wendt is the need to see identities as circumscribed, bounded objects. If identities (made possible/constituted by ideas) are to cause action (implied in the causal nature of transition theories) then they have to be unified and closed thus different from their effect – being an antecedent condition to it. For Wendt ideas may be constituting agents with properties and interests (identities) but that is only the beginning and as such of no great significance. It is only a study of stasis. What is really significant is action and transformation and that requires taking identity for granted. What is more it probably requires sideling it altogether. Change is more important but that is only seen in causal terms. However according to post-structuralist theory changes in identities or social kinds cannot be accounted for in causal terms. And that is because identity is not a bounded, closed category. The constitution of agents does not provide them with immutable, everlasting properties but with malleable ones that are always flexible. Change in identity depends on new discursive articulations of the identity and as such it defies causal explanations and it can also be seen as contradicting previously dominant identities. As Zehfuss argues contra Wendt:

'[I]dentities as they are defined in discourse fail to be logically bounded entities. They are continuously articulated, rearticulated and contested, which makes them hard to pin down as explanatory categories. The stories we tell about ourselves are… not necessarily coherent. If identity is to cause anything however it must be an antecedent condition for a subsequent effect and as such distinguishable from that which it is causing… [This] makes necessary the identity of identity.'

Identities however for a Derridaean theorist do not exist apart from articulation; they have no clear boundaries and fail to be logically coherent.

**Political Discourse and Party Change.**

The issues raised above mean that in order to develop a truly ideational account of changes in party ideologies/identities we need to move beyond traditional ‘variables talk’ or the ‘modernist’ constructivist attempts made by authors like Wendt. Identity in our proposed schema will be seen as a discursive phenomenon that arises out of different...

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56 Alexander Wendt ‘On constitution and causation in International Relations’ op. cit., p. 105.
57 Ibid. p. 111.
59 Ibid.: 157
60 For a related post-Wittgensteinian criticism that revolves around the debate of whether ideas can be causes see Smith ‘Wendt’s World’, op. cit. pp. 158-160.
62 Ibid.: 338.
63 Ibid.: 338.
hegemonic articulations and which dissolves as soon as these articulations are replaced by
others. Identity in this schema is seen as decentred, flexible and open ended. Borrowing
heavily from the work of prominent post-structural discourse theorists, especially
Laclau, I will attempt to utilise their analytical tools in order to build an ‘ideational’
account of programmatic party change (as exemplified by the case of the PSOE).

Post-structuralist theory is based on Saussure’s linguistics and especially on his insistence
on the arbitrary and differential character of the sign. For Saussure each sign is defined in
relation to other signs. Thus, what determines the meaning of a word is the place of the
word in the linguistic system within which it is opposed to other signs. For example the
meaning of the word red can be grasped only to its opposition to ‘not-red’, ‘pink’,
‘orange’, ‘green’ etc. In the same way in politics the meaning of ‘socialist’ can only be
grasped in opposition to ‘liberal’, ‘communist’, ‘conservative’, ‘nationalist’ etc. According
to the structural linguistics of Saussure this system of oppositions, determines the
boundaries of the concept signified and gives it its meaning. The meaning of any word is
constituted by its network of relationships to other words in the system. Thus for
structuralists what is fundamental is a binary opposition between what is inside and what
is outside the definition of a term.

Post-structuralists however draw out the implications inherent in Saussure’s linguistics.
For example for Derrida:

The first consequence to be drawn from this view (Saussure’s account of linguistic meaning) is that the
signified is never present in and of itself in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially
and lawfully every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to
other concepts by means of the systematic play of differences.

Thus, for post-structuralists it is wrong to believe in the idea of a final, definitive and
clear-cut meaning for any word. Robert Wicks points out that for Derrida every word
carries a richness of meaning that is virtually inexhaustible. Furthermore Derrida moves
on to deconstruct the binary hierarchies that are found in the work of structuralists and
which post-structuralists consider as a constant feature of Western thought. Derrida
argues that Western thinking is organised around a binary opposition between a
privileged inside and an excluded and inferior outside. He then goes on to show:

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64 See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, (London, Verso Press,
1985).
65 See Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy op. cit, Ernesto Laclau On
Populist Reason, (London,, Verso, 2005), Chantal Mouffe The Return of the Political, (London, Verso,
op. cit , David Howarth Discourse, (Buckingham, Open University Press, 2000), Aletta Norval ‘The
Torfing and David Howarth eds., Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, policy and
governance (NY, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
68 Robert Wicks Modern French Philosophy, op. cit.: 200.

That the outside is not only posing a corruptive and ruinous threat to the inside but is actually required for the definition of the inside. The inside is marked by a constitutive lack that the outside helps to fill. The outside is therefore just as necessary as the inside.\textsuperscript{70}

Thus it is only through a certain ethico-political decision that a stable hierarchy between the two poles can be fixed\textsuperscript{71}. Only this decision is able to privilege some options over others, some meanings and identities over others. As Howarth and Torfing note what is brought out by Derrida's deconstruction of structural reasoning is the absence of an essence that would act as a centre for the whole system of signification; a centre that fixes all the identities of the system, an underlying essence that can explain the identities of subjects and objects\textsuperscript{72}. The social identities and meanings are eternally shaped and reshaped according to the different discursive articulations. What is important to note here is that discourse theory does not claim that there is never any fixity of meaning and thus of any social identity (an accusation that is often laid against proponents of post-modernism or post-structuralism), but (as we will see) that meaning is always transient and fixed around certain ‘artificial’ centres (what is termed nodal points) that establish specific hierarchies which are in their turn denaturalized and replaced by other discursive articulations build around different nodal points.

Discourse here is broadly defined as a relational system of signification. ‘By discourse I do not mean something that is essentially restricted to the areas of speech and writing but any complex of elements in which relations play the constitutive role. This means that elements do not pre-exist the relational complex but are constituted through it\textsuperscript{73}; whence it is obvious that discourse does not have to do only with language, or with a text, but is coterminous with the social\textsuperscript{74}.

In a more concrete level it refers to

\begin{itemize}
\item An ensemble of cognitive schemes, conceptual articulations, rhetorical strategies, pictures and images, symbolic actions (rituals), and structures (architectures)… All these things should be analysed both in terms of their ability to shape and reshape meaning and in terms of their ultimate failure to provide a homogenous space of representation\textsuperscript{75}.
\end{itemize}

Discourse is the ‘field of objectivity’, that is to say it is within discourse (within a system of relations) that meaning and identity is born. That is true of language as much as it is true for any signifying element. ‘An action is what it is only through its differences from other possible actions and from other signifying elements – words or actions – which can be successive or simultaneous\textsuperscript{76}. This however, the production of meaning and identity in a discourse, is achieved through what Laclau calls a combination of the logics of difference and equivalence. All elements in a discourse are differential (a la Saussure) but in order for there to be a totalizing closure in the system of differences there has to exist a frontier between what is inside the system and what lies outside of it – what is excluded from it\textsuperscript{77}. This frontier however, the boundary, provides all the differential elements

\textsuperscript{70} Jacob Torfing and David Howarth op. cit: 11.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. 12.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. 13.
\textsuperscript{73} Ernesto Laclau \textit{On Populist Reason}, op. cit. 68.
\textsuperscript{74} Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe \textit{Hegemony and Socialist Strategy} op. cit.
\textsuperscript{75} David Howarth and Jacob Torfing op. cit: 14.
\textsuperscript{76} Ernesto Laclau \textit{On Populist Reason} op. cit: 68.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid: 70.
inside the system with an equivalential quality. These elements are equivalent to each other vis-à-vis what is excluded. Now these two logics are in constant tension with each other. The one always tries to subvert the other, but they are equally reflected in one another. ‘All identity is constructed within this tension between the differential and the equivalential logics’.

However this means that in the place of the totality (the whole) we find only this tension between these two logics. So Laclau concludes that what we have is a failed totality, the place of a fullness that cannot be found.

This totality is an object which is both impossible and necessary. Impossible because the tension between equivalence and difference is ultimately insurmountable; necessary because without some kind of closure, however precarious it might be there would be no signification and no identity.

This impossible object, that is the totality, however needs to be represented. And discourse theorists claim that this is only achieved through the extension of one of the differential elements (a particular difference) that now assumes the representation of this totality. ’In that way its body is split between the particularity which it still is and the more universal signification of which it is the bearer’. It is exactly this operation, of the differential particularity that achieves the status of a universal signification which Laclau calls ‘hegemony’.

And given that this embodied totality or universality is as we have seen an impossible object, the hegemonic identity becomes something of the order of an ‘empty signifier’, its own particularity embodying an unachievable fullness. With this it should be clear that the category of totality cannot be eradicated but that as a failed totality, it is a horizon and not a ground.

So discourse is build in and through hegemonic struggles that aim ultimately to produce a moral-intellectual leadership in the social sphere, namely to offer a credible scenario with which to read past and present developments and to direct action towards the future. Such successful articulations become hegemonic by gaining the wider acceptance of the citizenry. These discursive articulations in the political realm take the form of ideologies, which (in this schema) are articulations that deny the contingent and open ended character of meaning and identity. Stability in discourse is provided by nodal points that take the shape of ‘empty signifiers’. Namely particular differences that no longer signify a specific signified but are so stretched so as to acquire the function of universal signification, representing the totality and thus coalescing around them in an equivalential logic other particular differences. That means that constitutive of discourse (of the combination of the two different logics and thus of the political in general) is social antagonism, namely the division of the social sphere in antagonising camps.

Now Laclau accepts the possibility that an empty signifier may be completely lacking in any programmatic substance (completely detached from their initial signified) but

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78 Ibid: 70.
79 Ibid: 70.
80 Ibid: 70.
81 Ibid: 70.
82 Ibid: 70.
83 Ibid: 71.
84 David Howarth and Jacob Torfing op. cit: 15.
however I believe that this can only be an ideal type which one does not meet in reality. There must always be at least a minimum of programmatic substance in an 'empty signifier' for it to have any power of attraction – a feature which however ultimately erodes the hegemonic project itself by the friction that is created between this programmatic content (however hard to define and contradictory it might be) and the particular differences. Furthermore what the combination of the two logics and by extension of that of social antagonism implies is that all political projects involve both difference and equivalence. For Laclau an overextension of the logic of equivalence, to the point of dividing the social realm in two opposed forces is what he calls populism. What is involved in populism is that a certain difference, a particularity will attempt to present itself as the people vis-à-vis the enemy. On the other hand, the logic of difference implies no social antagonism and in its pure form it is the opposite of populism. This is the institutionalist discourse in which all differences in the community are accepted as equal. However even though there might be for a time a period when the logic of difference prevails (in a highly institutionalised social order) and thus all social demands are treated and satisfied singularly (thus there being no social antagonism) this will eventually lead to processes of articulation.

Thus, Laclau concludes, and we have to agree, that populism (creating a ‘people’, namely combining difference and equivalence and dividing the social in order to construct identities) is always entailed in the political. However, it is obvious that certain discourses, political projects slide towards the logic of difference (for example social democratic or social liberal discourses) while other slide more towards the pole of populism.

Furthermore, according to discourse theorists hegemonic discourses are finite and thus become dislocated when confronted by new events that they cannot explain, represent or in any case domesticate. This process leads to their replacement by other hegemonic projects via a process of articulating differently elements of previous discourses – hence the ‘floating’ nature of the signifier.

Finally, what follows for Laclau from all these is the emergence of the subject as a split subject, namely as one that seeks to redress the effects of a dislocation by seeking to identify with a new discursive articulation. Thus, for discourse theorists the dislocation of discursive structures means that the subject cannot achieve a full identity, hence leading the subject to seek identification with a new project in order to address the trauma that is caused by the lack of identity. For Laclau the subject is internal to the structure but it has neither a complete structural identity nor a complete lack of structural identity.

86 Ibid: 78, 82.
87 Ibid: 82.
88 Ibid: 78.
90 Howarth et al., op. cit.
92 Howarth et al. op. cit.: 14.
**Conclusion**

Political identities are constituted and change via political hegemonies, namely via the fixation of meaning around certain nodal points that take the form of empty signifiers. The identities of political organizations are hence discursively constructed by active political agents that attempt to redress the effects of hegemonic dislocations by offering new moral visions (re-articulation of discursive elements) to the public. The political public also seeks to identify with these new political projects/identities in order to find solace from the trauma caused by the dislocation of the previous identity. Of course not all changes are hegemonic ones and not all changes lead to drastic re-articulations of the discursive field. Many times ideological changes of political organizations involve adjustments that fall within the wider paradigmatic confines of a hegemonic discourse. The last major hegemonic change evidently took place at the beginning of the 80s with the domination of neo-liberal economic ideas, which later lead to the reconfiguration of the identity of social democratic parties (around the empty signifiers of modernization, globalization and individualism). It is up to the analyst to disentangle and bring to the fore the elements that are at play when discursive re-articulations lead to new hegemonies.