THE DYNAMICS OF LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS IN GREECE: THE CASE OF EQUAL AND LEADER COMMUNITY INITIATIVES OF THE DEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF HERAKLION.

DESPOINA GRIGORIADOU

PhD candidate

De Montfort University, Research Center of Local Governance

Abstract

The focus of my research is the formation and development of local partnerships. My object of analysis is local partnerships in Greece established by the EU Community Initiatives Programs EQUAL and LEADER. The selected case study is in the region of Crete (Greece) and it comprises of one EQUAL and one LEADER partnership scheme. Both partnerships are coordinated by the Development Agency of Heraklion.

 The study examines the causal relations between institutional context and individuals' behavior during partnership formation and development. The research has three aims: to analyze the formal and informal rules governing partnerships, to look into power relations among partners and to explore the role of the leader. Finally to demonstrate the impact of selected contextual factors such as social capital, political institutional framework, patterns of previous partnerships and Europeanisation on partnerships

The theoretical background of this research is based on neo-institutionalist approaches, especially those that recognize the role played by individuals in institutional performance and change. The study is also enriched by theories of social capital and political culture, those of urban political leadership and of Europeanization. Furthermore, it draws useful insights from the particular literature on urban partnerships and especially those studies that focus on concepts of power and leadership. Finally, it aims to adapt the above theories to the specific social and political environment of Greece by reference to the Greek political science literature, especially studies that analyse intergovernmental relations, urban politics (particularly recent changes), and civic organisation and culture.

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Introduction

The focus of my research is the formation and development of local partnerships. Therefore, I am more interested on the processes of partnership forging and working rather than the measurement of partnership outcomes. My object of analysis is local partnerships in Greece established by the EU Community Initiatives Programs EQUAL and LEADER. The selected case study is in the region of Crete (Greece) and it comprises of one EQUAL and one LEADER partnership scheme. Both partnerships are coordinated by the Development Agency of Heraklion (Heraklion is the capital of the region of Crete).

The study examines the causal relations between institutional context and individuals' behavior during partnership formation and development. The research has three aims:

1. To analyze the formal and informal rules governing partnerships: besides the formal institutional rules that we could usually recognize in the constitutional papers of partnerships, there are some unwritten rules like norms and attitudes. Despite their informal character, these rules are usually more powerful than the formal ones. Consequently, their recognition offers fruitful insides in the study of partners relations.

2. To look into power relations among partners and to explore the role of the leader: partners bring different resources as well as different needs and demands. These resources and priorities define the different degrees of power to partnerships. Furthermore, in recent years, local leaders have increasingly called to play the role of entrepreneurs in local governance. Thus, when analyzing a particular partnership, once has to calculate the range and balance of power among partners and the leadership role.

3. To demonstrate the impact of selected contextual factors such as social capital, political institutional framework, patterns of previous partnerships and Europeanisation on partnerships: Even though the interplay among partnership institutional rules, partners position and leaders behavior is significant for the partnership development, we have also to take also into account the larger context in which the three aforementioned factors are emerged. Furthermore, I have limited the study of the larger context mainly to those factors that influence the attitudes of partners towards collective action.

I. Theoretical developments

The argument set out in this section briefly reviews the theoretical background of the research.

I.1 Theoretical developments and research questions

The literature review of my research is based on two main assumptions:

- The combined analysis of the structural features of a partnership with the behavior's dynamics of the individuals involved is important. It is argued that a number of institutional and structural circumstances set limits to behavior and define what is considered appropriate and possible to do. On the other hand, an actor could choose to use/not use the whole space of action offered by the institutions and the structures or alter the established institutional rules and structural limitations (March & Olsen 1989).
- The second assumption emphasizes the dynamic process of policy making and the coexistence of forces of continuity and change (Lowndes 2005). Partnerships as well as the context in which they emerge are not a unified rigid object of analysis stuck on time; they evolve and their evolution stems from the interaction of the inertia status and the innovation dynamics between structures and individuals.

Consequently, local partnerships are multi facet dynamic institutions which need the analytical tools of different theoretical approaches in the discipline of political sciences and sociology.

I.1.a. Neo institutional theory

The theoretical background of this research is based on neo-institutionalist approaches, especially those that recognize the role played by individuals in institutional performance and change (March & Olsen 1989). The new institutionalism offers a new perspective in the study of political sciences because it starts from the assumption that political life itself and its institutional organisation are not simple mirrors of the social reality; they in contrast, shape the political bahavior. "Without denying the importance of both the social context of politics and the motives of individual actors" (March and Olsen, 1989, pp 17) the new institutionalism treats the political institutions as agents that construct and change the polity.

In political sciences, two approaches of the new institutionalism are dominant: that of the sociological tradition and that of the rational choice tradition. The first tradition is influenced by the seminal work of March and Olsen as well as of new sociological institutionalists like Putnam and Granovetter and radical sociologists like Giddens. The second tradition is influenced by the work of Elinor Ostron and of economist new institutionalists like Douglass North and Keneth Arrow. The main differences are focused in the definition of institutions, in the formation of preferences and at the level of interaction between individuals and institutions (see more in Peters 1999). Despite the differences between these two competitive theoretical approaches of the new institutionalism, there are some similarities: the first is the emphasis on institutions.

Individuals and groups pursue their interests in a context that is collectively constrained. One significant form of constraints, among others, is institution. As a result, institutions become a dominant explanation factor of political behavior. Secondly, institutions create greater regularity in individual behaviour than without them. Regulation comprises of constrains as well as desires, preferences and motives. Regulation offers the value of having predictable behaviour which supports trust and commitment between individuals and lead to collective action. The third similarity is the recognition of the need to understand the interaction of individual and institution for the explanation of institutional outcomes. Finally, institutions have historical roots and their rules embody and impact different power relations (Goodin 1996, Peters 1999).

In the current research, I have adopted a more sociological approach of new institutionalism due to its premises regarding the normative context of the institutions (values, symbols, ideas) and the central role assigned to the individuals to shape and change these values. However, I have borrowed inputs from rational choice, in particular the role assigned to the strategic behaviour of actors in pursuing their interests. Additionally, I have made use of its methodological tools such as the Ostrom model (Ostrom 1986) which allows for the mapping of the rules in an institutional context.

The neo institutional theory review has led me to the following reflections on my research on partnerships:

- The partnerships institutions demand the adoption of new managerial tools and values which are led by the private sector. This process has weakened the authority of elected members towards private sectors experts and chief executives (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). Nevertheless, these changes have raised questions about the legitimacy and accountability of the formal partnership bodies. On the other hand, it is the role of managers rather than elected politicians in the front line of communication with citizens and the use of innovative managerial attitude that affect citizens' perception of accessibility and responsiveness. Evidence from research suggests that the "public value management" principles ruled on governing manager's behaviour enhance citizens' participation. In contrast, traditional bureaucratic practices discourage citizens' engagement (Lowndes et al 2006).
- Apart from the formal arrangements that structure the partnerships relations, the identification of informal rules inside the partnerships is very significant for the understanding of the partnerships members' enactment in their roles. These informal rules could take the form of practices, conventions and customs. Furthermore, the distinction between rules in use and rules in form (Ostrom 1999) could offer more insights in the understanding of which rules in reality are used for the regulation of the behaviour. For example, competition and internal procedures in political parties as well as styles of political leadership (reforming versus traditional) are very crucial factors for the deeper understanding of political outcomes. Furthermore, another factor is the style of civic leaders. They could reinforce the degree of co-ordination among civil society bodies and open channels of communication with local government decision makers (Lowndes et al 2006).

- Partnership is a dynamic process dominated by different modes of governance in the different stages of its evolution. Furthermore, it is possible to identify different trajectories of change and continuity of partnerships' working.
- It is rather important to acknowledge that the ways of doing things in partnerships is not only the result of its organisation rules; but also of its embeddedness and contestation to the wider institutional context of the locality. Two important factors, one deriving from the political context and one from the wider social environment are the political culture and social capital respectively.
- There is a degree of path dependency process of partnerships but it is important to study how the actors shape new institutional rules, particularly in cases where the institutional borrowing could lead to rapid changes. In the case of "learning from others", there still remain some open questions: will the new institutional repertoires have the same results as the originals given that: a. only the later is supported by a collective action which had transformed their congruence in institutional rules b. the pre-existing social capital and the ideas prevailing in the society could not support the logic of appropriate behaviour of the new institutional rules? Under these circumstances, the new institutional practise could lead to unexpected results such as stop and go cycles, short lived political coalitions and members' apathy. This process is getting more aggravating keeping in mind that elements of culture on which rely institutions are not "only time consuming to consolidate, but equally time consuming to abolish" (Offe 1996, pp218).
- The capture of the informal rules as well as the cultural and mental infrastructure of the environment in which partnerships are developed require a qualitative research i.e a more in depth analysis of case studies instead of large scale surveys (Ostrom 1999). Evidence of this requirement could be found in the research of the impact of rules in use in the local political participation in British local government (Lowndes et al 2006). This research argued that large scale national surveys investigations of participation could not capture the impact of rules in use. By contrast, the in depth studies of distinctive local contexts offer a more fruitful inside on the institutional design of participation.
- The identification of some desirable institutional criteria could support my effort to analyse the existent institutional settings of partnerships and ask the question: in which level do the partnerships follow these criteria? According to Goodin (1996), the two main criteria of institutional design are revisability and robustness. Institutions must evolve during time adopting innovative ways of doing things on the one hand and institutions must be stable in order not to be easily destroyed by changes initiated by individuals or the socio-economic context. For example, the implementation of institutions that are imposed by national and supra national governments could confront problems due to the resistance by local actors and its lack of correspondence to local circumstances. To this set of criteria, another one could be supplement; this of variability (Goodin, 1996, Lowndes & Wilson 2007).

The institutional design could take into account that one institutional paradigm could not fit to all the circumstances. In this context, each institution must offer a repertoire of a variety of combined rules in order to be better embedded in the local environment. Another criterion is the sensibility to motivational complexity of the individuals. The institutions must offer a space for alternative manoeuvres to individuals offering them the potential to pursue their motives. Finally, the publicity principle is important. Institutions should be accountable and legitimated to the public; that is a precondition for the embracement of people by these institutions. Lowndes and Wilson (2007, pp 230) went further on adding a new criteria, that of values clarity. They argued that publicity requires a clear recording of the values being promoted by the new institutions.

I.1.b. Social capital and political culture theories

My literature review is also enriched by theories of social capital (Putman 1993) and political culture (Almond & Verba 1989). One main contribution of these theories which support my understanding of the relations inside partnerships is that changes in political culture and in political system do not always follow the same speed and direction. It could be due to congruence or incongruence between political system and political culture. This is particularly important in cases where the institutional context is changing rapidly and the political culture is remaining stable.

Political culture and social capital are different things but they have aspects in common. They both emphasize the role of beliefs and values as explanatory variables of specific behavior patterns. Political culture refers to "the political orientations-attitudes toward the political system and its various parts and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system" (Almond and Verba 1989, pp 12). Otherwise, political culture connects political attitudes with political behavior (Bockmeyer 2000, pp 2419). Beliefs, knowledge, feelings, opinions and judgments of citizens towards the political system influence and reinforce the political understanding and their behavior. Regarding social capital, it "refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions" (Putman 1993, pp167). Or, social capital connects norms of trust and reciprocity as well as social networking with capacity of collective action. Thus, "social capital can be understood as a resource of collective action" (Stone, 2001, pp4).

In my research, I defined which aspects of political culture and social capital facilitate or constrain local partnership processes in regards to collective action and institutional change.

One main concept of social capital and political culture is trust. Trust is a fundamental element necessary to produce joint political action and to forge civic co-operation in general. Trust is defined by "a set of expectations held by one party that another party or parties will behave in an appropriate manner with regard to specific issue" (Farrell & Knight 2003, pp541). Consequently, the absence of trust is accompanied by the expectation of dishonest and uncooperative behavior (Bockmeyer 2000, pp 2421). We could distinguish 3 types of trust: the particularized trust, the generalized trust and the civic trust (Stone 2001, pp25-30). The particularized or family trust refers to established

relations and social networks (family, neighborhood). The generalized trust, which is captured in Putmans' account, derives from the experience of actor in their social networks and refers to those with whom the actor does not have previous experience. The civic trust, which is related to political culture, refers to basic trust in the formal institutions of governance regarding fairness of rules, official procedures, allocation of resources, e.t.c. In partnerships, the focus is on the last two types of trust for two reasons. Firstly, partnership promotes the process of bridging and linking social capital. Representatives from different groups and of different social position (hierarchical relations) who do not know each other develop relations trying to "get ahead". Secondly, in this research, urban partnerships involve political actors, usually the local government and representatives from the state, mainly the coordinating Ministry. Their main goal is the local development and the social cohesion of the local society. Consequently, urban partnerships belong to the political sphere. As a result, the level of the members' civic trust is a main factor for the success of the partnership.

The second common aspect of social capital and political culture is the civic engagement. Putman distinguishes between formal and informal networks. Informal networks refer to relations between family, friends, relatives and neighbors while formal networks refer to social relations in the social and political space. The second one, the relations developed in the political space is the common ground between political culture and social capital.

The norms of reciprocity as well as trust refer to the quality of the social networks. It is an important concept for the study of partnerships because reciprocity refers to the assurance that the obligations of the exchange will be kept by all the participants. Reciprocity is "the exchange within a social relationship whereby 'goods and services' given by one party are repaid to that party by the party who received the original 'goods and services' " (Stone 2001, pp30).

Finally, some aspects of political culture like political competence, feeling towards the governance/ politics and partisanship could support my research goal to explain the interaction between the institutional rules and the actors' behavior inside the partnership.

Furthermore, the literature review draws upon useful insights from the existing literature on urban leadership and Europeanisation.

I.1. c. Leadership theories

Potential leaders in partnership could be those who represent the major sectors (public, private and civil), those that hold a formal position (chairman) and those that have a reputation of leader from the members of the partnership. Additionally to the horizontal identification of leaders, in partnerships that are established by EU funds and their initiation is mediated by the central government, leadership roles could also be attributed to higher levels of governance, to EU project managers and to central state executive managers.

Moreover, I have to keep in mind that leaders could be different in different stages of the partnership development. For example, in the partnership initiation, central state agencies could have a lead role whereas in the establishment of partnership the leadership role could be in the mayor's hands.

The literature on leadership suggests that both leaders and context matters. On one hand, a number of theories support that leadership is shaped by and responds to the context within which leadership is exercised. Called situational leadership or contingent leadership, this approach focuses on economic, political, institutional and cultural forces that shape leadership behavior (Elgie 1995, Hersey 1984 cited in Hambleton 2005). As Judd (2000, pp959) argued "urban leaders have the ability to make choices, but within the parameters imposed both by local political arrangements and by external forces."

On the other hand, leaders can make a difference due to their personal and behavioral characteristics. Personal qualities like vision, charisma, energy, commitment as well as attitudes like sharing power and empowering followers are associated with the enactment of the leaders' role (Burns 1978 cited in Hambeton 2005). As a result, leadership refers to the institutionalization of the role of leaders as well as the personal enactment of that role. Focusing on leadership environment and behavioral styles in the policy-making process enables me to avoid separated and isolated approaches that would not take into account the structural or the intentional complementariness of leadership.

In order to classify the leadership environment and behavior, the leadership literature uses the terms "leadership types" and "styles". By *leadership types*, we refer to the way the position of leaders is institutionalized in the context of a city and the broader political system; by *leadership styles* we refer to the enactment of leadership roles by those actors who are holders of a leadership position. However, a single style of leadership is not always successful in any place at any time. Leaders may demonstrate different leadership styles across different arenas (party and local government systems, partnerships) or at different moments in time.

In my effort to create a framework of analysis of leadership in partnerships, I have to make it adaptable to all the potential types of leaders (political, business, community leaders, executives, e.t.c). I have identified three main contextual factors that constrain/ enhance the leadership behaviour: the political and socio-economic environment of the city, the institutional context of the partnership and the relation of the leaders with fellows/supporters. The personal characteristics and values that shape the behaviour of the leaders constitute the forth influential factor of leadership.

Leadership in partnership is the result of the interaction between leadership types and styles. Although institutions matter because they provide individuals with a relatively stable framework of understanding of what has to be done, individuals occupying leadership positions interpret this framework differently and shape the specific features of leadership in each context. In other words: their behaviour makes a difference in the exercise of power. What I have just described is next illustrated by Figure 1.

Fig.1 Factors influencing partnership leadership

1. Political and socio economic environment

In this category, the vertical political structures and the urban institutional context of the city are the main subjects of analysis. The vertical political structures refer to formal and informal national and regional rules that shape the power, identity and context in which local leaders exercise their power. The local-central government relations and the level of autonomy of local government, the national political culture and the organization of interests in relation to their impact in their organization at local level constitute significant factors for the understanding of local leaders behaviour. Urban governance refers to the local institutional environment, i.e. the relation of the urban political leader to the council and to the municipal administration, the relationship maintained by the political leaders to a wider range of external bodies, (whether from the public, private or voluntary sector) in order to exercise responsiveness towards local issues, the structure and organization of business, the organisation of the civil society, the local political culture, e.t.c .

2. Institutional context of partnership

The partnership context and the stage of its development impact leader's behaviour. When I refer to the institution of partnership, I adopt a neo-institutionalist approach that treats institutions like a set of formal and informal rules. I will not only focus on the legal powers of the leadership office holder, the financial resource management and the organisational framework within which leaders have to work but to norms and conventions that are prescribed in leadership office. For example, one rule that is not written in legal documents of partnership is the collaborative context of partnership. Skelcher et al (1996) suggested that network participants may be enthusiasts, activists,

pragmatists or opponents and these attitudes towards network participation offer different support to leadership. Furthermore, some political cultures accept more authoritarian leadership than others and this difference may have implications for who becomes a successful leader. Other important factors are the level of institutionalisation of the partnership, the conditions under which it has been emerged and the complexity of the policy (Sweeting et al 2004). For example, in cases where previously partnerships have been rare or non-existent, the promotion of working together and the coordination of agenda are the main tasks of leader.

3. Relations with followers/supporters

This factor refers to the relationship that political leaders have with political parties. It accounts for the extent to which leadership depends on the leader's party and the local-national dimension within parties. There are hierarchical and less hierarchical parties and each category gives to leaders more of less freedom of manoeuvre. Furthermore, in the local party systems, the leader behaviour is influenced by the relations of parties, whether there is a competitive or a multi level party system, and it depends on whether one party is in power over a long or a short period (John & Cole 2000).

Additionally, the transactions of community leaders and business leaders with their constituencies and the success to win support and trust for their participation in partnership could either secure their power or constrain their ability to develop leadership tasks.

If the partnership depends highly on the institutional context in which leaders operate, the leaders' style can account less than what it does in cases where the partnership is more autonomous from its constitutional contexts. Starting from the assumption that leadership style is mediated by the context within which leaders operate, a research study in EU on partnership leadership (Sweeting et al 2004) distinguished 4 models of leadership:

- *Designed and focused leadership*: the leader is constrained at the margins by formal partnership or other collaborative arrangements. The influence of personal style is very strong in the partnership and in the followers.
- *Pivotal and integrative leadership*: leader style counts for less because partnership working is quite dependent on the external policy environment and the arrangements are complicated and bureaucratic. Leaders struggle to achieve consensus in a situation of multi organisational bargaining.
- *Invisible, implicit, fragmented*: There is a vacuum in leadership due to the complexity of partnership
- *Formative and emergent leadership*: Leadership is driven by the exigencies of implementation rather than strategic direction. Even if partnership is less dependent on the external environment, leaders get on with the job building networks and trust and forging the relationship with followers for the delivery of action.

4. Leadership style

The existing literature on the role of leadership in partnerships stresses a particular character on leadership behaviour that of a facilitator. "Leadership in collaborative

arrangements differs from leadership within single organizations given the need to develop an integrative capacity" (Stewart 2005, pp 157). This means that leadership has to discover diverse views and strives to build consensus among multiple actors. According to Hambleton (2005), three indicators are significant for good local leadership in a governance context: a. the development of listening and learning skills b. the recognition of the legitimacy of different viewpoints c. the adoption of a transformation rather transactional approach. Transplanting these indicators in the partnership process, good leadership should: a. discover and listen the different views of the partners, b. empower the neglected voices, particularly those derived from the community sector because there is evidence of their marginalization from partnership interests c. c1. Have a vision and commitment c.2 create opportunities for others to exercise power. Thus, leaders can have contradictory roles: on the one hand, generating collaboration, inclusiveness and consensus, and on the other hand exercising strategic policy by a powerful manipulation of diverse interests.

Building on the idea of the leader that mobilises collaborative advantage, Stewart (2001) saw a number of possible (non-exclusive) leadership styles that could be adopted in a partnership:

- Champion: taking forward the goals of the partnership
- Salesperson : keen to sell the partnership and its achievements to others in order to generate more resources, support, partners
- Interpreter : moving between networks to carry the message of one set of interests to another
- Broker: again moving between networks but in the capacity of negotiator, bringing together resources, putting together packages or multi-organisations projects
- Coordinator: mediating, bringing together, ensuring information is shared
- Visionary: forcing the partnership to think long term
- Representative: reflecting the feelings and wishes of particular interests and ensuring that their voice is heard in the debates of partnership.

I.1. d. Europeanisation theories

Europeanization studies have revealed that considerable variations on partnerships' implementation and governance structures have emerged from the EU regional policy in member states and that they have led to the rise of new alternatives approaches to Europeanization process based upon meso level analysis, i.e. those of new institutionalism (mainly historical and sociological institutionalism) as well as of network approaches (Marshall 2002, Bache & Marshall 2004). According to these theories, increasing attention has been paid to the ways in which European integration affects the domestic political and social processes of the member states. These studies refer to a more top down perspective in which EU is an independent variable.

The concept of "goodness of fit'' between the Europeanization process of policy-making, on the one hand, and the domestic (national, regional, local) institutional settings, rules and practices, on the other, has been developed and tested empirically in order to identify

the different adaptational pressures that domestic institutions and policy structures are expected to face in order to comply with European rules and practices (Cowles, Green, Risse 2001; Borzel 2001). According to this argument, there must be some degree of misfit between European level processes, policies and institutions on the one hand and domestic level processes policies and institutions on the other, for expecting domestic changes in response to Europeanization. The degree of fit or misfit defines the level of adaptational pressures. The lower the compatibility between European and domestic processes, the higher the adaptational pressure.

In my study, I focus on the extent that partnership form has adopted the composition and practices implicit in the EU model of partnership (Bache 2000). My aim is to understand the dynamics between those domestic practices, values and policies that are changing by the EU requirements (these changes will not have occurred without EU impact) and those that prevent them. More specifically, the influence of EU programs has had a fundamental role especially in countries without previous tradition in cooperative modes of policy making. In this case, local partnerships adjusted to EU imposed programmes and priorities (Geddes 2000) without being fully equipped on skills and capacities to enter to such collaborations. As a result, the degree and the ways adopted for the introduction of EU changes in urban partnerships has varied in each member state due to a number of factors such as the substantially different centre-periphery relations, the established constellation of urban power and the dominant political attitudes and beliefs. For example, the idea of cooperative governance supported by partnerships, community participation, e.t.c has challenged national statist policy-making practices and confrontational political culture.

In the analysis of the EU impact on partnerships, I will follow the scheme by Green Cowles et al (2001) adapted in urban politics and I will examine in each stage the research issues raised in the theoretical part. The following questions may support the investigation of these research issues:

- In which way are the requirements of EU programmes met in the selected partnership?
- To what extent has there been a Europeanization of partnerships forms by a. a reorientation of partnership policy-making practices to reflect the preferences of the EU. b. a proliferation of new actors in the policy process through the EU partnership principle?
- Which mediating factors enable the process of Europeanisation (formal institutions, entrepreneurs of influence, redistribution of resources, political culture)?
- To the extent that there has been a Europeanization of partnership forms, has this been the result of coercive or voluntary policy transfer? What are the characteristics of the EU policy (clear/unclear rules, simple/complex, e.t.c? What has done the Commission as the agent of policy transfer in relation to the partnership principle (legitimacy, physical presence to control and enhance partnerships, EU trans-national networking and process of learning and openness)?

- To what extent there has been institutional resistance to the Commission's partnership principle and the explanations for it. What effect do the pre-existing local institutional conditions have on the emergence of different forms and structures of partnership arrangement for the implementation of EU programmes (e.g. , political culture, institutional resistance, e.t.c)? Do pre-existing local institutional conditions enable certain urban actors and prevent others from emerging as central players in the policy process (e.g. Interests intermediation, organisation of the civil society, e.t.c)?

Finally, the literature review aims at adapting the above theories to the specific social and political environment in Greece by reference to the Greek political science literature, to the studies that explore intergovernmental relations, urban politics (particularly recent changes), and civic organisation and culture.

Regarding the original contribution, my research seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature by distinguishing the different types of interaction between institutions and individuals within a partnership process. My initial literature review has demonstrated that concepts like Europeanization, power relations and leadership would be significantly enriched by specific case studies at the national and local context. Furthermore, in Greece, the study of local partnership is underdeveloped. Consequently, the originality of my research is extended towards two directions:

1. Conceptualisation of various types of interactions between institutions and individuals in partnership formation and process.
2. Collection of data and provision of evidence on the evolution of local partnerships in Greece. In the future, these conclusions could be translated into recommendations to Greek policy makers for the development of more efficient and legitimate policies on partnership.

I.1e. Variables of the research

Four main variables have driven my research: larger context, institutional rules of the partnership, actors' position and leader's behavior. What I explore is precisely their relation and their impact on the partnership process.
The variables and their relation are presented in the following research protocol:

Fig.2 Research protocol

Context   Rules and Position   Behavior

National context:
Local - central
relations, party
system, national
political culture,
national social
capital. **European
context**:
europeanisation,
EU policies
(LEADER +
EQUAL)

**Institutional
context of the
partnership**:
formal and
informal rules
(appropriate,
formal and/or
normative
expectations of
roles and
perceptions

**Leadership
behavior**: style

Partnership
process: (a) the
impact of
dynamics between
individuals,
institutions and
structures in the
partnership
practices
(collective action)
and (b). change
(change of rules,
new rules) by
evolution and/or
intentional
intervention

embeddenesss

Local context:
socio-economic
context,
horizontal local
governance, local
social capital,
local political
culture, historic
path of previous
partnerships

**Structural and
Institutional
constrains and
opportunities
of actors
resources and
position**: power
relations and
their impact on
the level and
scope of their
involvement in
partnership
policy making

**Actors'
behavior**

Motives and
Patterns of
interaction

Partnership
legitimation and
accountability

Feedback: institutional rules of the
local context (institutional innovation
and /or change), actors power relations
(empowerment of certain groups)

II. Research methods

I have selected a case study methodological strategy due to the explanatory nature of my research (Yin 2003). In specific, my research is related to "how" and "why" questions because I aim at identifying the causal links among contextual conditions, individual enactment and the institution of partnership. Furthermore, I have adopted an interpretative approach. This means that the aim is to find evidence related to a set of pre fixed categories emerging from the theory as well as to interpret the meaning from respondents' experience. As a result, my theoretically derived propositions will be enriched by the integration of particular respondents' values, ideas and norms.

I have selected an embedded single case study analysis. My case study consists of the EU Community Initiative Partnerships programs EQUAL and LEADER, which are coordinated by the Development Agency of Heraklion. I have selected a single case study due to the combination of different criteria: first of all, it is unique in relation to its geographical intervention, the partnership stakeholders' identity and its results. Especially, the activities of both programs are distributed in the capitals of the 4 regions in Grete, the members of the partnerships are various (coming from the public, private and social sector) and the partnerships are locally initiated and organized. Additionally, they are evaluated by the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Agriculture respectively as successful programs in terms of processes and outcomes. Furthermore, both partnerships succeeded previous partnerships from the first round of the EQUAL and LEADER programs. Thus, they can offer data for testing path-dependency theory. Finally, each program is specialized in a different policy sector. The EQUAL partnership is focused on the implementation of social policy activities whilst the LEADER partnership coordinates and implements economic activities. This is quite interesting because each partnership could eliminate different aspects of the partnership formation and development.

In Greece, right now, there are very few local partnerships that are working well and have all these characteristics. On the other hand, this case study is typical when compared with previous local partnerships in all the geographical areas of Greece. Based on data derived from the evaluation of Greek partnerships for the implementation of EU programs, it could be concluded that both programs follow the same criteria in terms of their composition and coordination. They are both composed by different urban partners giving priority to public and social organizations and coordinated by the municipality or the Municipal Agency which in its turn is directly controlled by the mayor(s).

The units of analysis will include two different partnerships coordinated by the same Agency. These units complement each other. In these units, I will demonstrate various interactions between institutional contexts, leaders' behaviors and power relations.

Triangulation is employed on the basis of multiple methods of measurement of the same phenomenon. I am using a mix of different data collection methods:

1. Documentation (minutes, evaluations, progress reports and publications)

2. Semi-structured interviews with selected partners of the decision making body of each partnership. I had conducted approximately 10 interviews in each one. Moreover, I had conducted selective interviews with public servants from the relevant Ministries and Officers in Brussels.

3. Questionnaires to all the interviewees in relation to political culture and social capital. These questionnaires will complete the existing Greek literature on the above issues and will eliminate local particularities.

Regarding data analysis, I will use the "explanation building" technique based upon interview reports and coding methods. Additionally, during data elaboration, I will use a "list of codes" comprising the main issues and themes that are central to my research (Miles & Huberman 1994, pp56-65) and identify these main ideas in the interviewee reports. I will use the same list for the elaboration of the secondary documentation gathered from the field.

Finally, my pilot case study has been an EQUAL partnership named KEDAVROS. This program has been implemented in the urban area of Volos and in the rural area of Livadi. However, responsible for the management of the project has been the local branch of EETAA (Hellenic Agency of Local Development and Local Government) which is situated in the capital of the region, Larissa. I travelled to Larissa and conducted two interviews on the same day (15th of November 2007). The first one was with the director of the project and the second one with the coordinator of a sub project implemented in Volos. Meanwhile, the interviewees gave me a selected secondary material related to the project. The interviews were initially recorded; they then were transcribed and finally elaborated.

III. First conclusions

At this stage of the PhD, I am working on the data analysis. The case study research is almost completed. I have collected a large amount of data but I have not yet elaborated on them. In the following section, I present the first conclusions from the data analysis. Some conclusions are interpretations of the evidence, others are more descriptive and others give some explanations of how and why all these happened. In any case, the following conclusions are fragmentary and are not yet completed. The presentation of the conclusions is following the structure of the above research protocol.

III.1 National context

a. *Highly centralized state, conservative public administrative culture, loose organization of civil society, dependence relation with the EU*
The implementation of both projects found a number of obstacles deriving mainly from the organization of the Greek State. These are the following:

Policy content: In Greece, for many years, the agriculture development was and still remains equal to subsidies to farmers. Traditionally, it is a way for the State (and the relevant Ministry) to control politically the farmers. On the contrary, LEADER program

brought new ideas about the development of region. Furthermore, EQUAL program brought new insights in the social policy by supporting integrating policies of social vulnerable groups like women, disabled people, asking for political asylum in a country like Greece where the social policy is not at all strong. Additionally, EQUAL focused on the quality of policies. This was new to the Greek State attitude which traditionally has evaluated the results of a policy only by the numbers of the services beneficiaries.

Policy practices: Both programs gave to the public administrators more power due to their need of technocratic management. Because of that, some administrators tried to implement policies according to the program requirements contrasting the traditionally established relations between the state and the target groups of the programs. As a result, the Ministers felt threatened that they are going to lose their full control to these groups. For that reason, if some administrators tend to develop centrifigural powers, they got out of the management. Moreover, the programs expected partnerships, bottom up planning and innovation. These principles were completely unknown at that time in the Greek society (end of 1990). In reality, a bottom up approach was not realized for both programs. There were some obligations that must have been kept by the programs like seminars and information by the press to the citizens but in reality it was the central State that decided about the main sectors of intervention and then the Coordinator, in his/her turn, followed the easy pathway: which projects would absorb faster and securely most of the program money? Moreover, the bureaucratic procedures regarding the financial and administrative adequacy of the programs activities were so complicated and exhausting that they did not leave space for innovative actions with high risk. All these bureaucratic controls stem from the Greek state to prevent corruption. Consequently, by contrast with other countries like UK, France or Sweden, Greece had to start from the beginning due to institutional and culture void.

However, Greece has participated and implemented all these programs because, first of all, it received funding. Economic resources are the main motivating factor that convinces the country to make partnerships and adopt new policy practices. Afterwards, Greece is learning by doing and it gets gradually familiarized to these new practices.

Furthermore a number of other factors obstruct the implementation of the programs:

Withdrawn attitude: In Greece, there is a conservative culture in the public administration. The administrators not only resist change but they support that the way they are working is the best. They do not like to go out of their shell and see how other colleagues in other countries are doing thinks. Additionally, they are not motivated and they do not take new initiatives. For example, regarding the EQUAL project, in Germany, Sweden, France and Portugal, there were groups from the administration and local authorities that made a step forward either integrating these innovative policies in national programs or networking with other countries in order to pressure EU to find more funding for these initiatives.

The Greek state could not negotiate the principles of the programs due to its low negotiated power. Even if in Greece, the State is characterized as hydrocephalus, in

reality, it does not have a strong administration that could counterbalance the decisions of the EU. Furthermore, there is the attitude "do not bother them a lot - the EU-" because the politicians are afraid of an eventual rupture in the relation with the EU. Moreover, the State chooses to invest to the program with 25% and the EU contributes by 75%. As a result, the Greek State could not easily negotiate the principles of the programs such other countries where the national funding is 75% and the EU funding is 25%. Finally, the dominant logic of the state for all the European programs is "we take as more money as we could'' independently of what we are going to do with this money. There is not long term planning. Each time, the state struggles to fill the gaps in operational needs or to absorb the European funding when the deadlines are closed.

b. *Strong party system*
The political parties are very strong in Greece. When the programs were starting, the State did not make an ex ante evaluation in order to identify the needs. Firstly, the government, (the relevant Minister and the Council of Ministers) distributes the money in geographical areas and policy sectors according to their political interests and pressures from interests groups and from the parties of the opposition and later on it focuses on the needs of the selected areas of intervention. For example, in electoral regions electing one deputy, when the deputy belongs to the opposition, its region will be eligible for lesser funding than regions of which the deputy belongs to the government. Or, the local deputy of a region could pressure a Minister for more funding. Furthermore, the administrative system is so much centralized, that does not permit lower geographical levels like the regions to have their own political intervention in the sharing of programs money. For example, in Italy or Spain, the regional authorities were the main agencies of the LEADER programs. In UK, the EQUAL projects were implemented by the Local Development Agencies. This does not mean that political intervention does not exist in other countries but in Greece, politics are stronger because there is not a powerful decentralized local government and no strong social power groups that could influence the dominant political language. In other countries, due to established decentralized centers of power, the politics intervene in higher levels of policy making while in Greece it arrives at the lower level of policy making, for example, in the selection of small sub projects during their proclamation to the public.

Also, at the local level, political parties are significant. One main reason that keeps all the mayors unified in the programs is the common political affiliation. "We have high level of collaboration and political agreement" (Mayor). In Crete, there is a strong political tradition of the Socialist party (PASOK). Taking into account that the last 6 years, this political party is in opposition, all the mayors know that they have to stick together, to join forces in order to get more funding from the government 'We have already taken an additional funding for the program which it will be bigger if the political criteria from the government was not an obstacle" (Mayor)

c. Facilitator institutions and intermediary actors for the adaptation to the EU programs principles

Regarding the mediating factors enabling the process of europeanisation, the case study reveals the role of persons and the formal institutionalization of the partnership scheme. As expected, the redistribution of resources, in terms of money and type of policy also support the establishment of the partnership.

This 'coercive policy transfer' puts different actors on the table of discussion. In the EQUAL project, it was a very useful experience because they learn to listen and to work together at different levels (horizontally, inside the partnership, and vertically, in national and transnational thematic working groups). Furthermore, the less powerful partners, like the NGOs, realize their goals in a partnership that institutionally ought to treat equally all the partners. This experience led to stable partnership schemes reactivated to the second round of EQUAL. Finally, the role of the leader is very significant for the europeanisation process. In the interviews, it was mentioned constantly, that key persons in the Ministry, in the Management Committee and in the EQUAL partnership play an important role to the success or failure of the project.

In relation to the role of the EU in the facilitation of the europeanisation, there is a contrasting perception between the executives of the Management Committee and the Geographical Responsible of the EU. According to the executives of both Management Committees, the role of EU is strictly managerial. The interest focuses on the absorption capacity of funding rather on the way that the project will be implemented. Furthermore, there is a turn of the EU interest during the evolution of the programs. For example, in the EQUAL project, on its first round, the EU was more devoted on the needs of the program while on the second round; the EU was retired offering more space to the member-states. Finally, the principles on which the projects were developed were not always clear (e.g. innovation, type of partnership, mainstreaming).

According to the Geographical Responsible in the EU, regarding the criticism of the management Committees towards the gradual retirement of the active involvement of the EU from the programs, it is argued, that at the beginning of the program, the EU was strongly involved due to the innovative character of the projects. Gradually, it started only to observe and to make remarks and at the final programming period, it had been asked from the State Members to integrate these programs to their national programs. If Greece is not ready for this step, it is not a problem of the EU but of the dependence culture of the public administration towards the EU. Additionally, in our days, with 27members states, it is difficult, in terms of management and of political authority, for EU to control step by step all the programs.

However, all the interviewees supported that the trans national thematic working groups and the trans national annual meetings of all the national partners contribute to the exchange of information and the resolution of problems.

III .2 Local context

    a.   *Strong local identity, culture of cooperation, dense social relations*
One main finding from the interviews is the significance that partners give to trust and to the good reputation of their name. Since these societies are small, people know each other; they could meet by chance in the market or in a social event, much more in a meeting organized by the Prefecture or the Region. "The personal relations and the mutual trust are important. There is honesty. There are relations of sincerity; the partners act transparently. The relations are personal and not partisan. We all have a name, I will not lose my dignity for a cousin whom I will help to take an extra funding and expose myself to the President or the Vice President of the Development Agency" (Municipal council partner).

The significance of reputation and trust is related with a dense network of social relations between partners. For example, the Director of one Development Agency is the best man of the Director of a NGO partner. The directors of two Development Agencies declare their good friendship. Broadly speaking, most of the partners mention that they know well each other well and they get together, with their families, in many occasions.

Furthermore, there is a progressive development of collaborative culture that overcomes the localism of the mayors. In the region of Heraklion, next to the Development Agency that comprises almost all the municipalities of the Heraklion region, there is also another institution, KOINOPOLITIA, in which 45 municipalities participate. This NGO is activated in the sector of social policy. Finally, the region of Heraklion has a tradition in agriculture cooperatives. Consequently, the mayors learn step by step that they will have more benefits if they get in common activities with other mayors on the one hand and the local people are more familiarized with cooperative efforts on the other hand. I was impressed by the fact that the region of Chania has a loose cooperative tradition. In Chania, there are not at all any farmer cooperatives like in all other areas of Crete. For them, the EQUAL project appears as a good tool for starting develops the social capital in their region.

    b.   *Historic path of previous local partnerships*
In the EQUAL II program, most of the partners had also been participated in the first round of the program (EQUAL I). Consequently, they know very well each other and the way that each partner responds to the partnership rules. "In this EQUAL, we know all the partners; it was not like the previous one" (Development agency partner). Even one new partner, the Technological Park, has already collaborated with the Development Agency in other programs, so this partner knows well the Development Agency and the local context in which the partnership is evolved. For all the interviewed partners, it was expected to participate to the second round too. Furthermore, most of them, made an effort to continue the activities derived from the first round of EQUAL or they have used the existing networks of the first round for expanding more quickly the activities in the second round of EQUAL. For example, the Development Agency of mountainous Mylopotamos and Malevisi (AKOMM) established a new women cooperative in Sivito village next to the existing one from the first round. The Sitia Development Agency

(OAS) has failed to establish a cooperative in the first round and EQUAL II gave to the Agency the opportunity to complete its effort and to finally create this cooperative.

The participation in previous partnerships led all the partners to a process of learning how to better cooperate and it created a stable network of cooperation between groups of local society and the local government. 'The EQUAL program is collective, we respect the opinions of others and we learn how to understand. When many people work together, we ought to understand the delays and the difficulties of each one' (Development Agency partner). "I have now the experience to understand the other, I am more open-minded, I am now more social (Municipal councilor partner).

III.3. Institutional context of the partnership

a. Clear and unchangeable rules

The rules are distinguished by their clarity and their unchangeable character. The rules cannot be revised either by the Ministry or by the partners of the partnership. This fact is resulting both from the Ministry and the Coordinator of partnerships, the Development Agency of Heraklion. In the first level, that of Ministry, the rules are very clear and the controls are sometimes exhausted. This is an effort of the Greek State to avoid corruptions like in the implementation of previous EU programs. In the lower level, the Development Agency is very clear in some principles like financial absorption of all the available funding, fast and reliable results from the programs, equal distribution of funding in all geographical areas, devotion to legality and to fairness (avoidance of clientelism and favoritism). These principles guide all the choices regarding the selection of the activities of the programs and the partners know very well that they could not change them.

Another character of the rule is its distinctiveness. In the EQUAL program, each partner has his own competencies, strictly separated from the other partners. For that reason, the conflicts are much narrowed. Since, the proposal was approved by the Ministry, everyone started to carry out the job in his institution. "We had good relations with all the partners. Everyone has a distinctive role; the program was very clear about that. These separated competencies created better collaboration" (Development Agency partner). It is like all the partners are the satellites of the Coordinator. However, this task separation is aggravated by the geographical distance of the partners. The partners are spread all over Crete and the difficulties of communication between partners are bigger. For example, there are partners that they have seen each other two or three times during the whole program. In LEADER project, I was impressed by the ignorance of one cooperative's representative of which other cooperatives are participating in the partnership.

b.   Trustworthy institution

The Development Agency of Heraklion is viewed in the minds of all partners as a powerful and legitimised institution that all partners ought to respect its opinion and its will. It is the Agency that brinks money to the cities and villages of the region and has adequate experts and knowledge to organize and implement the relevant programs.

On the other hand, the trustworthiness of the institution was achieved by a progressive and stable rapprochement to the local community through sharing information and

achievable results. The Development Agency is open to new ideas and proposals and there is a lot of discussion before a decision is taken in the partnerships. However, limits set up when the partners' proposals overcome the above mentioned principles of the Development Agency.

III.4. Actors' behavior and leadership

   a. *Style of leadership*

The role of persons is very important for the success of programs in all territorial levels. "People make the difference". In EUQAL project, it was the administrative director of the Management Committee that could keep a distance from political pressures and she tried to introduce a more rational way of achieving targets. In LEADER project, a group of public administrators who have already managed previous European programs, made an effort to work in a different way, in a more technocratic one. However, the role of individuals is not only significant in Greece but in other countries too, like Portugal, Germany, and in the EU itself.

The leadership of the Development Agency of Heraklion is very strong. The President and the Vice President are very powerful mayors with long presence in the political arena, elected from the first ballot with high percentage. That means that they have vision, they have a strong legitimation by the voters and they are respected by the other mayors. "The Vice President is active many years in local government, he is an old hand. It is important not only to speak but also to be listening. The Vice President has been listening to all, he is a lawyer. But also the President is a well known mayor with high electoral percentage, he has reliability and he is an outspoken person. He makes good public relation and he has a vision' (Municipal Councilor).

In lower level, the director of the coordinative institution is also characterized as a leader. He is distinguished as a person with personal engagement in the objectives of the Development Agency and with vision. According to the interviews, the director finds solutions when serious problem exists, communicates with the political personnel of institutions and press them in order to advance the decisions that have been taken in lower level. Also, he leaves space to the executives of the Development Agency to develop their initiatives but he always wants to be informed of what happens. It is important for the successful development of the project that the executives who realize the project enjoy the absolute confidence of their political directors.

According to the director, a good leader must treat all the partners equally, support the partners that have problems to follow the project, and have good relations with the political leaders but also keep a distance from them in order to promote the priorities of the project and not their political priorities. The director argues that in many cases, he has to argue with the politicians for making them understand that the project is not a mean of political promotion but of social and economic development.

Also, the personal engagement and effort of executives of the Development Agency are stressed: working overtime, use of their private cars for the transport of material and products, undertaking activities that exceed their competencies.

b. Motivations and objectives of actors' behavior

The motives of the partners are directly related to the needs of the institution that are represented. Each category of partners pursues its own interests. The Development Agencies are activated in the field of economic and social development of their geographical area. Consequently, these programs respond directly to their goals as institutions promoting local development. Furthermore, the social organizations in EQUAL project find a financial support and a more formal way to enter more actively in the field and realize their goals. On the other hand, the cooperatives in LEADER project enter in the program in a more passive way; because they were asked to do so by the Development Agency. However, their goals are clear, get more money for their organizations. For the politicians, getting in these programs means investments for the development of their region "I am interested in my area. I participated in the partnership even if my place was not eligible for this program. I wanted the program to function effectively and to have the biggest financial absorption" (Mayor). Furthermore, the participation to these programs offers the mayors an informal network; to all the mayors of Heraklion region that means bigger negotiation power towards the central State.

c. Power relations

The main patterns of interaction among partners are negotiation and consent. All the partners underlined the luck of big disagreements and conflicts. They also mentioned the lack of competitiveness among them. The main reasons are the following: they know each other very well and each partner has his own obligations which are well distinguished from the others. "In general, there is not competitiveness. We are all Development Agencies and our directors have good relations" (Development Agency partner).

In EQUAL project, the negotiation is more obvious in the first stage of the partnership development during the preparation of the final proposal. It was the Development Agency of Heraklion that prepared the proposal and it had consulted occasionally, in respect of their competencies, the potential partners of the partnership. According to the interviews, in this stage, the partners made some propositions concerning the budget (e.g the need for more stuff that will support the activities) or the type of programs beneficiaries. In many occasions, these conflicts had been solved by negotiation, by the coordinator having the final word. "It is the coordinator that defines the solution and gives the general direction'' (Development Agency partner)

In the decision making process, it is again the Development Agency of Heraklion that set the agenda. In EQUAL program, the conflicts usually raised upon bureaucratic issues. However, it is again the Coordinator that decides what to do because he/she knows better the program. "For us, the program was innovative, so we learned through the process and the discussion (Development Agency partner)

In the case of LEADER, thinks are a little different. Here the opinions of the President, the Vice President and the Director of the Development Agency are dominant in the

partnership. All the other members, mainly the cooperatives consent to all decisions because "the Agency knows better'.

There is something like a 'political pax' among the mayors of the region of Heraklion. Right now, there are two big programs running in this region: OPAX and LEADER. The mayors have separated geographically these programs in a way that each mayor knows if his area is eligible to submit for OPAX or LEADER. In this way, one mayor entitled to OPAX program could not submit for LEADER program because he breaks the rule. It is striking that the Vice President of the Development Agency that participates in the LEADER partnership is a mayor of a city that is entitled to OPAX programs. However, he participated in this partnership not only due to his position as Vice President of the Development Agency but also due to his role that the Agency invited him to have. Since he and his city do not have a direct interest in getting money from LEADER, he could play an intermediary role between the LEADER partnership and the mayors asking excessive funding for public investments "As I am not entitled to LEADER program, I do not have a direct commitment to my population, so in crucial situations, they put me in the front line' (Mayor)

Of course, there are conflicts between the mayors but these conflicts remain outside the LEADER program. For example, there are groups of mayors that pursue common goals (mayors of neighborhood cities) and they have confrontations with another group of mayors. However, the President of the Development Agency makes an effort to make all the necessary political contacts with the mayors in order to avoid that these conflicts will obstruct the program progress.

In EQUAL partnership, there are two main groups. It is clear that the four Development Agencies feel part of the same team inside the partnership. According to the interviews, the Agencies have the same goals which are the development of their geographical areas. Another group is the two social organizations, KOINOPOLITIA and ZEYXIS which are the children of the Development Agency of Heraklion.

In LEADER partnership, there is the Coordination Committee (Local Action Group) and the Administrative Board of the Development Agency of Heraklion. The Coordination committee is a small partnership scheme that takes all the decisions of the program. The Administrative Board has a more typical role in controlling the decisions of the Coordination Committee. Inside the Coordination Committee there are two main groups: the political group which is composed by 2 mayors, one is the President and the other is the Vice President of the Development Agency as well as the President of the municipal council of Arhanes, a small city where the Development Agency is situated. The other main group is the cooperatives. It is clear, from the interviews that the political group makes all the decisions and all the other members follow the opinions of the political group.

Comparing the two programs, it is concluded that the political weight on LEADER program is bigger than that of the EQUAL program. While, in the second, the management and implementation of the program is left to the experts and the managers of the relative participative institutions, in LEADER program there is a close following by the politicians. This is related to the budget of both programs and the policy sector that

are activated. The LEADER program had a much bigger budget than the EQUAL. Secondly, it refers to the economic sector while EQUAL to the social sector. In Greece, traditionally, the local government is more interested in economic development than in the provision of social goods. As an interviewee mentioned for EQUAL program "Where the budget is big, the responsibilities of the Directors are bigger, in this program, the money was little" (Development Agency partner).

1II.5. Feedback

Things are changing with great difficulty in Greece. Political parties are present everywhere. The luck of planning and the improvisation of policy making is a permanent problem. The Mayors cannot overcome their dependence to the electorate and their logic of localism.

However, the feedback of these two projects is very significant. For all the partners, the participation in these programs offered new resources to their institutions and it empowered their role in the local society. For example, for the Development Agency AKOMM, EQUAL gave the chance to know better their geographical area and to undertake new actions. Furthermore, it offers relative experience in social policy which it could be used in future programs and it reinforced the human resources in the institution. Another Development Agency underlines the role of EQUAL in the development of the Mayors awareness for social policies. Additionally, the programs left a new attitude towards partnerships and planning in the local institutions involved in these projects. Furthermore, they empowered new social groups like women and disabled people. Finally, they left well skilled executives in the Greek region.

Conclusions

As I have already mentioned, the above data are preliminary and they do not offer an integrated picture of the development and evolution of the partnerships. However, there are some main conclusions for the factors influencing the success of these partnerships which could be used later on with further elaboration as guidelines for policy makers.

The success of the Development Agency is based on the following factors
- The political support by all the mayors. For them, the Development Agency is a vehicle to get funding for their area and to pressure for their rights to the central government. Furthermore, it is a unit of all the provincial local authorities of the region with the same needs standing vis a vis the metropolitan local authorities of the region.
- The permanent evolution and adaption of the Development Agency to the needs of each national programming period. They are prepared so as to be ready for the proclamation of new programs and their demands
- The Development Agency is staffed by well skilled executives
- The leadership role of the Presidents and Directors of the Agency

- Good relations between the partners of the Development Agency due to regular planning and mutual understanding that if the Development Agency will shut down, the region will lose a developmental pole.
- Clear rules of the game in the Development Agency. Nothing happened under the table

The success of the EQUAL project is based on the following factors:

- The policies were directly oriented to the needs of the target groups due to the active involvement of NGOs. KOINOPOLITIA and ZEYXIS were two partners with passion and commitment to their goals. Furthermore, there was a democratic process for setting off the needs of women for the establishment of cooperatives; the women have an active role in the development and the implementation of the project.

- Another factor is the complementary goals of all the members that participated to the partnership scheme. The partnership had different actors that their activities complement each other (NGOs, research institutes, educational institutions, Development Agencies et al.
- The Director of the coordinated institution is a charismatic leader, passionate and effective in his job.
- The partnership does not create new institutions for the realization of their goals. On the contrary, it uses the existent institutions and networks from previous projects (EQUAL I, Social Capital) for the maximization of its activities.
- The informal network of persons previous to the partnership scheme supported the effective cooperation between partners.
- Clear roles of what each partner contributed in the partnership and the feeling that no one is unfairly treated.
- Previous experience of the Coordinator in European funding programs.

The success of LEADER project is based on the following factors:
- Dense social network in the local society
- Previous collaboration in programs and the participation in the first and second round of LEADER
- Effective leadership
- Effective organization of the Development Agency of Heraklion
- Progressive establishment of social capital of collaboration and trust
- Political tradition and political affiliation of almost all the political partners in the Socialist party (PASOK)

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The Causal Nexus between Social Capital and Local Development in Mountain Rural Greece

Harokopio University of Athens

Department of Home Economics and Ecology

Panagiota Karametou, MSc, PhD Candidate (*e-mail:* karametou@hua.gr)

"How does the nature of social capital affect the quality of local development in two mountain rural areas in Greece?"

Research objectives

- ✓ **to measure the available stock of social capital and to evaluate the nature of local development in two Greek mountainous areas**

- ✓ **to reveal and interpret the relationship between their level of socio-economic development and the available stock of social capital**

Research hypothesis

' the nature of local development within a small rural area will be influenced by the nature of the existent stock of social capital in the area'

Theoretical framework

What is Social Capital?

"**social capital refers
to features of social organisation and social life
such as networks, norms and trust
that facilitate
co-ordination and co-operation
for mutual benefit.
Social capital enhances the benefits of investment in
physical and human capital**"

(Putnam, 1993)

The Relationship between Social Capital and Civil Society

Social capital
Civic participation & social networks
Formal Social capital

Civil society
A network of formal and informal groups
Formal civil society

**Participation in civil society**
Membership of social clubs & voluntary organizations
Generalized (social) trust

Formal institutionalised organizations
Membership in political parties, labour unions & non-governmental organizations

Informal social capital

Informal civil society

Social networks
Frequency of contact with friends, colleagues and with neighbours
Social support

Informal groups
Informal collectivities
Networks or circles of neighbours self help groups,
Small social movements focusing on local issues

(Pichler & Wallace, 2007; Sotiropoulos, 2004)

Theoretical framework (continued)

Trust & solidarity

Information & communication

Group & networks

Collective action & cooperation

Social cohesion & inclusion

Empowerment & political action

?

?

World Bank, 2003; Grootaert & Van Bastelaer, 2002a,b; Ibanez et al, 2002; Grootaert, 2001; Narayan & Cassidy, 2001; Narayan & Pritchett, 1999;

Research Design & Methodology

The Study Areas

Two Greek Mountainous Rural Areas

Zagori & Pilion

Data: collection & nature

➢**Quantitative data**

    ✓ **Questionnaire survey to inhabitants**

      - consisted of 318 individuals aged 15 years and over

      - 194 of whom were resident in the Prefecture of Magnesia, and 124 resident in the Prefecture of Ioannina

➢**Qualitative data**

    ✓ **Semi-structured interviews** to inhabitants and local institutions from each area (46 in-depth, semi-structured interviews) with selective participants and key informants

      (31 in the area of Pilion and 15 in the Zagori area)

    ✓ **Secondary assessment of the local based bibliography** (local newspapers, journals, official local and research reports, regional documents)

Quantitative data:
questionnaire survey to inhabitants
(continued)

Local development questionnaire: contained 13 closed-type questions

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Human development

o Life expectancy

o Rate of high school attendance

Social quality

o Health services efficiency

o Gender equality (women's integration into the labour market, women's involvement in local politics)

o Labour precariousness

o Public school infrastructures

The state of health of rural ecosystems

o Efficiency of public transports services and of water softening systems

Data analysis

- ✓ **Descriptive statistics**

- ✓ **Exploratory factor analysis**

- ✓ **Confirmatory factor analysis**

Data Analysis (continued)

Identify:

- **which items were empirically related to social capital & local development** (and which ones were not)

- **the elements of social capital (factors)**

- **a good set of items for future use in measuring social capital & local development in other mountain rural communities**

- **the causal relationship between the nature of social capital and the quality of local development**

Empirical results

Sample profile

Sociodemographic variables	Pilion N=194	Zagori N=124
Sex	60 % (female)	62 % (male)
Individuals' age	16 to 73 years old	23 to 82 years old
Primary School	29 %	27%
Marital status	70,6% (married)	51,6% (unmarried)

Exploratory factor analysis results

Variables	Kaiser Meyer Olkin=0.80
'I think that there are many differences (in wealth, income, social status e.t.c.) *between people living in my village/neighborhood'*	*'I feel that there is a strong feeling of reciprocity and solidarity between the citizens in my local community'*
'I trust my neighbors'	*'I can influence decisions affecting the quality of life in my local area'*
'I think most people in this village/neighbourhood are willing to help if you need it'	*'I have the power to take decisions which can change/improve my life'*
'I trust local government officials'	*'I believe that the relationship with my relatives is very important for my life'*

Exploratory factor analysis results

7 social capital & 2 local development factors

(67.1%)　　　　　(51.8%)

- ✓ **Feeling of isolation and existence of important differences between the citizens**

- ✓ **Social trust *(trust neighbours and key service providers)***

- ✓ **Social trust *(trust fellow villagers)***

- ✓ **Institutional trust *(trust local government and local government officials)***

- ✓ ***Reciprocity and solidarity* (fellow villagers)**

- ✓ **Empowerment *(control over institutions and processes directly affecting their well-being)***

- ✓ **Informal (family) social networks**

The efficiency of public health & public transports services

Life expectancy and health of natural environment

Social capital scores for case study areas

Case study areas	Sample size	Cohesion	TrustNghs	Trust Fvils	Trust Loc. Gov	Reciprocity	Family networks	Empowerment
PILION	194	3,31	3,52	2,81	3,08	3,76	4,18	3,72
Makrinitsa	22	3,23	3.00	2,55	3,04	3,72	3,45	4,13
Portaria	33	3,79	3,94	2,88	3,84	4,24	4,57	3,67
Zagora	38	3,21	3,26	2,87	2,62	3,84	4,28	3,68
Mouresio	40	3,23	3,74	3,21	3,61	3,87	4,38	3,79
Milies	29	3,07	3,48	2,62	2,55	3,44	4,00	3,67
Argalasti	32	3,31	3,50	2,53	2,25	3,40	4,06	3,44
ZAGORI	124	2,39	3,72	3,26	3,06	4,00	4,06	3,67
Papigo	31	2,68	3,77	3,29	2,97	4,24	3,64	3,77
Anatoliko Zagori	31	3,10	3,97	2,53	3,48	4,06	3,80	3,55
Kentriko Zagori	29	2,59	3,17	2,97	2,62	4,03	4,48	3,51
Tymfi	33	3,30	3,91	3,21	3,03	3,87	4,33	3,81
Total sample	318	3.16	3,60	2,98	3,06	3,86	4,13	3,70

Confirmatory factor analysis results

Path diagram of the second-order factor model

Chi-Square=161.70, df=118, P-value=0.00471, RMSEA=0.034

Path diagram of the main social capital and local development dimensions

Chi-Square=265.25, df=250, P-value=0.24251, RMSEA=0.014

Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables

	Cohesion	TrustNgh	TrustFVi	TrustLGo	Reciproc	Snetwork	Empowerm	SocInfru	EnvQuali
SocInfru	-0.04	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.12	-0.04	- 0.08	1.00	
	(0.13)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)		
	-0.33	0.85	0.77	-0.60	-2.31	-0.74	-1.54		
EnvQuali	0.29	-0.08	-0.02	0.11	0.16	-0.01	0.18	- 0.64	1.00
	(0.11)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	
	2.64	-1.19	-0.29	2.00	2.91	-0.18	3.48	-10.62	

Concluding remarks

- **Where is the *surprise* ? What's new?**

Concluding remarks (continued)

○ **low levels of bridging social capital and strong familial ties**

○ **weak inter-community connections**

➢ **'closed' communities with few significant bridging links to others in a position to assist them**

Concluding remarks (continued)

"…..the negative relationship between bonding social capital and economic development proves to be biunique: not only strong family ties may hamper human development, but they also deteriorate themselves with higher levels of development"

Sabatini (2006)

Concluding remarks (continued)

" …the loyalty to family over and above all else creates a situation in which people 'maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; and assume that all others will do likewise' argued that amoral familism can thus be reinforced by situations of underdevelopment"

Banfield (1958)

Concluding remarks

" *…in countries where family or informal social capital predominate to a much greater extent it may be more difficult to establish a vibrant civil society of the kind described by Putnam because the culture does not allow it"*

Pichler & Wallace (2007)

Conclusions

'there has never been a more important time to increase social capital in rural areas' (Alston, 2002)

fostering high levels of social capital joins the development of physical and human capital as well as a range of other initiatives, as key ingredients for a successful local economy

Thanks