THE IMAGE OF PARTY LEADERS IN
CONTEMPORARY GREEK ELECTIONS

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Introduction

The intense use of image campaigning worldwide derives from the need of political parties to communicate their messages across using technologically advanced means that are at their disposal during certain periods of time. Characteristically, in the USA in 1900, William Jennings Bryan was the first candidate who used the phonogram to record his speeches, while in 1908 the public visited the cinema in order to watch speeches of the then presidential candidates. Inevitably, during the 1950s onwards, television drastically changed the nature of political campaigns. Similarly, there is nowadays a tendency for politicians to communicate with the public via the internet, with professionally designed websites, forums and email marketing.

In Greece, due to the sporadic absence of democratic processes particularly during the dictatorship of 1967-1974, the emergence of television broadcasting made its appearance at a later stage, imposing a slower start of the professionalization of political campaigns which emphasise the image of party leaders during election campaigns. However, the fast economic, cultural and political modernisation of the country since 1974, the mass popularity of television other than newspapers in Greece, as well as the emphasis given to party leaders during election campaigns, have allowed image campaigning to develop speedily, especially during the last decade.

This paper aims at presenting the image of party leaders in contemporary Greece using the 2004 election campaign as a case study, for the purpose of determining whether image campaigning in the country is Americanised or Modernised. The first part of the paper refers to the emergence of image based campaigns and the definitions of Americanisation and Modernisation which shall be used in the second part of the paper, for the purpose of analysing the political election processes in Greece and the image promoted by the leaders of the two large parties in the 2004 parliamentary election.
The shift from issue-based campaigns to image-based campaigns

On an international scale, academic analysts are witnessing the ascendancy of ‘image’ politics, the increased professionalization of political communication and the adoption of campaign style and practices that heavily rely on the mass media to appeal to voters. It has been observed that major changes in Americanized societies involve the weakening of political parties and citizens’ activism in the formal political process and the de-emphasis on major governing issues. By analysing the emphasis given on image formation and presentation of the candidate, it can be safely said that image in the past decades has been an important factor in election campaigning.

In recent years great importance has been attributed to personal image in several aspects of our lives. Politics have become more personal as personalisation is far more potent today than ever before. Forming the desirable image of a candidate is more difficult than it seems, as it involves considerable market research, the skills of experts and the ability to perform in public. The best image management leaves no traces and no fingertips of public relations professionalism. Thus the call to “let Reagan be Reagan”, or its equivalent, is often heard.

Image of the candidate includes not only appearances and charm, but also personal characteristics and abilities. The capability to perform in public is a key issue in public performance. The way a person communicates, performs and acts, can determine how skilful he or she is and how competent he or she can be, in a powerful position. The places a candidate chooses to visit and the pseudo-events that she chooses to organise also have a great effect upon her likeability. Images are formed by a number of means such as physical attractiveness, personal characteristics and abilities, as well as carefully chosen public appearances and messages.

The constant focus of television on party leaders sometimes causes the drift from ideology-based campaigns towards image-focused campaigns. The importance of image also increases with the growing number of the “chronic-know-nothing” voters; those are the voters who disregard the importance of politics and vote according to the candidate’s

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4 Pseudo-events are organized mainly by politicians to engage a certain audience’s attention.
external appearance, family background, personal acquaintances and hobbies. Voters in most societies seem to have little grasp over the details of party and candidate positions. As a rule people tend to vote according to their general perception of the personality and image of the candidates. Therefore, a candidate’s image and her perception among the public, is extremely important not only during elections but also in other public appearances in her daily life.

The formation of a specific image is more likely to attract voters that are weakly attached, or not at all attached, to a party. Ideologically-oriented voters tend to vote for the candidate of their party even if they feel that the specific person does not acquire the skills of a leader. It is in countries with a traditionally strong ideological basis, such as in Greece, that the development of image campaigning is only starting to show, as the shift of voters between parties has up to now been rare and difficult to emerge. As mentioned earlier, it appears that voters seem to have drifted away from the political parties; and that party politics have been replaced with “merchandised politics.”

Consequently, achieving a favourable image for a candidate is a key objective of modern campaigning. As Kavanagh observes, approval of the candidate is not based upon a reality, but it is a product of the particular chemistry between the voter and the image of the candidate. Image consultants are specialised in emphasising characteristics of candidates that will be able to attract voters. “It is their job to let the public get to know the real president. In truth, the job is to let the public believe they know the real man.”

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Defining Americanisation and Modernisation

When examining the development of political campaigns and image making, one can certainly observe common practices being used worldwide. These practices are largely based on the American model of campaigning. The United States has become a role model for other cultures, which are distinct from each other, because it represents an abundant society, the freedom to consume and more generally, what many people conceptualise as the “good life”\(^{11}\). The influences of the American model on the political environment of several European countries have been observed extensively during the 1990s onwards.

The political parties, firstly in the USA and in some European countries later on, have been overshadowed by the political images that are produced by image consultants and other professionals. There is no doubt that the trend of image-making was introduced in America, along with most of the political communication techniques that are currently being put to practice worldwide.

Defining Americanization can be rather complicated and confusing as there have been several different interpretations of the word and its meaning in the past. The main characteristic of Americanisation in political elections, in which most scholars and professionals agree upon, is that “elections have become pure beauty contests, designed by handlers, spin-doctors, and professional image-makers, and packaged in ways that are easily communicated via mass media”\(^{12}\).

For the purpose of this paper, Americanisation of election campaigns is held to be the process in which countries, regardless of their cultural, political and economic environment, copy without altering, American techniques that deal with the promotion of the candidate through the media with the engagement of election professionals\(^{13}\).

Moving over to the concept of Modernisation within the context of political communication, there are considerable attempts to define the term as the “personalization of politics;

\(^{13}\) Mancini, P. and Swanson, D “Politics, Media and Modern Democracy”, New York: Praeger, p.56, 1995
adapting campaign practices to media logic and priorities; and employing technical experts to advise parties on public relations, opinion polling and marketing strategies\textsuperscript{14}.

This paper considers that Modernisation of election campaigns is the process in which countries adopt new techniques for the promotion of candidates through the media with the help of election professionals while taking into consideration the cultural, political and economic environment and needs of their societies. In other words, Modernisation is a process of picking and choosing the tools you need from a tool box instead of taking everything that is being offered in it, which could describe the process of Americanisation.

Before analysing the existence, or lack, of Modernisation or Americanisation in Greek political election campaigns it is wise to get familiarised with the political scene of the country.

The Greek political environment

Greek politics can be characterised as a ‘dynasty’. The 2004-elected Prime Minister of Greece, Kostas Karamanlis, is the nephew of former Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, while his opponent during the same election, George Papandreou, had a father (Andreas Papandreou) and a grandfather (Georgios Papandreou) who also served Greece from the post of Prime Minister. Furthermore, Dora Bakoyannis, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, is the daughter of yet another former Prime Minister, Konstantinos Mitsotakis.

Talking in figures, around 70 candidates in the 2004 parliamentary election were sons, daughters or close relatives of sitting or former Members of the Parliament, while 12 per cent of all outgoing MPs had a politician parent. It is a fact that political career within the family is a very strong phenomenon in Greece whereas politics is exerted as a profession. It is evident that the family name in Greek politics plays a crucial role to the rise of individual politicians, while it also affects the voters’ perception on the politicians’ abilities and strengths.

Beyond the ‘dynasty’ factor, appearance and image of party leaders does play a substantial role in political elections in Greece. Greece, as explained above, had to overcome its difficulties after the dictatorships at a fast pace in order to achieve a political, economic and cultural modernisation. Television in Greece made its appearance in 1965 with the state-owned ERT. It was only after 1989 that the Greek Parliament passed a legislation legalizing private broadcasting in both radio and television media.

Televised news immediately demonstrated that a new era in politics was to emerge. One of the first comments on the image of the Prime Minister on Greek television was the affair Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou had with Dimitra Liani - who became his wife later on-and the Koskotas scandal, a major financial scandal involving Andreas Papandreou and members of his Government. These incidents played a crucial role for television broadcasting as well as for image perceptions of party leaders, as they enabled the public to reflect upon their Prime Minister, his personality (both as he appeared in his public and private life) and his suitability for the post.

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15 BBC News, Familiar feeling about Greek Elections, Richard Galpin, March 4th, 2004,
The first political television advertisements made their appearance in 1990 while later in the same decade they were transformed from party television advertisements to party leader television advertisements, promoting – in several instances - the future Prime Minister on a greater scale than the actual promotion of the political program of the parties.

This phenomenon of image campaigning in Greece did not occur overnight but evolved gradually, through the development of professional political campaigning, the involvement of political consultants in Greek elections and the increase in the use of technologically advanced means in promoting the messages of the candidates. It could be argued that the employment of foreign political consultants from Greek parties during parliamentary elections have caused the import of American ideas, techniques and strategies in the Greek political arena. However, it is in fact true that even some Greek political consultants and campaign experts, claim to have had considerable inspiration from American elections\textsuperscript{17}.

In order to observe the promotion of the image of party leaders in Greece and their similarities - if any - with American campaigning, a closer look to the campaigns of the New Democracy party and of the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) in the 2004 parliamentary elections must be analysed further.

\textsuperscript{17} Yannas, P. “The role of image makers in the Greek Political scene” \textit{Journal of Political Marketing}, Vol.1,(1), p.81, 2002
The 2004 Parliamentary Election Campaigns

A crucial part of modern election campaigning is the television presentation of candidates, whether that is on televised debates, television news or paid advertisements. The most successful way of promoting one’s message is via paid advertisements, since the public receives the exact message that the party wants to communicate, without any external influences from the comments of journalists or political analysts.

The 2004 television advertisements of PASOK, although very professional in production, cannot be described as very powerful in terms of messages. In fact, there were very few references to the details of the political program of PASOK and its candidate for the premiership, George Papandreou. The messages promoted in these advertisements were vague and without any real substance. PASOK did not have one specific message in its television advertisements. Instead, it used different slogans in each advertisement. Some of these slogans were: “I HOPE - I DECIDE - I VOTE”, “TOGETHER IN VICTORY, TOGETHER IN A NEW AGE”, “WE UNITE GREEKS, WE CHANGE GREECE”, “WE GIVE A COMMAND- WE CHANGE THE ERA”, etc. Furthermore, the use of a different music theme in most of the advertisements showed no signs of a unified approach or a coherent structure in PASOK’s television campaigning.

Papandreou only appeared in the party’s television advertisements very late in the campaign. This can be attributed to the fact that he was elected as the president of PASOK only one month before the elections took place and there was a limited time for the preparations and the promotion of Papandreou as a leader and a possible future Prime Minister of the country.

The television advertisements, in which Papandreou took part in, exposed the lack of the candidate’s knowledge for the problems of the Greek people. Characteristically, in an advertisement in which he appears as a narrator he says: “I see happy faces, people who have a vision and strength and hope for the future. Let us change the era so that every Greek opens his road to the sun”. The advertisement showed pictures of farmers, working mothers, young people and villagers. Looking at their faces, there was nothing hopeful or happy about them. Instead watching them, created a feeling of dissatisfaction. This advertisement, although it aimed at giving people hope, it did not illustrate that Papandreou had a strong indication or an in-depth knowledge of the problems of the groups portrayed in
the advertisement. Instead, it showed that he was rather utopian with a lack of the realistic situation of the country’s population and their particular concerns.

Other advertisements demonstrated the positive steps that PASOK made during its time in Government, emphasizing the years of the Kostas Simitis administration. These advertisements showed buildings that were restored, bridges that were built and new constructions that took place during those years.

In another set of television spots, a historical background of PASOK was given, featuring previous leaders of the party and their achievements. This spot can be considered as a mistake on behalf of the PASOK leadership in that it promoted a political environment that was tiresome for the public due to its twenty years in government. Moreover, it was controversial to the party’s parallel campaign for a renewed PASOK with new people and new ideas in a new government. Some of the slogans used to promote this new PASOK in government were: “PASOK: MOVEMENT OF CHANGE” and “THE POWER OF CHANGE”. The promotion of change by PASOK was also misleading since in fact there would be no considerable change of policies and practices in government. The only difference would be that the people executing them would be somewhat different from the ones who were in power for the last twenty years.

The New Democracy (ND) television campaign focused more on getting its message across rather than the leader’s image. The first advertisement that made its appearance on television was one where picturesque sites of Greece paraded along with the message “The places we loved need a new vision”. The specific advertisement was characterized as a touristic advertisement rather than a political one18, which is not a completely invalid point. However, and in contrast to PASOK’s spots, the rest of the ND advertisements that followed illustrated specific solutions to identified problems that the public was facing. Spots talked in figures, putting forward the political program of the party and consequently its candidate for the premiership, Kostas Karamanlis.

The slogans used in the advertisements of ND were precise and were repeated regularly. Specifically, the slogans used were: “FOR ALL GREEKS” and “THE COUNTRY NEEDS POLITICAL CHANGE”. The face of ND’s leader and premiership candidate Karamanlis appeared in all television advertisements at the end of the spot along with the slogan.

Although Karamanlis could get involved in negative campaigning against Papandreou, he was obviously advised not to, in order to absorb the voters of PASOK that were not satisfied

18 «Χαλαρή η προσέγγιση μέσω των διαφημίσεων», article in Kathimerini newspaper, 6 March 2004.
with the PASOK government and consequently would not vote for Papandreou. It is understandable that if he was to get caught up in negative campaigning he would most likely push away those voters. In fact, the ND campaign concentrated on limited negative campaigning aiming at the outgoing government and the people’s dissatisfaction from its performance\(^\text{19}\). Specifically, they used lines such as “PASOK offered what it had to offer during its twenty years in government. It is now time for a new government”.

The lack of extensive negative campaigning from ND managed to promote a suitable image for Karamanlis in his pursuit of the premiership, as he appeared to be superior to previous candidates since he did not need to accuse anyone in order to get elected. Instead, he successfully presented his political program and convinced the public that the actions he was about to take from the position of prime minister were strong enough to get him elected. PASOK’s negative campaigning was also limited to promoting ND as a party of the radical right, while trying to portray itself as more of a centre party rather than a socialist party.

PASOK was successful in getting the media’s attention through the large rallies that were organized. In fact, Papandreou toured around Greece speaking publicly and exhibiting, via the media, that PASOK was powerful and popular enough in every corner of the country. On the other hand, Karamanlis concentrated on his messages instead of the mass rallies. While touring across the country he promoted that it was time for the people to trust their government and that he was ready to listen to the public’s views, problems and suggestions\(^\text{20}\). The only instance in which Karamanlis appeared to handle the power of the media much better than Papandreou was when very bad weather conditions occurred in Athens and its suburbs. While both leaders visited places that were affected badly by the extreme weather conditions, only Karamanlis visited nearby places that were also accessible to television crews. On the contrary, Papandreou only managed to have phone conversations with the televised media since he went to more isolated areas\(^\text{21}\).

After achieving a high concentration of their members, both parties, aimed at attracting the 12 per cent of voters that claimed to be undecided\(^\text{22}\). The difference in their approach to these groups of people was once again the messages that were communicated to them. Karamanlis managed to reach the people that were dissatisfied with the PASOK Government (the farmers, working mothers and young people) and remind them of the mistakes of the PASOK government, while also demonstrating the new measures that were

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\(^{19}\) «Εντός των Τείχων», article in *Kathimerini* newspaper, 1 February 2004.

\(^{20}\) Article of Kostas Karamanlis during the election campaign of 2004 www.e-logos.gr

\(^{21}\) «Τι ελπίζουν, τι φοβούνται ΠΑΣΟΚ και ΝΔ», article in *To Vima* newspaper, 15 February 2004

\(^{22}\) «Στις ειδικές ομάδες στοχεύει ο Καραμανλής» article in *Kathimerini* newspaper, 15 February 2004
proposed by ND and Karamanlis for their specific needs. On the contrary, PASOK did not make any distinctions between specific characteristics of these groups and talked to them generally, in a vague manner and without any substance.

The use of the Internet was extensive on behalf of PASOK and of Papandreou in particular through his personal website. PASOK’s website contained all the promotional material produced for the purpose of the 2004 campaign. The visitor could watch the television spots and listen to the radio spots of the campaign online, while it was feasible to print the leaflets of the campaign and read the speeches of the party leader from the comfort of his home. The actual political program was also available to every visitor. ND’s use of the Internet was much more restricted, its website not being up to the standards of PASOK’s equivalent.

Karamanlis suggested to Papandreou, on the day he was elected President of PASOK, to arrange four televised debates\(^\text{23}\) during the election campaigns. Three of these debates would be between the two leaders and one between all five leaders of the parties that took part in the campaign. Papandreou agreed to a head to head debate that would take place on the 26\(^{\text{th}}\) of February 2004. However, Papandreou was pressured from members of his party\(^\text{24}\), not to take part in this debate as there was a risk he would not be able to exceed the rhetoric of Karamanlis. One day before the debate, Papandreou announced that it was not fair to the other three party leaders not to be included in the election debate and although it seemed that the debate was about to be cancelled the other party leaders accepted the offer and the debate took place as planned.

In the debate, Papandreou was asked to explain some of the controversial elements and actions of the Simitis Government. Instead of appearing ready to account for some of the omissions made on behalf of his party while in power, he struggled to emphasize that party members were renewed and that central policies of the current Government would be altered in a new PASOK Government under himself. Furthermore, he seemed rather nervous and stressed, often looking at his notes carefully before answering any questions. Karamanlis seemed more confident and eager to give answers to the questions raised to him. Overall, Karamanlis successfully communicated an image of being a more suitable and better prepared candidate than his opponent for the Prime Minister’s post\(^\text{25}\).

\(^{23}\) «Ο κ. Κ. Καραμανλής αλλάζει σελίδα», article in Τo Βίνα newspaper, 8 February 2004.
\(^{25}\) «Οφθαλμοφανής η διαφορά των αρχηγών» article in Kathimerini newspaper, 27 February 2004.
At the elections of March 7th, 2004, Karamanlis and ND won with a percentage of 46.40 of the total votes, while Papandreou and PASOK acquired 41.48 per cent of the votes.
Image of the two Party Leaders in the 2004 Election Campaigns

The two larger parties in Greece managed to conduct election campaigns which on the one hand maintained numerous differences between them, while on the other hand they shared some fundamental similarities. Emphasis was given to the personal image of both party leaders running for the premiership. However, it is doubtful that any political communication professional can claim that either campaign was Americanised or entirely Modernised. This can be explained when looking closely to the two campaigns, what they aimed and what they finally achieved overall.

Papandreou and PASOK attempted to run a campaign that revolved around the image of the candidate for the premiership. Their campaign had little to do with the party’s ideologies and issues while it distinguished the party from the candidate to a large extent. Of course this was done strategically, in order to promote their slogans for ‘effective change’ and ‘a new era’ from the PASOK Government.

The messages promoting the campaign of Papandreou were very vague, they lacked in substance and included very limited references to figures and specific measures of his suggested political program. The participation of new people in the leadership of PASOK struggled to promote an overall renewal and modernisation of the party’s management that would consequently result in an entirely fresh PASOK administration in the event of Papandreou’s election.

Furthermore, the Papandreou campaign used limited negative campaigning which proved to be wise, considering the likeability of his opponent among the voters. He used negative campaigning verbally and not on any printed or electronic media. Moreover, he made excellent use of the technologies available to him, since he had a very comprehensive and interactive website with all the information a voter needed.

One of Papandreou’s crucial mistakes was the fact that he made tremendous efforts in order to separate his own image from PASOK’s. Everything around his campaign demonstrated major changes that were about to take place with a possible Papandreou government. However, Papandreou as a Minister of Foreign Affairs of the outgoing PASOK Government was held accountable for many of the mistakes made while his party was in power. In other words, he struggled between promoting his own new vision for the country and apologising for the errors and misjudgements of his party’s administration.
In the opposing field, Karamanlis managed to conduct a much more balanced campaign with the use of messages and issues being the campaign’s priorities, while his image was employed as a complimentary element to the campaign. The campaign carried out by ND included, among other things, the deployment of comprehensive messages, detailed explanations of the political program of the candidate and frequent interaction with the public. The very limited negative campaigning conducted by ND revolved around the PASOK administration instead against Papandreou himself. This tactic enhanced Karamanlis’ positive image by demonstrating that he was able to win the elections based on his own innovative ideas and fresh vision for the country.

Karamanlis’ campaign seemed to be lacking in terms of technologically advanced means. He did not manage to use the Internet effectively in order to promote his messages and political program on that level as well. Furthermore, ND’s own website was not as competent as PASOK’s online portal and therefore less accessible and of a lower appeal to voters.

A positive aspect of Karamanlis’ campaign is the fact that he managed to sustain a harmonic inter-relationship between the issues and his image, the party and himself and ND’s ideology in relation to his messages. In this sense, he managed to make it both an ND campaign as well as a Karamanlis campaign, whereas something similar was not observed vividly in the Papandreou campaign.

On a personal level, Papandreou aimed at promoting himself as an athletic person and a good husband. He attempted to demonstrate his close links to foreign politicians by emphasising his performance as a Minister of Foreign Affairs. Overall, Papandreou did not manage to display that he was indeed capable of being perceptive of the public’s concerns nor did he suggest viable and specific solutions to their problems. It can be argued that he underestimated the public’s perceptions and expectations and that he made wrong judgements of what the people really look forward to from a candidate for the premiership. Furthermore, he seemed unprepared for the campaign he was conducting as if he rushed into it at the very last minute. Although Papandreou has been involved in parliamentary politics longer than Karamanlis, in the duration of the 2004 campaign he revealed a political immaturity, through a series of mistakes that could either be due to unsuccessful organisational skills or due to the misjudgement over the public’s desires.

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26 George Papandreou was elected Member of the Parliament for the first time in 1981, while Kostas Karamanlis was elected Member of the Parliament for the first time in 1989.
Karamanlis revealed a stronger candidacy, with firm views and precise suggestions. He appeared to be facing the public with respect and avoided miscalculations of their potential as a society, a workforce and voters. He seemed to be much more prepared for this battle than his opponent was, while he also emerged very confident in his public speeches and appearances. Karamanlis dealt with issues as most opposition leaders would: he understood what the public looked for and raised the focus of his political program towards their needs and expectations in a coherent and persuasive manner.

It is of course important to remember that the 2004 parliamentary elections were the second for Karamanlis as a party leader and candidate for the premiership, having lost in 2000 to his opponent and 2004’s outgoing Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis. Since the summer of 200327, Karamanlis’ political advisors and campaign planners must have had certain expectations of the changes that were about to occur in PASOK regarding the leadership transition just before the election. Such calculations could certainly have given them a head start as to the planning of the campaign, while enabling them to adopt techniques that would promote Karamanlis and employ their – arguably limited - negative campaigning against the then PASOK Government instead of Papandreou. ND was given an advantage that proved to be valuable for the better development of the strategies and campaign techniques of the parliamentary elections of 2004.

Conclusion

Greece enjoyed advancement in the professionalization of its election campaigns during the last decade. The campaigns of 2004 in particular, concentrated on both the image of the candidates and the issues raised by their parties. Both candidates for the premiership ran competent campaigns while being under the guidance of campaign experts.

Overall, the campaigns of both Greek parties examined in this paper do not demonstrate any similarities to campaigns conducted in American elections were the campaigns are mainly image-based. On the contrary, party politics play a crucial role in the Greek political scene. Moreover, Greece has a very stable voting behaviour with large numbers of the public being closely affiliated to political parties in the country.

Additionally, Greek political parties demonstrate signs of modern election campaigning with the use of balanced campaigns promoting both the image and personality of the leader as well as the issues that are supported by the parties. All the messages are promoted by party officials, via both traditional methods such as public rallies and radio interviews and modern methods such as television advertisements, colourful posters and magazine advertisements. Furthermore, the employment of Internet websites and online forums are signs of further advancement of the election campaigns in the Greek political environment.

As a result, Greek election campaigns cannot be described as Americanised in any way since they do not illustrate any signs of copying identical techniques in image campaigning from the ones conducted in the USA. On the contrary, Greek parties follow the modernised image campaign model, in which they adopt specific techniques that suit the political, economic and cultural environment of the country.

Conclusively, Karamanlis managed to acquire the trust of the voting public to a reasonably high degree by outlining in detail his policies and proposals regarding their major problems. Papandreou on the other hand, based his campaign more on his image, something that admittedly proved fruitful regarding the increase of the party’s percentage in the final election result compared to the opinion polls conducted during the period of the election campaign examined in the present paper. However, PASOK did not manage to win the election and came second by a five per cent difference of total votes from ND. Papandreou had a clear
disadvantage: that of the broad dissatisfaction over the Simitis administration and the public's desire for radical change in the state of the country.

It is worth reflecting upon the possibility of whether an image campaign of Papandreou would have resulted differently if the public was not as dissatisfied with the outgoing Simitis administration. Indeed, it would have been a phenomenal transition for Greece to elect a head of government who would structure his campaign primarily around his image. That would have definitely been an indication of Americanisation's emergence in the Greek political scene.
Bibliography


Examining the Europeanization of West European Communism: The Greek Communist Party and Europe

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Abstract
The paper seeks to understand the tactics employed by the Greek Communist Party vis a vis European integration, through the distinction and interaction between strategy and ideology. In so doing, it places analysis within a broader investigation of the Europeanization of West European Communism. The Greek communist party, the paper argues, is one of those few that retain an orthodox Marxist-Leninist argumentation against the EU. But its communist ideology also has two dimensions: one related to Soviet history and doctrines and one rooted in the values of Marxism-Leninism. While the party has been Europeanized to a mild extent, as expected of all parties with a parliamentary presence, its orthodox stance has remained unaltered and the party has chosen the tactic of pursuing strategic goals without flexing its ideology. This is portrayed through a summary of the existing literature, the condensation of preliminary results from the study of party documents and essays by party theoreticians, as well as interviews with party officials. Both policy rhetoric and international affiliations are examined.
Introduction

While the study of Euroscepticism is rich in evidence and analysis, the essence of Europeanization as a process of party change and the analysis of the tactical maneuvers of parties in response to this process, have been left under-theorized. The existing literature has paid limited attention to the actual Europeanization of WECPs as a process of altering its various mechanisms and adjusting its original character, whether at the policy or organizational level. Certain studies have focused on the ‘perceptions’ these parties have of Europe, while others have simply outlined party discourse on various EU treaties. Many scholars have theorized ‘principled’ Euroscepticism of the left but have failed to examine its content in detail and subsequently provide us with distinct and comprehensive hypotheses concerning the factors conditioning the Europeanisation of political parties. Following recent theorizations on party strategy and ideology the crust of the chapter’s argument is that the Europeanization of communism can be better understood by distinguishing between ideology and strategy and examining their interaction. The chapter essentially attempts to achieve two tasks: derive a conception of Europeanization of West European communism and apply this theorization to the case of the Greek communists.

The next section constructs a theoretical framework, based on strategy/ideology interaction, to account for the change imposed (or avoided) by Europeanization. The more rigid tendency and the antithesis between the KKE and most WECPs, is explored in the third section. Analysis covers mainly the KKE’s ideological orientation vis a vis Marxism Leninism and Soviet history and then socio-economic concerns – as these are known to be the core of communist ideology – and explores emphatically the KKE’s policy rhetoric in an attempt to portray as vividly as possible how unchanged Marxist-Leninist ideology translates into European policy rhetoric. It also briefly covers the party’s international affiliations in an attempt to extent the argument emphasizing the KKE’s attachment to orthodox communism. The concluding section evaluates the fit between the case-studies and the framework and suggests possible rationales underlying the KKE’s tactical approach to Europe.

Theoretical Framework: Understanding Marxist-Leninist Euroscepticism

Party tactics: Ideology and strategy
The labels ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ (Euroscepticism) offer a valuable but crude tool for researchers who wish to account for intra-party-family variations of a party’s tactical approach towards European integration. In an attempt to solve this problem some scholars referred to the distinction between ideology- and strategy-driven Euroscepticism (Kopecky and Mudde, 2005; Rovny, 2004): parties ranging from soft to hard Euroscepticism can be thought of combining different volumes of ideology and strategy at the same time. Other scholars have also briefly referred to ideology and strategy as distinct entities of party tactics (Conti, 2005, Conti and Verzichelli, 2005). Even, scholars who view Euroscepticism as a predominantly strategic issue, have repeatedly referred to the interaction between ‘interests’ and ‘ideology’, although conceptualizing these within the politic of opposition and emphasizing the government-opposition dimension (Sitter, 2001). Truly, the distinction between strategy and ideology has remained quite subsumed into broader formulations of Euroscepticism. Perhaps, as Batory (2001:21) concluded, there is an uneven explanatory power of ideology which is ‘caused by the fact that some parties are more closely associated with one clear ideological strand than others’. Likewise, Marxist-Leninism as the main reason for initially rejecting fully European Integration and the EC must be conceived as a very distinct ideological strand.

Therefore, in addition to the prevailing view in the literature that parties make choices between competing goals (votes, office, policy), for communist parties there is another ignored dimension of choice between all or either of these goals and ideological preservation. To understand fully the maneuvers and changes of WECPs, as induced by the process of Europeanization, one has to study both the intention to maintain their core ideological baggage (which in its original form is in complete opposition to European integration) and the intention to satisfy other strategic goals (which are a manifestation of electoral competition). To incorporate these two approaches it is pertinent that strategy on the one hand, which is a major concern for all parties embracing multi-party politics, should be distinguished from the equally important attention these parties must accord to ideology. Moreover, the two must be conceptualized as competing, insofar communist ideology remains Euro-rejecting or inherently Eurosceptic.

**Ideology**

Ideology was an external component, which is not part of electoral politics and party competition. It wasn’t born to protest within capitalism and the various ideologies that are born from within its superstructure and institutionalized into parties or movements. It was indeed an ideology inherently opposite and one protesting against the economic system of capitalism and its political
manifestations. In the case of communist parties all three goals, or better utility maximization, can be pursued only within a specified context of ideological predilections, which does not aim at satisfying any designated interests but is rather linked to a system of beliefs. This context exists on another dimension which constitutes, in essence, the very limits of WECP activity. This ideology, which is in its own essence opposition to and disbelief in the potentials of capitalism is precisely what differentiates these parties from others with milder ideologies, vaguer identities or ones that do not see class capitalism as the main enemy. Every ideology is different. And scholars of theory have disagreed both on its precise epistemological definition and on the amount importance they tend to accord it.

The ideological dimension of party tactics must be classified as an element that incorporates two dimensions: ideology in the normative sense and ideology in the more abstract sense. The former, is a consequence of the Soviet Union being identified as the true and utmost expresser of Marxism-Leninism and communist society. In the face of large currents of propaganda being directed against this country, throughout the Cold War, the third principle of international proletarianism, (that is, protecting the interests of the Soviet Union) became an important rule to abide by and characterized many parties as much as they were characterized as Marxist-Leninist. Therefore, the fact that parties of the communist family adhered to Soviet doctrines, decisions and pacts… Additionally, insofar a more literature-involved definition of ideology is followed then the very origin of a party is also thought to constitute the core of its identity (Mair and Mudde, 1995); and communist parties originated from the reverberations of the Russian revolution and were financially supported by the subsequent Soviet governments (e.g. see Urban, 1986 and others). The nature of the abstract notion of ideology is different, for this very reason; that it was based on theory, vision and prospect, (as most theorists define it after all).

Thereafter, the flexing of ideology will encompass less attention on either of the above dimensions and may gradually lead to either, no relations with the Soviet/Russians, of course involving closer relations with non-communist forces and/or, a set of policies that accept some (many or few) aspects of European integration, either by accepting their countries membership or by voting for EU-related change that is disaccord with their constituency interests. These so called ‘compromised policies’ will reflect less and less the original, revolutionary identity of the party. In most cases, the normative notion of communist ideology has been abandoned before the abstract and in most cases that survived enough to see its collapse, the past of the party was discussed and found guilty (the Cypriot, Portuguese, Spanish cases would be the most
illustrative). At the same time, while Soviet attachment was dropped and criticized, the majority of communists still defend the more abstract notion, as one that does not necessarily correlate with the Soviet past. And while these terms may appear as fluid and open to interpretation, most scholars tend to agree on important flexing points in the history of communist parties (references and information).

Figure 1.

The flexing of ideology

In both the epistemological sense but also when conceived as targeting votes, office or policy, the flexing of communist ideology must be conceived not in the abstract sense but with regard to the existing elements of communist orthodoxy. A potential flexing may take various forms: 1) Both or either the soviet and more theoretical dimensions can be diluted and ideological identity will thus be flexed (examples from WECPs); 2) ideological policy can be flexed but the identity part can remain intact, although this betrays the very essence of communist struggle and may lead to
internal conflicts or activist unrest (as in AKEL). The possible ways that either identity or policy can be flexed are various: references to Marxist readings may be limited or absent; references to policy change and more specifically, in our case, the absence of critical analysis on important EU developments also signifies dilution. And of course the very act of voting for policies that are against the party original programme is also an act of flexing.

Strategy: A Redefinition

Following a vast quantity of party literature I define party strategy as the party’s coherent approach to satisfy one or some of three main goals depending on its priorities; 1) Pursuit of office 2) Maximization of votes (including concern for more long-term electoral performance) 3) Pursuit of policy (Strom and Muller, 1999; Laver and Schofield, 1990; Budge and Laver, 1986; Riker, 1962; Downs 1957). The three goals are predominantly seen by the coalition literature as competing, as parties may have to compromise one in order to achieve the other. For example an office seeking party may have to forego compromises in its policy program, in order to enter a coalition and subsequently implement policy that was not in its ideal policy program (for an analytical discussion of the interaction between vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking models of party behavior, see, Müller and Strøm 1999: 5-9).

The three goals, vote maximization, office seeking and strategic policy pursuit, shape a broad formula on how a party, functioning under the tenets of electoral competition is going to compete and satisfy and/or protect its interests. As mentioned above, the most fundamental assumption of public choice literature is that parties are rational actors maximizing utility. In the case of parties, “utility” can be translated into: votes and/or office and/or policy. Nevertheless, these goals must not be perceived as mutually exclusive, but as complementary. Although each has both an intrinsic dimension, that is the satisfaction of doing it, they can also be conceived as instrumental, in the sense that they lead to subsequent goals (Muller and Strom 1999; introduction). In other words, vote maximization is an instrumental goal, as it is the means to gain office and this in turn is the means to influence policy. Therefore, the pursuit of policy is closely connected with the pursuit of office, since a party aiming at influencing policy must firstly gain office. Truly, government parties that are in office on their own or the strongest coalition partners are usually the ones with the most votes and with the most public posts, thus influencing policy the most. In other words many parties (if not most) that succeed in obtaining one goal succeed in the others as well. And the level of achieving one goals correlates with the level achieved by the others For example, if a party gains many votes, then it is more likely, than its competitors on its side of the
political spectrum, to have more power (either be in government alone or act as the dominant coalition partner (or even by exercising more coalition potential to others in a coalition as dominant partners usually do (references) and in turn exercise more policy dimensions and dominate more public posts. It is, therefore, worth looking at these parties as pursuing all three goals simultaneously, under the general label “utility”.

In Muller and Strom’s formulation, policy is defined as a deeply ideological concern and policy seeking as having an intrinsic dimension: a sincere caring for the policies in question, which leads an attempt to shape public policy towards its preferred dimension. However, at the same time, Muller and Strom, as well as most theorists, while acknowledging the instrumental dimension of policy pursuit which is the strategic use of policy making as a means to an end, they also accord it limited importance. It is with a clearer distinction between strategy and ideology, as well as more emphasis on this intrinsic dimension that policy pursuit can be better understood as having the same two dimensions that party tactics have; one related to interests and one to ideology. The former entails policy making that aims at satisfying, either the abstract notion of political power or the interests of the party’s selective constituency or, following a more principle-based approach, to keep the right out of government and essentially avoid worst policies or even to gather more electoral support for the next elections. In this vein while policy may definitely prove harmful in terms of votes, it must not be conceived as competing to office but merely as its result; because even a compromised policy making will lead to the satisfaction of one or more of these concerns. Coalition theory’s conception of the policy-seeking party sees the party’s success in pursuing its policies as depending on its ability to change public policy toward its most preferred positions or to prevent undesirable changes. Therefore, according to Muller and Strom (1994:7), the crucial question is whether party leaders will regard the results of policy-making as successes or failures in policy terms. But this is not only a matter of policy positions. Obviously party leaders prefer less compromises than more; nevertheless, the very act of policy making achieves a strategic satisfying of at least one of the reasons cited above as motivations for what Muller and Strom term as the intrinsic dimension of policy making.

In simple terms, policy pursuit illuminates a something previous scholars have identified: that there exists (strategic) policy-making, not linked to ideological predilections but simply to utility maximization. This illuminates three possible arguments why strategic policy and ideological policy must be conceptualized as different. Firstly, because strategic policy is pursued at specific times and not randomly and frequently, indicating important re-theorization at the level of the
leadership. Mainstream parties have been recorded to shift along the policy dimension both frequently and infrequently depending on the domestic factors but more extremist parties of a non-catch-all nature do not (see Ezrow et al., 2006). But even when they do, it is less frequently that they alter their ideological policy substantially, to an extent that causes media speculation or supporter unrest. If we specify the external constraint that imposes undesirable policies, as the EU, the ideological policy would see either its abandonment or its drastic reform depending on the communist party’s ideology at the time of the EU’s creation.

Secondly, because the decision for ideological policy change arises in periods where external shocks which affect the macro-environment (such as after the dissolution of socialism or, the collapse of fascism and the subsequent rise in liberal democracy and party competition) are very pressurizing. Hence, ideological policy must be conceived as something that exists intact for a longer period of time. This is why major policy changes are broadly framed through very few key Congresses – that are also identified as such by the present literature. Strategic policy making involves a decision that is discussed frequently among party leaders and more specifically every time an election approaches. Decisions to follow strategic policy arises more easily since they are influenced only by the microenvironment of the party depending on many factors such as the duration of the party out of office, the expectations and ambitions of the leadership, as well as who is in government and what are the needs, opportunities and prospects for a possible participation in coalition. In the light of ample evidence about constant communist compromises, once in coalition (Dunphy and Bale, 2006), the party may pursue policy making and undergo compromises for the three reasons stated above. In other words, the decision of party leaders between votes and policy, as well as between ideology and strategic policy-making will be taken before the actual participation in government. The party elite, composed of professional politicians will most certainly be able to foresee some of the potential compromises, under coalition government, or, at least be ready to allow them. When communist party leaders make a decision to participate in government with non-communist forces, they must be viewed as strategic maximisers, from the very moment the decision is taken, or at least that the leadership accepts to flex their ideology to the extent that it will raise suspicion to some (depending on the level of compromise).

The other two goals (votes and office) are not as complicated in their nature as the act of policy pursuit, because they do not have a dimension that is underlined by ideological principles in the abstract sense of the term. The compromises that these may bring are only related to material
concerns and needs that are shaped within the arena of electoral competition and not the external dimension. For example, Muller and Strom (1996: 9) argue that, ‘Contrary to office and policy seeking votes can only plausibly be instrumental goals’. This instrumentality lies in the fact that votes are conceived within the mechanisms of electoral competition; hence, more apart from the pure concept of ideology (in the case of the communists, reforming drastically or disbanding the EU). But even office seeking does not have an intrinsic dimension, in the same manner as policy pursuit does, that is, a deep concern about the party’s preferred policies; because, such a concern would only be able to materialize where the party is alone in government. Again, in the light of ample communist ‘compromises’, leaders are familiar with the sacrifices of office in terms of ideology and at the time of making the decision to participate in government, they instantly accept foregoing policy shifts, at least in voting. Especially considering, that a totally Euroreject ideology has never been able to secure office for any communist party, or for that matter any of the utility associated with the three goals, at least some policy change must appear as necessary to the eyes of the leadership. After all, perhaps there was a reason why the intrinsic and instrumental value of office had not been traditionally been distinguished (Budge and Laver, 1986: 490).

Party tactics: Ideology versus strategy

There are two methodological reasons why this study proposes a clearer distinction between strategy and ideology. While the two are inextricably linked (e.g. many scholars refer to strategy to mean both strategic concerns and ideological maneuvers) there is extra analytical value to distinguish between the two and view them as competing, as it opens up new conceptions. For example, that some communist party leaders may truly view the two as competing – in the sense that either Marxist-Leninist ideology needs a constant reinterpretation in order to fit current conditions or new tactics need to be discovered to win over a Europeanized electorate – and conceive themselves in an ongoing balancing act. In this sense they may be seen as either ‘rational-choicers’, ‘true ideologues’ or, ‘half rational-choicers and half ideologues’. Secondly, while the first and third trend have been phlegmatically examined by the literature (Dunphy, 2005; Benedetto et al. 2006) this approach may be used to illuminate more clearly the tactics that many ‘ideologically unflexed’ parties (possibly comprised of true ideologues) choose in order to achieve strategic goals; these parties are the ones that either believe in the potentials of such a tactical struggle to change the superstructure in favor of them or give primacy to ideology, as opposed to utility maximization.
The foundational stone to the logic of competitiveness between ideology and strategy (as defined above) is merely the assumption that once a shift form a fully rejectionist stance of capitalism (and therefore, the EU) to a reformist one, then the potential for maximizing either, or, all of the three identified strategic goals (that is more utility) is improved. Firstly, at the theoretical level, since the enduring and prevailing nature of the EU (which as it has been widely recorded it has become increasingly salient throughout its expansion (Ray, 1999), have established a deeply capitalist project of integration and consequently shaped an increasingly capitalist prevailing mentality that at least sees the EU as an inevitable (if not desired) reality with many liberal (if not neo-liberal) features, an ideology that totally rejects capitalism is far from the necessary mentality of achieving votes, office or policy; neither, of the three goals can be easily achieved. Under the current superstructure in Western Europe, as shaped by the dominance of the EU model, Marxist-Leninist jargon can only hope (at best) for a substantial part of the anti-capitalist protest vote; especially when considering the rise of green parties, new left parties and even extreme right parties with a touch of populism, this protest vote is more likely to be shared widely and indeed this has been documented as a factor for the electoral decline of Western communism (see Ramiro, 2003; Fattore and Bohrer 2003; others).

As Hix (1999:80-81) asserts ‘Anti-integration stances will only have limited class and sectoral appeal’. Therefore, vote seeking will become more effective once a shift to the right is made, thus competing with the Liberals and social-democrats for a much bigger part of the electorate who are placed closer to the center. Parallels can be drawn between such a shift towards the centre (in a one dimensional space) or towards the centre and upwards (in a two-dimensional space), and the famous shift that Kirchheimer’s catch-all parties underwent, as a result of the changing socio-economic conditions of Western Europe (Kirchheimer,1966; Hough, 2002; Padgett, 2002). Just like the abandonment of the tenants of Marxism Leninism by the PDS (at its 1959 Godesberg Congress) enabled it to act as a party that has the potential to ‘catch all voters’, similarly, the flexing of ideology on the EU would make a communist party acceptable to a broader electorate, while not necessarily bearing on it losses from the protest vote (as Euroscepticism would remain) and as table 2 illustrates it will accord the potential of ‘targeting more voters’ - at least, potentially both in the short- and long-term and depending on the tactical moves it makes. This assumption is also in line with recent studies, showing that that proximity to the centre is related to popular support (i.e., votes) across the multiparty systems of Western Europe. Specifically, ‘parties occupying positions close to the mean voter position are likely to receive modest electoral benefits compared to non-centrist parties’ (Ezrow, 2005; also see
Alvarez, 2000a; 2000b; Schofield, 2004). More relevant to our study, would also be the number of voters with a potential of voting for parties that do not reject EU membership. As recorded by Baromètres, this number remains substantially higher than the protest vote, especially between 1989 and 2005 (Barometer, 1996). Following these trends, we can easily ascribe a neutral/positive attitude towards European integration as one of the positions that characterize the median voter and therefore illuminate the restrictive nature of anti-integration stances, simply based on the validity of studies that have recorded electoral benefits for positions approximate to median voter. Yet, change on European integration is not a simple one-issue change. A shift from a Euroreject position to one of reformism signifies broader ideological changes within the party and brings it closer to the centre on the left-right dimension with regard to all the issues encompassed in this dimension.

In turn, office seeking is thought to be less likely, firstly due to the inability of the protest vote to propel a party to power on its own and secondly since a strongly anti-European party will be viewed as too reactionary for coalition government; or, according to Sitter (2003:8) because European integration is a government-driven process. In effect, policy seeking can only be achieved (at best) at the local level, where the EU issue is less salient, or through the control of trade unions in countries where these are considered as important social partners. And even then, with a general trend towards the increase of blue-collar workers in Western societies, the most radical WECPs have been confirmed of achieving increasingly less power within trade unions.

Perhaps, it was, at least, some of the above concerns that communist parties reflected on, before having conceded to fighting the EC/EU form within and thus it comes as no surprise that out of those parties with parliamentary potential, only the KKE remains a Euroreject. At the empirical level the above expectations are (crudely) confirmed. Notwithstanding the wealth of literature focusing on the domestic problems and challenges each of the parties has faced. Strategic maximization has been better achieved by those parties that have been reformist in their approach to European integration (some like the PCF swinging back and forth) (table 1). In extension, all of those parties that flexed their ideology on integration managed, firstly to gain office through coalitions (either immediately after or in the long-run), ensure policy-making (though compromised in most cases) for their chief constituencies and ensure electoral stability – especially following important historical points like 1989 – or even achieve electoral increases (as in the case of AKEL). The pattern of inflexibility, bearing no strategic achievements and
flexibility showing at least certain signs of strategic maximization has been historically confirmed by the West European communist movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Votes (average % in legislative elections)</th>
<th>Office (total time)</th>
<th>Policy Making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurosceptics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCE &gt;1974</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.9 (1977-2000)</td>
<td>2 years (coalition)</td>
<td>3 ministries researched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCF</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>15.5 (1958-2002)</td>
<td>3 years (coalition)</td>
<td>researched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCI &gt;1960s</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>29.7 (1972-1987)</td>
<td>Ongoing (support)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC &gt; 1992</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>7 years (coalition)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKP</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>(1960-1990)</td>
<td>3 years (support)</td>
<td>Regional posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPK</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5 (1968-1988)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eurorejects</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKP</td>
<td>W.Germany</td>
<td>0.2 (1975-2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8.44 (1981-2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPL</td>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPO</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>researched</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KTP</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.14 (1991-2007)</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>12.5 (1975-2005)</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A few comments must be made in an attempt to interpret and extend the generalized conclusions of the tables. First, as evident from table 1, none of the parties that have remained outright opponents of European integration (have not flexed their ideology) and were seen as purely anti-system on the issue of Europe (PCP, KKE, VKP, DKP) but were also viewed as ideologically extremist, have succeeded in obtaining important strategic benefits, either in terms of their vote share, government participation or policy-making. While the issue of Europe was not, by any means, the sole determinant of these parties’ strategic performance, it has to be reminded that the dimension of ideology encompasses both the element of theory and that of policy. It is, therefore, crucial to note that an ideological change on the issue of Europe is not a simple circumstantial shift in policy rhetoric; it is accompanied by deeper ideological changes that touch upon the very identity of Marxism-Leninism. In other words, parties that did not change their outlook on Europe are the same ones that sidestepped processes of ideological renovation……..give examples.

In contrast, parties like the PCI, SKP/VAS, V (at least by the end of the 1960s) and AKEL (after 1989) that were not viewed as anti-system movements with inflexible jargon but rather as reformist (whether they campaigned for radical or soft reformism), or, at least, somehow conciliatory towards capitalism, have been the most successful among the party family, in terms of all strategic goals. Actually, even for parties that swung back and forth from Euro-rejectionism, like the PCF, it was after they changed their EU policy that government participation and policy making was realized.

With regard to vote maximization, the picture is somehow blurred. Change in EU policy has not improved the parties’ rank in the party system (except from AKEL) and the trend among the more lenient parties (Eurosceptics) does not clearly indicate easier success. In any case, two points need to be stressed. Firstly, the average vote of the Eurorejects is much lower than that of the Eurosceptics, indicating greater appeal on the behalf of the latter. Once again, it appears that the
theoretical extremism that underlies the total rejection of Europe does not easily attract voters. Secondly, once the constant ups and downs of Soviet foreign policy, the subsequent ‘fire and ice’ that CPs were put through (Lazar, 1988) and eventually the impact of existing socialism’s dissolution are taken under consideration, the insights are clearer: change as initiated and completed during the 1989-1991 and which in most cases involved a re-assessment on the EU issue, has allowed not only survival but subsequently, a key part in the party system and strong potential for government participation, as in the case of the German PDS which achieved as high as ….the Cypriot AKEL and the re-founded communists in Italy, which appeared from the beginning as pro-European but anti-neo-liberal (Dunphy, 2005; Neugebauer, 2003).

The goal of vote maximization is somehow different than the other two, since it relates more explicitly to domestic factors. While it is argued that a shift from a total rejection of European integration to a more conciliatory stance will definitely make communist ideology more compatible to strategy (and subsequently increase all three strategic goals), any subsequent softening (involving mainly policy compromise) will increase the potential for office and policy, but may or may not lead to a rise in votes. The underlying assumption is that any change in votes will depend on the complex nature of the existing class cleavage, changes in public opinion (that may also be related to non-domestic factors) and more broadly speaking, the complex nature of domestic electoral behavior (see figure 2).

The definition

The approach adopted in this thesis is broad enough to encompass both the issue of ideological identity as reflected by (internal needs) and strategic orientation, as reflected by domestic conditions shaped by the party system and the constant need to play by the rules of electoral competition (external needs). Yet, parties will not always attempt to reach a balance between the maximization of the four strategic goals and the minimization of the loss of identity. Although broad trends in party organization, electoral competition and policy positions have been observed and recorded among party families, this should not obscure the possibility that distinct types of party tactics may persist within the same family. Some parties may prefer to remain ideologically rigid paying little attention to their strategic goals, others will choose to become potentially competitive in the market for office, votes and policy, and some will attempt to maintain a balance. Therefore, whether ideologies are impacted in a similar or different manner, the variety
of trends within the WECP family imply that tactics will differ, thereby leading to a different result in the programmatic and other aspects of each party. From here a more specific definition can be derived:

*The Europeanization of political parties is a process induced by the interaction between (i) ideology and (ii) strategy, based on a conscious decision to change tactics due to an increasingly European context.*

The term “European context” is vital to our definition of Europeanization. It refers to the constantly changing reality (increasing policy transfers to the EU level, supranational institutional building but also a characteristically capitalist path of integration) that calls for parties, as actors in the process of European integration, to define their interests *vis-à-vis* their changing policy, institutional and ideological environment (and its further evolution). Thereafter, European integration as understood here does not only provide parties with a new policy arena and a new institutional environment but also with a new ideological environment. The ideological character of Europeanization is profoundly one of advanced and neo-liberal capitalism. While the political nature of European integration remains contested between the West European communist movement, with some parties appearing more Europeanist than other and more willing to pursue supranational solutions to problems of democratic reconfiguration, the main nucleus of their Eurosceptic arguments revolves around the issue of the economy. Indeed as Dunphy (2005: 172) shows, all radical left parties, including the communists, converge in their critique on seven main points, out of which the economic ones are the most representative of the communists: Maastricht and the neo-liberal nature of economic convergence enshrined in it; increased protection of the environment; stronger regional policies; a full integration of immigrants; more democracy in the EU; anti-militarism and opposition to European subservience to NATO; opposition to the exploitative relations that the EU has developed with many lesser developed countries.

The two figures below illustrate exactly this reasoning. Figure 1 illustrates one possible situation: A Euro-reject ideology, as portrayed through the initial stances of WECPs, is deemed as incompatible with strategic goals and therefore, as distant from them, as illustrated by the distance between A and C. As ideology is flexed (both at the theoretical and policy level), the distance becomes smaller for all three strategic goals, as the party is now located at point B, but especially for office and policy and less for votes. Crucially, the success in votes will depend on the domestic factors that regulate electoral behavior and that are different from those conditioning
bi-partisan negotiations for office. Thereafter, any further flexing of ideology, leading to lower levels of Euroscepticism (point C) may still have the intention of catching more voters, or attaining office, yet its success in doing so, will largely depend on domestic conditions, such as public opinion, the saliency of socio-economic issues among the population, the party’s own historical legacy, the number and maneuvers of radical left and centre-left parties and the salience of the class cleavage among others. The crux of the argument remains that ideology and strategy must be perceived as competing for communist parties acting in electoral competition and that at least a one-off shift towards a less anti-system ideology is widely believed to act as a propeller towards more material achievements. However, equally important is the resilience of all self-proclaimed communist parties to shift towards lower levels of Euroscepticism (point C), essentially remaining different in their programmatic positions from social democrats, as explained by Dunphy (2005). Indeed, all communist parties have flexed their ideology on Europe only once and subsequently retained their Eurosceptic nature Even the PCE, while forgoing programmatic compromises related to EU matters, in exchange fro participation in government with the socialists, soon returned to its Eurosceptic position (Ramiro, 2003; Dunphy, 2005 others). This phenomenon, additionally, illustrates the constraining nature of communist ideology, that if flexed greatly will cease being communist.

Figure 2. Flexing ideology
Figure 2 illustrates a different situation. Rather than flexing communist rhetoric, in an attempt to satisfy strategic goals, a party may choose to leave ideology untouched and strive to fulfill the strategic goals within the orthodox context of Euro-rejection. This may be done through the extensive use of propaganda, more activism on European issues in an attempt to attract disillusioned voters of social democratic parties, through more intensive ideological education on the issue of Europe, through an intensified attempt to integrate the working class in its ranks, through a consistent ideological platform (in an attempt to convince the electorate of its stable character), or through opening up to radical anti-EU student organizations. In this manner the party again attempts to balance strategy and ideology within an increasingly European context. Once again, however, the success of the party’s tactical changes within an un-flexed ideological context – for all three strategic goals this time – will depend on domestic factors.

Surely, the question that arises is why would a party choose this tactic of ideological Euroscepticism, if ideology and strategy are truly competing? There are three possible explanations that relate to the leadership’s perception of strategic benefits on the one hand and to their ideological beliefs on the other. Firstly, the domestic conditions may be such that a Euro-reject position will achieve higher strategic benefits for the party; put differently, in the specific country, ideology and strategy are not competing. Truly, this does not appear to be the case in any of the West European member-states. Secondly, the leadership may decide that ideological
inflexibility will bear more strategic benefits. Once again, the leadership may not conceive ideology and strategy as competing. Thirdly, the leadership may be less interested in achieving office or (strategic) policy and more focused on its ideological beliefs and the genuine programmatic positions that stem from them. In this sense, the party leadership may be composed of true ideologues.

At this point, it is pertinent to clarify two ambiguities. Firstly, the meaning of ‘flexing one’s ideology’ is not as straightforward as it may appear. According to a large camp of intellectuals, activists, scholars and politicians, any accommodation of capitalism may be seen as simple reformism. In another camp, the flexing of ideology represents the necessity of taking communist ideology forward and adjusting it to the prevailing context and in no way does this represent compromise. Therefore, this study defines the flexing of ideology as its reinterpretation into a less anti-system stance. Such an approach achieves two main tasks. Primarily, it saves for more theory-based research, a more informed debate on the line between orthodoxy and reformism, based on the empirical evidence of case studies. Furthermore, it avoids the risk of prejudging any party leader’s or partisan’s conception of communist ideology and its proper position, within the left of the party system, under conditions of electoral competition.

The second ambiguity arises from the difficult task of casting WECPs behavior vis a vis the EU as a conscious choice among the two conflicting goals of ideological preservation and strategic pursuits; it may prove false to do so even if the diversions in communist Euroscepticism certainly point in that direction (author’s own emphasis). In other words, although it is common sense that any party would take electoral objectives under consideration, as part of its decision to modify its position on an issue as crucial as the EU, it is historically debatable whether ideology was on many occasions flexed, as a result of a genuine dissatisfaction with the theory and practice of communism, or in a conscious endeavor to satisfy strategic goals. Some cases, such as that of the Cypriot AKEL indicate that leaders may have flexed their ideology in order to become vital as coalition partners and consequently also act in preventing the right from gaining office as in the. Other cases, however, appear more complicated. A vast amount of ideological theorization by partisans at the time, suggest that, for example, the PCI’s Eurocommunism was partly based largely on its conviction that European integration had the potential of undermining the Cold war division of Europe and superpower hegemony over the continent and the PCE’s similar root stemmed from the theorizations of party secretary Santiago Carillo (see Bracke, 1998; Dunphy, 2005; Benedetto et al, 2006)
It should be repeated, that the Europeanization of political parties is not simply the flexing of ideology – either from a fully anti-system position to a reformist one or from a radical change to less radicalism. In the context of this project, the Europeanization of political parties is merely the interaction between ideology and strategy within a European context; that is either the flexing of ideology towards strategic concerns or the pursuit of these concerns within an un-flexed ideological context (as denoted by Figures 1 and 2). In either instance there is change as induced by Europeanization. Before the next section considers this change and sketches its main dimensions, it is vital to point out those cases where there is no evidence of Europeanization. Following from the definition of Europeanization above, the absence of it, arises when there is neither a flexing of ideology towards strategic concerns nor any pursuit of these concerns within an un-flexed ideological context; in other words, when Europe does not induce any innovation in existing tactics. In the light of the above formulations, three possible occasions arise: 1) Europeanization through flexing; 2) Europeanization through no flexing; 3) No Europeanization.

**The KKE and Europe: Further insights into the KKE’s ideological variant**

*Policy orientations*

Previous studies on the KKE have been very critical of its leadership, mostly concentrating on its persistence to identify with all things Soviet, its Stalinist nature, which ‘falsifies and distorts systematically and beyond recognition even the most self-evident facts of life’ (Kapetayiannis, 1982:454) and concluding that the party’s has proven unable ‘to formulate a credible perspective for Greek socialism” (Olin, 1993:99). Its Stalinist nature apart, however, no scholar delved into a careful analysis of the party’s adherence to its ideology of Marxism-Leninism and its practical application into EU rhetoric. Where a brief analysis has been done by less critical scholars, this sufficed to an outline of its response to Treaties, involving very little analysis of how strategy and ideology interacted to produce this criticism or, what exactly this rhetoric is (see Dunphy, 2005). Here, I will attempt to make the first step towards that direction.

According to the party, there is not anything distinctly theoretical or political about Stalinism as a political and ideological doctrine. “Historical periods are judged and accordingly personas are
placed within them” (personal communication). Criticisms against crimes known to have been committed by Stalin are part of a myth, according to leading partisans cultivated in the 1930s and adopted in the 1940s and 50s mostly in the context of the Cold War. The facts and numbers mentioned by critics of Stalin are historically false, according to all interviewees. For instance, the infamous Moscow Trials, as reviewed and popularized by the then US Ambassador in Moscow, whereby it was ‘proven’ that 10000 Polish were murdered by the Soviet Union, have been examined and proven false by Soviet and other historical literature. According to the party, the myth on Stalinism took such dimensions because the USSR did not withdraw in the face of capitalist pressure and continued to seek socialist change. This aspect of the KEE’s ideological viewpoint relates to what was once conceived as a main component of international proletarianism; in other words, even after the dissolution of socialism, leading party cadres persist in defending the image of achievements of the former Soviet Union. The fact that this is done through a lack of discussion on the Soviet leadership may be one of the reasons that the party has been branded as one of Stalinists but it also shows the KKE’s persistence to identify with the original form of Marxist-Leninist ideology and more importantly it illustrates the special emphasis that the party places on the writings of Lenin.

Additionally, however, as we will see later on, the mysticism and discipline embraced by Stalin has also affected the organizational aspects of the party and inevitably led many of the ‘would be’ supporters of the party to view it with awareness. It wasn’t long ago that Charilaos Florakis, ex-General Secretary of the party and widely respected figure in Greek politics, quoted one of Stalin’s famous exhortations to the Communist Parties’ delegations from capitalist countries attending the Nineteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, “to hold the banner of national independence and sovereignty high and defend it, if you want to be patriots, if you wish to become your country’s leading force” (quoted in Dunphy, 2005:108).

With regard to the events of 1989-1991 socialism was subverted or overthrown – and did not collapse. “Socialism was not a system with rusty legs which disintegrated on its own. There was a procedure with action from a subjective factor. It undeniably affected the whole communist movement globally, but the existence of the Communist Party remains necessary, especially during a phase where the transition from capitalism to socialism is imminent and the contradictions between capital and labor are more discernible than ever” (personal communication). The working class expands and plays a fundamental part in the changing of society towards socialism, argues the party in all Congress documents since its legalization in
1974. “The topicality of socialism is not a new question” KKE General Secretary Aleka Papariga said in a lecture in 2001. “And, of course, it remains true and today, despite the fact that dramatic and unanticipated for all of us developments happened in the beginning of the 1990s; that is to say ‘the inversion of Socialist arrangements Central and Eastern Europe’. Socialism is topical, as in the 19th century were topical the urban revolution, the French revolution and the other urban revolutions that took place” (Papariga, 2001)

Perhaps, one of the most damaging factors, for the KKE, has been its refusal, both during the 13th Congress and afterwards, to discuss the events of 1989 at a level that moved beyond polemics and concentrated on an insightful analysis of Soviet leadership. This has to do, partly with the composition of the orthodox leadership that took over from the 13th Congress onwards and which linked Marxism-Leninism to Soviet orthodoxy; thus making no attempt to disassociate the two or at least publicly denounce certain elements of Soviet socialism that have worried left wingers in Greece.

The party’s stance on social democracy is mirrored in its response to the otherwise widely accepted notion of a ‘Third Way’. A third way has never existed in the opinion of the party. Following Norberto Bobbio (1993), perhaps subconsciously, the forceful claim that Left and Right is an absolute, all dividing and far-reaching reality which conditions society and produces two competing camps is still evident. The camp of neo-imperialism speaks for all forces and movements that reject socialist progress based on the principles of communism, including the Neo-liberals, the Conservatives, the Christian Democrats and even the Social Democrats and the New Left. As shown later on, this is still reflected in the KKE’s domestic approach towards the other parties of the Left (PASOK and SYN).

To emphasize its disagreement with and divergence from the trends of social democracy the ideological office of the party’s Central Committee published a collection of critical essays on the subject, titled “Transformations of Social Democracy and Roamings of the “New Left””, following the collapse of existing socialism. In an article written in the light of the 1989-1991 events, Central Committee member Eleni Bellou (1994) theorizes the uprising of a world-wide denial and rejection of Marxism-Leninism. In its place, argues the author, triumph the so-called democratic socialism (or social democracy) better conceived as ‘capitalist reformism’ by the party. The line between modern social democracy and neo-liberalism is now thinner than ever and the fight between them concentrates on various dilemmas that are at best unnecessary for the working class and at worst exploitative: for example, people are now forced to choose between
‘stabilization’ or ‘development’; complete liberalization of markets or a more functional approach through a ‘careful’ and visible program of privatizations, argues Bellou (1994: 181). The flexibility on economic concerns, as embodied in social democracy is condemned firstly because it diverges significantly from Marxism-Leninism and secondly because it overshadows the real capitalist interests of social democracy through the naïve use of socialist and reformist slogans.

The slogan ‘Popular authority Popular Economy’ encompasses the party’s perception of a socialist future entailing the ‘socialization’ of the means of production. Needless to add that it rejects with repugnance SYN’s evaluation that under current conditions and taking into consideration the international factors and the reciprocity of effects between states no real revolutionary change can take place and no socialism as conceived by the KKE can be achieved.

In Greek politics, the KKE has for long been the outsider on the issue of Europe, with all other three major parties fully supporting Greek membership and further integration. A small exception to this pattern was PASOK’s original dismissal of the EU and “all things Western” under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou. However, the KKE didn’t follow PASOK’s reversal on the European issue and then KKE General Secretary Harilaos Florakis called on his party to step up its condemnation of PASOK’s betrayal, following Greek membership of the EC in 1981 (Dunphy, 2005:105).

However, at the congress of 1983, Florakis chose the tactic of criticizing the socialists ‘constructively’ rather than seek an ideological confrontation with PASOK (Loulis, 1993: 201). Nevertheless, while this may be interpreted as a tactical move in itself, in order to extent the party’s appeal among the protest vote, Florakis had made it clear that the target was ‘left-leaning PASOK supporters who used the same ‘language’ as the KKE, thereby essentially urging no flexing of ideology at all and insisting on ideological propaganda, rather than strategy-maximization (Congress references; also see Loulis, 1993:201). Although the party managed to win over certain key posts in the General Confederation of Greek Workers and state television, through an informal cooperation with PASOK at the societal level, (mostly by constraining its phraseology but not substance of its statements) this was not a crucial point where its radical ideological baggage was replaced by softer one. And as the study’s framework asserts, the KKE made no electoral advance in the next Euroelections (its vote rising by merely 0.7 points) and the parliamentary elections; the PASOK voters of 1981 who deserted their party were split between those opting for the conservatives and those backing the Eurocommunists (Loulis, 1993:203).
The only true moment of near-visible change came with the publication of the party’s Red Book in 1988. It was believed that the party was finally underway to becoming pro-European and seeking to pursue its potentials by leading a left coalition. The party now contemplated a change in the Community’s nature, rather than its total rejection. Once again, this can be attributed to the USSR’s altered stance, which now sought new EC-CMEA trading agreements (Dunphy, 2005:105; Verney 1988). This, however, soon provoked a backlash from party hardliners, led by Aleka Papariga and the EC issue, along with broader ideological and organizational points of internal conflict would be resolved at the most crucial Thirteenth Congress in 1991.

Party factionalism was evident in the KKE much earlier than the 1990s although it was then where the current division between the two existing communist parties was finalized. This long-lasting factionalism, which eventually led to a crisis, can be attributed not least to the issue of European integration. In 1968 a relatively big group split from KKE, forming the KKE interior. At this point, KKE Interior essentially broke ties with the KKE’s Soviet supervision and later established new bonds with parties such as the Communist Party of Italy (PCI), following a Eurocommunist line ever since. Overlooking many of their differences, in 1989 KKE and KKE interior, along with other left parties and organizations, formed the Coalition of the Left and Progress (Synaspismos tis Aristeras kai tis Proodou, or SYN) a name that would soon be associated with the latter of the two factions. The focal point of the renovators’ position was internal reorganization but as various observers (Dunphy, 2005:106; Doukas, 1991), party officials, as well as the Congress proceedings confirm, there was also a struggle on the EC issue in 1988 and 1989, between ‘renovators’ within the party, who favored at least a tactical change of line on Europe to facilitate a Left Coalition, and traditionalists, insisting upon Greek withdrawal from the EC. On the one hand, the ‘renovators’ appealed mainly to the polytechnic generation and on the other, the traditionalists included the oldest members of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, as well as some members of the 1960s generation. Eventually, after a successful cooperation between the two factions during the 1989 European Elections, in which they polled 14.5%, the Thirteenth Congress of the KKE in February 1991, defeated the demand to change the party’s policy of withdrawal from the EC. Demands such as the latter and other wider calls on organizational and programmatic renewal were denounced by ex- and current General Secretaries as “a piece of academic opportunism” (quoted in Dunphy: 2005:106). In July 1991, following the election of Aleka Papariga as the new KKE General Secretary, the KKE announced its withdrawal from the Coalition of Left and Progress. In turn, KKE reformers, led by Maria
Damanaki resigned from the KKE and pledged their loyalty to the Eurocommunist party that would carry the name Synaspismos (SYN). In the face of this split which cost the party a substantial vote share, one questions the party’s concern over the maintenance of party unity and electoral stability and the pursuit of policy-making, as the party repetitively denied to side-step issues of ideological disagreement, especially following a successful united European elections result.

The 13th Congress has to be treated as the most important political affair in the party’s recent history as it not only finalized the split between the KKE and SYN but also because it was held immediately after the party failed to bring about the desired outcome through its cooperation with New Democracy (against the corruption scandals of PASOK), its subsequent one and only participation in the tripartite coalition government of November 1989 and the successful result at the European Elections. At the same time the party was well aware of problems, such as a fall of almost 20 per cent in its membership, its decreasing appeal among industrial workers, scientists and the intelligentsia, and the paralysis of its youth organization (KNE) (see Doukas, 1991:395). Secondly, the neutralization of the ‘renovators’, through the appeal of former General Secretary Harilaos Florakis to the initially indecisive ‘centrists’, occurred in the name of ideological purity and the reiteration of orthodox catch-phrases, such as the ‘basic antithesis of capitalism’ and the like (Doukas, 1991: 296). The traditionalists did not appear ready to accept a challenge to the party’s ideological and organizational tradition and in essence an in-depth discussion of the ideological, political and organizational issues that concerned the ‘renovators’ was postponed only to be clarified at the next Congress, which clarified the KKE’s intention to continue the interpretation of Marxism in the same manner as in the last six decades.

Throughout the 1990s, it is impossible to speak of any ‘evolution’ of the party’s policies on European integration. The KKE views the period following 1992 as one which established the win of the ‘anti-revolution’ (Papariga, 2004: 13). The 1993 general election was fought using Maastricht as a weapon against New Democracy (ND) and PASOK, both of which had approved it in parliament. Since 1995 the party attacked both the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty and the decision by PASOK and ND to press ahead with Greek membership of the single currency, without making any policy concessions. The last two party Congresses, reiterated the decades-long anti-EU stance, which, however, failed to preserve a strong electoral base. Indeed, Dunphy (2005:108) argues that the Sixteenth Congress in December 2000 saw a further hardening of position. Hardcore rhetoric was reconfirmed in the 17th Congress in 2006 by which time the party
was polling merely 5% compared to 10% in 1981, when Greece joined the EU. As a response, it was acknowledged that the international communist movement was portrayed as critically unstable and weak with an important fight taking place in its ranks between ‘revolutionary communist forces and ones of reformism and opportunism’ (KKE, 2006). The party’s insistence to condemn the camp of neo-imperialism “which speaks for all forces and movements that reject socialist progress based on the principles of communism, including the Neo-liberals, the Conservatives, the Christian Democrats and even the Social Democrats and the New Left” (KKE, 2006), thus rejecting any so-called ‘third ways’ as unacceptable alternatives in Europe or anywhere else, has led observers to classify it as a protest or anti-establishment party (Volkens, 2002; Taggart, 1998; Muller Roemmel, 1995). Persistent has also been its constant attacks on SYN, its refusal to consider a possible coalition and its perception of SYN as ‘a disgraceful organization of the left’ (Papariga, 2004).

KKE’s thoughts popularized in the 1980s, but established since the early 1960s through Congress decisions, were repeated systematically throughout the 1990s and beyond 2000 making the party the most radical element of GUE/NGL. According to the party, it was the expressers of monopoly capital in France and West Germany, as well as other reactionary and conservative forces in Western Europe who, in accordance with American interests, pursued a variety of goals through capitalist European integration. Such goals incorporated the ambitions to establish a camp hostile to the USSR which can ideologically, politically, economically and militarily oppose its hegemony, to coordinate capitalist governments in opposition to the uprising communist movement, to establish an economic support system for NATO and concentrate monopoly capital, to reinforce the position of West European countries in the competition with the US and Japan (KKE, 1993). In the mid-1980s harsh criticism was constantly exercised by party organs and theoreticians towards the decision to create a common market in Europe, based on two aspects of the issue: 1) The undemocratic character promoted by the agreement. In contrast to all other Greek parties the KKE resented the act as transferring a large part of law-making power to supranational bodies and away from elected governments/parliaments without the right of resisting implementation. This constitutes impossible the coordination of a national social and economic policy congruent with the interests of the working class in Greece (Tantaroudas, 1987:53). 2) More in line with the French Communist Party’s approach at the time, the KKE rejected every single economic aspect of the agreement and saw all potential repercussions as disastrous for Greece and other comparatively small member states: “Within the EC the exploitative, competitive and unequal character of inter-state relations modifies the true potentials
of member-states and deforms their economic development” (Alepis, 1986:63). The underlying logic of convergence of EC economies was seen as a paradox and a lie, defying the truth behind the party’s own observations (Damanaki, 1986; Manolakou, 1993; Bellou, 2004) vi.

When Maastricht started emerging as the new reality-to-be, there was a reiteration of the party’s criticism on the issues of governance and economy. Lenin’s law of unequal development was applied to an ongoing situation. With regard to the correcting moves, promoted by social democratic and other Eurocommunist parties, such as the Delor’s package (including the Cohesion Funds) the amount received by Greece could by no means counterbalance the economic, social and political costs of membership, according to the party (KKE, 1993). While all other Greek parties were preoccupied with issues such as the amount to be received by Greece and the best way of distributing the package’s social benefits, the KKE dismissed such problems as insignificant. No positive claims were made for the cohesion funds and no demands of increasing the amount received by Greece and the other comparatively poor member states were put forward. The autonomy of Greece on social and economic policy was not to be compromised at any cost: “this is an issue that cannot be bargained or paid, not even with the gold of the whole world” (Papariga, 1993: 64)iii.

In retrospect, this fierce criticism of both Maastricht and the EU funding policy bring to the surface the issue of what is considered to be progressive and fair by the KKE. More recently, party theoretician and central committee member Makis Papadopoulos distinguishes between the two existing propositions on the issue of the Growth and Stability Pact. The first is the strictly neo-liberal ECB way (under its former president Vim Douizenburg) of concentrating on the prevention of inflationary pressures and subsequently preserving and obeying very strict guidelines on budget deficits. The second is the neo-Keynesian idea, as proposed by former Commission President Romano Prodi as well as Schroeder and Chirac, of finding an optimal mixture of economic management and adding flexibility to a Pact, which in practice, takes under consideration the different existing economic conditions in the member-states (Papadopoulos, 2004: 100). According to the KKE, both propositions and any mixture of the two have a wholly anti-popular character and are incapable of nullifying the capitalist cycle of the current crisis. They can only affect, to a certain extent, the timing, duration and level of the crisis; the crisis itself, though, is imminent under current conditions. The working people, according to the party, must not be constrained in choosing between an income which ‘contracts’ due to inflation, or one minimized through the battle against inflation (Papadopoulos, 2004: 103).
The party’s criticism remains forceful also on units with a more radical attitude on European economic policy, as long as they envisage their radical practice within the context of capitalism; for example, the 250 economists who, since 1995, exercise criticism on the existing EU economic policies from a Keynesian perspective. In 2003 they proposed abandoning the Stability Pact so that fiscal policy can promote goals such as full employment and social cohesion. They also proposed the establishment of a European economic government as a countermeasure to the ECB. Nevertheless, the party acknowledges such a solution is feasible only at the European level and cannot be applied individually in each member state. Such a proposal is therefore ‘methodologically wrong’ since its basic assumption remains the law of supply and demand. The goal of full employment within a capitalist framework is illusionary: “Capitalism, with all of its antitheses, inequality of developments between various fields, and the interests that unemployed people serve for capital, is synonymous to unemployment” (Papadopouls, 2004:99).

In the same vein, the party’s perception of social welfare attitudes remains rooted in what is progressive in a strict Marxist-Leninist sense. The party supports only those features dominant in command economies: a modern system of social protection, public and government owned, subsidized primarily, with the democratic attendance and control of workers, at all levels and with the attendance of the local and prefectoral self-government; that is true decentralization according to the party. The first point is to establish a public social welfare system in its normative sense; that is one with the intention of establishing the necessary positions for permanent specialized personnel with a 100% financial coverage by the state and pursuing on-time intervention. This system would cover freely all those who inhabit the country, permanently or temporarily, independent of nationality and religion. Special targets should be women, children, and young people, those with special needs, immigrants and old age people. This system should remain untouched by private entrepreneurial activities, even by the coverage of charity NGOs and provide freely all medical supplies, consumer goods and special technical assistance for the treatment of chronic deceases. All working people should further be employed on a permanent basis, without any flexibility in labor relations and with full rights for all employees. A system of free education for all people until the age of 18 should be further established, to eliminate the need for extra lessons by private institutions (Gatzis, 2005: 15). And once again Papariga specified: “Of course our perception is realistic within the frames of a different political correlation. Such a system of social care and protection can be built within the frames of a policy that collides with the "man-eating" laws of market and their institutions” (Papariga, 1998). In a similar approach of utter rejection without the potentials of modification, the party has criticized
the European Constitution without proposing an alternative more progressive one. What is being called today “the Constitution of the EU” is viewed by the KKE as nothing more than a new reactionary treaty that incorporates all the previous ones, while advancing new regulations that will exacerbate the conditions of the working 19 people of Europe. The new treaty is being put forward, according to the party, in order to impose inequality by statute, starting with the new countries, and in order to advance competition for spheres of influence inside and outside the EU. Papariga stated ‘Those who claim that a ‘No’ to the European Constitution must be combined with the pursuit of another…good constitution, ignore the basic issue, which is the struggle of all European people against the EU, as an intergovernmental union having one and only objective: to serve European capital’. SYN’s “No” to the European Constitution, was seen by the KKE as one ‘with a background of ‘Yes’’ and as ‘underlined by a hope that it can become a good constitution; in essence ’a half-criticism that constitutes a mega obstacle to shaping a radical consciousness’ (Papariga, 2005). In this sense any self-portrayal of a ‘Europe with a human face’ is a capitalist scam and can only be resolved through disobedience and discontinuity with the European project, according to the party.

Most of the KKE’s Euroscepticism is expressed in terms of policy not only at the EU level but also the national level. It can thus be classified as a protest or anti-establishment party in the sense that it has taken an anti-EU position as part of their general opposition to the functioning of political systems. It fiercely opposes and stands outside the established group of governmental parties (PASOK and ND) and promotes itself on the basis of its distance from them (see Taggart, 1998: 369; Muller-Rommel, 1995).

*International Affiliations*

‘The EP is plasmatic. It is worse than the national parliament’ (personal communication). And here begins the party’s perception of a union that shouldn’t exist. Surely, in the case of the KKE, while the concept of bourgeois democracy remains contested among the hard-liners, the main point that arises form their hostility to EU governance, is closely connected to the clear connection the party makes between democracy and national sovereignty. While the quote above indicates that the insurrectionary road lingers on among partisans of the older generation, parliamentary democracy is considered as the lesser of two evils.

All relations that the party maintains at the European level have not been influenced greatly by EU membership. The KKE, however, uses all forms of cooperation available to it through the
Institutions. Yet, in the context of the European Parliament it has established its presence for three basic reasons: to promote its policy program, to promote communist ideals and most importantly the development of the mass anti-imperialistic fight (by participating in Euro-elections the party commits to a specific policy program which the MEPs in coordination with the central committee are responsible of implementing); to reveal the capitalist and exploiting character of the EC/EU; to promote coordination and struggle against the EU and in favor of its collapse.

In contrast to SYN, which is one of the founding members of the, recently born, Party of the European Left (hereafter PEL), the KKE disagreed from the first instance with the formation of the EP party. This was for a variety of reasons. Firstly the procedure under which the group was formed was directed by the Commission and within the context of the European Constitution. As a result, the very formation of the party presumed the acceptance of certain principles with which the KKE disagrees. More specifically, the context within which European parties are created presupposes taking the EU, as a body of institutions, as granted and accepting its prevalence without any significant reorientations. Secondly it presupposes the financial dependence of such parties on the EU. Thirdly, beyond any ideological and political reasons, membership in the PES compromises the autonomy of each participating party.

From the outset, the KKE criticizes the Left Party as an arena where there are neither common goals nor similar motives among all the parties that signed the so-called “Berlin Appeal” on January 10, 2004, which was regarded as having given the initial kick-start to the “European Left Party” venture. To be precise, one should note that the signatories do not even agree on why or how this “party” should be formed, nor what the purpose of its existence is, which is proof of the profound disputes that are known to have taken place over its political program and constitution (Rizospastis, 2004). In the view of the KKE, the establishment of “European Parties” is not a concept that came from peoples or movements; it is an EU idea which is implemented according to the relevant Regulation of the Commission. This Regulation refers unequivocally to the *raison d’être* of these parties, “which is not of course to promote cooperation between communist and progressive left forces” (Rizospastis, 2004). On the contrary, we read in the regulations that “political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union and that they contribute to forming a European awareness. And it is of course natural that a party that aims at ‘integration within the Union’ will demand, as the SYN did, the recognition that the EU today is a reality” (Rizospastis, 2004). It is a matter of principle for the KKE that to remain true to its agenda of rejecting and arguing against EU
membership, it has no other choice but to reject a PES, which must observe in its program and in its activities the principles on which the European Union is founded (Article 3, Paragraph c).

The participation of the KKE in GUE/NGL is compulsory to a certain extent due to the EP’s regulation that each MEP must belong to a parliamentary group in order to have a voice. The GUE/NGL is seen as a cooperation of European parties or a parliamentary team on the basis of specific organizational principles and not a political entity. GUE/GNL is a co-federation of parties where the members do not function according to specific voting rules. It is vital to the party that if no agreement is reached then each unit will remain able of promoting its own agenda through its MEPs. A decision in the GUE/GNL can be taken only through unanimity and cannot be imposed on a party through a plurality vote. Party autonomy must therefore not be compromised at any level whether regional or wholly international. And once again here comes the issue of ideology; the preservation of autonomy conditions, to an extent, the preservation of party ideology. This last point shows that while the party’s participation has not resulted in any softening of its traditional withdrawal position, it has pursued the new venues which surfaced from European integration, in an attempt to fight against it. This, more or less reflects what the framework identifies as Europeanization within an un-flexed ideological framework and is confirmed by the inability of GUE/NGL to summarise the variety of anti-capitalist rhetoric into a coherent manifesto, partly because of the KKE’s stance (Volkens, 2004: conclusion).

At the international affiliations level, no substantial degree of Europeanization has been witnessed, either through the flexing of ideology - thereby establishing relations with socialist, social democratic parties and Green parties – or, through any hardening of ideology and the adoption of different tactics, such as cooperating more closely with other European communist forces. This latter possibility, however, stems from the fact that the KKE’s affiliations with other communist parties, especially those of similar jargon, have always been quite strong, therefore leaving little space for any tactical moves which seek to make them stronger.

One can easily misunderstand the KKE’s position as one of isolation from international affairs and extreme nationalism. As Mpatistatos (1993: 28) champions “We say NO to capitalist unification and YES to a superior kind of socialist internationalization in Europe and the whole world”. This, although a propagandist statement as it may be, illustrates the KKE’s conception of international struggle. It relies exactly on what relies also its policy approach to socio-economic matters. But here also it is influenced by the Cold War era and more specifically the party’s own
interpretation of the Cold Era. The party’s international affiliations and its relations with communist parties that geographically do not belong to Europe have not been downplayed due to EU membership or at any point during Greece’s participation in the process of EU building. There are constant references to other non-EU communist parties (see latest reference on a joint statement between the Greek, Bulgarian and Turkish communist parties on http://inter.kke.gr/News/), with party officials showing continuing concern throughout the years for the Communist Party and situation in Cuba and other socialist regimes. The party’s positions amounts to a firm stand by the Turkish people and the Kurds, by the side of all those who are suffering as well as ‘solidarity with the peoples of Cuba and North Korea, with communists and all progressive people who are persecuted’.

The party Youth Organization’s (KNE) international relations revolve around two main axes: 1) Cooperation with organizations which take part in the youth anti-imperialist movement as expressed through the World Movement Democratic Youth (WFDY), and the Youth and Students World Festival Movement. 2) Cooperation with all self-labeled communist youth organizations in Europe. Certain criteria and principles are therefore employed by KNE in its international affiliations and these have not changed through EU membership. While KNE has not reached its hands to organizations belonging in the International Union of Socialist Youth (Sosialistiki Diethni), which is considered to be a reformist, social-democratic dominated forum, there was also little to do, in the opposite direction, if it was to reinforce its cooperation with other geographically European but politically anti-European forces, since this has been a continuous reality since the early 1990s. Perhaps the only compromise that KNE has made, in its international affiliations has been its participation in multi-lateral, joint decisions with other European communist movements As the decision of KNE’s 9th Congress, explicates: ‘We have to multiply the initiatives of KNE for the growth and promotion of forms of collaboration between the Communist Youths, particularly in Europe. This is a precondition for the common action of the anti-imperialist forces in the international movement of youth. To continue our contribution to the, up to now, positive course of WFDY … the need is accentuated for the ideologico-political juxtaposition with forces of social democracy and opportunism that are moving within the frames of Social Forums the Party of the European Left and various NGOs, that are acting in the youth.’ (KNE, 2006).

However, KNE’s cooperation with other communist youth organizations in GUE/NGL resembles the affiliations that the KKE has with its GUE/NGL counterparts. That is, since European
cooperation (and its manifestation in the institutionalized left-wing bodies of GUE/NGL and European Democratic Youth) is a political necessity, KNE participates and promotes the meetings and joint decisions of European Youth Movements, which are not explicitly anti-European, on issues of imperialism, war and peace initiatives, always referring to the prevalence of ‘communist ideology’. Yet it has remained more careful in any more analytically coherent statements, as well in its bilateral relations with the GUE/NGL youths. The selectivity of its affiliations and support for other movements is mirrored in its more emphasized relations with the movements of more anti-system parties such as that of the Czech communist party.

Perhaps, most relevant would be the opening up of KNE to new issues of anti-imperialism and thereby movements and youths that are preoccupied, with problems that move beyond the socio-economic nature of socialism towards issues that are conceived mostly as humanitarian rather than communist, such neo-liberalism, embargos, AIDS, human rights, gender equality and environmentalism. This is promoted mostly through the WFDY considered to be a successor organization to the Young Communist International (from which most Western forces, apart from KNE, pulled out, during the Cold War, due to its association with Soviet-aligned socialist and communist parties) and the Youth and Students World Festival Movement. These two movements are explicitly against the maneuvers of governing social democracy, despite the presence of less hard-line youth movements, such as those of Italy (Giovanni Comunisti), Cyprus (EDON) and Spain (UJCE). However, the initiative to participate in these organizations cannot be linked to responses to a European context and therefore is not associated with any kind of Europeanization, but can rather be seen as a response to the growing anti-globalization movements or even one to the incorporation of new left issues by other movements.

**Discussion: Does the Baricentre lie on ideology?**

Albeit the common concern for equality and exploitation (the *modus vivendi* of their original ideology), two main variants have prevailed in the communist party family exemplified through the crashing majority of WECPs on one hand and a very small minority led by the KKE on the other. The KKE has steadily criticized anything that bordered social democracy, Eurocommunism or the more recent models of communist behavior *vis a vis* the EU as fraudulent and opportunistic and refuses to suffice to reformist alternatives. The rest of the party family may still be modeled on the Leninist or bureaucratic centralist principles, but “what they realistically fight for, is a form of statism much closer to the social democratic tradition” (Boggs, 1982:92). Perhaps, Boggs
continues, “the most they (communists) can hope to achieve is a reordering of priorities and, if power is consolidated over any length of time, a shift toward rationalized state capitalism”. Within this context the WECPs argue for an alternative (capitalist) Europe rather than a non-capitalist one.

The KKE has to be treated as a special case, since it is one of the very few WECPs employing full ideological Euroscepticism at the time of writing. Yet the ideological trend is not one to accommodate the specificities of one party (the KKE). Almost all WECPs faced the EU with ‘Marxist-Leninist hostility’ initially and despite the more popular trend towards reformism certain parties, such as the PCP retained their rejectionist stance for a long period of time. Others, such as the PCF, while influenced by the premises of Eurocommunism, returned at points to a wholly ideological approach vis à vis the EU, retained a KKE-like approach to national sovereignty, dismissed not only neo-liberalism but capitalist integration itself and defended the position of a complete break with capitalism. Maintaining a strictly bipolar conception of society and relentlessly attacking any concessionary attitudes towards the EU the KKE’s stance amounts to a de facto repudiation, not of the contemporary state of the EU but of the integration project.

The main arguments that the Greek communists put forward revolve around the ongoing configuration of forces guiding European integration. However, while other parties may put increasing emphasis on issues such as regional policy and the reform of Treaties in favor of social objectives, the KKE prioritises its position of withdrawal from the union, hence, emphasising a sovereignty approach, which is distinct from that of most parties and which reminds Stalin’s theory of ‘socialism in one country’; something highly suspicious of a party that has publicized no criticism of Stalin. The party has indeed been Europeanized, throughout the last decades. It has been Europeanised in the sense of touching upon many of the issues that surface along with globalization and Europeanization. When the time came, the salience of Europe gradually increased and European integration was more systematically referred to as a promoter of American dominance; something the is still implicitly conceived within the context of the Cold War. Mention to the progressive forces became more frequent (without any intention of allying with Synaspismos, however) and the party’s youth organization begun participation in forums with an ideological variety in order to promote its values. The party has also increased its participation and status in the European parliament, through the advancement of senior KKE officials on the party’s ballot in the Greek Euroelections. These moves, show that the KKE has responded to an increasingly European context. But it has done so, while remaining consistent in...
its criticism of European integration and more importantly more emphatic than ever on Greece’s withdrawal from the EU.

It is important also to emphasise the dual nature of communist identity, which is clearly manifest through the KKE’s European policy. While the radicality of its program, (welfare universalism, absence of private initiatives and large-scale redistribution) as shown in its constant rejections of every budget proposed in parliament, up to date, is linked directly to Marxist Leninist values which stem from its deeper ideological commitment to serve the interests of the working class, another aspect of its identity, that is, the radicalism inherent in its international affiliations with parties that insist on an outdated communism, its constant denial to mention anything positive about supranationalism and its narrow conception of the societal class structure are remnants of its Soviet orthodoxy. Only when these two elements are combined the picture of the KKE’s European orientation is complete. Crucially none of these two elements of its ideology has been flexed. True, once considering the dissolution of existing socialism and the ensuing, neo-capitalist development of Russia, the party relies less on praising Soviet orthodoxy but the omnipresence of traditional soviet literature in its press and the constant accusations of non-communist actors on the global stage betrays an approach which is still anchored in the premises of international proletarianism. Despite the widely accepted claim that the ideological position of a party does not give us enough information to deduce its position on the EU (see Taggart, 1998: 377; Featherstone, 1988) the case of the KKE suggests a possible translation of its ideological predispositions directly into its stance on the EU.

With regard to this ideological inflexibility and the subsequent choice of an ideologically unflexed tactical struggle vis a vis an increasingly European context, there are three possible scenarios according to the Kalyvas and Metzeridis’s (2003) excellent illustration. Firstly, according to the rational position, the KKE elite may have acted as strategic-maximizers and reflecting on SYNS’s poor electoral performance and inability to be an effective and appealing government ally, decided that the maximising potentials may be better satisfied with the party as it always stood. Secondly, the party elite may all (or in their majority) be true ideologues, and in extension the 1992 final split with SYN has left these ideologues untouched by any who would otherwise have emerged as reformers within the party.

This study agrees more with the second explanation. The fact that the party’s elite could have decided for joining PASOK if it was to maximize strategic concerns shows that there was, at
least, a substantial ideological constraint (that for example may have been absent in many other cases) perhaps also when reflecting upon their membership’s adherence to orthodox Marxism Leninism. This shows that the party was acting within a specific ideological context and therefore this second choice was out of the question. Secondly because the split occurred after a successful European elections result in a coalition with SYN which essentially showed that a combined force can be more effective in electoral terms and that ensured a marginal effect by the dissolution of existing socialism, despite the expectation by many commentators that the party would suffer heavy losses (Verney, 1990:137). Thirdly it has to be made clear that while at the thirteenth party Congress the KKE simply objected to becoming Eurocommunist-like and stated that one of its main objectives was cooperation with the Leftist forces to establish an alternative to the Conservative government, in subsequent years following the Congress refused the very possibility of cooperation; as the later positions of the party clearly show, it has ever since objected to any potential alliance with SYN, something that it used to accept for two decades. This view, however, does not exclude that the non-change approach of the party (crucially including its European policy) was decided within the overall context of the party reassessing its position amidst the fallout from the participation in the coalition governments of 1990-1 and, of course, the shock waves generated by the end of the Cold War (Verney, 1991). And surely, as other observers have documented, there were voices of reform within the KKE, throughout socialism’s final years (see Kalyvas and Metzerides, 2003). Nevertheless, this does not undermine the argument that the KKE’s final decision reflected the majority’s ideological predilections of no compromise, who as has been widely stated, ‘had an emotionally charged set of memories that were particularly antagonistic to the Right’; in contrast to reformers ‘who tended to be motivated be more strategic concerns’ (Kalyvas and Metzerides, 2003; also Smith, 1993;). A KKE Central Committee statement, following the unsatisfactory result of the 1985 elections, would prove diachronic both in the party’s approach towards Europe and more broadly its tactical struggle for recognition: ‘….\textit{However}, the party failed to increase the percentage of its vote….\textit{It is thus clear that what is needed is more ideological activism so that the wider masses absorb the new realities of Greek political life and mainly the need for a struggle against the two-party system and reformism}\textit{’} (quoted in Loulis, 1993: 200).

Explanatory Endnotes

1 Across Western Europe a number of parties, from communist ones (Bosco, 2000) to agrarian parties (Arter 2001), green parties (Richardson and Rootes, 1995)and right-wing populist parties (Taggart,1995) have actively eschewed the catch-all model and remained on the protest edges of the political spectrum.
The timing of this statement is also a historically important, immediately following the split with SYN and the bitter conflict on the issue of European integration.

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**Appendix: List of interviewees**

- KKE: medium age member, Rank/Post: KNE official/ International Relations.
- KKE: old member, Rank/Post: Central Committee.
- KKE: medium age member, Rank/Post: Central Committee
- KKE: old member, Rank/Post: Central Committee/Political Bureau/International Relations
- KKE: old member, Rank/Post: Central Committee/Political Bureau
- KKE: old member, Rank/Post: Central Committee

**Bibliography**

- KKE (2005) ‘The constitutional treaty of the EU and the response of the people’ Athens Conference 13-14 December (Contribution by the general secretary of the CC Al. Papariga) (in Greek)
- (2004) KKE’s Political Proposal to the Working Class, the Middle Peasantry and to Craftsmen’ Athens: KKE (in Greek)


The content of advertising messages is wholly controlled by the sender. The subject is projected in a manner of his own choosing, presenting a manufactured image that frequently does not entirely correspond with the reality. For maximum effectiveness, advertisements often make selective use of social and political stereotypes, beliefs and attitudes that are current in the specific society at the specific moment (Zotos and Lysonski, 1994; Jhally, 1995; Doulkeri, 2002). Advertising thus serves as a mirror of society, and advertisements and their messages reflect its values (Doulkeri, 2001: 154). The end result of the selective, exaggerated and monosemous projection of types and models through advertisements, however, may be to reproduce and reinforce existing models or it may be to impose new ones (Kellner, 1995; Zotos, 2000a; Doulkeri, 2001).

A review of the international literature yields a number of studies of the various male types that are projected in commercial advertising for television and for print media (e.g. Lysonski and Pollay, 1990; Zotos and Lysonski, 1994; Cohan, 2001). Similar research has also been carried out in Greece (Zotos and Lysonski, 1994; Zotos, 2000b; Doulkeri, 2001, 2002). There have also been studies of the way in which both sexes are projected in politics on the basis of pre-existing stereotypes (e.g. Kahn, 1993; Bystrom et al., 2004). No detailed studies of male portrayals in political advertising with specific categorization and quantitative data, however, have to date been published.

**Research Objective – Questions - Methodology**

The object of this paper is to record and analyse the predominant male portrayals in political advertisements, and specifically in the newspaper advertising of

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The research answers two questions:

(a) What were the portrayals that were predominant in newspaper political advertisements in the period in question?

(b) Was there a change in these portrayals over that period?

The research was carried out in eight daily newspapers, six national and two local. The nationals were Avgi, Eleftherotypia, Kathimerini, Eleftheros Typos, Ta Nea, Rizospastis, and the locals Macedonia and Thessaloniki. The research covered all advertising of male MP candidates, elected and non-elected, during the six electoral campaigns that took place between 1989 and 2000, a period of osmosis of social, economic and political changes and developments in political communication in Greece. Each individual advertisement was counted as one, even if it appeared more than once. Thessaloniki and Macedonia newspapers, it should be noted, were not published during the 1996 campaign period.

Content analysis was the primary methodological tool used in the research. The quantitative record of findings is accompanied by quotations from advertisements, as examples, and a supplementary qualitative analysis.

There being no codebook for these portrayals, specific categories were constructed for the purposes of the study. These were based on corresponding studies in commercial advertising, on various references for male stereotypes in politics, and on references to characteristics that influence – positively or negatively – the image of politicians (esp. Schweiger & Adami, 1999: 361). These categories are presented in Table 1. The key features of each type are described briefly so as to avoid misinterpretation and overlapping.

The reliability of the scale was tested twice on a sample of 20% of the advertising inserts, by two people, using the coefficient of agreement $k$. Wherever the first decoding yielded a reliability of less than 0.70, the categories were redefined. At the second decoding, following the modifications, the reliability had risen to 0.89.

Findings

Table 2 presents the research findings relating to the types predominating in the advertising inserts used by the candidates in each campaign period and globally. The predominant portrayal in political advertising in the period covered was that of the
successful man (30.6%), followed by the dynamic-assertive politician (27.7%) and the visionary (20.2%). There were a few instances of candidates choosing to portray themselves as the ethical politician (7.4%) or the decent fellow (4.3%), and just one example of the good family man (1.1%). Finally, in 8.5% of cases it proved impossible to assign the model projected to any particular category.

1. **Successful man**
   - Emphasises to his professional capacity
   - Emphasises to his political achievements
   - Emphasises to his experience

2. **Dynamic - assertive politician**
   - Presents himself as actively promoting the interests of his constituents
   - Shows himself in action
   - Is portrayed against a backdrop of a specific location in the city

3. **Visionary**
   - Holds out hope for the future
   - Stresses his youth

4. **Decent fellow**
   - Gives weight to the average citizen
   - Appears ordinary, dresses simply

5. **Good family man**
   - Emphasises to the institution of the family
   - Appears with his own family

6. **Ethical politician**
   - Emphasises to ethics, transparency and reliability
   - Emphasises to preserving traditional values

7. **Indeterminate**

**Table 1. The variables defining the types predominating in advertising inserts.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Successful man</td>
<td>8 (34.8%)</td>
<td>7 (35%)</td>
<td>2 (28.6%)</td>
<td>9 (39.1%)</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>1 (5.3%)</td>
<td>29 (30.8%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dynamic - assertive politician</td>
<td>4 (17.4%)</td>
<td>5 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (42.8%)</td>
<td>9 (39.1%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td>26 (27.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visionary</td>
<td>5 (21.7%)</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>2 (8.7%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>5 (26.3%)</td>
<td>19 (20.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decent fellow</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (4.4%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (10.5%)</td>
<td>4 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good family man</td>
<td>1 (4.4%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical politician</td>
<td>3 (13%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (14.3%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (15.8%)</td>
<td>7 (7.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indeterminate</td>
<td>2 (8.7%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>2 (8.7%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>3 (15.8%)</td>
<td>8 (8.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23 (100%)</td>
<td>20 (100%)</td>
<td>7 (100%)</td>
<td>23 (100%)</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
<td>94 (100%)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 2. The predominant model types recorded in the advertising inserts used by Greek MP candidates in the ‘A’ electoral district of Thessaloniki in the period 1989-2000.
1a. The model of the successful man

As has been mentioned, the candidate model that predominated in the period studied was that of the successful man. The most prominent feature of the candidate image projected was either his professional capacity, his political achievements or his experience, educational background and/or social activity. In advertising messages of this type the emphasis was on who the candidate is, sometimes even to the point of including a concise *curriculum vitae*. The object of these advertisements was to demonstrate how capable the candidate was and persuade voters that he was worthy their vote.

In these advertisements the main message was reinforced by paralinguistic elements such as dress, stance, gaze and general appearance. The candidates were almost always portrayed in the dark suit, conservative tie and white or pale blue shirt that proclaim success, authority, reliability and trustworthiness.

Elements of the type of the successful man appeared in virtually all the advertising inserts, even if that was not the primary model. This does not appear to be accidental. The characteristic features of a candidate’s personality, such as his professional career, his experience, his intelligence and his ability to succeed, are inseparable constituents of his image and a basic selection criterion for the voter (Kapelou 2002).

In addition, this type also appears to be directly associated with the more general models of male identity prevalent in Greek society at the time and with perceptions of the ideal man. The predominant model was that of the independent loner with the mask of the hard and ultra-masculine leader, the man who is successful, indispensable, strong, masterful, powerful, highly intelligent, an ambitious achiever, rational and competitive, and totally in control of his emotions (Badinter 1994; Basch-Kahre 1999).

In their study of candidate advertising for the 2002 municipal and prefectural elections for Mayor and Prefect of Thessaloniki and Kastoria, Doulkeri and Panagiotou (2005) also recorded many features of the ‘successful man’ model. Moreover, studies of commercial advertising in the Greek media have shown that characteristics of this type, as described in the pertinent unit, were used with considerable frequency (Zotos and Lysonski 1994; Doulkeri 2001, 2002). Table 3 presents indicative examples of candidate advertisements using the model type of the successful man.
Table 3. Advertisements projecting the model of the successful man politician.

The first example projects two key aspects of the candidate’s identity: (a) that of the “acknowledged fighter” and (b) that of the university professor and president of the Medical Association of Thessaloniki.

The second example highlights a whole set of distinguishing features of the candidate’s identity, focusing primarily on his Pontic origin and refugee background. There are general references to his “long years of creative service” to the Pontic community, his experience and his effectiveness (“experienced and time-tested”), his steady character, his “sensitivity” to national affairs and his reliability and unswerving allegiance to the New Democracy party, the final object being to acclaim the candidate as the natural representative of the Pontic population of the “refugee city of Thessaloniki”.

1.b. The model of the dynamic-assertive politician

The second most frequently appearing candidate model was that of the dynamic-assertive politician. The candidates that opted for this model were depicted in their advertisements as out to get the best for the city, or as men of action, or were photographed against a backdrop of some city landmark, usually the White Tower.

The high frequency of this type of advertisement is construed as resulting from a combination of two factors: (a) it is associated with the voters’ lively interest in improving conditions in the city of Thessaloniki, and (b) it is associated with a
perception of masculinity based, as mentioned earlier, on assertiveness, dynamism, courage, aggressiveness and competitiveness (Badinter 1994, Katz 1995, Basch-Kahre 1999, Doulkeri 2001). Table 4 presents two indicative examples of this type of advertisement.

Table 4. Advertisements projecting the model of the dynamic - assertive politician.

In the first example the candidate is shown addressing Parliament. The model of the dynamic-assertive candidate is supreme here: even the body language of the candidate expresses these qualities. The accompanying slogan, which reads “For a modern and human Thessaloniki”, reinforces the image. The advertisement suggests to the reader that the candidate is ready to fight for a better future for the city and its people.

In the second example the portrait of the candidate presents him as a calm, smiling, likable fellow, while the accompanying slogan portrays him as a determined, dynamic fighter. This advertisement also includes elements of the successful man politician and the friendly, decent fellow.

1.c. The model of the visionary

Some candidates opted for advertisements conveying a message focused on the vision of a better future. In these advertisements the candidates were presented as holding out hopes for the future or emphasising their youth. The type of the visionary
politician was usually coupled with a more casual, more youthful appearance, in marked contrast to the stereotypical uniform of the other candidates, with their dark suits, sober ties and white or pale blue shirt.

This model was used primarily by younger politicians in an attempt to differentiate themselves from their older fellows, who emphasised their experience and achievements. They sought to show that they were young and uncorrupted, eager to work, with new visions and ideas, to position themselves as the representatives of the younger generation, targeting primarily the younger voter and those (mainly women and mothers) interested in the future for the sake of their children.

Table 5. Advertisements projecting the model of the visionary.

In the first of the two examples shown below (Table 5), a casually dressed Konstantinos Karamanlis (now Prime Minister of Greece) is presented as an affable, unaffected and patently young man. Projecting the image of the visionary politician, he uses slogans designed to encourage voters to cast a vote for the future (“tomorrow, now”, “the future has never been so present”).

In the second example the candidate enlists his youth, the prospect of a better future, and even his personal charm in what is obviously an attempt to win the youth vote. Smiling, casually dressed, sharing the hopes, dreams and visions of the younger generation, and radiating charm, he creates a sense of cordiality and with his ‘feel
good’ manner promises the voters a better future for Greece (“tomorrow Greece will be more beautiful”).

1.d. The model of the decent fellow

Sometimes – more frequently in the 2000 elections – candidates would opt in their advertising inserts for presenting themselves as ordinary, average citizens and voters. Their pictures would portray them as simple, unaffected, smiling, friendly, likable fellows. They were usually shown simply dressed, in shirtsleeves rather than suit and tie.

The messages in these advertisements, marketing oriented, focused on ordinary, everyday life and the problems of the average citizen. In them the candidate projects himself as an ordinary man, sharing the habits, lifestyle and visions of the electorate. He is like them, or perhaps a little better, and therefore understands their day-to-day needs. This manner engenders feelings of warmth towards the candidate, and creates a sense of familiarity between candidate and voter.

Aspects of this particular model were gradually adopted in more and more advertising messages. The candidates increasingly presented themselves as smiling and unaffected, targeting the fellow-feeling of the average voter.

Table 6 gives two indicative examples. In the first, although there are elements of the type of the successful man (the candidate is identified as a PhD and a university professor) and the wording is neutral, the predominant type is that of the ordinary, decent fellow. The candidate is presented casually dressed and smiling, and is referred to by the shortened form of his name (“Yorgos” instead of Georgios). This portrays him as a friendly, ordinary person, an image which is attractive to a great many voters.

The theme of the second example is basically the same. The candidate appears smiling, friendly, simple, approachable, casually dressed in shirtsleeves rather than suit and tie, and again is referred to by the shortened form of his name (“Harry” for Haralambos). This particular advertisement is accompanied by the slogan “for men and women and their hopes”, which orients the reader with regard to the candidate’s aspirations and priorities.
Although the institution of the family was a very powerful factor in Greek society in the period studied (Mousouri, 2000), for a large part of the electorate at least, the family was the focus of emphasis in only one of the advertisements used at that time. This is in strong contrast to commercial advertising, where the family as a value and the model of the good family man appear much more frequently (Zotos and Lysonski 1994; Doulkeri 2002).

Nor did any of the candidate advertisements project religion – also a very strong institution in Greece – as a primary theme. Although there were references to it, these were secondary, not primary.\(^5\)

The sole advertisement based on the model of the good family man is shown in Table 7. This advertisement, which was used in the June 1989 elections, was not the candidate’s only advertisement in that campaign.
Table 7. Advertisement projecting the model of the good family man.

In it the candidate is shown with his wife and two children, all smiling and standing close together, the very image of the model family, brimming over with love and happiness. The presence of the two small children is a winning and heart-warming element. Standing behind and slightly above the others, the candidate is projected as a proud and happy father, and a pillar of the family.

This image is designed to generate favourable sentiments towards the candidate, especially among those who give particular importance to the institution of the family.

1.f. The model of the ethical politician

Politicians are often criticised for lack of transparency, corruption, cross-linkage, exaggerated campaign promises and saying one thing while doing another, all of which were the case in the period studied. Transparency, reliability, ethical behaviour and promise-keeping are things that voters want from parliamentary candidates (Kapelou, 2002). Some candidates, in their effort to differentiate themselves and win the favour of the electorate, projected as their pre-eminent characteristics their moral character, reliability and integrity. The message was often combined with emphasis on the preservation of traditional values, such as the family
or the Orthodox faith. This approach also highlights the identity of the candidate, focusing on his capacities and character traits.

The two examples that follow are typical of this type of advertisement (table 8). In the first the accent is on the candidate’s moral character and his commitment to preserving traditional values, including meritocracy, justice, the family and the Orthodox faith. The choice of classic, serious dress reinforces the primary message.

| Table 8. Advertisements projecting the model of the ethical politician. |

In the second example the candidate projects himself as the ethical politician, sincere, honest and serious, who “tells the truth and dares to act”. His direct gaze gives the impression that he is looking the voter in the eye, and his classic, serious mode of dress enhances the core message.

1.g. Advertisements with indeterminate model type

The survey also recorded a number of advertisements that could not be categorised. These were usually announcements, informing the public of some event or other activity involving the candidate. These advertisements were ancillary; the main message was elsewhere. An advertisement of this type is shown in Table 9 (on the left).
Table 9. Advertisements with indeterminate model type.

There were also a number of primary political advertisements in which the portrayal of the candidate projected no core message. These advertisements did no more than simply inform the public of the subject’s candidacy. The portrait of the candidate projected no specific model; there was no slogan encapsulating the candidate’s fundamental position: the advertisement merely stated the candidate’s name and profession, his political party, and, usually, some contact information. This type of advertisement was commonest in the earlier election campaigns, and generally concerned non-elected candidates. An example of this type of advertisement is given in Table 9 (on the right).

2. Changes in model preferences over the study period

As is clear from the findings set out in Table 2, the model of the successful man, which had predominated in all the preceding election campaigns, was discarded in 2000 in favour of the models of the dynamic-assertive and the visionary politician. These types presented a combination of personal features of the candidate with the benefits the voters could expect to reap by electing him to Parliament. The relative number of advertisements promoting the candidate as a ‘decent fellow’ also more than doubled in this campaign period.
There appear to be two reasons for this development: (a) the advertisements used in the 2000 campaign appear to be governed by a marketing orientation, with the focus shifting from who the candidate is to what the voters can expect to gain by his election, and (b) the change seems to reflect broader changes in predominant social models relating to masculinity and the ideal man, following the change in the role of women and their place in society. This change to some extent eliminated the representations of the past and delineated a “new masculinity” (phrase used by Badinter, 1994: 228), in which the ‘ideal’ man has to have certain characteristics that in the past were considered to belong exclusively to the distaff side. Traits like compassion, tenderness and humanity were formerly seen as womanish, or as signs of weakness in a man.

**In conclusion**

The model type appearing most frequently in the advertising used by MP candidates in the period 1989-2000 was that of the successful man. These advertisements stressed the subject’s professional characteristics and capacities. Elements of this model type were found in most of the advertisements recorded, even when it did not constitute the primary message.

The model of the dynamic-assertive politician was the second most frequently used type. That of the visionary politician, which also appeared fairly often, was particularly favoured by younger candidates. Occasionally – most frequently in the last campaign of the period studied (2000) – candidates chose to project themselves simply as decent human beings, identifying themselves with the average man.

Some candidates opted to project as their pre-eminent characteristics their good moral character, reliability and integrity, often in conjunction with emphasis on the importance of preserving traditional values. The institution of the family was used as the basis of a projected image in only one instance.

Over the course of the period studied there was a marked change in the type of message projected. The model of the successful man, which had predominated in earlier years, was virtually abandoned in the advertising of the 2000 election campaign. The types preferred in this period were those of the dynamic-assertive and the visionary politician, while the model of the ‘decent fellow’ more than doubled in frequency. This development is thought to be due to the growing dominance of the marketing concept, which by the 2000 election campaign had come to prevail, and
also to the gradual change in the perception of male types in Greek society. This finding, however, needs to be further studied on the basis of additional data from subsequent election campaigns, since it is based on a single campaign period.

Notes


2Although these two newspapers were not in circulation during the 1996 election campaign, they were chosen because they were published for more of the relevant period than any other of the city’s dailies, and were generally the most popular.

3There is a general reference to traditional values, although the specific reference is restricted exclusively to the institution of the family.

4The White Tower is the symbol of Thessaloniki.

5In their study, which covered the municipal and prefectural elections of 2002, Doulkeri and Panagiotou (2005) found that many candidates in Thessaloniki gave considerable weight to the institution of the Church and the Orthodox faith in their advertising. By contrast, no weight was placed on the institution of the family.

References


