Proposing a Model for a National Hellenic Strategic Culture

Contributors

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Abstract: The study of the role that "strategic culture" has in the formation of the states' security policies is growing importantly in the field of Security Studies. The difference in actors' cultures reflect the basis on which they act and the source from which they gain their motivations. Consequently, a great part of the interaction between the several actors of the international arena can be importantly influenced by factors inherent within them.

A perpetual dynamic process of the social factors' perceptions and consequently their influence on the management of "high-politics" issues is now obvious. In the proposed paper we will initially examine the factors that framed security culture in Greece throughout the post-1974 period. Institutions, legacies, stereotypes and enduring beliefs within the society and the political community, attitudes and symbols that introduce specific security aims are some of the elements that framed the security and, consequently, the strategic culture of Modern Greece. Moreover, after the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 created an image of Turkey in Greece, as the first national security threat.

Even though that Greece hasn't made yet a brave effort for a strategic analysis, understanding and answering the abovementioned questions, time has come, with the new political researchers be willing and ready to respond to these challenges of modern Greece's political culture. This is the first step in order to be considered as a part of a continuing national strategic security culture procedure in Greece. Needless to say, we are interested not only in strategic culture, in the attitudes and beliefs that flow from a distinctive national experience, but also in national style in behaviour.

The use and parallel the challenge from the building a Hellenic Strategic Culture is to assert at least the following potential benefits: a) an improved understanding of our own, and other cultures in local terms, b) an improved ability to discern enduring policy motivations and to make predictions, c) an improved ability to communicate what is intended to be communicated and d) an improved ability to understand the meaning of events in the assessment of the Others.

Prologue

From the traditional security concept of political realism to the post-Cold War concept of global security and national comprehensive security, both connotation and extension of security have fairly changed. Owing to the change of the conception of security, consideration on national security interests is miscellaneous. After World War II, especially after the states' interdependence, various aspects of security have indicated their interrelated and transactional relations, gradually constructing an all-directional, dynamic and multi-dimensional security concept: a) Political security, b) Military security, c) Economic security and d) Cultural Security.

Strategic culture is a fluid and elusive concept first introduced in 1977 by Jack Snyder's RAND essay on the dominant USSR. Ken Booth probably provides the most detailed definition of the concept, noting down that strategic culture "*refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force.*" In short, strategic culture defines a set of patterns of a nation's behaviour on issues related to war and peace. Furthermore, it is derived from a nation's history, geography, and political culture, and represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns of behaviour of influential parties (i.e., the political and military elites) (Booth, 1979:121).

As with many concepts alleged to have explanatory power, strategic culture lends itself to abuse; to be useful it has to be corralled and employed in a disciplined way or, at the least, it has to be used with an awareness of the pitfalls that await the unwary. Needless to say, we are interested not only in strategic culture, the attitudes and beliefs that flow from a distinctive national experience, but also in the national style in behaviour. In this paper, we will examine the role of culture and national identities that shape the political culture of the Modern Greek state, looking into two very famous case studies: the Imia incident and the Macedonian issue. After this review we will conclude with some policy proposals for constructing a model applied to Greek reality.

The Role of National Identities and National Perspectives

The role of identities has reappeared in the international relations' analysis and the examination of the states' national policies by the constructivist approaches in the last two decades. The introduction of the identities' role has been placed in the context of social practices, which were underestimated by the mainstream theories. Therefore, the reflectivist approaches and thus constructivism also concern about identity and interest formation (Wendt, 1992: 393) in a '*sociological social psychological form of systemic theories in which identities and interests are the dependent variable*' (Wendt, 1992: 394), introducing the solution of Giddens about the agent-structure problem (Zehfuss. 2002: 12).

The importance of identities' role derives from the perspective that the states are not rational actors in the international arena of the states-system and therefore the formation of the states' foreign policies is based on certain assumptions shaped by factors either from the 'systemic' or the 'sub-state' level. This suggests that in this work we will take into consideration the influence of both of the international society upon to identities and interests and also the internal sources of state identity.

Working on the role of identities and interests, which are nothing else than collective meanings, as Wendt argues (Wendt. 1992: 397), we can recognize their importance by the fact that '*the instersubjective constituted structures of identities and interests in the system*' connect structures to actions (Wendt. 1992: 401) and therefore give substantive explanatory tools of the states' actions. Furthermore, it is

the vicious circle of reciprocal interaction that forms the intersubjective knowledge in the framework of which states interact, appointing a shift of the established institutions difficult (Wendt. 1992: 407). Institutional transformations seem at least difficult, if not unfeasible, due to '*systemic and "psychological" reasons*' (Wendt. 1992: 411). The anxiety that such shifts would bring and the cost of breaking commitments of the relative stable and already known structures intercept changes.

The goal would be to find the way out of the constraints of the so-called reality (Zehfuss. 2002: 36), the institutions in which states have set by themselves, otherwise, to 'break the chain' and stop the vicious circle of insecurity and conspicuousness. Such an aim cannot have as a starting point a unilateral action, either in domestic politics or in the system, without an equal response by the 'other'. Therefore, unlike to Wendt's work, we have to delve into domestic factors as well, in order to seek the trigger for institutions' transformations, an argument, which is also recognized by Wendt (1992: 425).

Without bracketing systemic factors and international norms, social and legal norms within states and their relationship with culture, identities and states' interests are of great importance in Katzenstein's work about the shaping of national security policies (Reus-Smit. 2001: 220). After recognizing the two-sided relationship and influence between states and environments, our main aim is to draw attention to the effects that environments have on actors' behaviour and identities (Katzenstein. 1996: 40-1). Setting as a starting point the international security environment instead of the domestic one, we can recognize three factors that influence states' security policies. In particular, formal institutions or security regimes, world politics culture and international patterns of amity and enmity are the main factors that affect states' identities and interests (Katzenstein. 1996: 34).

Initially, it is necessary to conceive the meaning of the norms and identities' idioms. Norms are the established beliefs about the existence of certain actors in specific environments, as well as the beliefs about actors' behaviour within these environments. Otherwise, norms either describe identities or prescribe behaviours (Katzenstein. 1996: 54). But what are the identities? To illustrate the implication of the term we have to delve into the existence of actors within an environment and its interrelations with the 'other'. The term refers to the separation of the 'self' from the 'other' and the impression of uniqueness within the system of interaction.

Furthermore, identity can be the framework under which different constructions of nationhood and statehood are shaped (Katzenstein. 1996: 59). Even though there are probably no states that are consisted of only one ethnic group and therefore they embody several identities, the national 'we-feeling'[1] – the common identity within a cohesive state society – that originally exists or has been created through the domestic institutions and hosts the identities of the social sub-state groups, has provided most of the societies of the developed world with close ties and relative coherence.

Having a concrete view of the concepts of norms and identities we can scrutinize how they affect the national security policies. There is dual effect of the norms. Initially, the first, suggests that '*Cultural or institutional elements of states' environments (norms) shape the national security interests or security policies of states*'. The norms, otherwise collective meanings, given specific interests, '*change the transaction costs or information requirements for certain policies*'. They might

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[1] The term 'nation' here should not be confused with the terms 'peoples' or 'ethnic groups'. It is treated as the population of a state, in which the moral conciousness brings homogenous or relatively homogenous people to the decision to live in the same political entity [Renan, E., 'What is Nation?', in Zimmern, A., 'Modern Political Doctrines' (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp.202-5] or just in the meaning that the UN Secretariat provided, that nation is the constitutive population of a state [Musgrave, T., 'Self-Determination and National Minorities', (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.155].

also influence and transform interests themselves (Katzenstein. 1996: 54, original italics). However, norms are not permanent. Old and new norms compete with each other until a new cultural-institutional element of states' environment prevails, making new policies possible. Some interesting examples for the role of norms are the ones of the '*liberal reformers within the USSR*', which led to a shift in the interpretation of the world order and that of the adoption of a defensive military doctrine by the French army in the interwar period, based on that country's culture[2] (Katzenstein. 1996: 56-7).

The second role of the norms is to shape a state's identity ('*Cultural or institutional elements of states' global, or domestic environments, shape state identity*'). Such transformations of states' identities might have their roots either in international or in domestic structures. For instance, states adopt different armament policies, which have often little to do with the real threats, based on the statehood that have enact (Katzenstein. 1996: 58, original italics). Such a shift is also well illustrated in Germany and Japan's cases, in which the global environment affected the '*domestic political process of reconstructing identity*' (Berger. 1996: 339, in Katzenstein. 1996, original italics).

Similarly with the dual effect of norms, there is also a dual effect of identity. '*Variation in state identity or changes in state identity, which affect the national security interests or policies of states*', is the one effect. The process of security policy planning and making in a great degree arises from states' identities. Identities, shaped by the interaction with the 'other', develop states' interests[3] and ultimately the national security policies. As a consequence, any change in states' identities leads to an analogous shift in interests and security policies (Katzenstein. 1996: 60-1, original italics). It appears that the starting point is the position of a state towards the 'other' and the perceptions and culture that such an interaction generates along with the already existing identity elements. Maoist Chinas' strategic culture illustrates the formation of perceptions towards the 'other' and the process of shaping the Chinese security policy (Johnston. 1996: .216-256, in Katzenstein. 1996).


Chart 1: The interaction that takes place between the states' identities and interests with the environmental structure and finally shape the national policies (Katzenstein. 1996: 53).

However, this aforementioned process appears to be a vicious circle with consequences to the international institutions. '*State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure*' (Katzenstein. 1996: 63, original italics). This implies that while exploring the whole progression, the already existing cultural and institutional structures cannot be marginalized. Such an attempt would have limited analytical merit.

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[2] The term culture is generally contested, but in this work means the tools with which other actors and actions are evaluated and perceived.
[3] Though, there are interests existing outside of social relationships and identities.

The cultural dimension- cultural distinctiveness in strategic thought and foreign policy

Culture constitutes of a new factor related to International Relations and Political Sciences' Studies. Up to now, culture exists as a reference (related to politics and not archeology and history) to bibliography mostly represented by the term of "*cultural heritage*". So, it would be better to distinguish the terms that refer generally to "culture"; Besides the term *culture*[4] there is also the term *civilization,*[5] but translated into Greek language, the meaning is one and unique: /*politismos/.* In the field of humanistic sciences there are some particular forms of culture in research. Studying Culture firstly under the frame of cultural diplomacy and cultural politics, the Otherness and cultural diversities, the political and strategic culture (all related to political theories) either studying culture as *civilization* or *civilizations' "clash"* (Huntington 1993: 22) one thing is documentarily obvious: Research on culture and its aspects is continually transformed, and a "cultural turn" (Valbjørn 2004: 2) is evident in its study. Relatively, Culture could be of research interest to International Relations through Cosmopolitan Culture, Global Culture, Diplomatic Culture, or Political Culture.

Culture's study in a more pivotal part, related to power and to today global Information Age (Nye 2004: 90), has been approached by the term of *"soft power*[6]*"* (Nye 2004: 120). Contrary to the hard power's (military power) term, *soft –*or *attractive-* elements that affect interstates' policies and balances now exist. There are also two parts of culture connected to this pattern, *high* (art, literature, music and intellectual expressions) and *popular* (popular art, music, cinema,) *culture.* Therefore the role of soft power's variables, as this of culture, is increasing, so the states have been obliged to include these *attractive* (Nye 2004: 128) clues in their foreign policy goals in order to be easier not to *coerce* but to *set the agenda* by this soft behavior (Nye 2004: 31). So it is clearly defined that there is a need to study specific regional issues, not only from their economic, military, energy aspects, but also in the 21st century, by their cultural resources, such as history, religion, and language, adjusted to every state's separate region. Globalization has made non state actors to increase their influence in all boards of international politics, a fact that cannot be controlled today by any government (Nye 2004: 142).

Culture socially comprises the persisting and socially transmitted ideas, ideals, values, attitudes, traditions, habits or people's (patterns of) behavior. Foreign policies are formed by the governments and governments are elected by the people. Public opinion so actually "forms" foreign policy by "legitimizing" its leader's decisions. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, institutions and their behavior is shaped by their cultural preferences, commonalities and differences. It is proved so, *that culture represents the prominent criterion for the people in order to judge and decide.*

A state's foreign policy is normally followed by a national strategy. National strategy concludes a state's foreign policy goals and national interests. Each

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[4](a) Art, literature, music and their intellectual expressions of a particular society or time. (b) The customs, arts, social institutions, etc of a particular group or nation, (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, p.285, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995).

[5] (a) An advanced and organized state of human social development. (b) a society, its culture and its way of life during a particular period of time or in a particular part of the world. (c) The human race, (Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, p.202, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995).

[6] Bibliography for soft power: Joseph Nye Jr., Soft power, 2004, Joseph Nye Jr., Power in the global information Age, Routledge, 2004, Joseph Nye Jr., "Propaganda isn't the way: soft power", (*International Herald Tribune,* 10 January 2003).

individual state's national political culture is continually being applied indirectly to its strategic culture, which forms its policy. Detecting and justifying a state's or a nation's special cultural features through the study of its policy and history, leads to find out some key points that produce wisdom for statecraft for the future as long-term strategy goals.

The Political Concept of Culture: The Tool of Political Culture

Understanding culture is more than "primordial differences" or "natural habits" with its physical relation to politics; the point is that that politics forms culture. Many scholars of comparative politics have written about culture as a defining feature of political outcomes. In 1980s, political scientist Aaron Wildavsky was a major voice in the "cultural" camp. Wildavsky wanted to develop a theory of culture that could explain political outcomes by positing "cultural rationality" (Wildavsky 1987: 3-21).

The political concept of culture is closely related to the concept of nation. Both emerged in the same historical period, developed in parallel and spread from Europe to all over the world[7]. Paul Gilroy speaks of a "fatal junction" of the concept of culture related to the concept of nationality (Gilroy 1995: 2). The formation of this unholy alliance which originated from Herder required a change in the concept of culture which pluralized culture in a way similar to the later reconceptualization by Boas within anthropology. Previously, culture was understood in the sense of 'being cultured'. Culture was a value and a characteristic applied to individual and which was acquired by formation and education in the fullest sense (Markus 1993: 6ff.; Williams 1988: 88f). Culture referred to the goal in a process of development, a higher stage of being, which then, consonant with the latter understanding of Tylor, could not only be attributed to individuals but also to the human history in general. Culture was opposed to nature; it was the dimension which raised humanity above animals. In an anticipated evolutionism European culture was definitely culture in the purest instance, the final stage of the human kind development. But in an equally anticipated relativism, Herder demanded to refrain from claiming European superiority in the sense that only what was European could be cultured. Non-Europeans had culture too (Williams, ibid.).

Thereby the pluralisation of the concept of culture became necessary even if - as Markus emphasizes - Herder himself never used culture in plural (Markus 1993: 23). However, Herder at the same time started to objectify culture by distinguishing elements of culture (for example language, art, science, but also political and juridical institutions and economic systems, cf. Markus 1993: 19f.). Here too an implicit pluralization of culture occurred because all these elements exist only in multiplicity. Herder's equation of people (defined by culture) and nation (defined politically) finally produced the concept of the cultural nation (*Kulturnation*) - or national culture. Here, the political boundaries of the nation are conceptualized as congruent with the boundaries of the related culture. The individuals who belong to a nation do not only share a political system, a state, but also a culture. Considering the extremely successful career of the concept of the nation it is not at all surprising that cultural

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[7] Considering the dissemination of the concept of culture, Virginia Dominguez writes: "... I am further struck by the apparent success European countries have had over the past 100 to 150 years convincing the rest of the world that culture is a 'thing', that it has value, and that any self-respecting group or people must have it. People may contest the extent to which the content of culture must be European in origin in order to be of value, but they are still overwhelmingly buying into the elite European idea that there is such a thing as culture and that it is through culture that one's value is judged" (Dominguez 1992: 36).

boundaries are frequently taken to be just as clear and objectifyable as are political boundaries.

In more specific terms, we can look at the interaction of politics and culture through the concept of ***political culture***. Political culture is defined by those elements of culture that reveal our attitudes or by behaviour toward political institutions and processes. Among the things we notice under the rubric of political culture are:
 a) deference to authority; b) obedience to law; c) belief in the core values that constitute the political system; d) trust in political actors and agencies; e) the way and intensity of participation in political affairs; and finally f) an overall sense of "connectedness" with the political process.

Political culture refers to the distinguishing attitudes, habits, and behavior patterns that characterize a political community. Researchers of politics can observe important distinctions between the values and beliefs that dominate to a society. In the United States, for instance, there is a great emphasis placed on individual freedom. Other cultures may be more concerned of collective equality or less enamored with the idea of personal freedom. The concept of political culture exerts significant influence over the structure and behavior of society.

A political culture is significantly influenced by a number of factors. Climate, kinds of natural resources and population affect political culture's frame. A nation's historical experience and memory clearly shape its culture, as do its language, religion, art, literature, and social mores. Economics and geography also influence the cultural ethos. Cultural framework is important because it provides the fundamental agreement-and therefore trust-without which politics cannot advance into a civilizing process. It provides sound rules for the political game. This agreement on fundamentals does not require, however, that all citizens agree on all aspects of life.

International relations involve more than power politics among states. States' interests and policies must be regarded at a deeper level; one needs to understand the culture that conditions policymakers and society into having such interests. Human beings, singly and collectively, comprise the source of all international politics (Hudson, 1997:5). Hence, studying culture is significant to understanding the similarities and differences in people's experiences of political systems. Culture is understood as "any interpersonally shared system of meanings, perceptions, and values". In this way, culture is a template for human action, ultimately explaining the driving force behind a nation's identity and direction. Postmodernist studies suggest that all things "political" have their roots in broad systems of shared meaning (Hudson, 1997:10). Insofar as politics reflects the broader societal culture, political culture may be understood as "*all of the discourse, values and implicit rules that express and shape political actions and intentions, determine the claims groups may and may not make upon one another and ultimately provide a logic of political action*" (Hudson, 1997:10).

Political culture studies sprung from the cultural anthropology research of Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Harold Lasswell, and others who sought to understand how children' socialisation might relate to political identity. However, while such work influenced studies of 'national character' in the World War II, they soon proved unconvincing in explaining the political behaviour of Germany, Japan, and the United States (Almond, 1993:9-10.). By the 1980s and 1990s, political scientists retreated from reductionist tendencies and decided to research institutions, recognising the need to understand rational self-interest in comparative contexts of laws, rules, ideas, beliefs, and values, which explain the political identity of different countries. Thus, political culture studies are now more rigorously researched, including historical and descriptive analysis as well as important theoretical explanations allowing for a better understanding of economic growth and democratisation in different cultural contexts (Almond, 1993: 12).

The end of the Cold War highlighted the significance of cultural identity as tracked down in the hegemony of Western culture, capitalism, and liberal democratic order that was imposed on the culture of most societies (Murden, 2001:460). Democracy is said to require a distinctive set of political values in its citizens: moderation, tolerance, civility, efficacy, knowledge, and participation (Diamond, 1993:1, 8-10). However, a society's orientation towards democracy depends on their distinct culture. In this way, political culture involves the knowledge, beliefs, feelings, and value judgements of a political system (Diamond, 1993:8). Notably, political culture is not a static phenomenon but dynamically conditioned by such factors as economic change, civil society, institutional practice, the international climate of ideas, and national security. Indeed, the last of these introduces political culture's off-shoot in the form of strategic culture. Nations display a distinctive and strategically evolving style of digesting the problems of national security: "Strategic realities are therefore in part culturally constructed as well as culturally perpetuated" (Booth 1990:124 quoted in Dellios, 1997:204). Differences in values are reflected in how culture influences economic development, with some cultures possessing distinct advantage because of their values.

The political culture of Modern Greece and the absence of strategic culture

Greece is a modern state established in 1832, a full member of the European Union (since 1981) and NATO (since 1952), but not actually belonging to the West. This comprises a fundamental question for Greece, while sometimes not following "western" foreign policies, such this of NATO's past intervention in Kosovo in 1999; and Greece's diplomatically support to the also Orthodox Serbians (Huntington 1996:

163). Greece's foreign policy towards its Balkan neighbors, Arab states is indeed deviant to Greece's allies and causes misunderstandings and sometimes also may engender crises. But what has affected political culture of a European Union member and a NATO ally to adopt such policies? Many western scholars allege that Greece does not consist of a clear Western state. But this is a reductionism of Greek political culture. The answer to that question is quite more complicated. But first of all, there must be a chronological separation to the periods that have formed Modern Greek political culture.

After the end of the World War II and before 1967 there was in Greece a "Right party *fear*" that was due to the civil war (1945-1949) *after* syndromes, but also the "Communist fear". Since 1967 a military junta governed Greece (April 21st 1967-1974) a fact that influenced Greece's modern political thought as few other matters (with that of Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 and the United Nations contemporaneous stance to that). After the "*colonel's*" government fall- because of the events in Cyprus- *Constantinos Karamanlis* flew to Athens from Paris, to become the first Prime Minister of the "*metapoliteysi*" period in Greece. The "right party fear" was increasingly high during all this period and that led to Karamanlis defeat in the 1981 national elections (after recent Greece's membership in the European Union as the tenth member) from the socialist party of *PASOK* and *Andreas Papandreou*. Orthodoxy and offensive stance of Greece against "*the danger from the East*" (meaning Turkey) characterize this period of Greece's history. New national disputes, as this of Macedonia appear, and Greece is unable to react properly, no matter which party controls the government, combined with nationalistic syndromes of the public opinion that stamped country's foreign policy.

After 1996, when *Constantinos Simitis* won the national elections there was a "*turn*" in foreign policy (firstly regarding Greece's relation to Turkey) but also domestically, with a direct conflict between the State and the Greek Church leaded by

Archbishop Christodoulos, a really charismatic personality and leader, for an identification cards issue (Kalyvas 2000). The end of this "fight", unusual for the Greek social, religious and political status quo, was the "defeat" and pullback of the Church. The relation with Turkey, after the Imia Crisis on 1996, has been accommodated with the planning of foreign policy by Andreas Papandreou' son, George Papandreou, as a Minister of Foreign Affairs (from 1997 to 2004) with the doctrine of foreign policy to have fundamentally changed (non state actors and their role have been upgraded and a *détente* approach to Turkey was a reality). This is the contribution of the last PASOK government (1996-2004).

The modern Greek state -and its political life- is characterized –unfortunately- by some detrimental aspects. Clientism, populism, introversion, religious nationalism, a "siege" mentality, economic protectionism and state corporatism are some of these. The reluctant aspects are the modernizing European forces, which have conduced to Greece's integration to the European Union and in the Monetary Union and also are trying to disembarrass Greece from all these false characteristics of its political culture.

A factor that mainly affects Modern Greek political Culture is Orthodoxy. After the disjunction from the Patriarchate of Constantinople the Autocephalous Church of Greece has actually politicized religion that has influenced Greece's national educational system. Greeks consider themselves as the "spear carriers of Christianity" (Huntington 1996: 193) that –unlikely the other European states- *have transferred their nationalism from a normal type of "civic" nationalism to a religious-Orthodox-one*. Greek students are brought up within a *Hellene-centric educational system that delineates an idol of modern-Classical Greece.* Greek education emphasizes on Classical Greece and its glory, Hellenistic Period with Alexander the Great and Macedonia and finally Byzantium. There are few references to Greece's close past, as the period of Ottoman "Yoke" (1453-1821). This applies also as an issue of Greece's modern foreign policy: past, present and –most important- the future relation with Turkey. In the Greek school books, superiority of the Greek against this of Turkish nation, combined with the icon of the Muslim, Asiatic, barbaric, power-hungry neighbor, has generated not only a stereotype in Greek society, too difficult to be surpassed, but also a foreign policy aspect that may explain Greece's stance opposite Turkey during the last 30 years (with small brakes after 1996). The religious aspect of Greece's national identity is an issue that cannot be discussed in this essay, but only to be referred, as a reality that attains Orthodoxy's hegemonic status in the Greek political culture.

Greek foreign policy has transcended its drags and managed –during the last years- to modernize. European integration has softened foreign policy and broadened national security towards low politics and economics[8]. Greek modern political culture faces a dualism: the modern European section and the Hellene centric traditional one. Greece is also said to suffer from an "underdog culture", because of Greece's glorious historical tradition. Greece's insecurity over its Balkan past and European future has bred a defensive attitude within the international institutions.

History and Mass Media in the Balkan region are interpreted in ways that banish actually cultural diversity and the "Otherness" by defending the national interests and promoting a national ideology that sometimes outflanks each state's propaganda. In the case of Greek negative images of "the other", stereotypes and "hate speech" cultivate a false sense of superiority. These syndromes in Greece are directed mainly towards the Macedonian issue and also through the relation to Turkey. A strategic culture's absence from Greece is broadly viewed in these two

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[8] Political Culture and Foreign Policy: *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of European Integration and Globalization* A NATO Fellowship Final Report.

paradigms: The decision making process and the national strategy during the Macedonian issue in the early '90s but more deliberately the crisis management in the Imia case in January 1996.

The Concept of Strategic Culture

The strategic culture thesis has its roots in a concern that was flagged informatively by Snyder. He wrote as follows:

"It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique "strategic culture." Individuals are socialized into a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semipermanence that places them on the level of "culture" rather than mere "policy." Of course, attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and the international environment. However, new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture" (Snyder, 1977: 5).

According to Gray the concept of strategic culture is a direct descendant of the concept of political culture, which has been debated, developed, variously employed, and even more variously defined by political scientists since the early 1950s (Kavanaugh, 1972). The idea of national style is derived logically from the concept of political culture: a particular culture should encourage a particular style in thought and action (Gray, 1984: 27). Strategic culture refers to a whole set of society of macro-strategic concepts. The basic contents of the society are identified by state decision-makers, and accordingly a long-term state strategic choice orientation is set up (Johnston, 1995: 32-64). Johnston believes that strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (i.e., causal axioms, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-standing strategic preferences by formulating concepts of roles and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs (Johnston, in Katzenstein, 1996: 222). Strategic culture includes the basic assumption about the orderliness of the strategic environment and the state decision-makers understanding of the international conflicts and their resolving methods, especially the understanding concerning use of force. To a large extent, strategic culture decides strategic choice.

Basically, we can divide strategic culture into two categories: conflictual strategic culture and cooperative strategic culture. In order to make the concept of strategic culture operable, we can further define three kinds of recognition: Recognition of war, of conflict and of efficacy of use of force (Johnston, 1998: 9). As Johnston argues: "Different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree, by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites", (Johnston, 1995: 32-64). According to Longhurst, strategic culture today can be best defined as 'a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process (Longhurst, 2000: 200). Gray in his late works who defines strategic culture as: "the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less specific to a particularly geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique historical experience" (Gray, 1999: 51). Carnes Lord creates his own version of strategic culture not just in terms of military practice but in terms of the social, political and ideological characteristics 'centrally constitutive of a state'. Lord identifies six factors which created a strategic culture: the geopolitical setting, military history, international relationships, political culture and ideology, the nature of civil-military relations and military technology (Lord, in Longhurst, 2000: 303). Katzenstein used a mixture of

political-military cultural elements and based his theory on two main aspects of security- the cultural/institutional and the national identity dimension (Katzenstein, 1996). As Alan Macmillan suggests: "The decision making process in matters of defence is not an abstract construct based purely in the present moment but is, rather, steeped in the beliefs, biases, traditions and cultural identity of the individual country- all of which feeds into its strategic culture"(Macmillan, in Katzenstein, 1996). This culture is shaped by formative episodes in times of crisis and is highly influenced by experiences of the past. Furthermore, change in strategic culture is gradual in nature and is most likely to occur in the forms of adjustments so long as the core values stay intact. Beliefs, feelings, fears, aims, stereotypes, hate speech and ambitions are the unobservable aspects of each strategic culture. They are the core values that form the foundational elements of it, giving it its quality and characteristics. These foundational elements are derived directly from formative experiences and have been internalised, creating a fairly consensual or centripetal nature to the strategic culture.

Different scholars use different components in order to define strategic culture. For instance, Kerry Longhurst identifies three main components of strategic culture. The 'foundational elements' (basic beliefs regarding the use of force that give a strategic culture its core characteristics), the 'security policy standpoints' (the contemporary, widely accepted interpretations as to how best core values should be promoted through policy channels, in the sense that they set the preferences for policy choices) and the 'regulatory practices'(the long-standing policies and practices that actively relate and apply the substance of the strategic culture's core to the external environment) (Longhurst, 2000). On the other hand, Jones gives us an alternative account of strategic culture elements when he argues that there were three levels of inputs into a state's strategic culture: a macro-environmental level consisting of geography, ethno-cultural characteristics and history, a societal level consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society, and a micro level consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations (Johnston, 1995: 32-64).

The Macedonian issue in the early '90s

The Balkan subsystem has been characterized centuries ago, by shifting boundaries, diverse traditions and cultural groups and, therefore, by numerous conflicts. The term "Macedonia" refers to a broader area which is actually being geographically shared by three states (Greece, FYROM, and Bulgaria). These actors raise different political and cultural claims in order to legitimize themselves and justify their "possession". The "Macedonian" dispute is typical paradigm of the ethnic diversities and complexities that characterize the Balkan Peninsula.

The breakup of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s raised an issue that was concealed for more than forty five years under the federation of that Balkan state; the Macedonian issue, which instantly came up with the declaration of independence by the *former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia* having as a constitutional name 'Republic of Macedonia'. The newly established state declared independence after the referendum that took place in the 8th September 1991, in which the Macedonian people and the rest of the population -Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities-, (Constitution of Republic of Macedonia. 1991: 1) decided the secession of the southern part of the former Yugoslavia. One would have expected Greece to play a crucial role, this of the arbitrator, thus confirming her regional role. A hypothesis far from reality; instead of acting as a mediator, Greece was contributing to the explosive potential of the region… Mainly, Greek Foreign Policy was suffering from what Christos Rozakis called as "*Macedonization*" of her foreign policy. The

use of term "Macedonia" involves a set of cultural elements. The use of these elements as distinctive features of the national identity of a new state does not premise a simple appropriation of the name, but rather an appropriation of the culture and the tradition this name signifies. Almost even every side of Greek political elite had become obsessed with the "name issue" and the alleged "Macedonian irredentism". Hence, every policy decision had to take into account Greece's intransigent attitude towards that latest arrival in Southern Balkan statehood. As a result, Greece ended up with only one "ally" in the region, Orthodox Serbia.

The analysis of the Macedonian issue with the constructivist approach aims at a better understanding of the emergence of a Modern Greek type of "nationalism". The claims of Greece with reference to FYROM are based on cultural, historical and to a certain extent, geographical arguments. *Macedonia*, meaning the region where the kingdom of Alexander the Great started, has 'a fundamental place in the Greek political psyche' (Pettifer. 1992: 478). However, the claims of the other side, the so-called today Macedonians, referring to the people of the FYROM as descendants of Alexander the Great, colonized by a Greek-speaking elite class (Pettifer. 1992: 478), the use of an emblem of the Macedonian Empire as a flag and mostly chapters of the constitution of FYROM referred to Macedonians in the neighboring states, shattered the Greek society and the Greek authorities. Therefore, the majority of the population and authorities either neglected or undermined the role of the name Macedonia for the coherence of the newly established state, which until nowadays struggles in the difficult task of the nation-building (Roudometof. 1996: 253).

Albeit that, the Macedonian controversy is mainly of a political nature. The use of Greece's historical symbols by a different nationality's group, threatens the identity of the in-group. This led Greek people to redifine their sense of "We" in contrast to the "Others" which becomes a concrete outgroup, in this instance a weak and alone state, FYROM. They thus emphasize the distinctiveness of their culture and the uniqueness of their trajectory through history. Moreover, their arguments find their concrete expression in the numerous monuments and "poetic spaces" found within the Greek terittory. By the course of time those ruins which became a second nature to the Greek landscape were "charged" with a new function: to serve as constant reminders of the nation's descent (Smith, 1986).

The nationalist feelings of the population have however been manipulated by political parties as a campaigning device, namely as a means of discrediting one another while keeping the voter's attention away from internal economic and social problems (Mouzelis, 1978: 135). A conservative government intially and later a socialist government simulated nationalist sentiments and simultsneously, acted to disorient the electorate in a period of economic and political crisis. National pride has systematicaly been emphasized in a political discourse which concentrates on the "injustice" caused by "foreigners", i.e. FYROM or the internatinal community. Thus, as often noticed, the glories of the past have been used to recompense for the failures and dissatisfaction of the present.

A rigid nationalist position was initially adopted by the conservative government of Constantinos Mitsotakis. The ruling party, which held a majority of one member only in the Greek Parliament, seems to have tried to increase its electoral appeal through the use of nationalist propaganda. Indeed, the government took up a number of cultural intiatives against the regognition of the "Republic of Macedonia". Roundtables, workshops and public debates with the participation of the academic community and the media organised. Furthermore, the National Tourism Agency launched and advertizing campaign promoting cultural trips to the Northen Greece, in the regions on Macedonia and Thrace. Nationalist messages written in English so that tourists would understand were stamped on T- shirts and stickers. *"First Learn History"* and *"The Spirit of Alexander the Great is Universal but his Homeland*

Macedonia has been Greek for the past 3.000 Years", were some of the most eloquent slogans.

The government's initiatives were successful in mobilizing Greeks at home and abroad. A huge public rally took place in Athens in December 1992. Despite being organised by informal actors actually, this rally gathered approximately one million people. It seems that collective mobilization occurred quite spontaneously because of the perceived importance of the matter at stake. Another public demonstration was organised in Thessaloniki a few months later, as were others in most of the Greek diaspora communities in the US, Canada and Australia (Danforth, 1995). In parallel, the Greek argument has been disseminated in various ways from the Hellenic Diaspora all over the world, including full-page political advertisements in leading newspapers, travel advertisements inviting people to visit "Macedonia", English-language material distributed by the Greek Embassies and pamphlets distributed in Greek Orthodox churches (Tsakonas, 1997). The adoption by Prime Minister Mitsotakis of a more flexible stance with regard to the Macedonian issue during the summer of 1993, was considered as a "nationally dangerous" behavior and led some MP's from his party to withdraw from the government. Moreover a new party called "Political Spring" was created by the ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs from Mitsotakis government, Antonis Samaras.

The disagreement between Greece and FYROM never really concerned the question of the name of the new republic as has been erroneously assumed. The real rivalry was always Greece's refusal to recognize the existence of a Slavomacedonian ethnic group within (as a minority) and outside Greece's frontiers (as a state). Greece's foreign policy in the early '90s consisted and covert attempts to destabilize FYROM with the help from Milosevic's Serbia, even from 1993.

Greece's foreign policy on the Macedonian issue is plagued by serious contradictions and omissions. The first omission concerns the announcement from Greece the dogma of the "non-viability of multiethnic states", the theoritical underpinning of its Balkan policy in the early '90s. The second contradiction in Greece's policy towards Skopje consists in the fact that the Greek state refuse to recognise the existence of a Slavomacedonian ethnic group with its language, symbols and history. The contradictions and omissions that characterize the foreign policy of Greece towards Skopje are the result of the ideology of ethnic nationalism that has dominated Greek society since its inception. Abandoning the doctrine of "non-viability of multiethnic states" and recognizing at the same time the existence of a Slav-Macedonian ethnic group would have implications that would have had implications within Greece's borders; recognizing the existence of a Slavomacedonian minority in Greece, whose existence would be vehemently denied. Such recognition would come up against to the templates of ethnic homogeneity and ethnic purity, which define Greek ethnic nationalism. In Greece, like in most states dominated by the ideology of ethnic nationalism, the *"right to exist"*, derives from the person's belonging to the dominant ethnic group and not from his participation in the political community, his payment of taxes to the State or his obedience to the Constitution of the country.

The conflict between Greece and FYROM remains an unfortunate international dispute in a region that needs no further cause for unrest. The realities of politics and power have left it a debate characterised by resource to the legends of days gone by a battle of the historians. The brief attempt above at a legal analysis of the situation lends support to a prediction that the Macedonian issue will remain a political war of attrition, with a workable interim compromise perhaps stuck in the meantime on issues relating to the constitution and acceptable compound names.

The Imia Crisis

In January 1996 a group of Turkish "journalists" removed the Greek flag from the islet of Imia and hoisted a Turkish one. Greek troops immediately replaced the Greek flag. *Theodore Pangalos,* Greece's Foreign Minister considered the affair closed until the Prime Minister of Turkey *Tansu Ciller* laid an official claim on that and many other Greek islets and commenced a confrontation that almost escalated to warfare. The crisis was defused through the intervention of US diplomats but yet another one item was added to the overburdened agenda of Greek- Turkish disputes in the Aegean (Veremis, in Keridis- Triantaphyllou, 2001: 44).

According to Wilkinson, Imia incident confirmed the Greeks' worst fears about broader Turkish assertions that undefined (*"gray") zones* exist to Greece's Aegean territorial waters. Athens adamantly denies any ambiguity and charges Ankara with infringing on non-negotiable sovereign Greek territory set by international treaties. Greeks uniformly interpret Turkish position as a new escalation and a demonstration of Turkey's "aggressiveness" (Wilkinson, 1999: 17).

Security dilemma, as a diagnostic and methodological tool of the realistic paradigm, refers to the notion that a state's efforts to increase its security, by threatening another state which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state's security (Jervis, 1978: 167-214). Ifanti's analysis of the crisis seeks to reflect on the issue of the Imia crisis through the connection of the anarchic structure of the international system with the expansionist state conduct at the unit level of analysis. Charting the spiral of events that triggered the Imia case and brought the two countries to the edge of a war, he attributed this crisis to Turkish revisionism (Ifantis, 2002: 29- 48). Ifantis essentially voiced the view that the security dilemma in the Greek- Turkish conflict reflects a blend of inadvertent and deliberate types, being the product of two, seemingly contradictory, factors in combination. The Greek inhability to consolidate the status quo and seek for security without being trapped in a dilemma of response, and the Turkish ability to maximize its power and secure more relative gains. In effect, according to Tsakona's there exists a 'deep security dilemma', even though the implications could be contained or even ameliorated (Tsakonas, 2002: 10).

An offset to this argument, Ayman perceives in the Imia crisis a Greek effort to present a fait accompli with respect to what she calls a Greek expansionist policy in the Aegean(Ayman, 2002: 49-72). As a result, Turkey was forced to increase its security by arms built up, a fact that, thanks to the Greek 'Greek non-security goals', deepens the security dilemma further. According to Ayman, Turkey acted as a defender of the *status quo* who drew a line and tested – successfully- the validity of its deterrent strategy (Tsakonas, 2002: 10).

For both countries, the *Imia- Kardak* crisis marks the culmination of the uncertainty in strategic orientation of both countries in the post- Cold War Era. It is not easy to understand this crisis in materialistic terms; According to some scholars, it was a crisis over two tiny, barren islets inhabited only by goats. Indeed the challenge that this crisis posed for those who prefer to explain international relations in materialistic terms finds one of its most interesting expressions in the words of the US National Security Council Spokesman David Johnson: "*Sovereignty promotes people to do strange things*".

The Imia crisis was an epitome of what Wendt calls the "*social construction of power politics*" (Wendt, 1992, 391- 425). This crisis cannot be understood without its social context. First, the historical reservoir of negative images, hate speech, prejudices and stereotypes about the "Other" is very critical in the emergence and escalation of the crisis. This is one of the main points in constructivist analysis of international relations, which puts a special emphasis on the social context of state behaviour (Kovert, in Kubakova- Onuf and Covert, 1998, 108). Similarly, it is

necessary to understand that Greece and Turkey are two countries which achieved their sovereignty as a result of the wars of liberation they fought against each other. The collective memory in both Greece and Turkey is continuously nourished by reminders of past enmity in history textbooks, literature and the media. These factors explain how a little island can turn into an issue of sovereignty bringing them to the verge of war (Millas, 1995). Second, it is important to consider the domestic context in explaining the Imia incident since the crisis coincided with domestic turbulence in both countries and a concern as to how the Western powers perceived this situation. The end of the era in which Greece led to growing concerns the West about the country's political stability according to the rise of Constantinos Simitis and the "modernizers" to the country leadership. Turkey was subject to similar concerns among Western partners due to the rise of Islamist politics, defined as one of the major threats to national security following the Welfare party's electoral victory in December 1995.

In this context, the Imia crisis can be seen partly as an effort by these two countries to disprove any domestic or Western perception that they were uncertain, unstable and weak at home or abroad. It is possible to argue that the failure of this attempt of reassertion was one of the strongest motives behind the "critical rethinking" in Greek and Turkish foreign policies.

Some have argued that Imia crisis strengthened negative perceptions and hostile feelings in both Greece and Turkey, thus bringing an increase in the security dilemma (Ayman, 1998: 111-119). It is possible to agree with this argument since the Imia crisis had a negative influence on Greek-Turkish relations, even promoting talk of a civilizational clash on both sides of the Aegean: Greece portrayed Turkey as "barbarian", "uncivilized" and "Asiatic." Turkey, on the other hand, argued that Greece was the "spoilt child of the West" (Lenkova, 1998) However, it is also possible to argue that the Imia crisis created the first motives toward a rapprochement in Greek-Turkish relations. In other words, the crisis can be considered as a "blessing in disguise" since it generated strong pressure from the United States and the European Union, especially on Athens, to reach an understanding with Ankara, and compelled Simitis government to abandon Greece's long-held policy of 'no talks with Turkey' (Athanassopoulou, 1997, 97).

Policy Proposals for a Hellenic Strategic Culture

Contemporary international reality is characterized by the emergence of peripheral nationalisms and the reethnicization of politics (Calloni,1995:96) which challenge the boundaries of the nation-state. The eclipse of the ideological discource deprived entire societies form meaningful symbolic frames of reference, a development which certainly applies primarily in Eastern Europe. The development generated a vacum which gave birth to syndromes of "romantic nostalgia" of old traditional values which provide a sence of collective security. The phenomenon is neither peculiar to the Southeastern Europe nor it is list manifested after 1989. Balkan nationalisms envolved first as ideologies which sought to reach the respective states came into existence. So nationalisms evolved first as ideologies which sought to reach collective ends, namely the generation of new nation states (Mouzelis,1994: 37-39). More specifically, in the Balkans, where nations are perceived in ethnic terms, the states which succeeded the Ottoman Empire set the foundation for great illusions, namely that they represented ethnically homogeneous societies. In this sence, the "Others" were supposed to be outside the borders, and minorities within them were just neglected or disguised. Loyalty thus to the nation is intepreted as a form of symbolic support for a metaphysical essence which reflects the idealized "We".

A basic malign feature of Greek political culture is an "*afterwards*" approach to international processes and correlations, with an occasional and circumstantial approach to that result to a lack of credibility in Greece's national foreign policy. Flexibility and efficiency in diplomatic maneuver should be based in a common and long term strategy plan. In the case of Greece there is no national interest, but national "matters" directly related with neighbors "scope" to Greek territorial, historical, legitimate and national rights.

Greek society is straightforward connected with the shaping and decision making, due to social effect to national political culture. Its aspects are fear for the foreign possible intervention to Greek national matters, a continuous threat for Turkey, and a "superiority" syndrome towards the foreigners, because of the glorious Greek classical culture. It it appropriate to underline the complex ethnic mix that characterize Modern Greece. A major issue of international concern is the threatment of minority ethnic groups in Greece- Albanians, Turks and Slavomacedonians. Greece continues to deny the existence of all except a "Muslim Minority", meaning Turkish speakers, and seems willing to aknowledge them only because they are specified in international threaties. There are also some who argue that potential unrest from its Slavomacedonian minority, or pressures for the return of exiled Macedonians to Greece and parallel for the resumption of confiscated lands. These aspects affect the decision makers as human (sociological and psychological factors) but also the cliental criteria and behavior of the Greek political system (policy makers, members of Parliament, rely on their electorate basis).

 Colin Gray underline three pillars, within which we should propose a national startegic culture: a) The concept of strategic culture is a useful tool for better understanding ourselves, others, and how others view us, b) Just as cultural awareness can enlighten, so the "fog of culture" can restrict understanding and c) Restricted understanding of the strategic culture of others can be very dangerous for international peace and security (Gray,1984:26). Thus, the classic Greek dichotomy between "Us" (Greeks) and "Others" (non-Greeks) is currently used within a new context. In antiquity it had served to distinguish between the Greek civilization and the "barbarian" populations[9]. In contemporary times the dichotomy acquired a new character. During the past two centuries the Turks have become the salient outgroup. Memories of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the Imia crisis are still too recent. In the early '90s, FYROM seemed to have the potential to also be identified as a significant "Other" given also its religious and political affiliations with Turkey (Poulton, 1995:203). A Hellenic strategic culture should be characterized from the break of the civic stereotypes and negative images of the "Others" and parallel the humanisation of the "Other". Proposing a Hellenic Strategic Culture we should to assert the following potential benefits:

- An improved understanding of our own, and other, cultures in local terms.
- An improved ability to discern enduring policy motivations and to make predictions.
- An improved ability to communicate what is intended to be communicated.
- An improved ability to understand the meaning of events in the assessment of Others.

Greece is expected to have a special strategic culture because of its nature of foreign policy. State formation implied that state's army had an important role to play in forming the identity of each state. However, Greece's strategic goals should put on soft elements in external relations. We should also take into consideration that the division between 'high' and 'low' foreign policy has been blurred by latest

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[9] Those not enlightened by Grrek thought, culture and civilization.

developments in the field with new works from scholars aiming at bridging the gap between the two camps. However this does not limit its role in strategic culture. For instance, it may be the case that a Hellenic Strategic Culture, although deals with questions of security and defence, is still based on the idea of the projection of the Greece as a primary civilian power. This can be also derived as a conclusion when the Hellenic Strategic Culture is studied in detail in terms of military power the use of force will likely resemble that of the doctrine of just war: military coercion will take place only when mandated by international law, and the use of force will be severely constrained.

- *Indemnity of continuance and consequence in the national strategy lining and national policy planning*, regardless of the governmental and political rotation. For the case of Greece, a creation of a National Policy and Strategic Plan. The enactment of a permanent, independent, Advisory Committee of National Strategy, Policy and Security, and parallel upgrade of the Council of Foreign Policy.
- *Cosmopolitanism, Modernization and Democratization of Greece's foreign policy*. Multilateralism in the diplomatic level, erasing the bureaucratic politics from the decision making process and parallel resetting of the agenda of Greece's Foreign Policy through the alternative types of diplomacy. Scientific approach to all national political matters, by recruitment of all governmental bodies, and contemporaneous staffing in all these institutions with members from the International Relations academic community. Adoption of a more "aggressive" foreign policy planning and win-win approaches to cases of national interest.
- *Utilization of Greece's "soft power"*. Greece has the ability of promoting its cultural characteristics, from which is most known in the global environment, that will allow the country to be more "attractive" and not so "cumbersome" as she is for all these years of national "tragedies". Greece should exploit the use of its development co- operational policy and economical diplomacy in the Balkan and Mediterranean subsystems such as to stabilize her role as regional power. Bilateral cooperation to further development, humanitarian aid, and the protection of human rights should be key principles to Greece's foreign policy. In parallel Greece should export its *know-how* on various issues concerning the European aquis. Besides, as a member of International and Interstate Organizations and Fora- i.e. the Presidency of the Security Council of the UN in July 2005- Greece could reach a more aggressive policy assisting its neighbors' effort to streamline and parallel to achieve better conditions and platforms for negotiations in case to provide the resolution of its National Cases. The ultimate national goal should be Greece's nomination to a regional power and as Peace and Stability guarantor in the Southeastern subsystem. . In the framework of the Balkan Stability Pact, Greece should take important initiatives to promote regional stability, by creating networks of cooperation, and by taking steps to actualize regional reconstruction.
- *Rationalization of Decision Making Process and in Crisis Management*. A creation of a backdrop for decision taking process and crisis prevention and of a permanent action mechanism for crisis analysis, interpretation and management. Gradual suppleness and bureaucracy casting out, in the decision making procedures. High risk policy specialists, analysts and advisors contribution educated for that purpose should be reached.
- *Europeanization and Socialization of Greece's Political Culture*. Minimization of the State interventionism, liberalization of the process of

decision making. Strengthening of the Civil Society and the Non State Actors -that apply to foreign policy matters- networking, after an immediate sorting out period from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

- *The step-by-step social shifting of Sovereignty, Stereotypes, Syndromes and Negative images*. Attempt for humanizing the *"Others"*. Minimize the social phenomenon of "hate speech" (i.e. anti-Americanism, anti western syndrome). A more realistically and modern approach to educational system as a whole, but also in the role of the Mass Media. Including family, there should be a constructive and long term approach to the Others form these social factors that contribute to the new generation national cultural characteristics. The assistance from social sciences that apply to social matters (sociology, psychology) is necessary.

- *Reestablishment state and church relations*. Under a common platform from dialogue, this acute relation of the last years must be reexamined and approached under a new legal status quo, toward the best of the Greek political, legal and economical system.

Conclusion

In summary, Greek national identity has been reconstructed through the territorialization and politicization of ethnic and cultural traditions. Ethnic customs, linguistic ties and religious beliefs have been transformed into national sentiments. According to Smith's distinction between ethnic and territorial nations, the Greek national community belongs clearly to the former type. Thus, any questioning of the "Hellenicity" is perceived as a threat to the very essence of the nation because it casts doubt on the continuity of the national community through history. Analysing the case of a Hellenic Strategic Culture we can highlight the Greek claims of "property" over certain cultural traditions and more specifically, the relationship between these claims and the ethno-cultural character of Greek national identity, also we can underline the cyclistic strategic manipulation of these nationalist feelings by rhe Greek political elite. The role of political and cultural myths in redifining national identity and in drawing the boundaries, symbolic and territorial, between "Us" and the "Others" is investigated. The problems that may arise from such an ethnic conception of the nation state are discussed and as a "window of opportunity" a "constitutional model of patriotism" can be proposed as an alternative solution.

Conclusively, Greek public opinion and society reflects its cultural characteristics in Greek national foreign policy. Regarding also the term of national "matters" (Cyprus, Macedonia, Aegean Sea) and not national interests, demonstrates the dominance of domestic beliefs, priorities and policies and the possible political repercussion to any decision concerning foreign policy matters. The costs of this unconventional behavior of Greece is a static and no dynamic approach to today interdependent states' relations and a simultaneous jostle for Greece from the international fora.

The republican tradition seems no longer able to provide solutions to conflicts emerging either at a local or an international level. Contemporary reality requires citizenship not to be restricted to groups which claim to be ethnically and culturally homogeneous. Greece may therefore reflect on the content but also on the form of its national identity. The heritage of the classical period, the ancient polis and the prototype of the Athenian democracy may become a stimulus for a criticalreflection on the present situation. The past may be integrated into the present in a creative manner. Selective forgeting is a strategy which helps to reconstruct an idealised past

but does little for the future. The cultural herirage and the identity of a nation may be better preserved through peaceful collaboration and recognition of diversity rather than through rejection of the "Other". Greece's foreign policy and national startegy objective is clear: to carry forward fundamental, dynamic initiatives in order to establish a framework of principles and rules, of justice and democracy, which will take effect throughout our region. Greece is, and will continue to be, a model of democracy, stability and cooperation for the region. Greece's regional policy is, in a sense, the answer to the new challenges of globalization. Greece's inclusive foreign Policy in the 21st century needs economic, environmental, educational, and cultural dimensions too. The foremost political priority for Greece in the ever changing world of the 21st century should be the consolidation of cultural and educational diplomacy.

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Representing Greece in Brussels: explaining issues of national fragmentation and malfunctioning

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Abstract

In the past the author has worked with British MEPs (European Parliamentary Labour Party) and has been in touch with UKREP representatives. The clash between the different countries-Greece and the UK in particular, were the first stimulus in writing this paper. The paper deals with the issue of Greek national representation at the EU level. It is argued that although Greece has been an EU member since 1981 it still has not managed to set up a cohesive network of representation. Much of the failure is inherent in the weaknesses of civil service bureaucracy at the national level. Problems emerge from the very nature of the Greek state as well as from the failure of the political elites to address new challenges in an imaginative way.

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Introduction

National representation in Brussels is based on a national pattern of administration that one needs to study in order to understand the main issues and problems. Therefore, the paper begins with a short introduction of the Greek administrative system. Examples are provided from the main agents which are in charge of representing Greece in Brussels such as the COREPER, mission, the Greek MEPs at the European Parliament, the representation in the Committee of the Regions and the Greek Presidencies of the EU. The aim of the paper is not to give a long account of each body's weaknesses and strengths but rather to summarise some common issues and problems that emerge from representing Greece in the EU.

One has to go back to history in order to understand the problematic process of Greek 'Europeanisation'. Greek accession to the EC was decided without a broad consensus as there was a strong divergence on the issue between the two main political parties- New Democracy (Conservatives) and PASOK (Socialists). Greece became an EC member in 1981 and got its first socialist government at the same year. The Socialists got into power with an ambivalent position on the EC. On the other hand, the decision to allow Greece to enter the EC was a highly political decision without a long accession period as it was the case of the next Mediterranean enlargement. Greece therefore had entered the club of the rich western nations but there was very little it could get out of it in terms of benefits. One might argue that neither Greece was ready for EC membership at that time but nor was the EC ready for Greece. The absence of a detailed transition process left the Greek administration intact and ill equipped to deal with the outcomes of EC accession.

A good description of the problematic nature of the Greek administration is provided by Spanou who suggests that: 'the Greek administrative system is characterised by a set of parameters: sectorization and fragmentation, low co-ordination, centralization and hierarchical structure, importance of informal networks and personal strategies, as well as weak institutionalisation of horizontal and staff functions.'[1] Problems of dealing with the fragmented nature of the system are evident when decisions need to be taken at a quicker pace. A lack of real priorities as well as the lack of clear plan of modernising administration have lead to many problems of functioning which have a direct impact on dealing with Europe and representing Greece at the EU level.

Therefore, the Greek administration remained very much an observer of the Greek-EU ambivalent relationship in the 1980s. However, the 1990s can be characterised by a process of slow administrative Europeanisation and modernisation. Part of the Europeanisation process can be attributed to pressures from the EU and new policy challenges. In the 1990s the majority of the Greek political elites supported the process of administrative modernisation but did not push it far enough. Changes took

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[1] Spanou, C., 2001.Permanent Challenges? Representing Greece in Brussels in The National coordination of EU Policy, H. Kasssim & A. Menon, Oxford University Press and also Spanou C., 1998, "European integration in administrative terms: a framework for analysis and the Greek case", Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.3, no.3, pp 467-484

place at a slow pace and the administrative mechanism remained entrapped in anachronistic practises. This influences the way Greece is represented in Brussels.

Representing Greece: main agents of representation

One of the most important agents of representation is the Permanent Representation in the Council. In order to function successfully the Greek representation needs to be a well organised and powerful institution in order to promote the national interest. However, by examining the structure of representing Greek interests in Brussels one can tell a very different story.

The Greek Representation in the Council lacks the so-needed institutional autonomy. Political networks of influence still play a vital role in the process of promoting employees and policies. Therefore the role of the Representation as an independent agent which provides impartial advice is undermined by the growing level of politicisation and partitocracy. Although diplomats are regarded as permanent employees they cannot promote a party-independent policy neither can they challenge the political leadership when they think that issues are not dealt with successfully.

Unfortunately, in order to deal with the growing needs of representation in Brussels the Greek administration has dealt with its usual way: expanding by increasing the numbers of bureaucrats. The large number of people working in the permanent representation has not render it into a successful one. Expansion is ideal when it deals with the real needs and challenges. However, the increase in the number of employees has not led to a qualitative increase in expertise. Kassim and Peters mention the quality of the staff of permanent missions by suggesting that: 'incumbents are typically high-fliers with distinguished records of service – Greece, apparently, is an exception – or exceptional negotiating skills.'[2] In addition, the apparatus is slow in dealing with issues and slow when it needs to get mobilised. Due to internal weaknesses, the Greek Representation in Brussels misses the chance of influencing the process from the very beginning. This is also the case in the Committee of the Regions and the European Parliament. Mobilising at a late stage is not a successful strategy as many issues are considered as a 'fait accompli' and even when other countries recognize that Greeks are right in wanting a new compromise they do not want to start the process from the very beginning as they consider it a waste of time.

Experience and specialization are usually required by some of the most successful missions in Brussels such as UKREP. However, contrary to the practises of other nation states experience is not ranked highly and there is a lack of linking staff experience to the real needs of Greece. As Spanou comments: 'no previous experience or familiarity with the EU decision-making is required for secondment by sectoral ministries. Moreover, it is far from guaranteed that the expertise they have acquired will be used upon return. On the contrary, they may receive any position or even be intentionally marginalized in the service since their appointment to Brussels

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[2] Kassim, H. and Guy Peters, B., 2001. Co-ordinating National Action in Brussels – a Comparative Perspective in H. Kassim and A. Menon (eds), The National Co-ordination of EU policy, Oxford University Press

is seen as an envied privilege'[3]. In addition, Spanou suggests that the permanent representation does not receive the necessary support from the centre; there is a wide scope for personal interpretation and handling of the situation, but also the possibility for mistakes or miscalculations.[4] The consequences of the lack of technical expertise and lack of national support lead to weak representation at the Council.

UKREP has a very dense network of personal and institutional contacts. Contacts are a vital tool of policy influence for UK MEPs and for the Representatives of the Committee of the Regions. Contacts with Greek nationals working in the Commission, COREPER and the Parliament are usually good but rather patchy. There is a Greek community of Brussels elites that is based on mutual help and there is a lot of understanding between different departments. However, the relationship is not institutionalised and is based on the good will of the employees. The relationship between Greek COREPER Representatives and the Parliament was a problematic one but it is improving as the Parliament is becoming more of an important policy-making actor. However, there is no still not a strong network of communication with the Greek civil society, no strong links with NGOs and very limited help and consultation with local government. Other national missions are boastful when it comes to the network of connections they have with their national demos. A good connection with the public can be used in order to legitimise a policy and promote it further. In addition, it puts pressure on national policy makers to adopt more up to date realistic policies and less visionary ones. The Greek Permanent Representation occupies a leading position in shaping the national stance and sometimes even deciding what the national interest is. The Greek MEPs have also a wide margin of monoeuvre when it comes to voting. However, this can lead to outcomes that cannot be implemented nationally thus leading to a Europeanisation in paper. As Hibou suggests: 'the tiny government elite that negotiates in Brussels is considerably out of touch with the population as well as the huge body of civil servants in charge of putting guidelines into practice within the administration'.[5]

The current system of representation is also characterized by the weakness to construct efficient networks with other important internal and external players.The network of country allies is mostly limited to grouping with the southern European countries. However due to the process of enlargement, a 'Club Med' alliance will not be as powerful as it was before and Greece has to make steps in order to find allies amongst the new Eastern nations. Even as part of the Mediterranean bloc Greece has not promoted the high level of elite interaction that other alliances have (e.g. the Northern dimension).

There are limited contacts between the national ministries and the Representation in Brussels and information sharing between the Permanent Representation and the national ministries is not the best possible. In the case of the Greek MEPS relations

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[3] Spanou , C., 2001.Permanent Challenges? Representing Greece in Brussels in The National coordination of EU Policy, H. Kasssim & A. Menon, Oxford University Press
[4] Ibid
[5] Hibou, B., 2005. Greece and Portugal: Convergent or Divergent Europeanization? In Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (eds), the Member States of the European Union, Oxford University Press, pp. 229-253

are even more problematic. The Greeks working for the Commission have a more updated view of Greek Ministry workings due to the very nature of their every day work. However, the issue of connecting Europe with the public is a problem in many cases. For instance, in the case of the Commission the interaction between the Commission and civic society is restricted and not helped by the neither the Commission/ European Parliament representation in Athens. In the case of the European Parliament there is no link between the MEPs and the Greek constituencies. The UK selects its MEPs in nine big constituencies. Therefore, UK MEPs have to be accountable to their electoral communities. This is not the case in Greece where parties impose name lists for the whole Greek entity. There is no real contact between Brussels and the periphery and most of political communication takes place between Athens and Brussels. At the European Parliament there is a good presence and involvement of Greek MEPs but there is very little continuity-as most of the MEPs are replaced with the new ones which are 'EU inexperienced'. The Greek MEPs have not yet managed to have the national interest approach of the French MEPs where a government position constitutes automatically a national interest. On the contrary there is still a high amount of rivalry with MEPs of the Conservative opposition trying to score good points by undermining the former national socialist government.

When it comes to representation the centralized nature of the Greek state makes things even more difficult. A new decentralisation plan divided Greece into 13 administrative regions. In addition a new local government plan (the Kapodistrias plan) has dealt with the issue of forming larger municipalities which will be able to deal with wider issues including European issues such as Community directives. All the above have been all positive steps towards a stronger local society and a regionalisation of Greek politics. However, they are not sufficient to deal with the new European challenges. Local governments and prefectures are weak when it comes to financial support and real powers. Greek regions lack the strong powers of German or even Spanish Regions. A new framework that will connect the local demos with the European polity is therefore necessary. The weaknesses of the Greek regions are evident when it comes to representing Greek regions in the Committee of the Regions. Greek Regions seem to be the poor relative, lacking financial and other instrumental tools which are necessary in order to influence decisions. Many European Regions have permanent offices in Brussels that are used as constant information gatherers and policy promoters as well as promoters of the Region in touristic and development terms. This is not the case with the Greek Regions.

Decentralisation has been part of the Socialist modernisation agenda. However, although important steps were made the modernisation did not lead to radical changes of institutional practises. One can suggest that there is a gap of discourse on change and real practises. In addition the modernisation agenda was of a limited nature. As Kazakos suggests: 'stabilisation and structural reform were therefore confined to the margins of domestic power balances, core-political practises and politico-administrative structures.'[6] Indeed it seemed that the progressive forces in Greek politics managed to unite the Greek people under a common scope: monetary unification. The path to European unification, gave a common vision to the majority

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[6] Kazakos Panos, 2004. Europeanisation, Public goals and Group interests: convergence Policy in Greece, 1990-2003, West European Politics, vol.27, No.5, pp.901-918

of Greek people. Modernisation and Europeanisation become part of the everyday political discourse and filled a vacuum in the search of a new identity for the nation. However, too much emphasis was put on the EMU and the economy with less energy and effort directed towards the social and administrative field. As a result of the complete dedication to the Maastricht criteria and the question of Monetary Union the detailed debate on how administration should function in the future was sidelined. Europeanisation therefore can be seen as a limited process that took place at a technocratic and elitist level and not diffused at the bottom of society. The process of partial renewal and partial restructuring that took place in the 1990s is successfully described by Hibou as a process of pseudo-restructuring. Unfortunately since monetary unification was achieved the discourse of modernisation seems to have lost its former impetus.

However, it is not all gloom and doom. Both the third and the fourth Greek Presidencies have proved very successful thus demonstrating that Greece can project a different image and be a constructive player at difficult times for the EU. The Ioannina compromise can be seen as a careful treatment of an issue that has caused a Community deadlock. The fourth Greek Presidency has been successful in promoting a Balkan agenda as well as making sure that the developments in ESDP and the accession process will not be undermined by disagreements over the war in Iraq. However, successes can be attributed to personal commitments and loose epistemic communities that press for change and maintain a busy agenda. The image of the ambitious, busy, active and 'multidimensional' bureaucrat slowly penetrates the minds of Greek bureaucrats.

Institutional independence is a major step to success. The role of the Greeks in the Commission was more successful as the Commission is a supranational institution with its own rules and permanent staff. Greek National saw the Commission as an independent path of influencing European decision-making as they were not so constrained by political elites and vested interests. Therefore, Greek COREPER staff saw the Commission as the natural haven after realizing that the National Representation had not much to offer them. Greeks have managed to climb up the Commission ladder with many of them occupying posts of strength and prestige. However, the two major Greek political parties have been always trying to find ways to promote their own devotees to certain jobs and to penetrate the Community system. (source: interviews with Greek Nationals)

The emergence of a new Europeanised executive has added more pressures on administration to deal with issues effectively. In addition, successful Commissioners such as Vaso Papandreou and Anna Diamandopoulou have demonstrated that personalities do count when it comes to altering the image of a country. The socialisation with others tends to promote a new model of negotiating and dealing with European issues. This leads us to the next point which deals with issues of socialisation and policy learning.

Representing Greece in Brussels: policy learning, socialisation and sociological institutionalism

Representing Greece in Brussels is a process of learning for policy-makers and the administration. Kavakas suggests that EU membership has changed the way Greece is forming its policies and pursuing its interests in many ways. For instance: 'first, there is an increasing level of pre-consultation between the Greek and other ministers. This has been developed gradually and was totally absent during the first few years after Greece's accession.[…] A second aspect is that of compromise. Greek foreign policy makers appear more familiarised with the process of compromises in one area in exchange for benefits in another. […]. The third aspect is that of building a common position of common positions, socialisation of foreign policy makers has brought the tendency to reach agreements in the council. Greece has gradually left behind its strategy of blocking the common positions and started to develop an attitude of trying to influence them'.[7] Therefore, the Greek Representatives have become more pragmatic, less ideological and dogmatic. Of course this does not imply that policy elites have lost their former vision of Europe (or that they do not hold any reservation on the process of European unification) but they are working on those issues more systematically by having accepted that the process of European integration is one of trade offs and backlashes. Therefore, the image of Greece has been transformed from that of a country that blocks decision to one of a constructive partner.

An interesting example of policy transformation is the battle over the name of the Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia. For reasons of internal electoral consumption the Greek Conservative government tried to mobilise the Greek electorate by using nationalistic rhetoric and organising rallies against the use of the word Macedonia by the neighbouring state. This had a repercussion of the image of Greece in Brussels. The economic embargo on FYROM in 1994 was seen as an unnecessary irredentist move. The country was seen as another hot blooded Balkan nation that acted according to its feelings and not according to its long term interests and logic. The Greeks failed to convince the Europeans about the danger of the naming of FYROM thus loosing a good opportunity to Europeanise a national issue. The form of rejection that Greek policy-makers received in Brussels gradually led to a reconsideration of the national position and the slowing down of rhetoric. Due to the non acceptance of irredentist forms of action on behalf of the EU Greece managed to escape the most important trap of all - getting involved in the Yugoslavian conflict. Although a great deal of nationalism and a partial rewriting of history took place[8], the European link remained strong and kept Greece out of any possible war adventures. This demonstrates that the normative power of the EU has pushed Greece towards a certain direction and has led to the rejection of the Balkan nationalist image. Although the newly elected government of PASOK kept part of the rhetoric after 1993, there was a bilateral dialogue and implementation of a common agenda on behalf of Greek diplomats that led to the creation of a new bilateral agenda between the two countries. Exchange of opinions and implementation of common policies (which were kept secret from the public eye) demonstrate that Europe pushed the administration of the

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[7] Kavakas, Dimitrios, 2000. Greece in Manners I. and Whitman R. G.(eds), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States, Manchester University Press
[8] For more information on the Macedonian issue and the question of identity see Triantaphyllidou , A., 1998. National Identity and the 'other' Ethnic and Racial Studies, Volume 21, Number 4,

Ministry of foreign Affairs towards a more pragmatist and reconciliatory policy. It is interesting to notice that from a policy of 'rhetoric fighting' the Greek stance turned into a policy of Balkan inclusion by promoting the issue of EU membership for the Western Balkans which was a vital priority of the fourth Greek Presidency. Due to the special relationship with the Balkans image of Greece has been transformed from that of an awkward partner to a stability promoter. Greece became part of the solution not part of the problem. Europe brought the rediscovery of the Balkans as a means of external influence as Greece became the intermediary between Europe and the Balkans[9].

Challenges of representation

This part of the paper deals with the number of challenges that the external representation of Greece is facing. Challenges can be divided into internal and external ones.

Issues of populism, the neo-Orthodox agenda the neo-Stalinist revival in parts of the 'small' Left go against the main modernisation trend and pose an alternative vision of representing Greece abroad. The Orthodox slogan 'Greece, Europe, Orthodoxy' used by the Greek Orthodox Church in demonstrations against the new ID Greek cards demonstrates that Europeanisation is open to many different interpretations and even not accepted as a value by all. As Hibou suggests: 'Europeanness is, to some degree, devoid of meaning, in that European integration cannot be boiled down to a project, that the evolutions that have occurred cannot be assessed normatively and that Europe cannot determine social practices on its own and give an overall meaning to the events underway'[10].

The rising wave of populism and the social instability of the weak Greek economy leaves a space for extreme political formations to challenge the current status quo. A challenge might arise from the Neo-Orthodox, nationalist and chauvinistic party of LAOS. Its power is very small in order to pose a danger now[11]. However, the fates of Austria, Italy, Belgium and France demonstrate that politics is a gamble. Politicians and diplomatic elites need to balance carefully between the fears of their electorates and their cosmopolitan views of the future of Greece in Europe.

Political rivalries between the two main political parties can be seen as another challenge to representing Greece successfully. The current party of government, the Conservatives Hs not proved mature enough in opposition. Attempts of Conservative MEPS to expose Greece as a bad European have led to a counter productive internal fights that have undermined the image of Greece in Brussels. The declarations of some MPs on the issue of whether Greece would be ready for the 2004 Olympics were detrimental not only to a national cause but to the image of Greece in general. In addition, the failed attempt of the Conservatives to organise a Counter Presidency against the Greek Presidency of 2004 bewildered many external viewers. Another

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[9] for more details see HIBOU, BEATRICE, 2005. Greece and Portugal: Convergent or Divergent Europeanization? In Simon Bulmer and Christian Lequesne (eds), the Member States of the European Union, Oxford University Press, pp. 229-253

[10] Ibid

[11] In the last European elections LAOS secured 4,12% of the vote. Source Ministry of the Interior: http://www.ypes.gr/ekloges/content/gr/europ_fr.htm

Conservative imprudence- that of exposing the former government's budget the Portuguese way has exposed the country as a corrupt and inefficient southern partner in times where neither France nor Germany can satisfy the Maastricht criteria.

However, challenges do not only arise internally but also externally. Apart from being a positive influence on Greece, Europe can also be seen part of the problem. The complex nature of EU decision-making makes things even more difficult for the Greek Representation. Interrelated issues of the three different EU pillars tend to overlap thus creating a great amount of confusion on which actor is responsible for which issue.

In addition, although the issue of subsidiarity is part of the EU discourse the intergovernmental nature of high politics continues to empower the Prime Minister, the cabinet and the highly ranked policy elites. Therefore, it is the case that the EU way of reaching decision also acts in a centralised manner that goes against the so needed process of decentralisation.

Furthermore, there is also the issue of the problematic link between the representation of the EU in Athens which fails to empower the relationship between the national and the European capital. Both the Representation of the Commission in Athens and the Office of the European Parliament find difficulties in spreading the message. The actions of the two institutions take part in Athens and there is limited information in other parts of Greece. Although the interest of the public is high there is not a strong plan that will lead to a Europeanization of the political discourse and consequently ignite the popular flame of getting closer to the EU. Therefore, although there is a strong EU normative presence (EU exercising influence by its status and presence) the results are limited in substance, practice and adopted policies.

Conclusion: towards a new institutional dynamism?

Greece is not the only country with a fragmented and somehow problematic national image. Each EU country has to reconsider its past and come to terms with parts of its identity. There is a process of synthesis which sometimes includes and excludes different parts of what is considered as 'national'. The sooner the state comes to terms with different parts of its multiple identities the stronger its becomes. Power therefore lies in the cultural diversity of the national image.

Although Greece has been an EU member since 1981, the process of Europeanisation and modernisation of its European Representation and image has been a slow one. Many of the inherent problems of representation are inextricably linked to the internal problem of national administration. In terms of theory, one has to look at patterns of sociological institutionalism in order to understand the chances in policy, negotiation style and discourse. In this paper I have argued that the process of modernisation led by the former socialist governments was more of a normative rather than an institutional/administrative nature. The current government has to demonstrate that the process of modernisation will continue by the adoption of practical reforms. However, until now very little has been done. Some ideas that have to be implemented are the construction of efficient co-ordination mechanisms, the depoliticisation of administration, the search for continuity of interests, decentralisation, respect of administration, effective control as well as constructing a new network of

strong national alliances. Therefore, a major revision on the way the Greek administrative system is representing Greece in Brussels is necessary. The Greek administration needs to adopt a more entrepreneurial style. Issues of benchmarking, setting targets, dealing with Constituencies and the Greek demos, having a promotion plan of interests and an expansion plan for national alliances are necessary priorities. The next generation of Greek representatives has to understand that the job of representation is not like that of any other administrative post. On the other hand, the rest of the Greek administration has to find ways of dealing successfully with EU issues and supporting the Greek representatives in Brussels in the most efficient way.

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http://www.mfa.gr

Greek Ministry of the Interior
http://.www.ypes.gr

The EU's impact on the Orthodox Church of Greece

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Abstract[1]

This paper explores the linkage between church activity and Europeanisation (that is the EU's impact) with particular attention set on the Orthodox Church of Greece, one of the new religious actors of the European scene. As this is a relatively new area of study, the main aim of the paper is to provide further insights to a more systematic research on the EU's impact on the Orthodox Church of Greece by presenting a basic framework for analysis. Specifically, the paper explores EU-related changes and adaptation of the Orthodox Church in Greece, at the following levels: structure of organization, transnational activities, church policies, and church discourse.

(Work in progress. Please do not quote without permission. Comments very much welcome.)

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Introduction

The rapport between the Orthodox Church of Greece (hereafter OCG[2]) and the European integration process is the focus of several existing (older and recent) studies on the OCG. The overwhelming majority of these studies though, are influenced by the broader academic interest in the role of religion *in creating European identity* and the role of churches as *factors of integration* towards the EU and tend to focus on the role of both orthodoxy and OCG in the integration process of Greece - most of them arguing that orthodox Christianity and the OCG in particular, function as barriers between Greece and the EU[3]. Thus, they tend to report only half of the story failing to capture the complex impact of the EU on the OCG -especially in the recent years. This paper proposes to explore the OCG in relation to European integration process from a fuller perspective. The aim here is to explore the EU's impact (Europeanisation) on the OCG itself.

Since, the election of Christodoulos, in May 1998, as the new Archbishop of Athens and All Greece, OCG launched a new phase of activism not framed solely to the domestic/national sphere of church activities[4]. Actually, in the post-Christodoulos era, the OCG seems to be increasingly determined 'to come in terms with the exigencies of the (post)modern world, including the project of European integration', demonstrating a escalating interest to participate 'in European debates on the process of European integration' - a fact that is reflected in the establishment of representation office in Brussels (Makrides and Molokotos-Liederman 2004: 464).

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[2] Other authors, for instance Anastassiadis (2003), prefer to use the acronym GOC, standing for the Greek Orthodox Church. However, whilst the use of a national name is appropriate for defining other Orthodox churches (e.g. Russian Orthodox Church, Bulgarian Orthodox Church etc.) the use of the adjective 'Greek' is problematic. Actually, the term 'Greek Orthodox Church' is also used to refer to the Eastern Orthodox Church as a whole (Simpson and Weiner 1989: 808). It is for this reason, for avoiding such confusion, that is used here the acronym OCG, standing for the 'Orthodox Church of Greece'.

[3] For a review of different schools of thought that portray orthodoxy and the OCG as 'barriers between Greece and the EU' see, Fokas (2000).

[4] Alivizatos (1999) notes that since the election of the new archbishop, the OCG has entered to a new phase of activism within the Greek society, which very often leads to involvement of the OCG in purely secular, if not political issues. The same stand takes also Stavrakakis (2003) who argues on the current politicization of the OCG. In overall, the post-Christodoulos era has been characterised by the increasing attempts of the new ecclesiastical leadership to 'de-privatize Greek Orthodoxy by rendering it a more active factor' (Makrides and Molokotos-Liederman 2004: 464) within the Greek but also within the European public space.

As Jansen[5] (2000: 108) points out, the churches in our days are 'major partners and actors in numerous fields where the *(European)* Commission itself is involved in framing policies and projects'. This a reality to which the churches, including the OCG, are not indifferent. In fact, the OCG sees in the EU a *new structure of opportunities*. As Ioakimides notes (2002) the OCG is among the domestic actors that see in the EU structures 'greater opportunities and better channels of influencing policy both at national and supranational levels' and the setting up of representation office 'close to EU organs' gives evidence of this new reality. Therefore, although the recent decision of the OCG to get more actively involved in the European integration project is linked to the new phase of OCG's activism that began since the election of Archbishop Christodoulos it should not be attributed solely to it. One should see the new experience of the OCG as a religious actors of the European scene in relation to the broader framework of relationship between the EU on the one hand, and the churches and other religious and humanist actors on the other, that provides to the latter the appropriate structures and opportunities for interaction at the European institutional arena.

The paper focuses on the recent decision of the OCG to get more deeply engaged in the European integration process and attempts to measure the impact of this participation on the OCG's profile. Thus, the focus is on the OCG's recent change and adaptation to the European integration process. The main hypothesis here is as follows: if there is an impact of the EU on the OCG, as this paper argues, this should become evident in the OCG's EU-related adjustments at least in the following areas[6]: structure of organization, policy, transnational activities and church discourse. The reasons for focusing on these particular indicators for assessing the impact of the European integration on the OCG are explained below.

The presence of the OCG at the European framework of action entails expansion of its activities beyond the domestic/national level, which used to be until recently its only space of action. The new operating environment though, the supranational European Community context, is structured in different ways than the national one. Therefore, the presence of the OCG at this new framework of supranational action necessitates certain changes and adaptation at the institutional level that would allow to the OCG to 'fit' in it. A minimum

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[5] Thomas Jansen was member of the Forward Studies Unit and responsible for the relations between churches and the European Commission during the period 1996-2000 (Massignon 2003: 40).

[6] The study draws on a analytical framework initially offered by Ladrech (2002) and further developed by Bomberg (2002), which originally emerged for detecting and analysing the Europeanisation modifications of political parties. Nevertheless, many of the methodological suggestions used for measuring the EU impact on the political parties are particularly helpful for exploring EU-related change and adaptation of the OCG.

requirement is to set up liaison structures with the European Community and to develop appropriate organizational structures through which the OCG would be able to follow European developments related to church interests, and therefore able to respond to them (monitoring and lobbying the European institutions)[7]. At the same time, the participation in the European debates and developments entails not only a certain familiarization and engagement to the European agenda but also the development of European-focused church policies. In this view, monitoring and lobbying the European institutions should start to become part of the programmatic commitments and policies of the OCG. In addition, the presence of the OCG in the European *enlarged public space*[8], necessitates a deeper engagement in European religious actors forums and networks of communication and participation. This engagement is necessary for the work of the OCG at the European level for at least two reasons. The first is that the OCG is relatively a new-comer[9] in the European space of church action and therefore the experience of other religious actors that deal for some years now with European institutions is precious to the OCG for gaining effective EU know-how. Also, in terms of actual power and influence the OCG is not in position to have

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[7] A necessity for all the religious, humanitarian actors and churches, who deal with European institutions, is the development of appropriate organizational structures that enable the leadership and decision-making bodies of the former to monitor European processes and policies, to be informed on them and therefore to be in position to influence them by designing appropriate strategies (Jansen 2000: 104; Massignon 2002: 23). The emergence of these new organizational structures, which are very similar in terms of objectives, brought about a certain 'homogenization' in the way that churches, religious and humanist actors are organized at the European level (Jansen 2000: 103; Massignon 2002: 27).

[8] Jansen (2000: 103) refers to the 'enlarged public space' (i.e. the EU) as the new emerging context to which the churches and other religious actors need to adapt and harmonize their forms of organization. However, the European public space is not only a framework of organizational adaptation for the religious actors but also a context that frames their transnational activities and trans-confessional collaboration (Massignon 2002: 24; Willaime 2002: 84).

[9] Whilst, for the OCG, the European environment is a new space of action, this is not the case for other religious organisations that have been exposed at this environment for decades now, accumulating an important experience in dealing with European institutions and European issues. For instance, the COMECE (Commissio Episcopatuum Communitatis Europensis/Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community), which is the main body that represents the Roman Catholic Church in the EU, was created in 1980 (Willaime 2004: 78; Foret and Schlesinger 2004). Since then, the COMECE, whose aim is to create liaison structures between the Roman Catholic Church with the European Community, had started to monitor European developments and promote to the European institutions the pre-occupations, questions and points of views of the Roman Catholic Church.

significant impact on European developments –if it acts alone. Comparing to other churches and religious actors (the Roman Catholic Church for instance[10]) the OCG is less competent to influence European developments, a fact that enforce collaboration for policy-making purposes with other religious actors of the European scene. Finally, the participation of the OCG to the European debates should have an influence also on the overall discourse of the church on Europe and the EU particular.

Therefore, the paper monitors the following: the adjustment of the OCG organizational structure so as to facilitate its communicative and lobbying activities within the EU structures; the reorientation of its policy-making that takes now into account the European public space; the network of communication and co-operation with other religious actors at the level of EU institutions; and the shaping of an official discourse on Europe, which has started to be less hostile towards the EU than it used to be in the past. Furthermore, the aim of this study is to monitor: a) the response of the OCG to the altered conditions generated by the development of the EU and b) the attempts of the OCG to have an effect on the EU integration process. The central argument here is that the OCG has been recently going, since late 1998[11], through an intensive period of Europeanisation which is manifested in differential way through the dimensions mentioned above.

By exploring the impact of the EU on the OCG, the paper attempts to bring some useful insights on the overall relation of the latter with the European integration process, indicating that there is an important EU-influence on the OCG. At the same time, by measuring the EU's impact on a well-established state church of an EU member-state, the paper attempts to contribute, by means of providing empirical findings, to a relatively neglected area of the European studies: the study of the impact of the EU (i.e. Europeanisation) on the churches.

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[10] Among the religious actors at the European level the Roman Catholic church is by far the most active and most influential (Foret 2003: 3). The Roman Catholic Church has shown an early interest in following European developments: the oldest confessional organisation presented at the European level is the Office Catholique d' Initiative pour l'Europe[10] (OCIPE, Catholic European Study and Information Centre in English), a Jesuit organisation of information on European issues, presented since 1956 in Strasbourg and since 1963 in Brussels since (Massignon 2003: 164, footnote 104). Both, its status of state, unique among other churches, and its strong diplomatic channels were beneficial for the position of the Roman Catholic Church within the European construction allowing the development of (privileged) relations with the EC since 1962 (Willaime 1991: 172 footnote 3, Massignon 2002: 27).

[11] Since the election of Christodoulos as Archbishop of Athens and All Greece.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first one sets the basic framework on the relationship between the EU and the religious actors (in an effort to support the argument that this relationship justifies the exploration of the EU's impact on the churches), and it also provides the basic theoretical framework in which the concept of Europeanisation is used in the context of this paper. The second part explores the impact of the EU on the OCG. Finally, the third part, the conclusion, summarizes the findings of the paper and discusses on the uneven impact of the EU on the OCG.

PART I

A. EU and religious actors

While the process of European integration and its linkage with domestic actors' adaptation and change has been extensively studied in the recent years, nevertheless there is less effort, in exploring systematically its link with church adaptation and change[12]. Yet, the churches are set recently in a dialectic relationship, in an interplay with the EU. On the one hand, they respond to the impact of the EU by adapting their own structures to the changing European context (Jansen 2000: 103, 109; Massignon 2002: 23) whilst on the other hand, they try to influence EU policies and processes as far as church-related issues and interests are concerned, by developing strategies at the European level and establishing a network of communicative and participatory ties not only with EU institutions but also amongst themselves. A recent example is the lobbying of the Churches during the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, proposed by the EU Convention on the Future of Europe.

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[12] Several scholars bring into the light the impact that the EU has, as a new space of action, on churches and other religious and humanist organizations, although they perceive this impact in different manner. Ioakimidis (2000), for instance, suggests that the religious actors are attracted by Brussels due to the greater opportunities that the EU provides to domestic actors to influence policy; whilst Jansen (2000) and Massignon (2002) argue in favour of the adaptation pressure that the churches feel to adapt to the new institutional framework of the EU. Nevertheless, only few studies offer a *systematic analysis* on the adaptation process of the religious actors. Massignon's work (2002) that links Europeanisation with church activity is one of the few exceptions. However, in her study, the exploration of religious and humanist organizations 'dynamics of Europeanisation', is limited in tracing the Europeanisation of religious actors exclusively at the supranational level. Her work documents institutional adaptation at the EU level and development of transnational and trans-confessional collaboration of the religious actors, leaving aside the domestic impact of the EU.

Today, the churches has shown an increased interest to coordinate their actions at the European level, to be represented at the European institutions (Vincent and Willaime 1993: 283), in other words, to follow and participate in the European developments. The adoption of the Single European Act in 1986, which reduced the policy-making influence of national governments and formalized and strengthened the European Commission's powers to initiate Community policies in areas such as social policies (Mazey and Richardson 1993: 191-193), was a catalyst in reinforcing their interest in European Commission policies and legislation in the period that followed[13]. On the other hand, the European Commission has shown an increased interest in creating liaison structures with churches, religious and humanist actors and engaging them in the European construction process[14]. Initially, during Delors administration, the perceived importance of churches' contribution to the European integration process was framed by their capacities as spiritual forces: the churches had been asked to give 'a soul to Europe', to give 'spirituality and meaning' to the European integration process'[15] (Foret: 2004: 4). A few years later, in 2001, the churches and religious actors were

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[13] The expansion of the scope of European Commission jurisdiction especially over social made obvious to religious actors that the European Community legislation could affect onwards their own interests, in the same way or even more than the national legislation did so far. The European Commission became now, for the religious actors, a new important factor, which they ought to take forwards into account in the core of their policy-making designs. In the view of these developments (the shift in power to Brussels) the religious organisations started to develop an increased interest in getting closer to European Union so as to monitor European developments and make their voices heard in the EU decision-making structure. As a result, the religious institutions was among the new actors that poured into Brussels since the adoption of the Single European Act (Lenders 1993: 298).

[14] The European Commission, since 1982, during Thorn's presidency (1981-1985), has officially expressed a certain interest in setting up 'a system of liaison with churches and religious institutions' (Jansen 2000: 111, footnote 5). The institutionalisation of these relationship between the European Commission and religious actors that started in 90s (Massignon 2002: 29-30) was further developed and structured throughout Delors (1985-1995) and Santers (1995-1999) presidency years by the Forward Studies Unit (Cellule de prospective) (Jansen 2000: 105, 111, footnote 5; Massignon 2002: 30), which had the mission to engage actively the churches in the reflection on the European problems (Willaime 2002: 88). During Prodi's administration (1999-2004) the Forward Studies Unit was replaced by the Group of Policy Advisers of the President of the European Union (GOPA), which in turn was replaced, under Barosso's administration, by the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA) -the new body charged with the responsibility to maintain a dialogue between churches, religions and humanisms on the one hand and the European Commission on the other.

[15] In 1992, Delors stated in an address to the churches that "if in the next ten years ahead of us we do not succeed in giving Europe its soul, a spiritual dimension, true significance, then we will have been wasting our time. That is the lesson of my experience; Europe cannot live by legal argument and economic know-how alone. The

recognised, by the European Commission, (through the White Paper on European Governance), as partners in the good governance of Europe. In the context of building the gap between citizens and European Union, the above mentioned actors were welcomed together with other civil society actors to get involved in a more democratic and efficient European governance[16] (Commission 2001: 19). The White Paper on Governance[17] provides evidence that, in the future, the churches together with other religious actors are likely to play a more concrete role in the European integration project or at least that they will have less difficulties to access the doorstep of the European Commission.

Notwithstanding future developments however, the existing system of relations and interaction between the EU and the religious bodies, especially the direct relationship with the European Commission which is formed in parallel with the pre-existing state-church relationship at the national level, along with the rising church activity at the EU level, suggests that the study of churches and other religious organizations should not be seen in isolation from the impact that European structures and policies have on them.

B. Conceptualising Europeanisation

Before moving to the exploration of EU impact on OCG, it would prove important to present the way in which the concept Europeanisation is understood and used in the context of this paper. In its broadest meaning, the term of Europeanisation is used here to refer to a process of change that is related to responses by actors to the impact of European integration (Ladrech 2002: 389). More specifically though, Europeanisation is defined here as 'a complex process whereby national actors adapt to, but also seek to shape, the trajectory of European integration

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potential of the Maastricht Treaty will not be realized without some form of inspiration', (cited in Belopopsky, Grange and Noll 2002: 26).

[16] According to the White Paper on European Governance, 'churches and religious communities have a particular contribution to make', in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and delivering services that meet peoples needs (Commission 2001: 17).

[17] EU officials had already voiced similar views regarding the role of religion as contributor to the governance before the publication of the White Paper on European Governance. In 1998 for instance, during Santer's Commission, and three years before the White Paper on European Governance, a Forward Studies Unit working paper (Cleveland and Luyckx 1998: 11-25) argued that religion 'defined as organised spirituality' is likely to perform 'a weightier role in governance', participating in the policy-making and implementation of public policy.

in general, and EU policies and processes in particular'[18] (Bomberg 2002: 32). In terms of domestic impacts, Europeanisation is seen as related to structural, policy changes but also to the shaping of the discourse and identity of domestic actors (Dyson 2000a; 200b; Checkel 2001; Olsen 2002: 935). The EU institutional framework is understood here to provide to domestic actors new 'structure of opportunities' (Hix and Goetz 2001: 12) whilst the European scene is viewed as the arena in which domestic actors are likely to drawn new boundaries of solidarity with other actors (Dølvik 1997; Mazey 1998; Olsen 2002: 936) in the context of developing strategies in response to EU inputs[19]. Finally, the study holds that the Europeanisation is not a linear or homogeneous process; the course of Europeanisation is unique for each actor. This uniqueness is related to the particular characteristics of each domestic actor and to the setting, to the context in which this actor is placed at the national/domestic level. The specific ways in which an actor responses to the impact of the EU are affected by these factors[20]. Outcomes of Europeanisation are shaped by national features leading to 'domestic adaptation with national colors' (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso 2001: 1).

PART II. Exploring the impact of the EU on the Orthodox Church of Greece

What follows is not by any means a detailed presentation of the OCG response to the impact of the European integration. Due to space limitations, the paper elaborates on some aspects.

A. Programmatic change and Europeanisation of policy discourse

A way of detecting Europeanisation modifications at the policy and programmatic level of a given institution or organization is to examine the development of its policy or programmatic

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[18] Bomberg's definition is particularly helpful for exploring the impact of the EU on the OCG, because it can be used to explore not only the adaptation of the OCG to the altered conditions generated by the development of the EU but also the attempts of the former to have an effect on the EU integration process.

[19] The concept of the EU as a new structure of opportunities is particularly helpful for explaining the decision of the OCG to become religious actor at the European level while the relations of the OCG beyond the national/domestic context could be examined and explained in the context of the new boundaries of solidarity drawn at the European arena between the OCG and other religious actors.

[20] Ladrech (1994: 71) observes that what differentiates Europeanization from terms such as internationalisation or globalization is obviously the geographical delimitation but also the 'distinct nature of the pre-existing national framework which mediated this process of adjustment in both formal and informal ways'.

content. The hypothesis is that Europeanisation could be viewed in the reorientation of policy-making and platforms of actions (through inclusion of the European dimension in the guidelines of work) and also in the references to the EU as an additional factor in the pursuit of church policies. In order to detect policy change resulting from European integration and politics the study examines the programmatic content of the OCG, as this is set in the written public notice on the aims and the plan of church's activities. This is presented at the beginning of every Synodal Period in the context of the first annual meeting of the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy of the OCG[21]. During this meeting, the OCG takes its final decisions on its course of policy for the following year.

An eloquent indication of the effect of the EU on the OCG's policy, which is easily traced in its the policy plans, is the launching of a new strategy that aimed to integrate the OCG in Europe. Since the enthronement of Christodoulos, the participation of the OCG in the process of European integration is defined as a key target for OCG's guidelines of work bringing about a considerable break with precedent policy lines of the OCG[22]. The integration of the OCG to Europe is for the new Archbishop 'the major issue'[23]. A new programmatic commitment is set: that of 'making known' the OCG to Europe, of putting the OCG in a dialogue with Europe (Christodoulos 2000a: 79). The new programmatic commitment is to establish liaison structures with European Community, to lobby the EU and other European institutions, to make known to the European institutions the pre-occupations, questions and points of views of the OCG. For the very first time, the *European orientation* of the OCG becomes a manifesto, a programmatic aim for the new church administration that fixed as priority the autonomous presentation of the OCG to the European institutions[24]:

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[21] The annual meeting of the Holy Synod takes place at the beginning of October every year (Dimitropoulos 2001: 88).

[22] It is characteristic that high rank members of the OCG perceived the election of Christodoulos as a new period of openness to Europe. In the words of the President of the OCG's Synodal committee for Inter-Orthodox and Inter-Christian Relations, Metropolitan Ambrosios of Kalavryta and Aegialeia 'the elevation of His Beatitude, Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens and All Greece, to the Archiepiscopal Throne marked a new opening of the Church of Athens and All Greece towards Europe. A long period of introversion has already come to an end! The Church gazes at the world both within and beyond the borders of our country, converses with all and participates in the events of contemporary society on all-European level' (Ambrosios 2003: 204).

[23] See, the speech of His Beatitude Archbishop of Athens and All Greece during the opening of the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy of the Church of Greece (07.10.2002) in Church of Greece 2002.

[24] See for instance, the first opening speech of Christodoulos to the Holy Synod (Christodoulos 1998) and also the second annual speech to the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy of the OCG (Christodoulos 2000: 79-83) in which

Beyond, the well-manifested Europeanisation orientation of the OCG, the Europeanisation of the policy agenda of the COG (i.e. the integration of the European dimension in the OCG' policy-making) is also evident[25] through its new EU-focused normative dimension. See, for example, where the OCG has stated that 'bioethical issues, the problem of exclusion, the demographic problem, religious education, the issue of abortion are examined from now with the view to the EU laws and proposals to the people of Europe' (Holy Synod, Press Office 2002a: 197).

Another element which reflects the EU's impact on the policy agenda of the OCG is also the instrumental use of the EU in order to justify OCG policies and courses of action at the national and transnational level. The *EU* (or *Europe* and *European people*) are used onwards in various ways for justifying several of the OCG policies and programmes of action. For instance, in the name of the OCG's responsibility to the Christians people of Europe are justified: the participation in the ecumenical dialogue (Christodoulos 2003: 422-426); the collaboration of the OCG with other religious actors so as to 'find a way of positive influence to the developments in the European continent' (Holy Synod, Press Office 2002a: 197) and the re-organisation of the Synodal structure and other services of the OCG so as to be informed on EU developments and participate (even indirectly) to the decisive processes of the organs of the European Union and to EU programmes (Christodoulos 1998; Tsaousis 1998a).

Therefore, if one defines 'discourse' in the way Schmidt and Radaelli (2002: 7) do: 'as both policy ideas that speak to the soundness and appropriateness of policy programs and the interactive processes of policy construction and communication focusing on generating and legitimating those policy ideas', then the justification of OCG policy programs by using EU-related and European related source of legitimating these policies is evidence for a change in the policy language of the OCG, originated by the EU developments.

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the new Archbishop exposed his personal views and proposals of action for the OCG and argued in favour of the European orientation of the OCG and the need of autonomous presence of the OCG at the EU level. Actually, the European orientation of the Orthodox church of Greece is reaffirmed, and defended by the new ecclesiastic leadership as a realistic response to the new conditions 'as these are shaped in our surroundings' (Christodoulos 2000a: 79).

[25] The increased centrality of the EU developments in OCG policy-making and discourse, is also reflected in the appearance, since March 2003, of a new special section in the official bulletin of the OCG (*Ecclesia*) under the title 'Church and the EU' (see Church of Greece 2003: 206-209). In this new section all the EU-related issues, are reported, as well as statements, speeches, official opinions on the EU and EU developments.

B. Europeanisation and institutional adaptation

From the moment that the European orientation of the OCG has been manifested as a programmatic aim, new organisational structures have emerged to enable the presence of the OCG in Europe. In order to gain access to resources (i.e. exploit EU financial sources available to churches and religious social actors); develop vertical links (that is the links with institutions of the EU) and also horizontal links (that is the links with other religious actors active at the European level); communicate and participate effectively at the European supranational level, the OCG had to create the appropriate structures which would allow it to go beyond the domestic framework and networks of policy making and widen its horizons of action at the European level. The new objective was to organise the ecclesiastical apparatus in the best possible way so as to be able to intervene at the European level on social and other issues (Christodoulos 1998). This process of renegotiating its structure of organisation, is in many aspects, part of a 'process of detachment' of the OCG from the national state as the exclusive territorial framing of the structure and networks in which the OCG used until now to operate as policy actor[26] and at the same time a process of *fitting* the OCG within the European space of action. In other words, it is a process that reflects the change in the logic of OCG's policy making (participation in the European political process and incorporation of a European dimension in the policy making of the OCG).

Since 1998, and within a short period of time, new Synodal committees became established, new legal entities and NGOs were formed, the activities of which were related to the effort of the OCG to enter into the European arena of action. Some of the institutional changes of the OCG are directly linked to the European orientation of the OCG, while other are indirectly related to it. As directly linked are understood here the new committees or other services of the OCG that have been designed with the main objective to establish and develop participation and communication at the European level (to establish direct links with the EU and religious actors active at the European level) and facilitate co-ordination of action at the European level. As indirectly linked are understood those committees or other services which

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[26] The *process of detachment* is a term introduced by Ladrech (1994: 79) in his analysis on the Europeanization of the French domestic politics and institutions. Ladrech applies the above mentioned term to describe the Europeanization of French policy-making system as a change in the logic of French policy-making, as a process of disconnection that occurs 'in the territorial exclusiveness of the national state in framing the structure and networks of policy actors'.

even if they might have not seemed, at first instance as EU related, they still play an important role in enabling the OCG to :

a) get closer to the European policy-making developments related to churches

b) establish and promote cross-sectional cooperation and participation links (horizontal links) with other religious actors active at the European level and finally

c) absorb EU-funds for church projects.

In the present framework of OCG's organisational structures, the task of developing EU-related activities is not entrusted exclusively to one special OCG committee but it is assigned in several committees or services, that are responsible for developing EU activities alongside the domestic ones. In other words, the European dimension of policy-making is broadly integrated into the domestic organisational structure. In this context, it is reasonable to assume that that the EU's impact at the organisational structure of the OCG is not negligible, since the whole apparatus of the OCG organisation is engaged in actions aiming to facilitate communicative and lobbying activities at the European level. The section that follows elaborate on some of the recent EU-related institutional changes that occurred since the manifestation of the European orientation of the OCG.

I. Institutional changes at the national level directly linked with the European orientation of the OCG.

i)   **The Special Synodal Committee for the Pursuit of European Issues**

The new Special Synodal Committee was formed with the Regulation 99/1998 of the Holy Synod (Ignatios 2001a: 23) and along with the Office of Representation in Brussels reflects the newly acquired interest of the OCG to get more actively involved in the European integration project and establish the presence of the OCG in the European community.

The objectives of the Committee are to [27]:

- communicate with the institutional members of the EU.

- cooperate with the EU and the European Parliament on educational, cultural and social events

- contribute in the formulation and implementation of various EU-programmes

- coordinate various churches activities and proposals to the EU

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[27] See, Regulation 99/1998 (Ignatios 2001a: 23).

- cooperate with the office of the OCG in Brussels

The mandate of the committee is to handle issues that pertains to the relationship of the OCG with the EU and in this context it has the overall responsibility for the coordination of the transnational activities of the OCG at several fields (Ignatios 2001a: 24), and supervises the permanent OCG delegation in Brussels. The Synodal Committee for the Pursuit of European Issues has the overall responsible for developing communication and cooperation networks with other national and transnational church committees that work on issues of European integration. In this framework, the committee participates in most of the meetings aiming to define modes of more systematic cooperation and communication at the European level between the OCG and other churches[28] or ecumenical church organisations[29]; whist it is also responsible for organising the visits of OCG delegations in Brussels (Ignatios 2001b: 701).

The Sub-committee for the Development of Human resources

With the view to organise its work more effectively the Special Synodal Committee for the Pursuit of European Issues appointed a sub-committee for the Development of Human resources. The main aim of this sub-committee is to implement and materialise several European programmes (Ignatios 2001a: 23). More precisely, the task of this sub-committee is: to monitor EU financial resources; identify those that the OCG and its satellite organisations (such as the NGO's of the OCG's) could use for financing several of their projects; and subsequently organise the absorption of these funds by the OCG. Along with the limited liability companies[30] of the OCG, are the main channels through which the OCG absorbs EU-funding to support its social work at the national arena.

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[28] Members of the committee participated in the delegation of the OCG that visited Vatican, from 8 until 12 March 2002 (Theodorou 2002: 252) and in the second meeting between the Catholic Church and the OCG that took place in Athens, on 10-14 February 2003 (Ambrosios 2003: 201). Both of these meeting aimed to define modes of collaboration between the Roman Catholic Church and the OCG at the European level.

[29] For instance, the special Synodal committee for the Pursuit of European Issues participated in the meeting between the COMECE delegation and the OCG on 26 and 27 January 2000 in Athens (see Ignatios 2001a: 24); and in the meeting with the CEC in Athens, on 8-10 April 2002 (CEC 2002b). The aim of both meetings was to develop further collaboration and communication at the EU level.

[30] In order to meet the requirements for EU-funds the OCG had to create limited liability companies. As the Standing Holy Synod of the Church of Greece stated (Press Office of the Holy Synod 2002c: 282), the

II. Institutional change at the supranational (European) level directly linked with the European orientation of the OCG

The emergence of an official office, the 'Representation of the Church of Greece' to the European Union, is a crucial landmark in the Europeanization process of the OCG, which reflects the aspiration of the latter to participate in the European process. It is a service abroad of the Holy Synod designed to represent the OCG in the EU[31]. In Bishop Athanasios word's, director of the representation office in Brussels, it is a 'sort of bridge between the OCG and the European institutions' (Siniakov 2003). The ultimate goal of the representation office in Brussels is to cooperate with the centres of decision-making in Brussels, as Christodoulos notes (2001a: 6). Indeed, several of its objectives clearly targeting in facilitating lobbying at the EU level. More precisely, the aim of the permanent delegation of the OCG in Brussels is to monitor EU policies and keep the ecclesiastic leadership of the OCG informed about issues at stake at the European level that fall within the immediate interests of the OCG, so as to facilitate the expression of remarks and proposals to the appropriate authorities[32]. The permanent representation in Brussels is also a key-service of the OCG in maintaining and advancing its horizontal and vertical network of communication and collaboration in the EU. According to its regulation[33], the permanent delegation of the OCG in Brussels is entrusted with the task to maintain and advance relations not only with the representatives of Churches, religious communities, NGOs and other partners of the European civil society (horizontal links) but also with several EU institutions[34] (vertical links). Of special concern, is the maintenance of permanent contacts European Parliament and particularly with its Greek deputies, and the establishment of regular contacts primarily with the European Commission (Siniakov 2003). In brief, the task of the permanent OCG delegation in Brussels is to make

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establishment of limited liability companies has been emanated from the EU regulations with the aim to absorb funds of the European Union.

[31] According to its internal regulation, the OCG office in Brussels represents the former not only to the EU but also to the Council of Europe and the UNESCO (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece 2002a). However, as its director notes (Siniakov 2003), the priority is given on the contact with the European Commission. A fact that is also reflect in the title of the permanent delegation of the OCG.

[32] See, article 5, paragraph ζ of the Regulation No 149/2002 (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece 2002a) and also Siniakov (2003).

[33] See, article 5, paragraph ε of the Regulation No 149/2002 (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece 2002a).

[34] See, article 5, paragraph δ of the Regulation No 149/2002 (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece 2002a).

the voice of the Church of Greece heard at the debates upon the future of Europe (Siniakov 2003).

However, while the grafting of new committees in the existing Synodal system was not a difficult process, the formation of the representation office in Brussels was problematic. In fact, the initiative of the OCG to be independently represented at the European level put in question the role of the Liaison Office of the Orthodox Church in Brussels of the EP as ecumenical representative of the orthodox religion in the European context. Indeed, until the formation of the OCG's office in Brussels, in August 1998, the only representation office of an orthodox church at EU level was that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Established since January 1995 in Brussels soon after the pastoral visit of the Patriarchate Bartholomew to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, on 18 April 1994, the Liaison Office of the Orthodox Church to the EU had the aim to ensure ecumenical representation of the orthodox churches in the EU: to represent the orthodox cult, to speak in the EU on behalf of the orthodox churches as a whole[35].

In this context, it was inevitable that Christodoulos' decision to establish an autonomous representation for the OCG in Brussels, assessing that the OCG 'has both a role and a word' in the EU (Christodoulos 2001b: 40) would have perceived as a threat from the EP, and therefore faced by sharp reaction. In order to solve the problem that emerged by the initiative of the OCG to appoint its own representation in Brussels the two churches decided to hold bilateral talks, in June and September 1998 (Christodoulos 2000a: 80). It is not in the scope of this paper to expand the discussion to the negotiations between the OCG and the EP, however what is important to note here is that the formation of autonomous direct links with the EU was not an easy-going process for the OCG. The aim to obtain its own independent organised structure at European level, its own direct and official links with the EU institution will become a focal point of the OCG policy in the post 1998 period, a fact that reflects the centrality that the European Union has acquired for the Orthodox Church of Greece.

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[35] However, the other orthodox churches did not participate in equal terms within the structures of the Liaison Office of Orthodox Church. According to the regulations of operation of the office each church, including the OCG, holds only one vote in the general assembly (in spite of the number of Metropolises) whilst the Ecumenical Patriarchate has the right to have 23 votes in total based on the number of its Metropolises in Europe, Dodecanese Islands and Crete (Tsaousis 1998b). Therefore, the office of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Brussels was providing structures of representation to the other orthodox churches, but not in equal terms, on the whole it was a common representation under the aegis and supremacy of the EP.

III. Institutional changes indirectly linked with the European orientation of the OCG

i) Special Synodal Committee on Women Issues

At first sight, the Special Synodal Committee on Women Issues, which was created on 22 October 2002 (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece 2002c: 809) does not seems to be EU-related. Nevertheless, according its mandate[36] the committee is entrusted with the task to notify the Holy Synod on decisions taken by other Churches or the EU or other national or international organisations on women issues and to draft appropriate proposals for dealing with the above mentioned decisions. Therefore, the committee is entrusted with the task to monitor and analyse EU policy and legislation on women issues and to inform the leadership of the OCG so as to facilitate the expression of proposals to the competent European authorities and actors. Likewise, the committee is also responsible for promoting cooperation with similar committees or representatives of other religions or other national and international organisations that work in the domain of women rights[37]. Therefore, it is responsible for advancing cross-sectional relations of the OCG on women issues in the European context.

ii) Special Synodal Committee for Bioethics

The Committee was appointed on 8 December 1998 and acts as the channel through which the OCG expresses its official position on domestic but above all on the European developments related to bioethics, biotechnology and euthanasia issues, participating in this way in the recent dialogue on bioethical problems in Europe[38].

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[36] Article 2 paragraph γ of the Regulation No. 153/2002 (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece 2002c : 810).

[37] Article 2, paragraphs ζ and η of the Regulation No. 153/2002 (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece 2002c: 810).

[38] From a brief look at the Press Releases of the Synodal Committee for Bioethics, it turns out, that one of the main objectives of the Committee is to express the pre-occupations and points of views of the OCG merely on recent European developments on the bioethics and biotechnology field. Indeed, in the period 2000-2003, the Committee expressed the opinion of the OCG on several bioethics developments that took place either in the EU (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Bioethics Committee 2003a; 2003b), or in other European countries e.g. in Denmark (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Bioethics Committee 2000b) or in UK (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Bioethics Committee 2000a), whilst only ones it expressed opinion on a domestic/national policy issue (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Bioethics Committee 2002).

The Committee is engaged in transnational activities at the European level and is used by the OCG as a channel through which it broadens its European network of communication and participation[39], encompassing both horizontal and vertical dimensions of participation. Working in partnership with church-related bioethics committees at the EU[40], the Synodal Committee for Bioethics functions as a bridge of communication and collaboration with transnational churches organizations while at the same time it interacts with EU institutions aiming to impact EU policies on bioethical problems. For instance, through the participation of its Synodal Committee for Bioethics to the Public Hearing with the Civil Society that took place in the European Parliament, in Brussels, on 9 and 10 July 2001, the OCG expressed its general skepticism on the recent scientific developments in the domain of bioethics (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, Bioethics Committee, 2001).

iii) Bureau for Mutual Assistance and Relations with Other Churches

The Bureau for Mutual Assistance and Relations with Other Churches offers another example. This service of the OCG has under its direction two Synodal services: a) the Centre of Support to Repatriated Emigrants (KSPM) and b) the Ecumenical Program for Refugees (ERP) [41]. Both these services are engaged in cross-sectional activities transnational and national with the financial support from the EU. The most important of these activities[42] is the participation of the Centre for Support to Repatriated Emigrants (KSPM), in the first

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[39] For instance, during the second meeting between the Vatican and OCG, that took place in Athens, on 10-14 February 2003, the OCG proposed the establishment of direct contacts between the OGC's Synodal Committee for Bioethics and that of the Special Synodal Committee for the Pursuit of European Issues with competent Committees of COMECE as a measure of strengthen the cooperation and communication between the COMECE and the OCG (see Ambrosios 2003: 204).

[40] For example, the Working Group on Bioethics of the Church and Society Commission of CEC.

[41] See, http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/committees/relations/metanaston.htm.

[42] The Centre of Support to Repatriated Emigrants (KSPM) participates also jointly with 25 other partners the KEM.M.ME.PAP-Ifestos project which is co-funded by the EU (European Social Fund) and the Greek Ministry of Labour and Social Security. Implemented in the framework of the Equal Initiative for the Combat of Discrimination and Inequalities in Relation to the Labour Market, the KEM.M.ME.PAP-Ifestos (Centre for Post-Information and Accreditation of Technical Skills for Migrants, Repatriates, Refugees) aims at supporting the social inclusion of immigrants, refugees and repatriates in the labour market. In the framework of the same European initiative (Equal Initiative), the Synodal service Ecumenical Program for Refugees (ERP) in two more projects co-funded by the EU, the projects ISTOS and ANADRASIS that work on the social integration of migrants, repatriates and refugees.

(December 2002 - December 2003) and in the second phase of the Christian Action and Networking against Trafficking of Women (CAT and CAT II projects) which have been funded by the European Commission[43]. The project joined together ongoing activities of different churches and church-related organisations from all over Europe, active in the fight against trafficking, a cross-sectional activity of high priority in the European context (CCME-Caritas Europa 2002). The participation in both CAT and CAT II projects, enables the OCG to establish and develop horizontal links at the European arena level[44] (links with other religious organisations). What is more, the participation of churches in similar initiatives such as CAT enables the churches and churches related organisation to interact with European institutions that deal with these issues (i.e. European Commission, Directorate-General Justice and Home Affairs), permitting the development of vertical links of communication between the EU and the faith based organisations.

C. Europeanisation and transnational church activities

This section focuses on the transnational activities, the relations beyond the domestic arena of activity that the OCG develops at the European level. The hypothesis here is that Europeanisation may result in a new perspective of transnational cooperation with institutions and organisations in the context of promoting new organisational and programmatic activities[45]. In particular, Church personnel, ranged from high rank hierarchs to lay executive staff of the OCG is likely to get engaged in extra-national forums and networks, thus developing contacts and possible influence aimed at Brussels decision-making process. Therefore, the objective of the section that follows is to present some facets of the of OCG's activity at the European level so as to trace EU adjustments. Namely, the aim is to document changes in the way that the OCG use relations with other religious organisations and churches

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[43] The CAT project has been initiated by the CCME and the Catholic Caritas Europa and was financially supported by the EU-STOP programme (CCME-Caritas Europa 2002). The second phase of the project (CAT II) was coordinated by the CCME and funded by the EU-AGIS Programme and (since December 2003) the World Council of Churches' Diaconia and Solidarity team (CCME-Caritas Europa 2003).

[44] Indeed, the exchange of views, the sharing experience of collaboration, and the developed of common making-policy among church related organization on issues of women trafficking was among the aims of this project which seek to bring together faith based organizations (see CCME-Caritas Europa 2002; 2003).

[45] Ladrech (2002: 399) argues that Europeanization of political parties may result in new perspective on transnational cooperation with institutions and organization with parties from other EU member in the context of promoting new organizational and programmatic activities.

(horizontal communicative and participatory links) in order to influence EU developments and to explore the development of new vertical links between the OCG and EU institutions.

i)   **Horizontal communicative and participatory links**

The OCG has clearly stated its objective to communicate and participate with other church delegations and European church organizations in Brussels. The OCG transnational activity in Europe is manifested mainly through its membership to transnational church structures such as the Council of European Churches (CEC), the World Council of Churches[46] (WCC), the Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe (CCME) etc, that represent Christian churches at the European level. These ecumenical church organizations provided the main platform on which the OCG builds up its network of communication and participation at the European level and participates indirectly in shaping the European developments on several issues social, cultural, bioethical, educational, ecological etc. These are the main channels through which the OCG develops activities at the European level, via participation in special working groups and committees of these church organizations that monitor and influence the work of the EU on issues related to church interests.

Since it is not possible here to analyse extensively the entire network of the OCG's relations at the European level[47], the paper would seek to examine the partnership of the OCG with the Roman Catholic Church at the European context. The example is deliberately chosen. To the extent that the relations between the two churches were never harmonious the

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[46] As it is evident by its name the WCC is not an European religious organization, but a global religious institution, however in many ways has a vocation primarily European (Mehl 1993: 309).

[47] An important dimension of the transnational activities of the churches at the European level is their participation in the ecumenical dialogue (inter-Christian and inter-religious). A detailed elaboration of the OCG's participation in the ecumenical movement as part of its transnational activities in Europe is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, what is important to note here is that several obstacles in the ecumenical dialogue seems not to disturb seriously the process of the OCG transnational cooperation with Christians churches of different dogmas (see, Christodoulos 2002a). Moreover, to pursuit cooperation on practical, moral and social issues at the European level is perceived by the OCG's hierarchs as a task easier to accomplish and also more fruitful than that of the theological dialogue (Press Office of the Holy Synod 2002b: 170). In addition, the collaboration and cooperation at the European level, is viewed by the OCG as the way that progressively will enable the churches to approach each other and overcome problems in their relationship (see Christodoulos 2002b). In overall, for the OCG, the cooperation with other religious actors in the EU context is not imperative to be based on good ecumenical rapports between religious actors.

development of such a partnership gives a strong evidence of the degree to which the European integration process affects the OCG's relations at the European arena. Of course, the fact that the OCG uses its membership in ecumenical church organization as a mode of developing church activity aiming at Brussels decision-making is not less important, however it is a less surprising step in the context of confirming its position as religious actor within the European public space.

The network of communication and participation between the Roman Catholic Church and the OCG at the European level

In the general context of engaging the Orthodox churches in dialogue on issues related to European integration, a COMECE (Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community) delegation has visited the OCG on 26-27 January 2000[48] with the aim to study together with the OCG the potential for further cooperation at the European level and even the develop of a common strategy for the shaping of the new Europe. The prospect of collaborating with COMECE was welcomed by the OCG as a positive step in its attempt to successfully accomplish its work and mission in Brussels[49]. This meeting put the basis for establishing further liaison between the two actors in Brussels (Ignatios 2001a: 24-26).

However, the landmark in establishing collaboration and participation links with the Vatican was the visit of John-Paul II, in Athens, on 4-5 May 2001. Despite the fact that the OCG was initially against the official visit of the Pope in Greece[50], producing in this way a new source of conflict between the Greek government and the OCG (Prodromou 2004), this visit turned to be the beginning of a new era in the relations between the two churches, which until then were seen each other with suspicion. On 4 May 2001, there was a common

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[48] Except of the OCG, COMECE delegations have visited also the leaders the orthodox churches in Belarus (1999), Bulgaria (2001), Romania (2000), Russia (1997 and 2001), Serbia (1999 and 2000), the Catholicos of the Armenian Apostolic Church (2002) and also the Ecumenical Patriarchate (2001).

[49] See, the address of the President of the Special Synodal Committee for the Pursuit of European Issues, to the President of COMECE Bishop Josef Homeyer, on January 27, 2000 (Ignatios 2001a: 25).

[50] As the President of the Synodal Committee for Inter-Orthodox and Inter-Christian Relations admitted to Cardinal Kasper and his delegation, the visit of John-Paul II met with strong opposition in the core of the OCG, while by the opening to the Roman Catholic Church the OCG faced a real danger of internal schism (Ambrosios 2003: 203).

declaration[51] made, by the prelates of the Catholic and the OCG, before the Bema of St. Paul, which marked the opening of further collaboration between the two churches on many issues including the European[52] ones. The initial declaration of cooperation on European issues gave its place to actual cooperation established by reciprocal visits of the delegations of both sides.

A delegation of the OCG visited Vatican, for the first time in its recent history, from 8 until 12 March 2002. This was at the invitation of the President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity[53] Cardinal Walter Kasper. As the Archbishop Christodoulos stated to the Standing Holy Synod of the Church of Greece (Holy Synod, Press Office 2002a: 197) the objective of this meeting was the exchange of views and information with the appropriate committees of the Roman Catholic Church over several issues with the view of the EU laws and proposals to the people of Europe. Moreover, the delegation[54] was sent to Rome with the objective to create a bridge of communication, reconciliation and trust among the two churches in the European Union, so that their 'witness as Christians to be more intense, more trustful and more fruitful' (Theodorou 2002: 252). In the name of the shared responsibility of the Christian Churches for the future of European people the two churches were in search of finding 'a way of positive influence on the developments in the European continent' (Holy Synod, Press Office 2002a: 197). In the same spirit, during the reception in audience of the delegation the Pope observed, on 11 March 2002, that 'the hour of collaboration has struck' (Theodorou 2002: 253). The rationale for this new spirit of collaboration was to redress the secularisation of the European polity. This can be seen in the perceived disavowal of transcendental accounts of 'man' by Europeans and the stated need for Europe to find its 'Christian roots' so as to face the developed tendency towards refusal of the transcendental dimensions of the man and for leading Europe to find its Christian roots.

During this visit the Greek delegation participated in special meetings with the appropriate Vatican committees, in the context of which they exchanged views and submitted proposals

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[51] For the full text of this declaration see, Pope John Paul II and His Beatitude Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece (2001).

[52] With regard to Europe, at this common declaration the two prelates confirmed their intentions to do everything in their power, 'so that the Christian roots of Europe and its Christian soul may be preserved inviolate', arguing that the emerging tendency to transform certain European countries into secular states without any reference to religion constitutes 'a retraction and a denial of their spiritual legacy' (Pope John Paul II and His Beatitude Christodoulos, Archbishop of Athens and All Greece 2001: 392).

[53] This is the body of the Roman Catholic Church which is engaged in ecumenical work.

[54] Metropolitan of Attiki Panteleimon, was the head of the delegation of the OCG (Press Office of the Holy Synod 200b: 170).

for developing a common policy of action and presence in the EU included all the 'big issues that are linked to modern Europe'. An extensive number of social, cultural, educational, ecological issues were on the agenda of this meeting[55] (including bioethics issues, the problem of social exclusion, demographic problem, abortions, religious education) but also the relations of the churches with the EU and the secularisation of Europe and issues such as Christian heritage and identity in Europe and its place in the European Constitution that was in the process of drafting at that time. These issues related to the new European reality which is under construction offer the basis for the collaboration of both churches despite the dogmatic differences that keep them apart.

The commitment to collaborate and communicate in Europe, marked also the agenda[56] of the second meeting that took place in Athens, on 10-14 February 2003, during the reciprocal visit of the Cardinal Kasper and his delegation. The objective of the talks between the two delegations was again to broaden collaboration between the two churches and draw a common policy in Europe. The discussions and decisions taken during these talks reflected this concern[57].

ii)   Vertical communicative and participatory links

Together with its horizontal links at the transnational level, the OCG tries to develop also its vertical links with European institutions, namely the European Parliament and the European Commission. The main avenue of relations with both the above-mentioned European institutions is the contacts of the OGC office in Brussels. The recent election of the

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[55] For the agenda of this meeting see, Press Office of the Holy Synod (2002a: 197).

[56] The agenda of the second meeting was broad covering a variety of issues (Christian heritage and identity in Europe and its place in the European Constitution, bioethical and environmental issues, protection of Human Rights, terrorism and the role of religion, economical and social inequality, religious and racial discriminations issues, issues of immigration, issues regarding young people etc.)

[57] At his address the President of the Synodal committee for Inter-Orthodox and Inter-Christian Relations (11.02.2003), talking on the behalf of the OCG, stated (Ambrosios 2003: 202) that the two churches should strengthen the exchange of visits and channels of communication. In this view, he proposed the exchange of visits on the level of clerical and lay executive staff of the Church and the organization of common conferences to explore social issues. The extension of collaboration of the OCG with the COMECE on European matters was also proposed as a measure of immediate priority so as to include meetings on a regular and fixed basis between the Synodal Committees of the OCG e.g. the Special Synodal Committee for Pursuit of European Issues, the Special Synodal Committee for Bioethics, etc. with the competent COMECE Committees.

director of the representation office of the OCG to the EU (Bishop Athanasios), as member of the CEC Central Committee during the 12th Assembly of CEC (25 June - 2 July 2003)[58] is a very positive development for OCG not only because it leads to further engagement of the OCG in the CEC's work in Europe, but also because it enables the OCG to come closer to the EU organs. Since his election as member of the Central Committee of the CEC, Bishop Athanasios Chantzopoulos of Achaia has participated in several CEC delegations that met with EU officials[59].

In addition to that, a number of OCG delegations consisted of ecclesiastic and lay representatives have visited Brussels following invitations of the Greek Euro-deputies, especially those who belong to the European People's Party and European Democrats Group (EPP-ED)[60]. The first visit took place on 24-27 July 2001, after the invitation of a Greek member of the EPP-ED group (Ignatios 2001b: 701) and since then a number of similar visits allowed members of the OCG to meet Greek Euro-parliamentarians, to visit the European Parliament, to come in contact and exchange views on issues related to European church activities. These visits function as additional channels of communication for the OCG, not only with Greek members of the European Parliament and Greek officials of the European Commission but also with several other EU officials as well with other European churches

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[58] During the visit of a CEC delegation in Athens (8-10 April 2002), the OCG expressed its solid commitment to get more closely attached to the work of CEC and together with the CEC explored ways of further collaboration on questions related to the future of the European Union. It was in the context, that the OCG promised full participation at the 12th Assembly of the CEC in Trondheim, Norway (CEC 2002b). In fact, the OCG, achieved to get two of its members elected at the CEC Central Committee. Together with the director of the Office of the OCG in Brussels, Mrs Katerina Karkala-Zorba was also elected as member of the new CEC Central Committee (CEC 2003a : 14).

[59] See for instance the meeting of CEC and COMECE with the Greek (CEC-COMECE 2003) and Luxembourg Presidency of the European Union (CEC 2005).

[60] The EPP-ED Group has a special relation with the churches in the EU, including the Orthodox churches. Since April 1996, the EPP-ED Group in collaboration with the Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate is organising series of dialogues with representatives of several Orthodox churches in the context of its broader dialogue it has establishes with Christian churches and other religions (EPP-ED Group 1998). Therefore, it is not surprising that out of the nine Greek Euro-deputies to whom the Archbishop Christodoulos expressed his gratitude, in 2004, for inviting OCG delegations to visit Brussels (Christodoulos 2004a: 98) five of them were members of the EPP-ED group (Dimitrakopoulos Georges, Hatzidakis Konstantinos, Trakatellis Antonios, Xarchakos Stavros, Zacharakis Christos), whlist three of them were members of PES (Group of the Party of European Socialists: Karamanou Anna, Koukiadis Ioannis, Tsatsos Dimitris) and one (Bakopoulos Emmanuel) was member of GUE/NGL (European United Left-Nordic Green Left).

organisations[61]. In other words, they not only strengthened the vertical communicative links between the OCG and the European Parliament and European Commission but, they also reinforce, the horizontal ties of communication between the OCG and other European religious actors.

D. Europeanisation and discursive change

Whilst, the European dimension seems to be broadly integrated into the present structure of organization, and is also reflected in the OCG's logic of policy-making and in the network of transnational activities, when it comes to its discourse on Europe and the EU one can easily see a certain resistance to Europeanisation. In fact, Christodoulos' public rhetoric tends to focus on the potential dangers for Hellenism and Greek national identity originated from the European integration process, aiming to position the Church as the guardian of the voice of the Greek people within the 'cultural melting pot of the EU' (Mavrogordatos 2003: 133; Prodromou 2004: 479). By underlining the harvest challenges and threats that the participation in the EU could entail for the Greek nation, the OCG attempts to convince the potential protégés of how vulnerable they are to the dangers of the EU integration process, and then, as expected, after having attempted to convince them, the OCG comes forward and offers voluntary its service as protector from further damage[62]. The proposed service that the OCG offers to the Greek people is the preservation of its distinctiveness (of its national identity) within the EU structures[63]. This protection proposal which the OCG offers to Greek people could also be read as an argumentation favoring the active presence and involvement of the OCG in the EU process, as the only option for achieving the harmonious coexistence of Europe and Greece without fatal consequences for the future of the Greek people. In other words, the OCG exploits its symbolic role as protector of the Greek nation, using its close relation with the Greek national identity[64] and the role that the national narrative[65] has already

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[61] For more details see, Ignatios (2001b: 701); Press Office of the Holy Synod (2002d: 818).

[62] Poggi (2001: 68) argues that this mechanism of creating insecurity is the most valuable in fostering continuing dependency of the power subjects on whatever the power holder can supply. Obviously the OCG seeks to take advantages of a new concern about Greek national identity which the European integration process and especially the project of a common European identity may generate.

[63] See, Christodoulos (2000b: 43; 2004b: 10).

[64] Alike the Jewish (Tsoukalas 1994; Lekkas 1996: 181), Irish,, Polish (Lekkas 1996: 181) and most of Balkan national identities (Pollis 1993: 348; Lekkas 1996: 181, footnote 24), religion is a crucial element of the Greek national identity. Orthodox religion is so much intertwined with nation in Greece that Greekness and Greek

attributed to orthodox religion and church: that of the champion of the nation[66], of the ark of the nation's soul,[67] for projecting this role within the European framework. It uses its identification with the 'endangered' Greek nation (Mavrogordatos 2003: 134) for justifying its role at the European level. Although, the reference to the threats of European integration process may be read as an effort of the OCG to justify its place and role within the European supranational structures in the name of Greek nation's interests, as protector of the Greek nation to the EU still portraying EU as a threat to the Greek people indicates an ambivalent fit between OCG's discourse and the EU.

However, the discourse of the OCG on the EU and European integration is not static, but subject to many factors that play a role in re-orientated this discourse towards a less rigid and critical view on the EU. Despite the tendency of the OCG to underline the potential threats of the EU process on Greek national identity, the overall discourse of the OCG indicates a change towards 'mellowing' of its discourse on the EU which is not negligible. The fact that the OCG obtained a recognized status within the EU is related to its 'softer' discourse on the EU[68]. The recent positions of the OCG on the EU underline this point. In the speeches and official positions of the OCG, the EU is projected not only as a big challenge but also as a big opportunity for the OCG. Contrary to what happen in the past, now the OGC

Orthodoxy turn out to define the same notion; nation and Orthodoxy are seen as one inseparable unity (Pollis 1993: 348; Lekkas 1996: 181, footnote 24; Mavrogordatos 2003: 129).

[65] The prolonged fusion of Orthodox identity and Greek national identity over the centuries is a key-element in the narration of the Greek nation as primordial and continuous entity into history: assuming that Orthodox and national identity are inseparable, Orthodoxy (both as a basis of people identity and as institution (Orthodox Church) is conceived as the vehicle, through which Greeks preserved their national identity in their pre-independence period (Tsoukalas 1995: 295-297, 300-302).

[66] As Kitromilides (1994: 178) notes, the assumption that the Orthodox Christianity and the Orthodox Church preserved during ottoman occupation the Greek national identity is one of the 'greatest anachronisms' of European historiography in the sense that injects national content into traditional religious distinction.

[67] The identification of the church with the country's holy ark, with the guardian of the nation's soul is a usual phenomenon among nations whose national histories involves oppression under a foreign denomination, especially if the religion of the oppressor is different from the one of the oppressed people at of the people as that of Greece (Rémond 2001: 13-14). The Greek case is a classic example.

[68] Anastassiadis (2003: 7) argues that the Church's aggressive discourse towards Europeans disappeared when the Orthodox churches managed to obtain a status of recognition within the Community. He obviously refers to the establishment of the Orthodox Liaison office in Brussels in 1995. It is reasonable to assume that the fact that the OCG obtain recognized status within the EU, by opening its own representation office to the EU should have even more dramatic effects in changing the OCG's rhetoric on the EU.

is searching its 'own place in Europe' (Christodoulos 2000a: 79-83) and refers to EU as 'our common home (=oikos)' (Christodoulos 2001b: 41). At this point it should be noted that this statement is very different from previous ones made by the present Archbishop on Europe. For instance, in 1982 (Christodoulos 1982: 63), shortly after the accession of Greece in the EC, he asserted that there is a lot of things that separate Greeks from Europe and in a rather critical tone cast doubt over the value of Europeans 'as the new friends' of the Greek nation. Moreover, the EU is considered now as an entity to which the OCG ought to be related to and ought to participate. The idea which has started to be projected is that of the OCG as a partner of the EU, as 'a contributor in the building of the European Home' (Church of Greece 2002). The OCG will come to the point to make her own suggestions on the model of Europe: her suggestion is to work 'for a more Human Europe' (see Holy Synod 2002b: 470; Zorbas 2002: 357).

Also, since the establishment of its status at the European level and especially since the mobilization of the OCG during the drafting of the future European constitution that aimed in addressing their shared concerns of the churches on the European Convention's work to the EU institutions[69], the OCG has started to put more emphasis on its role as

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[69] The drafting of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, proposed by the EU Convention on the Future of Europe, attracted the interest of the European Christian churches (see for instance, CEC 2003b) and brought about the formation of churches' coalition that aimed in addressing in common to the EU institutions their concerns the European Convention's work (see for instance CEC 2002a; CEC-COMECE 2003). Their requests concern mainly three points: a) a religious reference set in the future European Constitutional Treaty b) legal provisions set in the constitutional treaty, by which the EU should declare its respect for the existing relations between member states, churches and religious communities and c) the establishment of a structured dialogue between the institutions of the EU and the churches (CEC-COMECE 2003).

The OCG joined the other European churches in their effort to lobby on the European Constitution drafting and participated in this coalition with various ways. For instance, the director of the Representation office in Brussels, participated in the common meeting of CEC and COMECE with the Greek EU presidency on 28 January 2003, in which the church representatives addressed their concerns on the European Constitution drafting and lobbied on the issues mentioned above (CEC-COMECE 2003). In the same context, the Holy Synod of the OCG made a statement on 30 March 2002 in which it noticed that the EU can not ignore its Christian long-term influence and asked "for the recognition of the Christian influence in the Preamble of the European Constitution which refers to the history of Europe (Holy Synod of the Church of Greece 2002c). Also the Holy Synod of the OCG, submitted its proposals to the Valéry Giscard d'Estaing responsible for drafting the new European Constitution on the 20.02.2003 (Holly Synod of the Church of Greece 2003: 206-207). Whilst, during the period of the Greek Presidency at the EU, the Archbishop Christodoulos in a letter addressed to the then

defender of the European (Christian) civilization and the European people in general than to its role as guardian of Greek nation[70] and harmonizing its discourse with that of the other churches[71].

It should also be noted, that in contrast to the first years of Christodoulos administration the EU is not perceived anymore as a threat to the OCG, at least not at the discourse level. The ID crisis[72] gives a first evidence of that change. Indeed, Archbishop Christodoulos had stated initially, at his opening speech before the Holy Synod in 1999, that it was likely, the EU to impose the separation of state-church in Greece or other law regulations that would lead to the lose of OCG's privileges within the Greek state (Christodoulos 2000: 130-135). During the ID card conflict (spring 2000-autum 2001), the actual involvement of the EU in the decision of the Greek government became a politicised issue[73] of the highly mediated public debate that accompanied the conflict. In fact, those in favour of keeping the faith on identity cards suggested that the conflict was the 'result of external pressure' and held the European Union alongside with religious minorities inside and outside Greece responsible for exerting influence on the government to eliminate religion from identity cards (Molokotos-Liederman 2003a: 15). Whilst on the other hand, those in favour of omitting the

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Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis (dated 23 January 2003), he repeated the three above-mentioned demands made by the European churches on the European Constitution.

[70] See for instance, Holy Synod of the Church of Greece (2002c).

[71] There is not sufficient scope within this paper to assess the influence of transnational activities on the discourse of the OCG. However, what we can note at this point is that the communicative and participatory ties of the OCG with other religious actors of the European arena have also influenced its discourse on Europe (in terms of style and content) in the sense that is now more harmonious with the discourse of the rest of religious actors in Europe.

[72] As ID card crisis is defined here the controversy between the Greek government of the time (PASOK) with the OCG that started off in May 2000, when the former decided to implement the decision of the independent Hellenic Personal Protection Data Authority according to which the sensitive personal data including religious affiliation should not be mentioned in the identity cards of the Greek citizens (Stavrakakis 2003: 153-154; Molokotos-Liederman 2003: 291). The OCG, which perceived this decision as a direct attack to its institutional monopoly, refused to accept it (Mavrogordatos 2003: 122-123) and mobilised its mechanism (organisation of mass rallies in Thessaloniki and Athens, organisation of petition etc) with the aim to change it (Prodromou 2004: 474).

[73] It is characteristic of the degree that the European influence became an issue related to this debate that a Greek Euro-parliamentarian (Alenxandros Alavanos) posed direct questions to EU institutions (European Commission and European Parliament) asking them whether or not the mention of religious affiliation on the Greek ID cards was finally in conformity with the European norms.

religious affiliation from the ID cards, very often referred to Greek obligation to respect both national and international law provisions and to conform with the European norms. As the argument went, since no other European country records religion on public documents, Greece was due to do the same (Molokotos-Liederman 2003a: 15; 2003b: 303). The same view shared also the Greek government that used the EU context in order to justify the decision to remove the mention of religion from the Greek identity cards (Prodromou 2004: 479).

With the view of the previous statement of Christodoulos on the EU's external pressure on the Greek state, one could expect that the OCG would have accused the EU for imposing norms that lead to weaken church authority within the Greek society. However, Archbishop Christodoulos and the hierarchy of the OCG, were careful not to point the finger at the EU as having been involved directly or indirectly to the decision of the Greek government to omit the religious reference from the Greek identity card. They argued instead, that the EU was not in any way involved in the issue accusing the Greek government of making instrumental use of the EU (i.e. that uses the EU and the need to comply to its norms as for imposing its own policies)[74].

Despite its tendency to use the threats of homogenization within the EU, in order to justified its role as protector of the Greek nation at the national and European level, the OCG avoided framing the ID issue as an indicator of this threats[75]. It attempted instead to disconnect the ID card issue from the EU frame arguing that the EU had never put any pressure to the Greek government to take this decision. This position shows that there is a considerable change on the OCG's discourse on the EU itself. Although, in the beginning it was openly named as a potential danger, as a threat to its status within the Greek society) that came about in a very short time.

On the whole, the OCG's discourse on European integration and the EU displays a complex adaptation and change. The reference to the threats of Europe ('melting pot' etc.) makes clear that the OCG is in place to exploit EU-related issues such as the threat of the European in order to increase its own authority within and outside the domestic framework of its activities. Also the discourse of the church on the EU confirms that the influence of pre-existing national frameworks is a important factor in framing the Europeanisation course of a

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[74] See, Christodoulos (2000b: 302; 2000c: 320-321).

[75] An opposite view holds Prodromou (2004: 479) who argues that Christodoulos' populist discourse framed the ID card episode as indicator 'of the threats of homogenisation posed by the religious pluralism and political liberalism of the EU'.

domestic actor. The fact that religion and national identities are intertwined in Greece and the church is considered as an ark of the nation, have its own effect on the discourse that the OCG shapes on the EU.

Conclusion

This paper tried to explore the OCG in relation to European integration process proposing a different perspective than the one which is usually adopted. The aim here was not to study the role of the OCG in the European process of Greece, but to explore the effects of the EU on the OCG itself. In other words, the aim was to monitor OCG's response to the altered conditions generated by the developments of the EU and also its attempts to have an effect on the EU integration process. The intention was twofold: on one hand it aimed to bring new insights in the study of the OCG and the overall relationship of the latter with European integration by illustrating facets of OCG adjustments to EU impact, and on the other hand to contribute to a more systematic research on the EU's impact on churches and religious actors by providing a framework of analysis based on the exploration of the effects of the EU in four basic categories by which we can trace EU impact at both the national and supranational level.

Space constraints prevented a detailed elaboration and what was presented here was only some aspects of the OCG adaptation and change, related to its recent decision to play an active role in the enlarged public space of the EU. However, it cannot but point out that despite the fact that this is only the beginning of its new European experience, still the impact of the EU on the OCG has started already to become evident by changes and adaptation of the OCG across several levels. In specific, the entrance to the supranational European level of action entailed: adjustments in the institutional structures of organization (at the domestic and European level) so as to permit the development of vertical links (with EU institutions) and horizontal links (with other religious actors active at the European levels); certain reorientation in the Church's policy-making logic with the inclusion of EU-related issues in the agenda of the OCG; development of a communicative and participatory network at the EU level aiming at Brussels decision-making process; and finally changes at the discourse level. Moreover, as the case of the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union shows, the OCG does not only respond to the altered conditions generated by the development of the EU but also attempts to have an effect on the EU integration process.

The diffusion, though, of the EU impact seems to be still uneven across several levels of the OCG activity. Whilst, the European dimension is broadly integrated into the present

structure of organization, in the OCG's logic of policy-making and in the network of transnational activities, still its discourse on Europe and the EU illustrates that changes at the ideological/identity level are not always instant, but need more time to come to the surface. To the extent thought, that Europeanisation as domestic impacts is not limited to structural and policy changes and can also shape discourses and identities it may be possible in the future that the anti-western and anti-European attitude of the OCG, will become gradually less rigid following deepening of integration in the EU developments. Although, this may seems to be an oversimplified approach at the moment, still there are indications in the discourse of the OCG on the EU that show changes to this direction ('mellowing' towards the EU). Nevertheless, everything will be depended on the further evolution of the OCG's Europeanisation process and the influence of the pre-existing national framework in shaping the course of OCG course of Europeanisation.

The challenge of the OCG in the future, would be to balance between successful adaptation and changes in the institutional structures, programmatic aims and transnational relations and its aim to position itself as guardian of the Greek people within the EU by projecting an image of the EU as a potential threat for the Greek orthodox people. Recently thought, within the context of lobbying the EU Convention on the Future of Europe the OCG had developed a discourse which position itself not simply as protector of the Greek nation but as a guardian of the European civilization and European people.

In overall, the OCG is particularly interested in the opportunities that the participation in the European integration process offers and to the extent that the EU is defined not just as an economic and political cooperation but also as a spiritual and cultural entity (Christodoulos 2001b: 36; 2004b: 11) the OCG will continue to embrace European integration. In other words, to the extent that European integration process continues to leave a space for churches to act at the European level, the EU integration cannot be entirely disruptive of OCG's ideological priorities or principles. Finally, the enthronement of Christodoulos as new head of the Autocephalous Orthodox Church on 9 May 1998 is a landmark of a new phase of OCG's activism that it is not limited only in the Greek public sphere (Alivizatos 1999), but is extended also to the European one.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CAT	Christian Action and Networking against Trafficking of Women
CCME	Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe
CEC	Conference of European Churches
COMECE	Commissio Episcopatuum Communitatis Europensis/Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community
EP	Ecumenical Patriarchate
EPP-ED	European People's Party and European Democrats
ERP	Ecumenical Program for Refugees
EU	European Union
GUE/NGL	European United Left-Nordic Green Left
KEM.M.ME.PAP	Centre for Post-Information and Accreditation of Technical Skills for Migrants, Repatriates, Refugees
KSPM	Centre for Support to Repatriated Emigrants
OCG	Orthodox Church of Greece
PES	Group of the Party of European Socialists
WCC	World Council of Churches