A small actor within an institutionalized group of states: Institutional-realism as a framework of analysis.

Tasos Karakatsanis

Department of Political, Social and

International Studies

University of East Anglia

Norwich NR4 7TJ

a.karakatsanis@uea.ac.uk

+44(0)1603593867
+4407748682716

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1. Introduction

This paper will focus on the Greek stance during the crisis that occurred pre-Iraq war period in both NATO's and the EU's decision making framework. The division was characterized as the "old Europeans and *the new Europe*" within the EU and the "Atlanticists" against the "Franco-German axis" or "the 4" within NATO. The decision making process was tested in both of them.

As it is going to be shown the actor might follow an institutionalist-cooperative approach to achieve a positive sum (Koehane, 1984, Lake, 2001, Martin, 1992). But its core of strategic choices is based on a new type of realism which allows it to adapt to the requirements of each organizational or institutional framework in which it participates. The norms of the institutional environment and the leading countries in the institution are important parameters that the small actor has to take into account to make its choices in order to plan the strategy that will serve better its interest.

Before we go ahead on introducing a framework of analysis let's have a brief look on classic theories that explains the state behaviour within the institutional environment between realism and institutionalism.

Snyder recognizes that there are different categories of realism. He makes two major classifications "neorealism" which is seen as a major challenge to the classical realism and a more explicit classification which recognizes two varieties of "structural realism", three of "offensive realism" and several types of "defensive realism" (Snyder,2002:149-150)

Offensive realism: great powers maximize their relative power and become the hegemon in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001:20-21). Mearsheimer's argument seems to fit better in bigger states or in today's system in the superpower's model. Snyder highlights Mearsheimer's argument that states *"with the incentives and the capabilities"* would tend to use them. Offensive realism derives from an idealist argument that the lack of institutions which can extract power and form a structured hierarchy in the international system provides the incentives for states to maximize their power, because only power can guarantee their survival (Schroeder P., 1995, Mearsheimer, 2001).

A weak point in the substructure of this argumentation is that they are driven from historical paradigms and they fail to capture the new political formations, international organizations and institutions, which have an impact on the way, states pursue their interests. These new political formations have changed the nature of struggle of power in some occasions constraining the uncontrollable exercise of power of the superpower (Ikenberry, 2001). However this school highlights some interesting tactics such as "hiding", "transcendence", "specialization" for smaller actors' behaviour which can be observed in use even still in the contemporary era (Schroeder P., 1995).

On the other hand defensive realism, structural realism or neo-realism, as it has been called, attempts to explain the current structure of the world and recognizes the role of institutions as the exertion of power by bigger states (Waltz, 1979). For Snyder Waltz's theory of neorealism represents a characteristic case of defensive realism and that this type of realism argues that the primary objective of a state is to maintain its power and not to maximize its strength (Snyder, 2002:152). The binding hypothesis is also used by neo-realists who argue that *"weaker states "bind" themselves to the institutions because they achieve greater voice within it"* (Grieco, 1996). This concept explains adequately the behaviour of the middle and small scale states in regions of high institutionalization like Europe or where states have compatible regimes or common economic interests.

Another classification of realist theories is being made by Rosecrance who divides the theory between specific realism (Kaplan, 1984, Morgenthau, 1948, Waltz, 1979) and generalist realism (Axelrod, 1997, Powell, 1999). He claims that the former is based "*on conflict and material power capabilities conjoined with balancing of power*". For the latter he points that it "*is a much broader and inclusive notion of realism that involves no necessary balance of power*" (Rosecrance 2001:135). Rosecrance goes on by observing that recent researches brought the generalist theory and the neo-liberal theory closer. He notices that Gruber's "*empirical findings are like those of neoliberal institutionalist, while his explanations are entirely of a realist variety*" (Rosecrance 2001:138). Rosecrance points out that the main difference between generalists and neoliberal institutionalists is in the way they explain the strengthening of international organization. The latter theory argues that the states voluntary join and cooperate within the institution while the generalist realist theory argues that "*bandwagoning*" explains better the joining of smaller states to institutions and their function (Rosecrance 2001:140-1, Gruber, 2000, Schweller R.L., 1994). Others realists argue that in the modern world political formations go beyond "*balancing*" and "*bandwagoning*" and there are more strategies such as "*bonding*", "*beleaguering*", "*binding*", "*buffering*" in the new Unipolar world (Chong, 2003).

Institutionalists tend to agree more on the way international organizations function. Cooperation within an hierarchical framework of decision making brings gains to superpower, great power and small actors (Koehane, 1984, Lake, 2001, Martin, 1992). Another interesting point made by an institutionalist, Gourevitch is that "…*commitment to an institution requires a belief that it will bring benefits that outweigh the costs of membership*" (Gourevitch: Lake, Powell (eds), 1999:141). What it is interesting in Gourevitch's analysis is that he inserts the subjective perception of each actor's, and he argues that this perception plays a role to its behavior within every framework of an international organization. He implies that at the bottom line it is the actor's choice to commit on the organizational or institutional framework and this does not depend only on the independent variables of the international system. The dynamics and the perspectives that are developed within the actor are also important and affect its final choices. As Moravscik puts it the strategy of an actor is complex; "*societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behaviour by shaping state preferences*" (Moravscik 1997: 513).

An explanation based mostly on practical experience comes from a high-ranking Greek diplomat in NATO. This view is closer to the offensive realist notion, since he claims that, in case of a small actor like Greece, if it had not joined institutions like the EU or NATO it would probably face the danger of losing parts of its territory. The membership in NATO and the EU might require giving away part of Greece's decision making power, but it guarantees the territorial integrity of Greece (Interviews, Source 1, 20/04/04).

As we have seen the different versions of realism and institutionalism intersect in different points. This study combines elements of the above notions to build an integrated framework of analysis in order to apply this to Greece's policy making in the pre-Iraq war period within NATO and the EU and analyze its choices. This framework will be named institutional-realism.

2. Definitions

Before I go on to set up the framework of institutional-realism I would like to define how I am going to use the terms international institution and international organization in my paper.

In order to define an international institution there are two main elements it should have; a) There should be a systematic, consistent and repetitive procedure of decision making based on an accorded set of rules which have been accepted by the parties constituting this organizational political network. b) The procedure of decision making should be in accordance with the International Law in order to make sure that its objectives and its tasks are not violating the rights of other actors.

On the other hand, international organizations are primarily political formations based on common interest. Their framework does not follow specific patterns of decision making process but allows the development of informal norms which is the heart of their decision making. Thus the decision making context is loose and promotes decision in the interest of strongest players. However some organizations have developed a semi-institutionalized decision making process meaning that in some

conditions they follow the procedure we described for defining international institutions but in some other occasions they have chosen to mobilise a looser framework for decision making. The latter one is the case of NATO and that is where the focus of my study concentrates.

3. Framework of analysis

Institutional-realism is a framework which sets up three fundamental variables for the analysis of international organizations and institutions. In order to apply institutional-realism as a framework of analysis to NATO, we need to study these three fundamental variables. They will give us accurate information about its structure (that is, whether it functions as an organization or an institution) and define its role on the international stage in particular time periods. 1) The objectives the members of the international organization or institution set up. 2) The decision making process for reaching the objectives and the norms which run it. 3) The actors which constitute the organization or institution, and the capabilities an actor possesses and its position on the international stage.

The same variables can be taken in consideration if we want to extend our research and examine the behaviour of a state within organizational or institutional frameworks. The element which should be added in the framework of analysis is the regional and political particularities of the actor is examined. Although the objectives for a small actor joining an organizational or institutional framework might be similar the political and historical context in which every actor was led to join and participate in the particular organizational or institutional framework is different. Furthermore their geographical location determines their perception on security[1]. And this is the

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[1] Holland, for example, cannot have the same perception of security issues as Greece. Holland is in a region where itself and the rest of the regional players enjoy high economic and trade development, and have a common history of domestic stability based on democratic and pluralistic patterns since 1945. All the above elements were lacking in the case of Greece and South-Eastern Europe. Greece changed her regional security perspectives only in the post-Cold War period and the prospect of the EU's financial integration altered the Greek perception of regional security (Tsakonas, 2003, Savvidis 2003, Pouli, Sasmatzoglou, 2000).

reason why small actors might choose to respond differently while they have the same opportunities and pressures, rights and obligations within the same organizational or institutional framework.

The institutional-realist framework of analysis helps us to identify the new flexible strategy Greece is following and to classify the different tactics which Greece is using in the different institutional or organizational frameworks. Furthermore institutional-realism is a useful pattern in seeking and identifying the reason the actor chooses a particular tactic at a particular time.

4. The Greek presidency on the Iraq issue.

The first response of the Greek government to try and manage the chasm which had begun building up between the "Atlanticists" and the "old Europeans" came on January the 17th 2004. The Greek Prime Minister Simitis had a joint meeting with the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and the EU High Representative of CFSP Javier Solana to discuss the issue of Iraq. PM Simitis stated for the need for a common stance for the EU members on the issue of Iraq.[2] There were already the first signs of divisions within NATO since the US was pushing for a number of requests to the European allies that would aid them to get prepared for the war on Iraq[3]. The US president George W. Bush and the Secretary of State Colin Powell had made obvious that the US would sooner or later, with or without a UN Resolution[4]. The EU High Representative of CFSP Javier Solana attempted to downplay the division between the two sides of the Atlantic and stressed the importance and the effectiveness of when the US and Europe take joint actions[5]. However this reconciliatory spirit did not avert the division and the clash of opinion within both NATO and the EU that was going to escalate in the next two months.

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[2] Ta Nea, 17/01/2003.
[3] See chapter 4 p.
[4] Ta Nea 30/01/2003
[5] Ta Nea 25/01/2003.

Greece was trying to keep a moderate line within the EU. The Greek officials were careful not to be critical towards the US in their statements over the superpower's position on going to war against Iraq sooner or later. However they were constantly stating on the need for giving time to the UN inspections to find if there were truly weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This was consistent with the priorities the Greek presidency had put on foreign policy issues. The Greek Prime Minister argued that the Greek Presidency would work for a common EU foreign policy in EU. The objective was to leave the EU framework unharmed by the contest between the "Atlanticists" and the "old Europeans" and let it evolve within the UNSC. (www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&article=122).

On the 10th January the Greek Prime Minster stated concerning the Iraq issue: "*I will be in contact with the (European) Prime Ministers of the countries that are members of the Security Council. The Greek government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is in contact with the other members of the European Union. We are currently exchanging views and our aim is to reach a common position. It is, still, too early to say when we will this common position and what will it be, since we are not, yet, aware of all the aspects of the problem.*

We are expecting the report of the Inspectors of the United Nations. We will take into consideration the reactions of our members and then, probably, we will achieve a common line. I can assure you, though, that from my contacts up to this moment, I presume that there will be no particular difficulties in agreeing on the issue."

And he continued: "*First, I would like to emphasise that we should not make assumptions for the future, without taking into consideration all the facts. As I said before, we are currently expecting the report from the UN inspectors regarding the demilitarization, the control of nuclear and biological weapons, etc.*

I would like to repeat the following: No one could prejudge today whether there would be a war or not. Our desire, intention and policy is that there should be no war. We don't want war. But there is a procedure that has been decided. The Security Council of the UN has set a range of conditions. There is a mission, which has been

sent to Iraq, to test whether these conditions are fulfilled and on the basis of the outcome of that work, decisions will be taken.

That is the procedure we will follow and we deem that the Security Council will have to deal with this, again, in due course, and decide what to do further with all that information at its disposal. At that stage, we can say this or the other thing should occur. Therefore, there will be a further process, which we hope will ensure peace, the removal or elimination of any weapons. But we must not prejudge that now. We simply have to stick to the procedure established and foreseen by the United Nations". (www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&art icle=129).

The Greek presidency seemed to be achieving its aim and the first common statement of the "15" in accordance with the UN procedure came by the General Affairs Council on the 27th January 2003. The statement was making clear that "*the EU Council fully support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, in particular with UNRS 1441 of 8 November 2002*". Further down it was stressing that "*the council expresses its appreciation for the work accomplished by the inspectors so far and reiterates its confidence and full support for Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei to complete their mission in accordance with UNRS 1441*" (www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&art icle=167). This statement was nearer to the Franco-German position since it was supporting the UN procedure, which would not justify a war against Iraq unless there were a unanimous decision within the UNSC.

The Greek policy makers were aware of the limited capabilities Greece had for convincing the rest of the European partners for an integrated policy on Iraq, since they were divided. Thus they focused on agreeing on general and common perceptions and specifically in accordance with the UNRS. Although the Greek government was striving to find the lowest common denominator among the Europeans, it had from different directions the signals for the forthcoming division in the EU and NATO. On the 26th January the Greek Foreign Minster Papandreou had a short meeting with the US State Secretary Colin Powell. In the meeting Powell made clear that the US would go to war with Iraq and the only concession it could make to

the opposing countries was a delay of the offensive. The second signal the Greek government received came from the Spanish Prime Minister Maria Aznar who in a phone message that passed to the Greek Prime Minister Simitis had pointed out that the Paris and Berlin position did not represent the view of the "15" members of the EU[6].

On January the 30th eight European states, five[7] of them EU members, and three of them accession countries about to enter the EU[8], proceeded in a public statement to strengthen the US position. The last three were also the newest NATO members, which had close relations with the US. The joint declaration was a hymn to the transatlantic bond and the role of the US in winning against the two totalitarian regimes, Nazism and Communism, and went on by stating that they would support the US in its new quest against Saddam's regime and his weapons of mass destruction. The statement was referring in at least one paragraph to the fact that the signatories in their view felt they were representing Europe. Although they mentioned the need to go through the UN procedure, they implied that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and that the UN inspectors had been deceived a number of times, and that meant that Saddam was defying the UN resolutions. *"Sadly this week the UN weapons inspectors have confirmed that his long-established pattern of deception, denial and non-compliance with UN Security Council resolutions is continuing"* (www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0301/doc25.htm). This would give the US-European coalition the right to go to war on Iraq.

The statement of the "8" alerted the Greek government to the effects that would have within the EU and Greece decided to take a diplomatic initiative and started a series of informal consultations with the rest of the European capitals to seek common ground. The release of the joint declaration by the "8" was viewed by the Greek policymakers as an act against the effort of the Greek presidency to obtain a common stance within the EU Council, and in a way it was prejudging the action of the UN Security Council.

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[6] Kathimerini 27/01/03.
[7] The five EU Prime Ministers who signed the joint statement were: Jose Maria Aznar (Spain), Jose Manuel Durao Barroso (Portugal), Silvio Berlusconi (Italy), Tony Blair (United Kingdom), Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Denmark).
[8] For the accession countries, the signatories were: Vaclav Havel (Czech Republic), Peter Medgyessy (Hungary), Leszek Miller (Poland).

According to a Greek foreign ministry's source the declaration of the "8" aimed to undermine the UN's procedure. It was an effort to show that not all European countries were following "the initiative of four" which seemed to represent the EU. The Greek government tried to identify the common ground and adopt a flexible position. The Greek government wanted to convey the message that the EU states could have different views, but the EU could not act outside the UN framework (source 6, 08/09/2004).

One day after the public release of the joint declaration on the 30th January, the Greek Prime Minister commented the action as follows: "*The way in which the 5 EU member states and the 3 candidate states' initiative on the Iraq issue was expressed does not contribute to a common stance towards this issue. The EU seeks to have a common foreign policy. Therefore, a common understanding is necessary on the Iraq issue, as was the case with the General Affairs Council on Monday the 27th of January 2003*" (www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&article=176).

The Greek foreign Minister added to that and clarified further the Greek position; "*I would like to stress that the Greek Presidency has been working with the 15 Member States in order to shape a common stance within the framework of the conclusions of the EU General Affairs Council. This is now the framework within which we are working. The decision taken by the four members participating in the UN Security Council together with the EU Presidency regarding close cooperation and coordination was also a very important development. The way in which the joint declaration was made by the eight European leaders is first of all outside EU procedures. It is not an EU procedure and therefore may give rise to misinterpretations about whether Europe has a common stance or not.*

Therefore, I think it needs to be clarified that we all - that is, all the EU Member States - signed the statement of the '15', and I do not believe there is even one country which disagrees with the '15', with the common stance we adopted on Monday, which is moreover very specific. It speaks of the need for Iraq's total acceptance of and compliance with UN resolutions and particularly Resolution 1441, whilst expressing support for Dr. Hans Blix and Dr. ElBaradei. It also makes clear that the UN is the

organisation - the main, key-organisation - which will decide regarding any further developments on the issue of Iraq". (www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&article=177).

On the 5th February the statement of the "10" Vilnius countries all of the them aspirants to join NATO and the EU went ahead on another statement supporting the US, claiming that Colin Powell "…*had presented compelling evidence to the UNSC detailing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and its active efforts to deceive the UN inspectors, and its links to international terrorism*" (www.bulgaria-embassy.org/!/02052003-01.htm). This deepened the chasm in Europe and made more difficult the task of the Greek government because the tension and the pressure were increasing on every side and were toughening the rival positions.

On the 10th February the Greek Presidency announced a meeting of the EU Council to adopt a common stance on the Iraq issue. The Greek government took the initiative for the meeting in order to assess the situation on Iraq after the new UN inspectors' report on weapons of mass destruction, which would be publicized on the 14th February, for the Iraq issue and other issues of foreign policy. It was a last effort to synchronize the European countries to adopt a common stance on the Iraq issue according to the lowest common denominator (www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&article=206).

A second Greek announcement stressed that the meeting would examine the situation based on the findings of Blix's second report and on the EU Council's decision on 27th January and UNRS 1441. (www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&article=209). This was a clear signal that the Greek Presidency would attempt to keep the "15" within the procedures of the EU and the UN and would not give room for unilateral manoeuvre in every state individually. The Greek Prime Minister, one day before the meeting, was stating diplomatically; "*In any case, the EU cannot have an overall plan for resolving the problem of Iraq, given that the UN Security Council is competent for the issue*"

(www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&article=222). This statement again is consistent with the initial principle the Greek government decided to take on the Iraq issue, that is to keep the tone muted in order not to deepen the crisis and to avoid any critical decision within the EU framework. Nevertheless the Greek initiative was hiding dangers for both Greece and the EU's credibility in case of failure.

This was interpreted as a move closer to the Franco-German position due to the fact that the EU as an actor could not adopt a position against the UN. Its structures and procedures were bound to the International Law and as long as there was a UN procedure continuing, the EU had to follow this procedure. Thus the move from the Greek presidency can be easily viewed as a move to exercise pressure on the "eight". However the counterargument is that the Greek government adopted this position only because it had no alternative. The Greek government did not represent Greek interests alone, but the EU's interests as well, and certainly the Greek government did not want a collapse of EU credibility during the Greek presidency. Thus the Greek government was forced to take the initiative based on the norms of the EU organization, according to which the decision making has to be in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Unlike NATO, which is an intergovernmental organization based on the primary decision making of the alliance. And in the Alliance, the basic principles of decision making are power and solidarity.

The European Council summit took place on the 27th February and the EU members reached a common position on Iraq. They agreed that Iraq should complete an effective disarmament, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1441 and other resolutions. Furthermore, the 13 candidate countries concurred with the Council's conclusions. Prime Minister Simitis pointed out that the decision of the European Council highlighted two points: "*a) The EU, in the framework of the United Nations, is making every effort for peace, while at the same time war is not inevitable and b) all the Member States have the possibility of securing an important benefit for the EU, namely that "the members of the Union discuss, jointly shape views and aspire to a common stance*"

(www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=167&art
icle=226,www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=
167&article=272). However this result came only after intensive consultation with all
the European capitals and the compromise from the Franco-German side that it would
put in the phrase that the "*use of force would be acceptable, as a last resort, if
Saddam would not comply with the UNRS*". [9]

The Greek government got the credit from both sides, the "Atlanticists" and the "old
Europeans", for its initiative and its mild stance that helped lead to the formation of a
common stance within the EU. Although neither side wanted to accept it in order not
to spoil the concession, the final EU position was against the war. Essentially the
announcement was transferring the responsibility for the decision to the UNSC, where
France, Germany, and Russia were clearly against any new resolution unless there
were evidence of weapons of mass destruction. The "Atlanticists" tried to extract
some positive amendments to legitimize the forthcoming US offence but they only got
away with a conditional reference to war "*in the case that there is proof that Saddam
has weapons of mass destruction*". The stance of the Greek presidency was
catalytically to drive the EU in that direction.

5. The Greek position within NATO

As we have seen the Greek presidency within the EU was not favourable to the US
intentions to go to an unconditional war on Iraq and set the preconditions for the EU
to support and follow the UN resolutions. The concept was that the UN resolutions
did not give the US a foothold to legitimize a war against Iraq. But how consistent
was the Greek position with the stance Greece kept within the NAC?

The crisis in NATO, in the period December 2002 - February 2003, started after the
US put forward a series of requests to the Allies that would help them with their
military and political preparation for the prospective war against Iraq. However the

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[9] Ta Nea, 18/02/2003.

point to which the "4" disagreeing countries[10] objected was the insistence of the Atlanticists on deploying military equipment in Turkey, before any UN consultation, and before a UN decision had been taken about whether a war against Iraq would be legitimate or not. The refusal of the Franco-German axis to concede to the US requests led to the blocking of the NAC.

When the US announced its requests for this deployment within NATO and started a round of preliminary talks at a bilateral level with the rest of the allied delegations to assess their intentions, the Greek delegations just kept a reserved and cautious stance. The Greek delegation disagreed with some of the US requests and the way they were put forward.

The main issue that troubled the Greek delegation and the Greek foreign Ministry was the US demand to pull out the troops from the Balkan operations. Greece always perceived the presence of the US troops as a factor of stability for the region and the Greek government on many occasions stated its concern about the possible withdrawal of the US troops from Kosovo. The US was aiming to disengage from the Balkans since there was no clear US interest and the cost was high. The Greek officials stated these concerns but they did not want to adopt a stance that would add to the transatlantic rift, and they were hoping that even the Franco-German axis would adopt a more compromising position. The US involvement in the Balkans and maintaining good relations with Turkey was more important for Greek interests than joining the opposition of the "4" within NATO. This calculation proves the realist view of Greece in the US plan on Iraq.

The US, in the context of the preparations for the war against Iraq, asked the Greek government for a pack of facilities that would help the US army to advance its operational readiness and as we will see the Greek leadership responded positively to these requests. The requests went through informal consultations between the US and the Greek delegation in NATO, and through bilateral channels.

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[10] France, Germany, Luxemburg and Belgium.

The US ambassador in Greece, Tom Miller, in an interview on the 4th January stated that *"the communication and the cooperation between the Greek and the US leadership is excellent. The communication is really important on an issue as difficult as Iraq. We are sure that the period of the Greek presidency in the EU would be the appropriate to develop good and effective contacts, since Europeans and Americans want the same outcome and have the same objectives"*[11]. In the meantime the US was working through the NATO framework and at a bilateral level to build a political and military coalition that would provide political legitimacy and military support.

Preliminary and unofficial talks took place between the US official and the rest of the delegations to sound out the intentions of the rest of the NATO members. At this stage according to the Greek sources in NATO many of the Allies were uneasy on the way the request was put forward. In particular at the end of January Greece was "not ready to concede to the US proposal" (Source 3, 21/04/04). Since the issue had not yet reached the NAC, the Greek position was not very clear and Greece chose to keep a reserved stance and leave the initiative to other countries like France and Belgium that had already openly stated their opposition. Greece was not in favour of actions that would reinforce the climate of war against Iraq, but it preferred to "hide" this view within the NATO framework.

However the Greek government had responded positively to the US-NATO requests for contributing forces for the naval patrols in the east Mediterranean Sea. The Greek Ministry of Defence announced that would provide five military ships for the naval patrols which would cost up to 150.000 euros per day for the Greek state[12].

Based on the bilateral agreement signed in the past with the US the Greek government gave permission for unlimited flights of spy and military US aircraft, in and off the US base in Suda-Crete (Source 6, 04/09/04). In the base would arrive in the next few days many battle-ships and the aircraft "Harry Truman" in order to start preparations for the invasion on Iraq.

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[11] Ta Nea, 04/01/2003
[12] Ta Nea 07/01/2003.

Furthermore after a "non-paper" request by the US government, the Greek government decided to increase the security measures around Suda by activating the S-300 and "Vellos" anti-air missile systems. In the next days it was planned to fortify the anti-ballistic shield air defence by using the "Patriots" and the "PAC-3" anti-missile systems[13].

The US pressed more the Greek government to contribute to the coalition prepared to undertake action in Iraq. However Foreign Minister George Papandreou stated that the Greek participation would be limited on facilitating the US forces according to the bilateral agreements already signed by the two countries. Greece would provide the national airspace for the US flights and supportive forces in the perimeter of the naval patrols, provided that there would be no threat for the Greek personnel[14].

Furthermore, one of the frigates provided to NATO's patrol force advanced into the Arabic Sea. In a later interview the Minster of Defence Papantoniou commented that it was clear that Greece would not participate in any military operation of the US coalition and that the frigate would stop patrolling in the Arabic Sea if it were to be characterized as a "war zone" after the outbreak of war against Iraq[15].

The US request to Greece included also the deployment of "Apache"[16] helicopters and "Patriot" defence missile system in South-Eastern Turkey. The Greek Defence Minister Papantoniou replied that *Greece would provide military aid to any NATO country only after an invocation of article 5[17]*", meaning that since Turkey invoked only article 4 Greece would not provide any assets to Turkey.[18] However knowing that countries like Germany and France, the main opposition to the US requests, had stated that they were ready to commit military equipment and personnel to Turkey's defence, but only at a later time, it is easy for an observer to conclude that there are other reasons leading the Greek government to this direction[19].

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[13] Ta Nea, 07/01/2003.
[14] Ta Nea, 30/01/2003.
[15] Ta Nea, 10/02/2003.
[16] Greece and the US were the only NATO countries that had the "Apache" helicopters which are considered the highest developed military helicopter in the world at the current time.
[17] www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm
[18] Ta Nea, 10/02/2003.
[19] The Greek government could not choose to deploy the military equipment that had been bought to protect Greece from Turkey, for protecting Turkey. This would have meant a collapse of the Greek

On the 10th February, the crisis within NATO reached its highest peak, but Greece failed to sideline the Franco-German axis within NATO's intergovernmental process. The opposition of the 4 members who disagreed with the Turkish request had to do with the way the US was pushing the whole issue. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg did not want any NATO involvement without a previous decision from the UN that would verify the existence of weapons of mass destructions in Iraq.

The Greek position in the informal consultation was that the issue should be examined thoroughly; meaning a detailed examination of the advantages and the disadvantages if the decision for Turkey's defence was to be taken. In fact this is another proof that the Greek government preferred to "hide" its real intention because there was no reason for Greece to position herself positively or negatively with regard to the particular request. For three reasons:

First there was an informal Greek objection to the way the request was put forward when the US request was first made, in January. The Greek delegation made clear that it was not willing to block the decision, but that every measure should be taken in accordance with NATO's constitutional procedure. Meaning that an informal request from the US was not enough, but that there should be a formal invocation of article 4 by Turkey, which was the concerned country. Greece disagreed with the procedure of circumventing the NAC and asked for more time in order for the NATO members to consult on the issue (Source 1, 20/04/04, source 6, 21/04/04).

Second was the reason of the Greek presidency. The Greek government did not want to line up along with the "four". The message the Greek officials tried to convey to their EU partners was that "*we are interested in your initiative, we do not condemn them, but we can and will examine it only after the end of our presidency*" (source 6, 03/09/04).

Third, the fact that Turkey was the country officially requesting NATO's aid was important. Greece did not want to adopt a policy that could have been characterized

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strategic concept concerning the threat from the East and would have undermined the government's position.

as anti-Turkish. So Greece aimed to keep a neutral stance. However Mr Kintis admitted that whichever state instead of Turkey would invoke article 4 in the particular situation, Greece would not pose a veto on the decision about its defence. The explanation the Greek officials gave was that it is a fundamental principle of Greek foreign policy to respect the norms and the values of the organizations in which Greece participates (Source 1, 20/04/04, Source 3, 21/04/04, Source 6 03/09/04, Source 7, 05/09/04).

The basic argument for Greece not joining the Franco-German bloc within NATO was not negative with regard to NATO undertaking defensive measures for the protection of Turkey on the prospect of an Iraqi attack. For the two Greek officials from within the Greek delegation in NATO and the Greek foreign ministry, the concession to Turkey's invocation of article 4 was a matter of allied solidarity "silence". It was an issue of NATO's principle and one of the basic norms that run the Alliance (Source 1, 20/04/04, source 6, 21/04/04).

Yet after the Turkish request reached the NAC, the Greek delegation took an official stance and decided to keep the silence (source 3, 21/04/2004). The final Greek position was formed only when the Greek representative was informed that the issue would go to the NAC. A high-ranking official from the Greek delegation noted that if Greece had sided with the French-German axis, Greece would have paid political costs, not only to the US and Britain, as German and France did in the aftermath of the crisis, but to Turkey as well (source 1, 20/04/2004).

The Greek stance within NATO was completely contradictory to the one within the EU. The Greek government was aware that the positive response to the Turkish invocation of article 4 was going to be regarded as an acceptance and legitimization of the US intentions to go to war by the NAC, since Turkey would be under threat only after a US invasion in Iraq. Although in the EU Greece did everything in its power to stop any decision or action that would indicate or legitimize war, within NATO Greece failed to raise any objection to the forthcoming war.

The Greek government views the triangle US-Britain-Turkey as an important parameter of its security interests. Britain is always playing an important role as a

mediator in the Cyprus issue and the US usually works as the "fireman" in the contentions between Greece and Turkey. The Greek line, especially after the about-turn in 1995-96 (Couloumbis, Dalis, 1997, Kranidiotis, 2000), is to be more muted in its tone and to win over the Anglo-Saxon allies by going along with their security policies to a certain extent and by becoming more moderate in its stance towards Turkey. The Greek officials were aware that taking a tough stance within NATO, which is dominated by the Anglo-Saxon states, in an issue that involves Turkey, would have a direct impact on Greece's national interests. Thus Greece was very cautious to avoid putting any impediments to US policies within the Alliance. It preferred discrete statements which did not interfere with the essence of the decision.

When I had the opportunity to interview Greek officials, they avoided giving a direct answer whether Greece by keeping silence was supporting US interests. Certainly the fundamental norm that rules all alliances, and in the bottom line NATO is an alliance, is solidarity. In occasions of threat it is important for NATO's credibility that the rest of the members support and protect the member which is under potential threat. Nevertheless, in the particular case, the request for enhancing Turkey's request was a political move pursued by the US to promote their interests on the international scene. It did not have any practical reasons, since there was no real threat for Turkey unless the US were to invade Iraq, and because Turkey was more than capable of defending itself against Iraq. The measures which were about to be taken after the invocation of article 4 served the US's interests and not directly NATO's.

However the argument that Greece was trying to keep a neutral position, which most of the interviewees adopted ((Source 1, 20/04/04, source 3, 21/04/04, source 6, 21/04/04), is not completely accurate because by keeping silence Greece indirectly accepted the "Atlanticists" position. This is due to the consensus building process, according to which, if a member does not state its objection, it is as if it agrees with the proposal put on the table. The generalist or defensive realist would interpret Greece's position as "wait" and "hide" policy. For the specific offensive realist, Greece had backed down in the prospect of coercion by the US. The institutionalists would argue that Greece chose to implement the particular policy in accordance with NATO's norms which promote solidarity and cooperation. Yet whichever of the interpretations we choose, the small actors avoid blocking the decision-making in

NATO in order not to face sanctions on other issues by the US, who is usually the major player for policy recommendation and implementation within the organization.

The essence was that this tactic was a political manoeuvre of a broader overall strategy which began evolving in Greece's behaviour since the end of Cold War with NATO's transformation. As NATO broadened up, more complicated issues were brought to the Alliance's table, than just how to defend against a specific threat. This pushed smaller actors, like Greece in the particular position, to adopt more complex policies to respond to the new needs of NATO's decision making.

6. The Greek position on the use of the DPC as NATO's main body of decision making

As we saw the US decided through the Secretary General to push the decision making away from the NAC and into the DPC, in order to marginalize France. Greece was not positive with regard to the activation of the DPC for taking the final decision over such an important issue. However the costs to Greece – to face the US, Britain and Turkey in return for supporting French interests, without getting anything back for this support – were too great. (Source 1, 20/04/04).

According to Greek officials the activation of the DPC as a decision making instrument, in this particular case, came as an acceptable compromise from both the US and France. Third countries, like Greece, do not have reasons for rejecting the implementation of this decision-making process. The French absence from NATO's military structure is a French decision, which serves the political interests of both France and the US. Thus, according to a Foreign Ministry source, the Greek position on the activation of the DPC as NATO's decision-making body is sceptical, and Greece is not in favour of the use of such a process on regular basis (source 6, 16/06/04).

Assuming that the NAC is the supreme decision making body within NATO, and that it is intended to take the important, if not all, decisions for the Alliance, then the

current case is to be problematic for NATO's decision making system. The norms running the Alliance and the constitution that runs NATO as an organization does not equate the DPC with the NAC (NATO Handbook, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm, North Atlantic Treaty article 9, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb070101.htm).

So not only the function of NATO's intergovernmental process is elliptic, from an institutional point of view, but also the stance of a small actor like Greece proves that the members do not see NATO as an institution which guarantees benefits from implementing cooperative policies. In the current case Greece chooses to cooperate and adapt to what is perceived to be an institutionalist policy, because this is the best for its interest. This can be discerned by the emphasis which the Greek officials gave, not to whether the process is normal or whether it creates problems in NATO's decision making process, but to Greece's primary concern as to whether this process affects Greek interests.   There is no consideration from Greece with regard to intervening or tackling whether the decision making process is problematic, because such an action in itself might be taken as hostile by some countries, and Greece might face "sanctions" on issues which are perceived as more important for its national interests.

NATO's organizational structure and its decision making model does informally specify and narrow down the context in which smaller actors can move. We can say that the organizational structure channels the way the small actor can pursue its interests. NATO is an organization with procedures of decision making that are not clear, systematic, consistent and repetitive, but rather are dependent on US capabilities. Meaning that if the small actor exceeds the imaginary boundary set by NATO's organizational framework that actor will face "sanctions" by the US. These "sanctions" might be relevant to NATO issues or not. Yet they would definitely be relevant to the small actor's interests.

The four countries which disagreed to the US request had different reactions. Germany was the first to withdraw its veto. Luxemburg followed before the issue went to the DPC, and at the final stage were left France and Belgium. France did not concede, thus the Secretary General put forward the issue of the DPC. Last remained

the opposition by Belgium, which was put under tremendous pressure by the US and the Secretary General. Most analysts estimated that Belgium made a stand because in the period of the crisis the country was in a pre-election period and the Belgian Prime Minister adopted this stance for attracting voters. Yet the pressure by the Secretary General on Belgium was stifling (Source 3, 21/04/04). Belgium eventually backed down and the US requests were unanimously approved by the DPC.

The activation of the DPC was an action to isolate France, but the decision for the activation came after bilateral consultation between the US and France. France was aware that the issue would pass to the DPC and seemed to agree to that. It was convenient for France, since it would not continue blocking NATO's decision and at the same time it was avoiding the US pressure by making its political stand.

The dilemma that most states were put in was that of choosing either France's isolation by mobilizing the DPC or the marginalization of NATO's role on the international scene. The view of the Greek policy makers is that the more decisive the international organization, the more power and prestige its members gain on the international scene. The US was ready to proceed on Turkey's defence with or without NATO and as a result the Alliance would not have any role in Iraq. There was no question of NATO's engagement in Iraq due to the disagreement of most of NATO members. Thus the concession to the measures for Turkey's defence, by Greece and the rest NATO members, was perceived as the less costly solution for NATO's credibility. If NATO would not respond positively to Turkey's request NATO's purpose would be questioned seriously (Source 6, 03/09/04).

Yet the above analysis is based on the assumption that the issue of the US prospective attack on Iraq was irrelevant to Turkey's defence, though this is not the case. The discussion was avoided within the NAC in order not to create more problems in the Alliance. France actually exploited that fact to avoid any more pressure from the Americans, by threatening them that if they continued to pressure France to withdraw its veto, it would bring the issue[20] to the NAC (Source 1, 20/04/04). Another NATO

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[20] The French claimed that France would ask within the NAC who is responsible for the Iraq threat and would probably accuse the US for that. Bringing such an issue so openly in the NAC would cause big problems in NATO, something that neither wanted to.

official made clear that is for the interest of the Alliance to have a Secretary General who is aware of the position of every member and can lead NATO's decision-making mechanism to well-made compromises (Source 2, 21/04/04).

7. Inconsistent policy making?

Most interesting is the strategy Greece implemented within the two institutions. Though it seems Greece chose to follow different policies within NATO and within the EU, this is not the case. Since the two organizations have different aims, Greece adapted its policy making to the requirements of the institutional context and chose not to object to the policies of the leading states. The Greek Foreign Ministry official pointed out that both organizations have different ways of managing crises but also they possess different places in the international system. Thus there is no contradiction for Greece in adopting different ways to implement her strategy within NATO and the EU (Source 6, 03/09/04).

Greece at the time the crisis began within NATO was holding the EU presidency and, as the debate about the Iraq issue was spreading to all the regional and international organizations, the issue was certain to spill over. A high-ranking official of the Greek delegation said that he was not familiar with the exact statements of the Greek presidency on the Iraq issue and would not like to comment on them (Source 1, 20/04/04). This statement proves either a gap in coordination and communication of Greek foreign policy on issues that involve the same issue in different institutional contexts, or more likely it shows the unwillingness to comment on what it seems to be a contradiction in the Greek policy within the two institutions.

This apparent inconsistency of Greek foreign policy derives from the different positioning of the Greek government within the two international organizations. Yet Greece, as we said did not intend to interfere in the pre-Iraq discussion within the EU and tried to keep the tone as muted as it could. It did not take any preliminary action and its initiative came only after the joint declaration of the "8" and under the pressure of the events. So when Greece's and the EU's credibility was at stake from

the non-institutionalized interference and statements of the Atlanticists, Greece took the initiative to defend its own and the EU's prestige.

In NATO Greece tried to follow similar tactics of non-interference by conceding to the US demands. It offered facilities for the US military preparations against Iraq and helped by keeping silence within NATO's intergovernmental process. Yet even within NATO's framework Greece failed to comply totally with the US requests.

In the case of defending Turkey by using NATO assets, Greece was asked to contribute patriot antimissiles defence systems and "Apaches" and Greece is one of the few states in the world that has "Apaches". Yet the Greek government bought "Apaches" first for using for national purpose[21] and then for using for NATO (Source 6, 03/09/04). In the particular case there is obvious predominance of the national objective compared to the institutional one. The Greek government perceived as an oxymoron the use of Greek assets to protect Turkey since actually those assets were purchased to deter the Turkish threat.

6. Conclusion

According to the institutional-realism framework we set up in the introduction we can conclude the following for the role of Greece in the pre-Iraq war period within the NATO and the EU.

1. NATO's objective is to deal with security issues and the Greek leadership adopted this perspective in conceding to the Turkish request for invoking article 4. Since Turkey requested allied help, Greece felt responsible at least not to block this policy because it would undermine one of NATO's fundamental principles, which is NATO's solidarity. The Greek government did not link the Turkish or the US requests with the prospective war on Iraq. This apparently naïve stance was deliberate in order avoid clashing first with US interests and second with Turkish.

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[21] The Greek strategic concept is to modernize constantly its capabilities in order to overcome the Turkish numerical preponderance.

This can be concluded from the different Greek stance in the EU. As a president Greece tried to link the EU's policy on the Iraq issue with the UN Council. The Greek government sought a formula that all the EU members would agree to, that would restore the EU's credibility, and that had a common voice, and that is why it pushed for close attachment to the International Law.

2. The Greek policy makers are aware that the process of decision making in NATO is fuelled primarily by the US. The majority of policy recommendations which are pushed through the committees to the NATO council are in accordance with the US interests for the simple reason that the US is the major contributor by far. The persistence of the US on such an important issue persuaded the Greek leadership to join the Franco-German axis.

Within the EU the Greek policy was different. Since the normative line for the EU is to follow the UNRS, it was easy for Greece to find the lowest common denominator among the EU members, because no state could refuse to support them. It is obvious that small states can express their opinion within the EU since there is a clear procedure of decision making attached to the International Law and there is no superpower within it.

3. Greece seems to be adapting in the post-Cold War NATO organizational framework. There is an about-turn on supporting silently but practically the US policies within and off NATO's institutional aiming to serve its own interests. This strategy is being carried out as discretely as possible so as not to alarm the Greek public because it will have significant political cost for the government.

The lack of any single major player in the EU intergovernmental process and the attachment of the EU's foreign policy to the International Law give the Greek government more room to express its individuality. Thus Greece like more of the small actors is against any military intervention outside the concept of International Law, which is only for self-defence.

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The 2nd LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece: Current Social Science Research on Greece

Name: **Anna- Elisabeth Tsakona, 3rd year PhD student, Faculty of History, Peterhouse, University of Cambridge, UK**

e-mail: **aet27@cam.ac.uk**

Title **: Anti-Americanism in Greece: the case of Kosovo, 1999**

Introduction

After the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, the Kosovo war and the air campaign launched by NATO in the former Yugoslavia (March-June 1999) was the culmination of a long crisis[1]. In Greece, according to a number of opinion polls conducted for various Greek media outlet, over 95 percent of the population was against the war. Other opinion polls showed that 91 percent of Greeks declared themselves 'not at all satisfied' with the attitude of the European Union and 94.4 percent had a negative opinion about President Bill Clinton.[2] At the height of the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, the US embassy in Athens was besieged by daily demonstrations in support of the Serbs and against the war. Anti-American demonstrations were also held almost every day not only in the Greek capital but around the country. Politician Andreas Andrianopoulos recalled that 'the leaders of the western powers and President Bill Clinton in particular, were branded as cold-blooded executioners selfishly devoted to the destruction of a virtuous nation (Serbia). Therefore, it can be hardly surprising that Greek public opinion condemned NATO/US policy in Kosovo.'[3] Indeed, in the words of Alexis Papachelas, a Greek journalist in the leading daily *Vima*, 'the Greek reaction to the Kosovo crisis was the result of 80 percent of the Greek anti-American feelings and only 20 percent of the Greek solidarity towards the Serbian people'.[4]

In this paper the focus will be on the reaction of Greek political figures to the crisis and the degree to which this reaction could be related to anti-American sentiments. A detailed analysis is pursued on the views and comments of members of the major political

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[1] There is a great amount of literature regarding the breake up of Yugoslavia. See Bennett, C., 1995, "Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences", London: Hurst
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[2] Source, V-Project Research Consulting: www.balkanunity.org/yugoslav/english/greek.htm.
[3] Personal interview with Mr. Andrianopoulos, Athens, 08/05/2002
[4] Personal interview with Mr. Papachelas, Athens, 24/04/2002.

formations represented in the Greek parliament. This paper is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the way the war in Kosovo was perceived by Greek political leaders and the stance towards the crisis held by the government. The second part focuses on the causes of the war and the way Greek politicians viewed NATO and its new role in the international environment.

<u>1. This war is wrong</u>

All politicians of all political persuasions were unanimous in condemning the air campaign. Both the government and the opposition used the same arguments to denounce NATO's decision to strike Serbia. The only variation was the language used. They all proclaimed that air strikes in Kosovo was an incorrect decision for three reasons. The first one was that the allied bombing threatened to alter the status quo and this would cause a great number of refugees to flee the former Yugoslavia. The second reason was that the war could spill into other regions and could cause the whole area to destabilize. The third reason was that it was an illegal war since there was no UN Resolution authorising military action against Serbia.

Regarding the first issue, a general doctrine that all Greek foreign ministers followed was the 'preservation of the status quo', based on the perception that Milosevic was actually a stabilising factor and that Serbia did not threaten the status quo. Yugoslavia was a strong military and economic force in the Balkans and for successive Greek governments it was a guarantee of stability in the region. The majority of Greek politicians held the view that a change in the status quo would lead to a huge number of refugees fleeing the former Yugoslavia and seeking shelter in neighbouring countries such as Greece. One of the challenges the Greek government was facing was the need to protect the Greek Community in Southern Albania. There was a distinct possibility that if Muslims refugees settled in the southern part of Albania and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia they would outnumber the Orthodox population. In addition, there was fear over the possibility that refugees would take over Greek properties that were temporarily abandoned by Greeks who had moved back to Greece out of fear of the consequences of the war.[5]

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[5] The minister of Foreign Affairs arranged a special meeting with his Albanian counterpart to talk about this issue and to come to an agreement. The Greek foreign minister seemed to be satisfied with the Albanian Minister's reassurances that the properties of the Greek minority would remain intact. Cited in Papadioxou. K.P., 'Minima pros Tirana gia ti mionotita', *Kathimerini,* 1/4/1999, p. 5. See also the comments made by the government representative Dimirtis Reppas cited in Kalliri, F., 'Sinoliki Europaiki politiki kai katamerismo ton prosfigon se oli tin Europi ziti I Ellada', *Kathimerini,* 6/4/1999, p.5

Also the president of the Greek Conservative Party, K. Karamanlis, pointed out that 'abolition of the existing borders inevitably means the emergence of a great wave of refugees who will seek shelter in neighbouring and more prosperous countries such as Greece.'[6] In fact all members of the Greek Conservative Party focused on the issue of refugees and urged the government to take special precautions.[7]

Andreas Andrianopoulos, also a member of the Greek conservative party, and one of the few politicians who openly supported the war in Kosovo, held a different view regarding the issue of refugees. Unlike his colleges who presented the large wave of refugees as a consequence of the allied bombing, Andrianopoulos tried to stress the fact that people were fleeing their home towns long before the allied operations in order to avoid ethnic cleansing:

> Since 1992, I have repeatedly stressed the wider consequences of ethnic cleansing committed in Yugoslavia, namely the possibility of a great number of refugees fleeing their country and heading south. This would cause the persecution of Orthodox Greeks who live in southern Albania and it would urge Greece to intervene for their protection. This in turn might urge Albania to ask for Turkey's support and so on and so forth. It makes me sad to see that my fears are becoming reality.[8]

Giorgos Karatzaferis, member of the Greek Conservative Party with extreme right and nationalistic views, who was later expelled from the Party, formed his own political formation and also became member of the European Parliament, also focused on the issue of refugees. In his own interpretation of the events:

> The Albanian government is determined to use NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia in order to achieve its goal of exterminating the Greek minority in Albania. According to testimonies by Greeks living in the area, the government is systematically encouraging Bosnian Muslims, Turks and Egyptians to settle in villages occupied by Orthodox population who has temporarily moved to Greece. There have also been cases where Albanian courts have allowed Albanian citizens to claim arable lands as well as areas belonging to Orthodox monasteries. At the same time Albanians have given the right to Turkey to install four bases on Albanian soil.[9]

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[6] Ibid.
[7] See the comments made by Konstantinos Mitsotakis, Miltiades Evert, Ioannis Varvitsiotis and Dora Bakogianni in: 'Omofonia Karamanli-Mitsotaki sti ND', editorial, *Kathimerini,* 1/4/1999, p.9
[8] Andrianopoulos, A., 'Tis Apopsis mou tha tis dikeosi o xronos', *Eleftheros Typos,* 18/4/1999, p. 31
[9] Karatzaferis, N., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Session PIB', 26/4/1999, p. 6122

The second reason why the majority of Greek politicians, regardless of political persuasion, were against this war was their inner fear of a spill over of the war and of the destabilization of the whole region. Even recently, the former foreign minister of the Greek socialist party PASOK and currently President of the Greek Republic, Karolos Papoulias, expressed his concern over the situation in the Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia: 'the Greek government at the time was one hundred percent right when it supported the preservation of the status quo in the region. We have all witnessed the consequences of the destabilisation in the region and my view is that this destabilisation will last for years with unexpected consequences.'[10]

This destabilization was likely to have caused even Greece to become directly involved in the operations. On April 21st, 1999, the President of the Parliament, Apostolos Kaklamanis, talking on behalf of the whole parliament expressed his strong opposition to the bombings: 'we all denounce NATO's bombardment of Kosovo because we all know what the real motives behind this action are, namely the destabilisation of the entire South East Europe.'[11] The Prime Minister in his speech to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, vividly described the anxiety felt by the Greek people: 'The Americans have to seriously consider the consequences of this war; especially the possibility of causing permanent instability in the whole Balkan Peninsula. Perhaps for the United States this is not a major issue, because Americans are thousands of miles away from the conflict. How would they feel if this war was taking place in their own continent? How would people in Washington react if New York was being bombed? Greece is closer to Kosovo than Washington to New York; Americans have to bear this in mind in order to understand Greece's fears and concerns.'[12]

Nikos Konstantopoulos, the president of the Greek left wing party Coalition of the Left and Progress, focused on the issue of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that would re-emerge if Yugoslavia disintegrated. In his words:

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[10] Personal interview with Karolos Papoulias, emphasis added, Athens, 29/04/2002

[11] Kaklamanis, A., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Session PΘ´, vol. H', 21/4/1999, p., 5995

[12] Site in Dimas, D.P., 'Simitis : stamatiste, diafonoun ta Balkania', *Eleftherotypia,* 23/4/1999, p. 4-5. See also the comments made by the Defense Minister Athanasios Tsoxatzopoulos, 'Adianoiti kathe prospathia allagis sinoron', *Kathimerini,* 1/4/1999,p.8

Greece's vital interests are at odds with those of the United States. The Americans are aiming at weakening Yugoslavia, if not destroying it completely. They are after fluidity in the borders between Yugoslavia, Albania and FYROM. All this and especially the destabilisation of FYROM is extremely dangerous for Greece and is likely to undermine Greece's political and economic role in the Balkans.[13]

The third issue that made Greek politicians consider military operations in Kosovo the wrong choice, was the fact that there was no UN Resolution authorising such strikes and that war in general should not be a means of solving problems. Their claim was that military operations in Kosovo would have the opposite result to what the allies expected in terms of protecting the Albanian community. The President of the Parliament, Apostolos Kaklamanis, stated: 'we do not believe that military intervention could in any way solve the problem, and we have repeatedly said so in every occasion. We firmly believe in using peaceful and diplomatic means. As a government, we have explicitly stated our disagreement with anything that leads to disaster, pain and human suffering'.[14]

Also former foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos expressed his disappointment over the way the international community, and the United States in particular, chose to impose law and order in the world: 'it was ridiculous for the world's largest military, economic and political power to fight with all its power an illegal war against a small nation for three whole months.'[15] On the same subject, Karolos Papoulias stated: 'war should not in any case be a tool of solving any problems, it only creates more.'[16]

The Opposition leaders did not differentiate themselves from members of the government. To the president of the Greek Conservative Party K. Karamanlis 'this war was a mistake…everyone in this room, regardless of political persuasion, has realized

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[13] Konstantopoulos, N., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p.6435-6436

[14] Ibid., p. 6419

[15] Personal interview with Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, 30/04/2002.

[16] Personal interview with Karolos Papoulias, Athens, 29/04/2002. See also the comments by P. Paraskevopoulos, member of the PASOK government in Paraskeyopoulos, P., 'Allileggii xoris sinora', *Eleftherotypia,* 4/4/1999, p. 87. See also the speech Georgios Papandreou, the foreign minister gave at the time: Papandreou, G., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3.5.1999, p. 6446

that. The results of this air campaign are completely the opposite from those expected.'[17] He continued that: 'in order to deal with a crisis one needs to build bridges and not to cause deeper divisions like the allies have done in the case of former Yugoslavia.'[18]

Prokopis Pavlopoulos, also a member of *New Democracy* Party, attempted a comparison between the Gulf war in 1991 and the Kosovo war in 1999 in order to demonstrate that NATO air strikes in Serbia were not only illegal but also completely wrong. Pavlopoulos started his analysis by describing the features of the new century:

> Although the possibility of a new world war is virtually non existent, it is very likely that small local conflicts of religious and nationalistic origins will erupt and will threaten peace and stability in the world. This new reality will challenge America's role in the world. If America manages to escape isolation and bring peace and stability by acting as a global fireman and peace-maker it will deserve the title of global coordinator. Most importantly the Americans should always act in accordance with international rules and regulations. Otherwise the world would result into chaos; every country that feels strong enough would invade other countries according to will. Finally, Americans should invest in building alliances and should always keep in mind that respect for the allies is not a sign of weakness but a sign of political realism.[19]

In the case of the Gulf War, P. Pavlopoulos pointed out that 'the Americans managed to persuade the majority of world opinion to back the war because their intervention was based on a very legitimate claim, namely the freedom of Kuwait and most importantly their venture was endorsed by the United Nations.'[20] Pavlopoulos did not fail to mention however that even in the case of the operation to liberate Kuwait, the Americans 'could be accused of having double standards in enforcing international law. The case of Cyprus was indicative of the way the world's superpower uses international law selectively in line with its own national interests.'[21]

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[17] Karamanlis, K., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions ΡΗ'/20.4.1999-ΡΚΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. Η', 3/5/1999, p.6427. The same argument was expressed by another prominent member of New Democracy Party Stefanos Manos in Manos, S., 'Ime mathimenos stis sigrousis', *Eleftheros Typos,* 25/4/1999, p. 20-1
[18] Karamanlis, K., 'O proedros tis ND episimeni tous kindinous', *Kathimerini,* 1/4/1999, p. 9. See also Mitsotakis, K., 'I simerini igetes pezoun me ton polemo giati den exoun polemisi', *Eleftheros Typos,* 1/4/99, p. 4. Mitsotakis, K., 'Dramatiki parembasi gia exodo apo tin krisi', *Eleftheros Typos,* 4/4/1999, p.22. Sarantakos, G., 'I 10 megales alithies Mitsotaki', *Eleftheros Typos,* 2/4/1999, p. 8
[19] Pavlopoulos, P., 'Isxis ke dikeo mias iperdinamis', *Kathimerini,* 11/4/1999, p.7
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

In the case of Serbia, Pavlopoulos was convinced that there was no excuse for American intervention:

> to the irrationality of Milosevic brutal regime, the Americans answered with an equally irrational war and disregarded international law. Both in the case of Hussein and Milosevic, the international community had to confront totalitarian and brutal regimes that were guilty of violating human rights and of lacking tolerance towards minority groups. What made Americans and NATO reprehensible in the case of Serbia was that there was no UN Resolution justifying any kind of intervention. In addition, NATO made no provision for this kind of war. [22]

Nikos Kostantopoulos, president of the Greek left wing party Coalition of the Left and Progress (Sinaspismos), also denounced the war as illegal:

> What is happening in neighbouring Yugoslavia is not a military "intervention", it is not an "operation"; it is a brutal, deadly and savage war with no meaning, no legal, historical or political basis; it is a war without morality. In other words it is a crime against humanity. This war is responsible for the loss of life, for the demolition of the whole country, of the nature, of the monuments, of the infrastructure but mostly this war has caused the extermination of people of the present and the future generations. [23]

The point that there was no necessity to wage war on Serbia was made by Dimitris Tsovolas, president of the left wing party DIKKI:

> according to article 5 of NATO's Constitution, NATO is obliged to defend a member state if it is being attacked by another member-state. There is no provision for intervention for humanitarian reasons or for the defence of human rights or even more for bringing democracy in a country that lacks democratic institutions. And of course there is no obligation of any country to support NATO in its decision to invade a sovereign state. In other words, armed intervention in Kosovo is unconstitutional and illegal and does not obligate any member state to support it. [24]

Only Andreas Andrianopoulos, member of the Greek conservative party, *New Democracy,* expressed his conviction that the government was not only right in aligning itself with the West but should have held an even stronger pro war stance. 'Its not the first time that I don't follow the norm', he stated, 'but it will also not be the first time that my views will be vindicated in the future'. He maintained that by saying yes to the war in

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Konstantopoulos, N ., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p. 6434. See also the comments of the General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, Alexandra Papariga in Papariga, A., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p.6422

[24] Tsovolas, D., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p.6442

Kosovo, Greece was taking a decision to belong to the Western World were its natural position is:

> Maybe I'm wrong to consider Greece part of the developed Western World and not part of the marginal and underdeveloped East. Greece should make clear who it supports and where it belongs; we cannot receive assistance from the West and at the same time refuse to support their unanimous decisions. It's time to free ourselves from the underdog syndrome and realise that our interests lie with the developed Western world. How can we expect our western allies to support us in our disputes with Turkey when we oppose to their decisions?[25]

Andrianopoulos insisted that, apart from its obligations towards its allies, Greece would in fact benefit from the destruction of Serbia. In a recent interview he insisted that 'contrary to what the majority of Greek politicians believed at the time, a strong Serbia would in fact pose a threat Greece due to its constant ambition to find an exodus to the Aegean Sea through the city of Thessaloniki.'[26]

The paradox of the Greek reactions to the Kosovo crisis was that although all Greek politicians were unanimous in condemning the war in Yugoslavia, they held different views on the issue of Greece's official stance towards the crisis. The government as well as the Greek conservative party supported the view that Greece was right not to veto the allied decision to strike Serbia. The main concern of the government was to promote Greek interests and the only way to do that was to support every unanimous decision made by its allies. The government's slogan at the time was that 'Greece comes first'. The government felt that people should not be sentimental regarding the war and instead should be judging things more in terms of what is good for Greece and less in terms of what is ethical.

On May 3rd, 1999, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis in his speech to the Greek Parliament summarised the official stance of the government and analysed the reasons for this stance. He explained that Greece was in a very awkward position being a member of the European Union and also of NATO. Furthermore, Greece was a Balkan country and therefore had a great deal at stake if things went wrong in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the

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[25] Andrianopoulos, A., 'Tis apopseis mou that is dikeosi o xronos, *Eleftheros Typos,* 18/4/1999, p.31
[26]Personal interview with Andreas Andrianopoulos, former Trade and Industry Minister of the Greek Conservative Party, *New Democracy,* Athens, 08/05/2002

Prime Minister stressed the fact that despite complications and restrictions Greece had managed to form its own foreign policy and to distance itself as much as it could from the unanimous decision of its allies to go to war:

> We refused to participate militarily in this war because we are a country adjacent to the area of conflict and therefore it is essential for us to maintain a safe distance from the operations. In addition, we do not believe that military intervention can be the solution to any problem and we have repeatedly said so in every opportunity. To us Greece's national interest is and should be the number one priority. Greece comes first and therefore the government's goal is for Greece to remain trustworthy and strong in the international arena.[27]

Members of the Greek government pointed out that there was very little room for manoeuvre when the rest of the western world was unanimous in its decision to strike at Serbia. Dimitris Apostolakis, the deputy Defence Minister, said:

> Our government's strategy is to promote a political solution to the problem and to establish a policy of security and cooperation in the region. These goals cannot be accomplished if we distance ourselves from what is happening close to our borders. Our position is clear; we do not take part in any military undertaking but on the other hand we have to realize that as members of NATO we have some obligations that we need to fulfil…Although it's a wrong war according to our opinion we should some times pursue our own interests and release ourselves from the underdog syndrome; we have stood by the Palestinians, the Kurds, the Libyans, the Iraqis, but sometimes we have to look for our own benefit.[28]

Similarly, in a recent interview the foreign minister at the time, Theodoros Pangalos, insisted that the Greek government was right not to veto the war in Kosovo. This was not because Milosevic was a criminal and the international community was right to try to stop him in every possible way, but because 'Greece had more important issues to think of for the sake of its own national interests, namely the problem of Cyprus. A country

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[27]Simitis, K., *Records of the Greek Parliament*, Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H, 3 May 1999, p.6414. The same point was made by the minister of defense, Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos: 'The Greek government has made clear to its European counterparts that the only way to resolve the Kosovo crisis would be through peaceful means and with the cooperation of both America and Russia. Greece, as a Balkan country and as a stabilising factor in the region has the moral obligation through International Organisations to help in keeping the peace…our goal is through NATO to achieve peace and stability. If Greece fails to convince NATO to follow peaceful means it will abstain from any military operation.', Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos, *Records of the Greek Parliament*, Sessions OE'/8.2.1999-ΠΘ'/3.3.1999, p.4787. See also the speech of the Foreign Minister George Papandreou in the Parliament: George Papandreou, *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PKΔ'/12/5/1999-PΛΣT'/28.5.1999, Meeting PΛE', 27 May 1999, p.6446-6447

[28] Apostolakis Dimitrios, *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PKΔ'/12/5/1999-PΛΣT'/28.5.1999, Meeting PΛE', 27 May 1999, p. 7598. See also Paraskeyopoulos, P., 'Alilegii xoris sinora', *Eleftherotypia,* 4/4/1999, p.87

cannot pose two vetoes at the same time. It would have been like trying to carry two water melons under the same arm'.[29]

Apart from the government, members of the Greek conservative party maintained that the Greek stance was by and large the correct one but that the way the government presented itself in the international arena lacked decisiveness. Greece gave the impression to its allies that it has no policies of its own and therefore its role is restricted to confirming what the allies have already decided. Furthermore the members of *New Democracy* suggested that Greece should have pressed more for an immediate ceasefire. The president of the party, Konstantinos Karamanlis, when asked to comment on the government's line stated that 'the government is by and large handling the crisis in the right way but its policy is characterized by timidity'[30]. He never stopped arguing that Greece should have had a stronger voice in the international arena and should not give the impression that its policies are dictated by its allies:

> We were honestly surprised Mr. President by your strong pro-western and pro-NATO stance; for years and years we were trying to convince your party that Greece belongs to the West, but this time you overdid it! Your speech on Greece's position to the war was a road map for subjugation to the West; it was a description of the policy of 'yes man'[31].

Contrary to the government and the Greek conservative party, the rest of the political formations completely rejected the government's stance of not vetoing the war and they accused the Prime Minister and his Cabinet of lying to the Greek people. The central argument was that Greece was fully participating in the war and that it had become a puppet of Western, and in particular, American demands. In addition it was suggested that Greece's national interests did not dictate alliance with the Americans in this war. On the contrary, Greece would benefit more if Serbia actually won this war. Dimitris Tsovolas, president of the *Democratic Social Movement* (DIKKI), for example argued

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[29] Personal interview with Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, 30/4/2002
[30] 'O proedros tis ND episimeni tous kindinous, *Kathimerini,* 1/4/1999, p.9
[31] Konstantinos Karamanlis, *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Session PIZ', 3 May 1999,p. 6426. See also Barbitsiotis, I., 'Minima sto NATO i Symfwnia Milosevic-Rougova', *Eleftheros Typos,* 4/4/1999, p.16 and Manos, S., 'Eimai mathimenos stis sigrousis, *Eleftheros Typos,* 25/4/1999, p. 20-1. Similar views were heard by the honorary president of the party Konsantinos Mitsotakis and his daughter Dora Bakogianni in Sarantakos, G., 'Protasi irinis apo ton psilo', *Eleftheros Typos,* 5/4/1999, p.4 and Bakogianni, D., 'Ta Valkania xriazonte mia politiki arxon', *Eleftheros Typos,* 11/4/1999, p. 10-11

that if America won in this conflict then they would stay in the Balkans because it would be easy for them to control the area and use its natural resources. In order to control the area America would have to depend on Turkey and therefore Greece's national interests would have to be sacrificed. If America failed in this war it would most probably abandon the idea of controlling the Balkans and it would turn to other regions rich in natural resources, such as the Persian Gulf. In that case, Turkey would find itself in a bad position and therefore Greece would be able to take advantage of this opportunity.[32]

Nikos Konstantopoulos, the president of the Greek left wing party Coalition of the Left and Progress (*Synaspismos)* condemned the government for fully participating in the allied operations in Kosovo. He urged the Prime Minister to stop facilitating NATO bombings and bring to an end the lies he was telling the Greek public: 'we all know what is going on in northern Greece; it's a shame and it has to end now!'[33] His view was that Greece should support an immediate cease fire and promote a political solution that respected existing borders. To him it was also essential to grant autonomy to Kosovo and secure protection of minorities within the territory of Yugoslavia using UN inspections. To him, Slobodan Milosevic 'did not have bad intentions. He was simply interested in defending the independence of his country and in securing a political solution to the crisis that would provide political autonomy for Kosovo'. Therefore Greece 'should have supported the actions of this man'.[34]

Alexandra Papariga, General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) also targeted her criticism at the fact that the Greek government participated in the war in many ways. Both were convinced that the government was lying to the Greek public and both accused Greece of subjugation to American demands.[35] In Tsovolas' words, 'the

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[32] Ibid., p.6444

[33] Ibid,p.6434

[34] Katsavos, N., 'Na stamatisoun tora oi vomvardismi', *Eleftheros Typos,* 7/4/1999, p. 9

[35] Likewise, Alexandra Papariga, the General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, denounced the government for having no voice of its own and for following American orders. I her opinion, Greece's 'non participation' in words was an American plan and not a Greek decision. America and NATO needed Greece to look as if it abstained from any operation so that they had an allied country able to negotiate with the enemy after the war was over: 'a country to finish up their dirty work in Yugoslavia; after the end of this bloody war. The allies would need to use Greece as an angel force, as an overseer and a guarantor for

Greek government has become a watchdog for America's interests in the region…Greece is guilty of complicity to the crime committed in Kosovo. The government signed NATO's resolution to go to war last June and it also provided all the necessary means for this war to proceed. The government of Mr. Simitis disregarded the Greek constitution that prohibits foreign troops to pass through Greek territory under any circumstances.'[36]

To summarise, regarding the position that Greece should have held in the case of Kosovo the government and the Greek conservative party maintained the view that Greece was right not to veto the allied decision. On the other hand, members of left wing parties completely denounced the Greek stance as irresponsible. What was striking in the views held about the war in Kosovo was that neither the government nor members of the opposition, such as Andrianopoulos who openly supported the war, focused on the fact that Milosevic was a criminal and that war could be the last resort to stop the ethnic cleansing. They justified Greece's decision not to veto the war only with reference to the fact that Greece's interests dictated alignment with the West.

Another paradox of the way the war in Kosovo was interpreted in Greece was that regardless of the different opinions on Greece's obligation to support its allies, all politicians, including the Prime Minister and members of his government, denounced the war and expressed their disapproval of any use of force. Their disagreements were mostly about their pacifism and their fear of the consequences the crisis could have for Greece, a neighbouring country. The argument supported by the majority of Greek politicians against the war was the need to preserve the status quo in the region because otherwise Greece, more than any other country, would have to deal with the huge wave of refugees. Apart from that there was always the possibility a spill-over of the war that would rekindle disputes with countries such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Furthermore this war was denounced as illegal since it had no UN authorisation. War should always be the last resort and should not be considered as a means of solving problems. As it has been demonstrated in the case of Kosovo, the war had the opposite

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any so called "agreement" such as Dayton.' Alexandra Papariga, *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Session PIZ', 3 May 1999,p. 6422
[36] Ibid., p.6441

effect to that which was expected and had only exacerbated ethnic cleansing along with additional problems it created. In other words, the break up of Yugoslavia introduced a completely new political picture, which the Greek politicians could not work out at the time.

2. The first war of globalisation and the role of NATO

In Greece, public discussion on a New World Order and the role of NATO was another opportunity to accuse the US for imperialism and for attempting to rule the world. The idea of a New World Order was related in the minds of the Greek political leaders to the real motives of the war. The majority of the Greek political community held the United States responsible for the war in Kosovo and saw the allied bombing of Serbia as another opportunity for America to throw its weight around the global arena. The general idea was that in their effort to 'conquer' the world, Americans are using NATO, which they have transformed from a purely defensive alliance into and invader. Members of the government and the Greek conservative party were hesitant in openly expressing their views. Only in private interviews did they reveal their true feelings about the events. It has to be noted that some of the politicians did acknowledge the fact that Milosevic was partly responsible for the crisis and that he was indeed a criminal, but he alone was not to blame. He was used by the United States in order to promote their own interests. There were also some isolated members of the Greek political community who refused to blame the United States for the situation in the Balkans and claimed that only Milosevic was responsible for the criminal acts that led to the bombing of Serbia.

The starting point in the debate on the real motives behind the allied decision to bomb Serbia was American double standards in imposing law and order in the world. This was a very common theme among Greek politicians, which was often mentioned even by the people who held Milosevic entirely responsible for the fate of his country. To all Greek political figures the open wound of Northern Cyprus, that had been under Turkish occupation for more than 25 years despite numerous UN Resolutions that condemned it, was enough proof for American double standards in foreign policy.

The President of the Greek Parliament, Apostolos Kaklamanis, was the first one to touch on the matter of Cyprus in relation to Kosovo. The key argument was that, although there

had been numerous resolutions on Cyprus condemning Turkish aggression, neither the Americans nor any of their Allies decided to take any action:

> The drama of the Cypriot people has been going on for 25 years now and although the allies and in particular the Americans are partly responsible for it they have done nothing to stop it. It is the same people, the Americans, who now pretend to feel for the refugees in Kosovo. At the same time they seem to be completely indifferent towards the 200.000 Cypriot refugees, the continuous occupation of Cyprus and the destruction of churches and archaeological sites by the Turks. All Greeks have the duty to condemn the bombing of Serbia because they all know the hypocrisy behind the whole operation.[37]

Dora Bakogianni, a prominent member of the Greek Conservative party expressed her scepticism towards the American stance on Kosovo: 'it is hard to understand why NATO decided now to act in Kosovo and not elsewhere in the world where equal or even worse violations of human rights are taking place. The United States of America and NATO failed to show the same interest for other cases whereas in Kosovo they even sacrificed the United Nations to help the Albanians…Unfortunately the Americans feel that some people deserve to be rescued more than others'.[38] Similarly, Theodoros Pangalos when asked in an interview to state his view on US policy in Kosovo burst out:

> what about Cyprus? What about the Kurds? The violation of human rights in Turkey over the years certainly equal what Milosevic is accused of. The number of Kurds alone that were ethnically cleansed by Turkey more than equals the killing of Albanians in Kosovo. It appears that nobody can draw attention on Turkey or on Turkey's criminal actions. The right of Kosovo Albanians to return to their homes is regarded as vital by Washington; yet the Palestinians appear to have no such right. Why this sudden concern over the Kosovo Albanians now?[39]

The majority of Greek politicians were astonished by the American haste to go to war and by what they interpreted as American unwillingness to negotiate. According to Theodoros Pangalos, the Greek foreign minister at the time, 'Greece fully supported further negotiations with the Serbian leader and for that reason I had personally travelled several times to Belgrade to help towards a peaceful solution but the United States did

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[37] Kaklamanis, A., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions ΟΕ'/8.2.1999-ΠΘ'/3.3.1999, vol. ΣΤ', p. 5995. See also the speech of the representative of PASOK government, Kosmas Sfiriou, who expressed the same views. Sfiriou, K., in ibid., p. 5996

[38] Bakogianni, D., 'Ta Balkania xriazonte mia politiki arxon', *Eleftheros Typos,* 11/4/1999, p. 10-11

[39] Personal interview with Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, 30/04/2002. Similar views were expressed by Karolos Papoulias in his interview, Athens 29/04/2002 and by Konstantinos Karamanlis in his speech in the Greek Parliament, *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p.6428

not want to negotiate. They would turn down every suggestion that could lead to an agreement; it was clear that the Americans would only be satisfied if they destroyed Milosevic.'[40] The same point was made by Nikos Konstantopoulos, president of the leftist party Synaspismos. He accused the United States of aiming for the complete destruction of Yugoslavia: 'the Americans undermined any attempt to find a peaceful solution. Their only goal was to humiliate Milosevic and the Serbian nation, to create turbulence in the Balkans and to eventually alter existing borders to their own benefit.'[41]

Greek political leaders gave two reasons why Americans initiated the war in Kosovo. The first one was due to American arrogance and imperialistic policies. According to this interpretation, NATO was in danger of being used as a global policeman and as a guarantor of American imperialism. The Prime Minister was the first one to comment on the new role of NATO and of its relation to American policies. He acknowledged NATO's role as a guarantor of European Security but at the same time he pointed out that he would not like to see NATO extending its influence beyond Europe and becoming a global policeman. The Prime Minister warned the United States that disregarding International Law could be very dangerous. It could create a precedence which other countries might choose to follow: 'there should be some kind of legitimacy for every action NATO decides to take. No one should be allowed to surpass the International Law formulated by the United Nations, not even NATO.'[42]

The leader of the Greek Conservative Party, Konstantinos Karamanlis, although still considering NATO a useful international organisation and favouring Greece's participation in the alliance, was more critical of the new role of NATO. In his opinion, NATO would from now on feel free to invade any country in any part of the world, in the name of protecting human rights. In his view national sovereignty should be the number one priority because human rights can only be protected within a strong and independent nation state:

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[40] Personal interview with Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, 30/04/2002
[41] Konstantopoulos, N., 'I kivernisi stirizete stous vomvardismous', *Eleftheros Typos,* 18/04/1999, p. 12
[42] Ibid., p. 6416. The same point was made by the foreign minister, see Papandreou, A., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions ΠΗ'/20.4.1999-ΡΚΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. Η', 3/5/1999, p.6445

what should make us all worry about the new global situation is that one country or an alliance of countries has reached an arbitrary decision that protection of human rights is more important than national sovereignty…human rights are of course important, but how can one decide that NATO should intervene in one country and not in another? With what criteria will the International Community decide which minority needs to be protected or which violation of human rights is more severe than another? Has the International Community decided to impose democracy in the world at any cost, even by using non-democratic means?[43]

Karamanlis also pointed out the major change NATO had gone through: 'It is clear that the alliance has acquired a completely different character and form. From being a purely defensive alliance it has now turned into an alliance with broader responsibilities, so broad that not even its members know where to set the limits. NATO seems to be ready to even ignore the United Nations that used to be the only legitimate organisation in the world.'[44] M. Giannakou, member of the Greek Conservative Party *New Democracy* and currently Minister of Education, expressed the view that: 'The United States of America has one and only goal; to use NATO to create new puppet regimes in the area, namely countries that could be used as protectorates and would be easy to influence just like Turkey'.[45] Also Nikos Kouris, a former defence minister for the socialist government of Andreas Papandreou government, expressed his conviction that the Americans 'are actually seeking the opportunity through NATO to build a military establishment in the middle of the Balkans. It is a matter of great importance to them because the Balkans is Europe's weak spot and because it is a strategic geopolitical position leading the way to the oil and gas supplies of Caucasus.'[46]

Unlike the members of the government and of the Greek Conservative Party, members of left wing political formations were more critical of American motives in the case of Kosovo and on the way the Americans used NATO. As Nikos Konstantopoulos put it 'the war in Yugoslavia was the first war of globalization'.[47] Americans desired to control

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[43] Karamanlis, K., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p.6428

[44] Ibid.

[45] Cited in Sarantakou, G., 'Omofonia gia to Kosovo sti ND', *Eleftheros Typos,* 1/4/1999, p.4

[46] Cited in 'Anikse o kiklos enimerosis politikon arxigon', *Kathimerini,* 7/4/1999, p. 5

[47] Konstantopoulos, N., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p. 6435-6438

the region, which is strategically important for the oil and gas supplies of Caucasus. He accused America of using NATO to pursue its policies around the world while disregarding international law and order. His whole speech in Parliament targeted American vicious policies that threatened not only Europe but the whole world:

> The United States are aiming at destroying the old world and at creating a New World Order where Americans will be uncontested leaders; this New World Order that places the whole world under the tutelage of the United States is not going to be based on peace. It will be the new international barbarism where America will invade countries, divide people, kill political leaders, and destroy whole societies in order to secure its own interests.[48]

Dimitris Tsovolas, president of the Democratic Social Movement (DIKKI) also accused the United States of

> barbarism, imperialism, arrogant behaviour, and disregard for human rights. In order to achieve its goal of controlling the universe, America has practically hijacked NATO and has transformed it from a pure defensive organisation to an aggressive invader. NATO has been transformed into an international terrorist and at the same time into a global policeman that stands above any international law.[49]

To him the war in Kosovo was nothing more than a testing ground for the American plan to conquer the world: 'the success of this overbearing and inhumane plan is being tested in Yugoslavia. It is the first time NATO is testing its new role as a global terrorist. If America wins the battle in Kosovo the 21st century will be an American century.'[50]

Likewise Mikis Theodorakis, a famous music composer who supported the left wing party *Synaspismos,* denounced America's desire to control the whole world. Theodorakis was nominated for the Nobel Piece Prize in 2000. In an interview with the Greek daily *Eleftherotypia* he used scornful words to characterise the United States and American foreign policy in particular:

> all Greeks should condemn this cowardly behaviour of the assassins who spread pain, sorrow and death, who are responsible for the ill fate of innocent children and women, who act as directors of evil; they first take pictures of innocent people suffering and then

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[48] Konstantopoulos, N., Records of the Greek Parliament, Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p. 6435-6438

[49] Tsovolas, D., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p. 6440

[50] Ibid., p. 6443. See also the views of the general Secretary of the Greek Communist Party in Papariga, A., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p. 6423

they force this people to flee their country...Clinton is using Kosovo as a testing ground, to teach the rest of the world that America is the world's super power and that it can impose its will anywhere. In the case of Yugoslavia, Clinton's final goal is to completely destroy the country, to exterminate the Serbian leadership and to transform the Serbian people into slaves that will obey the Americans. Under the disguise of the nation-saviour there is a nation-invader who disregards all International Rules and Regulations. Yugoslavia is the first example of a series of others that will follow. A new era has began in which American Law has replaced International Law just like Hitler in the past wanted to replace global regulations with his own.[51]

Also the far right wing politician, Antonis Samaras, who served as a Foreign Minister in the *New Democracy* government during 1989-1992, and later founded the Political Spring Party, expressed similar views to those voiced by representatives of the extreme left. In an interview carried out by the Greek conservative newspaper *Eleftheros Typos* he stated: 'NATO has been transformed into the military arm of the United States and Europe has suffered a severe loss of political credibility. It has officially become America's lackey.'[52]

The second reason, according to Greek politicians, that made the Americans so keen to launch this war was the opportunity to undermine an ascending European Union that was likely to pose a threat to American global dominance. This argument was not as popular as the first one and was mostly used to support the first view that America's sole aim is to impose its will to the rest of the world and to eliminating any potential enemy. Karolos Papoulias openly accused the United States of undermining European integration: 'behind the rhetoric of the US for the protection of human rights, lay the inner desire to weaken the strength and stability of an ascending European Union, which with a single currency, an ascending economy and a strong voice in foreign affairs is likely to threaten the American empire in a few years time'.[53] In that sense, the United States by interfering

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[51] Theodorakis, M., 'Mia simaxia na stamatisi tous neous eksousiastes', *Eleftherotypia,* 13/4/1999, p. 6. See also the comments made by Leonidas Kyrkos, a prominent figure of the Greek Communist Party in 'Konstantopoulos: oratos o efialtis ton xerseon', editorial, *Eleftherotypia,* 19/4/1999, p. 6
[52] Samaras, A., 'Geliopiisi tou OHE', *Eleftheros Typos,* 1/4/1999, p. 9
[53] Personal interview with Karolos Papoulias, Athens, 30/04/2002. See also Leonidas Kyrkos, in 'Konstantopoulos: oratos o efialtis ton xerseon', editorial, *Eleftherotypia,* 19/04/1999, p. 6. See also Konstantopoulos, N., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p. 6435-6438. See also the statement made by the former Prime Minister of the Conservative Party Tzanis Tsannetakis cited in Sarantakos, G., 'Omofonia gia to Kosovo sti ND', *Eleftheros Typos,* 1/4/1999, p. 4

in the Balkans aimed at creating sources of instability in the heart of Europe, which were likely to impose a heavy burden on the European Union. In addition, Washington wanted to make clear to European leaders that Europe, lacking a well organised and ready to act army, would always need the support of the United States at critical moments.

There was also a group of politicians that refused to blame the United States for starting the war in Kosovo and put the blame on Milosevic for the situation in the Balkans. The most prominent supporter of this view was the Minister of Defence, Athanasios Tsochatzopoulos. He did not hesitate to condemn Milosevic for his policies and to justify the fact that the International Community finally decided to do something to stop the massacre:

> the policy of ethnic cleansing is not the result of NATO bombings; it had started way before the International Community decided to take some action. No one can exclude the possibility of Milosevic himself planning the alteration of existing borders. Milosevic aimed of taking all Balkan countries as hostages. Everyone should feel aversion for the means this man used to achieve his goals. We, as Greeks, have endured ethnic cleansing at least three times in recent history; in Pont Sea, in Asia Minor and in Cyprus. NATO is crystal clear about the reasons of these air strikes; it's up to Milosevic to prevent his own country from falling into pieces.[54]

Tsochatzopoulos was the only Greek politician who used such harsh language to denounce Milosevic and his policies. Most politicians who shared similar views were much milder in expressing their opinions. For example, the president of the Greek Conservative Party, Konstantinos Karamanlis, in his speech in the Greek Parliament on May 3rd 1999, admitted that the main responsibility for the crisis in Kosovo lay with the authorities in Belgrade who altered the constitution in 1989 and took the arbitrary decision to give autonomy to Kosovo. He nevertheless avoided mentioning Milosevic's policy of ethnic cleansing. Instead he referred to 'methods of expulsion of the Albanian speaking population that are not acceptable by the international community'[55]. Regarding the allied decision to bomb Serbia he stated:

> I was never in favour of conspiracy theories; therefore I accept the formal excuse for going to war, namely the protection of human rights. I do not see any other reason for the

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[54] Cited in Liarellis, S., 'Rouketa ke apo ton Aki', *Eleftherotypia*, 4/4/1999, p. 4. See also Fafoutis, K., 'Tsoxatzopoulos: Epithesi kata Milosevic', *Kathimerini,* 4/4/1999, p. 4

[55] Karamanlis, K., *Records of the Greek Parliament,* Sessions PH'/20.4.1999-PKΓ'/11.5.1999, vol. H', 3/5/1999, p.6427

Americans to engage in this war or what were they expecting to gain from it. On the contrary the Balkan countries seem to favour wide American involvement in their domestic affairs. Nevertheless, I am less concerned with the reasons for going to war rather than the results and consequences of it. The whole world is currently facing a major crisis, millions of people are suffering and the whole region is in turmoil.[56]

As demonstrated in the above analysis, the key questions in the minds of all politicians were related to the causes of the war. Why did the Allies decide to bomb Serbia now and not earlier? Why did they decide to take action in that part of the world and not in another where worse violations of human rights take place? In providing answers to the above questions, the majority of Greek political leaders held America mainly responsible for this war and not Milosevic. It needs to be noted that although both government members and members of the New Democracy party were extremely careful in accusing Washington for the break up of Yugoslavia, it seemed to be a common secret view that the Americans had much to do with the whole crisis. In their public speeches the most prominent members avoided taking sides or making open statements against the United States. Nevertheless, all political figures regardless of political affiliations seemed to be critical of the idea of a new NATO used by the Americans as an international policeman that would intervene in every part of the world to protect violations of human rights. The main fear was that as demonstrated in the case of Kosovo, NATO could from now on be used by America to impose a New World Order to fit its interests.

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[56] Cited in Sarantakos, G., 'Lathos polemos gia lathos logous', *Eleftheros Typos,* 25/4/1999, p. 8-9. See also the comments made by Prokopis Pavlopoulos in Pavlopoulos, P., 'Isxis k Dikeo mias Iperdinamis', *Kathimerini,* 11/4/1999. p. 7

Concluding Summary

95% of the Greek public responded negatively to the allied bombing of Kosovo. Equally, opinion makers in Greece condemned the bombings and explored the purpose and the results of this war. This paper focused on the interpretation of anti-Americanism in Greece. The focal point was the relation between reactions to NATO's air campaign in Kosovo and anti-Americanism. More specifically, the questions addressed in this paper dealt with the type of anti-Americanism which the bombing of Kosovo gave rise to, the people who were most likely to express anti-American views and the way in which these people justified their accusations against the United States. In an effort to establish whether anti-Americanism has played a role in the Greek politicians' interpretation of the events the analysis was divided into two broad themes.

The first theme explored was way Greek political figures viewed the war. It is interesting to note that the massacre committed by the Serbs and the moral obligation of every human being to prevent it from happening was not discussed. There were two basic reasons why the majority of Greek politicians condemned the air campaign. The first one was that it was against the dogma of preserving the status quo in the region. Any alteration of the existing borders was likely to create a large number of refugees as well as a spill over of the war that would destabilise the whole region and would encourage territorial claims by neighbouring countries such as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Another reason Greek politicians condemned the war was the wide perception that war cannot solve any problems, it can only create more. Especially since this war was an illegal one with no United Nations Resolution to authorise it and could well have become a precedent for similar actions in the future.

Apart from focusing on the negative results of this war, Greek politicians sought the 'real reasons' why the allies launched a war against Serbia in 1999. This was the second theme explored. The majority of the Greek politicians held America more responsible for the war than Milosevic. Politicians associated with both *PASOK* and *New Democracy* held a

somewhat ambiguous stance towards the allied motives for this war. On the one hand they refused to succumb to conspiracy theories whilst on the other they did express their astonishment at American/NATO indifference towards violations of human rights in other parts of the world that have been going on for much longer than those in Kosovo. Politicians that belonged to minor political formations were less restrained and therefore they openly accused the United States for launching this war in order to destroy Serbia and to be able to control the region more easily. As well as they accused America of trying to demonstrate their power to the rest of the world and trying to undermine European integration. Also the idea of NATO changing in character and responsibilities initiated a great deal of criticism. America was the target of most of this criticism because in Greece more often than not NATO was equated with America. All statesmen of all political persuasions showed little enthusiasm for the prospect of NATO disregarding the United Nations and invading sovereign states to protect minority rights. The focal point of the discussions about NATO was whether NATO had a reason to exist after the collapse of the Iron Curtain or not. For members of the government and of the Greek conservative party, NATO was still useful provided that it did not transform itself into a global policeman and that it would not be used by the United States to promote their interests in the world. To members of the Greek left, NATO was useless and should have been abolished, otherwise it was likely to be used by world's only superpower in an arbitrary way just as in the case of Kosovo.

To summarise, the above analysis demonstrated that anti-Americanism exists in Greece and that it becomes evident mostly in periods of crisis, either international or domestic. It needs to be stressed that the NATO bombing of Serbia caused considerable anxiety to the Greeks. All Greek politicians, whether members of the governing party or not, were extremely confused and concerned that with the war in Kosovo, there might have been a renegotiation of the borders. They were mostly concerned because they could not get a clear picture of how the situation would evolve and therefore they did not know how to react. It could be argued that anti-Americanism had served two goals. The first one was that it helped in keeping the Greek public united. The last thing the Greek politicians needed when their own country was facing a crisis was a divided population that would

cause domestic instability. There was a fire burning on Greece's borders and the Greeks felt that they had to be united and prepared for all eventualities. Anti-Americanism could very well, and as it turned out it did work as a uniting factor.

Secondly, anti-Americanism in the case of Kosovo played another important role, namely to justify to the allies the ambivalent position of the Greek government. In that sense it could be said that America was the scapegoat for the government's inability to deal decisively with the situation in Kosovo. On the one hand Greece was a full member of NATO and the European Union, on the other it was so adjacent to the crisis that the threat of a spill over was imminent. Therefore Greece wanted to avoid actively participating in the bombings instead trying to act as a mediator between the conflicting parties. How could the Greek government disregard the fact that almost one hundred percent of Greek public opinion condemned the air campaign and accused the United States for the situation in the former Yugoslavia?

Having said that, it is necessary to stress the fact that the government did not initiate or in any way support the anti-American sentiment that was growing in Greece. However, it could be said that the Greek government realised this kind of sentiment might prove beneficial if used in the right way. The majority of Greek politicians tried to restrict themselves into arguing vaguely about the negative consequences of the war, about what is right and what is wrong, and to logically proving that war is not the solution to any problem. However they did contribute to anti-Americanism by highlighting the negative consequences of this war that was launched by NATO, and which was directed linked in the minds of the Greek public to America. By criticising the war, Greek politicians were, in the eyes of the public, criticising the United States.

In other words Greek political figures contributed to anti-Americanism by expressing concerns over the destabilisation in the region, the possible territorial claims and the changes in the borders. They also touched on the issue of Greek minorities in Albania that, if hurt, could draw Greece into the conflict as well as the new political affiliations and alliances that could emerge including a possible upgrade of Turkey's status.

Although the majority of Greek political figures, with the exception of representatives of the extreme left and right, did not criticise the American government directly, they argued extensively the significant dangers to national sovereignty and security. There were extensive discussions by politicians on American Foreign Policy, whether the US was aware of the dangers in the region, on the new World Order pursued by the US government, on the changes in the character of NATO and the future implications of setting as a priority the protection of minorities in various parts of the world.

It is also worth noting that criticism voiced against America by the major political parties was more cohesive compared to past references. Political figures from the two basic political formations, namely *PASOK* and *New Democracy* held more or less the same views about American policies and were equally careful in the way they expressed them. It is also evident that since 1999 a new type of anti-Americanism has appeared which is not connected with the old left wing reactions to American led globalization and the capitalist markets. It is an anti-American sentiment that runs through Greek society regardless of class or political persuasion. This type of anti-Americanism is mostly political and the criticism is directed towards American foreign policy and its relationship with other countries. America is often presented as the world's bully who has hijacked NATO in order to pursue its policies around the world. Even the most lenient critics of American policies have accused the United States of treating the rest of the world in an arrogant way that is more suitable to an empire rather than a democratic country.

Another interesting observation was that in 1999 anti-Americanism in Greece appeared to be based less on domestic factors and more on international issues. In other words the sentiment did not derive from bitterness about the way the Americans treated Greek people in the past but originated in the concern about the dangerous path American foreign policy was on. Yet, one could still perceive traces of anti-Americanism based on past American policies toward Greece; for example there were several cases where politicians expressed their disappointment at American double standards; they pointed out that although in the case of Kosovo the whole International Community under the leadership of America rushed to save the Albanians, in the case of Cyprus the same

countries showed complete indifference and disregarded several UN Resolutions that condemned Turkish aggression.

All the above issues contributed to the sentiment of anti-Americanism in Greece. One could conclude that with the war in Kosovo, the flood gates burst open and the Greek people felt free and justified to grieve openly about the war, to voice their pain and anger against the American government, and to resurrect old issues such as Cyprus that caused them considerable doubt about American motives and declarations.

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Paper for the 2nd LSE Phd Symposium on Modern Greece

By George Koukoudakis
Phd Candidate at the University of Athens
E-mail: Georgeyd@hotmail.com
Tel: 0030-210-4517317

Title

The Foreign Policy of Greece as a Member of a Security Community

The Foreign Policy of Greece as a Member of a Security Community

INTRODUCTION

It is widely argued that there is a progressive "Europenization" of the foreign policy of Greece (Lesser. et. al 2001:36)[i]. This claim is true but usually the case is that we see only the one side of the coin. The most common explanation of this shift in the Greek foreign policy is that Greece feels more secure and politically stronger within the EU and therefore constantly tries to Europeanize its international relations. What is omitted, however, is that Greece due to its full membership in the European Union, owns, or at least is expected, to reproduce the foreign policy of the Union.

It is the task of this paper, based on the work of Karl Deutch et.al (1957) and Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) to demonstrate that the foreign policy of Greece is based on exactly the same strategy as this that the European Union (EU) is following in the conduct of its own foreign policy.

In its first part this paper presents the EU as a security community that does not only guarantee peace and stability among its members but by following a particular model of foreign policy, that of security community building, creates conditions of peaceful co-existence and constructive co-operation for the whole of the European continent. By examining recent normative and empirical discourses this study intends to show that the three tiers model developed by Adler and Barnett for the creation of security communities does not apply only to the way the EU evolved as a security community but also applies to the strategy which the EU followed in order to face the revolutionary changes in post Cold War Europe.

Within this context, firstly, the theoretical basis of security communities will be presented and by making reference to the historical and institutional evolution of European integration it will be shown that the EU has completed the final phase required to become a security community.Then, by analysing the way by which the EU approached the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), it will be shown that the three tier model for the creation of security community applies also to the way the EU is conducting its foreign policy.

In the second part of this paper, by pointing out the way by which Greece is conducting its own foreign policy, especially as far as its bilateral relation with Turkey is concerned, it will be shown that the Greek foreign policy model is also based on security community building. In particular, attention will be placed on Greek-Turkish relations since 1999, after the Helsinki Summit. The year 1999 is considered to be a crucial turning point in the history of the relations of both countries and certainly a change in the strategy of Greek foreign policy that has been followed until then. The main question to be raised however at this last part of the paper is to what extent we can expect to have similar results in Greek-Turkish relations as those with the CEEC. In other words, can we transfer the experience of Eastern and Central Europe to the Southeast part of the continent? If Turkey fails to enter the EU in the immediate future what is the possibility of a Greek-Turkish pluralistic security community? What are the prospects and limitations of such a claim?

The Theoretical Basis of Security Communities

Richard Van Wagenen, first used the concept of the security community in the early 1950s. However it was not until the publication of Karl Deutsch's and his associates study that the concept of security communities received its first full theoretical and empirical treatment (Adler and Barnett: 1998:6). Deutsch et. al define a security community as 'a group of people that has become integrated to the point that there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their dispute in some other way' (1957:5). According to their study, there are two kinds security community, amalgamated and pluralistic. An amalgamated security community is when 'two or more previously independent units merge into a single larger unit with some type of common government after amalgamation' (1957:6). In contrast, a pluralistic security community preserves the legal independence of the separate participant governments (1957:5). For Deutch, pluralistic security communities are the result of interactions and institution building between states that leads to the creation of a common identity' (1957:5).

Such a conception of international politics seemed idealistic in the shadow of super power competition during the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, however there is a renewed interest in security community theory. The work of Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett 'Security Communities' (1998), constitutes a serious effort to amend and apply Deutsch's conception in post Cold War era. By focusing on the study of pluralistic security communities, Adler and Barnett, recognise that the 'Deutschian contribution is to highlight that states can become embedded in a set of social relations that are understood as a community, and that the fabric of this community can generate stable

expectations of peaceful change' (1998:6). Adler, extends Deutsch's concept of pluralistic security communities by arguing that: 'Such communities are socially constructed 'cognitive regions' or community regions' whose people imagine that with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end' (1997:250).

In other words, Adler sees deficiencies in Deutsch's argument, that the achievement of security communities is taking place through intersocietal transactions. As Rosamond notes 'Deutsch became preoccupied with the achievement of security communities through intersocietal transactions. Furthermore, he was convinced that these transactions could be measured and quantified. So his attention was focused on measurable indices of communication such as international phone calls and the cross border traffic of tourists' (2000:168). The post Cold War interest in security communities, Adler argues, should focus not on this but on the sociological origins of transactions and the process of social learning that lead to the creation of a common identity (1997:250). Consequently, Adler and Barnett define a pluralistic security community as 'a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change' (1998:30).

Adler and Barnett dinstiguish two kinds of pluralistic security communities, tightly coupled and loosely coupled. This categorisation of security communities is taking place according to 'their depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalisation of their governance system and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it' (1998:30).

Having presented the conceptual basis of their version of security communities, Adler and Barnett, move on to develop a three-tier model of the

development of security communities (1998:37-39) that corresponds to a three-phase model: Nascent, Ascendent and Mature (1998:50-55).

The first tier deals with the creation of conditions that result in the emergence of security communities. Those conditions may be a combination of changes in technology, demography, economics the environment, the existence of external threats and changes in the interpretations of social realities. As a result co-operation takes place between states as states think that they can cope better with those changes or threats if they co-operate with each other. In this initial stage a mutual identification is not expected to be created, instead this phase constitutes the basis for a more pleasant and frequent future interaction because it helps states to realise the benefits of co-operation.

This leads to the second tier where a more institutionalised co-operation takes place and is defined by organisations, transactions and social learning. The most important aspect of this tier is the fact that states and their peoples become involved in multiple social interactions that shape their surrounding environment. These dynamic interactions provide the conditions under which a collective identity and mutual trust can be formed which are prerequisites for the dependable expectations of peaceful change.

In the third tier, both mutual trust and collective identity are formed and lead to the creation of 'dependable expectations of peaceful change', defined as 'neither the expectations of nor the preparation for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes' (1998:6). The third tier is the end point of security community building since member states perceive war among them as unthinkable as a result of the shared identity and trust that exists amongst them.

The EU Development as a Security Community

How the EU can be seen as a tightly coupled pluralistic security community? By considering important points in the evolution of European integration it will be shown that the three-tier model of the creation of security communities, as developed by Adler and Barnett, applies to the EU.

Although Waever notes that the EU went through distinct phases in its emergence as a security community he asserts that it did not obey the three-stage model of Adler and Barnett (1998:93). Contrary to Waever's argument, however, the three-tier model of the development of security communities can be seen to the political and institutional evolution of the EU. It can be argued that the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 took place because of the catastrophic consequences of the Second World War and the new political order that had emerged. The need for economic reconstruction during the early post - war years combined with the desire of keeping Germany's war industry under control and the Soviet threat, led the initial six European states to form the ECSC (Dedman: 1996:2). In other words, the need for economic security, and the threat posed by expansive Soviet communism and an unchecked and recovered Germany were perceived as common problems, which eventually led to co-operation. As set out above, in the first tier of security community building mutual identification is not expected. Instead at this stage what matters most is the identification of common problems and threats. This tier is considered fundamental in beginning the 'socialisation' of the actors involved. The establishment of the ECSC at this early stage with decision – making powers over a particular policy area, brought together a large number of

officials from the founding countries. Ministers, officials and interest group representatives began to interact within an institutionalised environment. As a result, those people 'exchanged information and opinions beyond their immediate agenda, and acquired habits of constructive bargaining as they were socialised into continuing groups' (Wallace: 1990:79).

This initial rapprochement of former enemies paved the way for further integration, as the members began to realise that they could be more effective by acting together rather than unilaterally. The creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 can be seen as the initial phase of second tier of the security community building. The incremental creation of a common market further increased the interaction not only between the elites of the Member states but now also between their people. The continued growth of trade and prosperity combined with increased freedom of movement of workers, helped to persuade the citizens of the founding countries that there is a possibility of a shared destiny. The ideological polarisation of the Cold War contributed further to the creation of a common identity; peoples of the member countries saw themselves as on the same side, supporting democracy and capitalism.

A survey conducted in France in January 1963 asking with which countries should France have the closest ties revealed that forty per cent of the French people replied 'with Germany' and only 25 per cent said 'with Britain' (Dedman: 1996:115). This is evidence that change is possible in international politics and confirms the constructivist view that 'social reality is constructed when individuals come into contact with each other and interact (Adler: 1997:257). Furthermore, the fact that the rulings of ECJ were respected also serves as an indication that the socialisation between the member states was

slowly moving towards the creation of mutual trust and a shared identity. This was the period when the ECJ established the principles of direct effect and supremacy. 'Flows of private transactions in conjunction with transnational institutions… and community law… can play important roles in transmitting and diffusing shared normative and causal beliefs of a civic culture' (Adler: 1997:260).

The implementation of the second tier, however, required time within the context of European integration. European integration stagnated in the late 1960s and 1970s mainly because of General De Gaulle. It can not be argued, however, that this was an impediment to the implementation of the second phase of security community building. All the institutions and processes put in place by the previous Treaties were functioning; the socialisation process between the people and the elites of the Member States was not interrupted.

 In contrast, it can be argued that the relaunch of integration in the 1980s was also facilitated by this socialisation progress. This socialisation process, through transactions and interactions, has provided the Member States with knowledge of each others' habits and behaviour. This built up a degree of trust in the fact that aspects of state sovereignty can be commonly guarded within the supranational institutions of the EC. The signing of the SEA therefore reflects not only the need for the EEC to have a more united front in the face of international economic competition but it also reflects the knowledge of the Member States that there is degree of trust between them which permit further co-operation and integration. In this way Adler's and Barnett's theoretical framework can be applied to European integration. 'Transactions and interactions generate reciprocity, new forms of trust, the discovery of new

interests, and even collective identities' (1998:14). At this point the EC had reached the third tier of security community building.

The creation of trust amongst the EC members also explains the introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers (CM), and the provision of the co-operation power to the EP. Thus it was not only necessity that led to such development but also the existence of trust that allowed them to occur. The incorporation of European Political Co-operation (EPC) in the SEA aimed to co-ordinate the foreign policies of the Member States, despite its declared role being, bears testament to the high degree of trust that was emerging between the EC member states, in particular given that foreign policy is considered to be the cornerstone of state sovereignty. Moreover, the establishment of the principle of partnership in 1988 further strengthen the socialisation process. Socialisation this time took place not only between governmental officials but with subnational actors' representatives, in this way leading to the creation of a multi –level system of governance[ii]. As a result, the Member States and their peoples became involved in multiple and social interactions that shape their surrounding environment. These dynamic interactions are considered fundamental for the further enforcement of mutual trust and the creation of a common identity.

The liberal democratic culture of the member states, which is characterised by the rule of law, respect of human rights duties and rights of citizenship, is also an integral part of the identity of their citizens. Consequently, as our theoretical model argues: 'the behaviour of member –states in a pluralistic security community reproduces this civic culture, which in turn, constructs a community- region civic culture' (Adler: 1997:259). All these actors,

therefore, by interacting within a particular institutionalised environment that inspired them with trust, began to realise that they have something in common. In other words, a civic identity has been created between the peoples of the EC/EU that is characterised by liberal democracy and the running of common institutions. This is a particular instance of Adler's and Barnet's theoretical conception. 'The distinctive feature of a security community is that a stable peace is tied to the existence of a trasnational community' (1998:30-31).

It can be argued, therefore, that the third tier of the development of the European Community as a security community was completed at this stage. Thus, by the end of the 1980s the EC had emerged as a security community. In other words, it had achieved dependable expectations of peaceful change. 'War between EC/EU member states has become unthinkable in the meetings of the Ministers of Defence no one sees each other as an enemy. Constant interaction has resulted in the feeling that we all serve the same goal-to protect the interests and guard the common identity of the Union'.[iii]

The Foreign Policy of the EU as a Security Community

The EU has not only developed as a security community but by following a policy of security community building has managed to contribute to interstate peace in Europe. The way in which the EC approached the CEECs bear testament to this.

Following the end of the Cold War, the new states that emerged in central and Eastern Europe embarked on a process of embracing democracy and free market economics. The security dimension of this transformation process soon

became obvious in the West in general and in the EC/EU in particular. Imbalances between majorities and minorities within these states and, weak political orders accompanied by virulent authority deficits, weak political cultures and deep economic troubles were the immediate problems that the CEEC had to face (Kahl: 1997:153). In other words, there was the possibility that political disorder and economic collapse in Central and Eastern Europe could lead to the formation of authoritarian forms of government in these countries.

Consequently, an unsuccessful transformation to democracy in the CEEC held the possibility of violent interstate conflict in Europe. Doyle's argument that democracies do not fight each other (1986)[iv] and, the dramatic events in European history support such a concern. In this situation, the ontological presence of the security community that the EC constituted could be threatened in spite of its own internal stability and peace. An authoritarian state in Eastern Europe, could, for example, become aggressive towards an EC member state, perhaps in order to attract the attention of its unsatisfied and thus conflict prone people. Booth, therefore, was justified when at the beginning of the 1990s argued that: 'Europe is unlikely to be able to remain a stable ship of peace and security if the seas all around are stormy' (1990:42). In other words, democratisation in the East became a security concern in the West. This explains the model of foreign policy that the EC/EU has chosen to follow in order to guarantee its peace and stability and the well being of its peoples.

As a result, the European Community was quick to respond to the revolutions in Eastern Europe. In July 1989 it adopted the PHARE programme (Poland –Hungary: Aid for Reconstructing the Economies). The programme was

originally intended to provide help to Poland and Hungary, hence its name but since then it has expanded to other thirteen countries. It included: emergency food aid, financial assistance, structural adjustment loans and credits, investment guarantees, and technical assistance grants (Niemann: 1998: 433). In addition the EC signed 'Association and European agreements' with the CEEC, which consist of four elements: 'promotion of free trade between signatories, industrial technical and scientific co-operation, financial assistance, and a mechanism for political dialogue' (Jones: 1996:293). Significantly, the PHARE programme and the association agreements were conditional on the establishment of the rule of law, human rights, multiparty systems, free and fair elections, economic liberalisation, and the introduction of market economies. Furthermore, in 1990, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was created to provide low interests loans to the CEEC.

This provision of aid had two aims. Firstly, in the short term, it was intended to curb or prevent any social conflict and political confrontation that could lead to the formation of authoritarian regimes, this aim is also shown by the conditions placed on the provision of aid. Secondly, in the long-term the aim was to contribute to economic development that would help in the consolidation of democracy. Economic development can be shown to be important in the development and maintenance of democracy, as Przeworski and Limong argue: 'the chances for the survival of democracy are greater when the country is richer' (1997:177).

At the June 1993 meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen it was agreed that the associated states of the CEEC could apply to become members of the EU provided that they first fulfil certain conditions. These conditions require

candidate states to achieve stability in their institutions that guarantee democracy, the upholding of the rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy, the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union and the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims, of political, economic and monetary union (Agenda 2000: 1997:39). Simultaneously, the pre-accession strategy 'was to be implemented politically by the creation of a structured dialogue between the associated States and the institutions of the European Union, to encourage mutual trust, and provide a framework for addressing topics of common interests'[v].

It follows that, within the context of the PHARE programme, the Association/ European agreements and the pre-accession strategy there was an intense interaction between officials from the CEECs and the EU. As a consequence these officials became familiar with each other and cultivated common habits and trust over their field of interaction. Niemann notes that: 'This is not surprising given the frequency of their interaction. They meet not only in the Central Europe Working Group, where most general matters concerning the CEEC, including PHARE are discussed, but also at preparatory meetings for the Association Council, the Association Committees and sometimes also at the PHARE management Committee' (1998: 436). Moreover, within the framework of the association agreements a series of trade agreements between the EC and the CEEC have resulted in the creation of intense interactions between businessman and, workers, etc. These people came to know each other and shared beliefs and experiences and, of course, they created a common interest based on trust through the way they interacted. The pre-accession

strategy was also characterised by the high level and institutionalised socialisation that can be seen here.

Thus, a process of 'constructive engagement' (1990:23), to use Booth's term, took place between the CEEC and the EC/EU that aimed to create mutual trust and, to establish institutionalised behaviour that was beneficial for all parties. ' A relationship of constructive engagement or mature détente should be able to withstand knocks suspicions, ambiguous behaviour, and possibly even minor defections from the spirit of the relationship….At its best it promised.. to be reciprocal, to establish ground rules for behaviour, to be mutually beneficial, to produce concrete results, and to be institutionalised' (Booth: 1990:24). This is what occurred, and in this way, the EC/EU was able to gain leverage over the process of domestic transformation of those states and consequently to avert the rise of authoritarian regimes that could emerge in Eastern Europe with unpredictable consequences for the whole continent.

On the other hand, membership in the EU for the CEEC was entailing a wide variety of economic and social opportunities and, of course, a high degree of security. In other words, by using its 'power of attraction' to use Gabriel's Munuera term (1994:91), the EU has managed to offer a long-term direction to those states which enabled them to reach a condition of détente with the EU and each other. Hungary's détente with Slovakia was such an example. In addition, as Kahl, notes, the European Commission has made it clear that if a country is not admitted in the first round it is not the end of the road; there will be a second round and applications will be reviewed each year (1997:175). In this way the long-term policy direction of these states is not diverted.

All these processes bear testament to the fact that the international politics of post Cold War Europe was characterised by a process of international socialisation between the CEEC and the EC/EU and their peoples. Schimmelfenning defines international socialisation: 'as a process that is directed toward a state's internalisation of the constitutive believes and practices institutionalised in its internal environment' (2000:111). In this process, which is part of the EC/EU's foreign policy strategy of security community building, the EC/EU tried and in most of the cases succeeded to make the CEEC adopt the common identity which it has as a security community- liberal democracy and free market economics. The applicability of the theoretical model of security communities is once again apparent. 'The international relations of the 'new Europe' are shaped by a process of international socialisation in which the Western Community transmits its constitutive liberal norms to Central and Eastern Europe' (Schimmelfenning: 2000:109). Through this process the EU assured peace and stability in the area and consequently the well being of its citizens and at the same time is expanding its common identity and political and ideological appeal.

This socialisation process was concluded when the CEEC consolidated their democracies and established a market economy, and thus adopted the social beliefs and practises of the EU member states. This last stage of the international socialisation process is called by Scimmelfenning internalization'. He argues that: 'internalization means the adoption of social beliefs and practices into the actor's own repertoire of cognitions and behaviours. A fully socialised actor regards these beliefs and practises as its own and follows them autonomously' (2000: 112). It can be argued therefore that when the CEEC

succeeded in internalising these beliefs and practices became members of the EU in 2004.

It can be shown therefore, that the three –tier model developed by Adler and Barnett on the formation of security communities also applies to the way in which the EC/EU choose to respond to the revolutionary events that followed the end of the Cold War in Eastern and Central Europe. The first tier corresponds to the creation and negotiation of the PHARE programme. The dramatic events of 1989 created a common threat to both Eastern and Western Europe and as a result the EU and the CEEC had to co-operate. The second tier corresponds to the implementation of the PHARE programme, the signing of the Association/European agreements and the pre-accession strategy. All of these developments resulted in more institutionalised and frequent interactions which paved the way for the building of common trust and the creation of a common identity at the same time contributed greatly to the maintenance of peace and stability in the area. At the same time it worth noting that since this three tier model also applied to the EU's evolution to a security community, it can be concluded that the EU's foreign policy imitates its own emergence as a security community.

The Foreign Policy of Greece as a Member of a Security Community

As was mentioned above, Adler expects from the member states of a pluralistic security community to reproduce by their behaviour, within the security community, the civic culture of the community which in turn constructs a community-region civic culture (1997:259). As was aforementioned this was also the case in the strategy of the foreign policy of the EU as a whole. A logical

question however that emerges after this is what kind of foreign policy the members of a pluralistic security community are following in their bilateral relations with states by which the EU also practices the same strategy. One logical answer is that the member state should also reproduce the foreign policy of the EU –security community building- while conducting their bilateral relations with other countries which aspire to become members. Such an attitude can be seen for the last six years in the Greek-Turkish relations despite the long standing rivalry between the two states.

Without any doubt the decision of the Helsinki European Council Summit of 1999, to give Turkey the status of a candidate state for EU membership, constitutes a turning point not only in the Euro-Turkish relations but also for the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece. The Helsinki Summit, at least this is the contention of this paper; establish the basis of a twofold integration for Turkey into a security community with Greece. The first possibility of a Greco-Turkish security community is Turkey's prospect for eventual membership into the EU's security community where Greece is already a member. The second is the formation of a bilateral Greco-Turkish security community given the obligation which has been undertaken by Turkey, as candidate state, to resolve in a peaceful way all of its disputes with its neighbour countries and to make all the efforts required under the aegis of the UN for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Settling, in a peaceful way interstate disputes, as was mentioned above is a basic behaviour for the members of a security community. This can also be seen as an external factor for Turkey's acceptance into the EU and at the same time demonstrates the interdependence of the two possibilities for the creation of a Greco-Turkish security community.

It is obvious however that since it will take Turkey more than a decade to enter the EU, not only because of the slow implementation of the political and economic criteria that membership requires but also because the EU is not very keen on the idea of Turkish early entrance. Turkey's size, cultural identity and the recent EU enlargement with ten new members put the entrance of Turkey in the Union in ten or even fifteen years. As a result, the prospect of a bilateral formation of a security community between Greece and Turkey acquires a more independent nature than the first. It should be highlighted however that the possibility of the formation of a bilateral Greek-Turkish security community will decline dramatically if Turkey will be left with no prospect for EU membership.

The Causes of the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement

The decisions taken at Helsinki, especially as the Greek-Turkish relations are concerned, have not been taken in vein. The Greek –Turkish relations in the 1990s have gone through faces of tension and uncertainty. The Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996 brought the two states very close to an arm confrontation and the capture of the PKK leader while leaving the Greek Embassy in Kenya further deteriorated the relations of the two Aegean neighbors and manifested the great lack of trust in their relations.

The tentative relations between Greece and Turkey was mutually damaging for both countries. From one hand, on an economic level, Greece, had to devote huge amounts of money for its defense budget and as a result could not concentrate its fiscal efforts to the fulfillment of the criteria for its entry in the European Monetary Union. Turkey on the other hand, had also interest in the reduction of tension with Greece not only in order to facilitate its European prospect but mainly, in that particular time in order to have more room for

maneuvers in its fiscal policy. Turkey has agreed in 1999 with the International Monetary Fund to reduce its huge fiscal dept. (Kazakos 2001:18-19). Greece and Turkey have the higher defense spending in the percentage of GDP among all other number countries, 4,5% for Turkey and 4,8% for Greece (Kairidis:2001:67). In addition, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) between 1994 and 1998 Turkey is ranked third among the main conventional armaments importers and Greece is ranked number six (SIPRI 1999:428).

At the same time, both states were directly exposed to the new security threats that emerged after the end of the Cold War. Post Cold War Europe is characterised by the emergence of a new security environment. The international security agenda has deepened drastically with the emergence of aggressive nationalism, social disruption and uncertainty in light of fundamental economic reforms, drug trafficking, organised crime, international terrorism, illegal immigration and environmental degradation (Baldwin: 1997, Krause and Williams: 1996, Rees, 1993).

The common characteristic of these new threats is their transboundary nature. In addition, they are closely interrelated with each other. An environmental disaster or an ethnic conflict in one country may produce immigration to other countries. This immigration movement may be accompanied by drug trafficking, and it may facilitate the transfer of weapons of mass destruction. It may also destabilise the society of the state where immigration takes place by causing an increase in unemployment and encouraging the rise of extreme parties, the creation of xenophobia and social conflict. The consequences of an environmental disaster may of course also

'travel' to the neighbouring countries. As a result what is threatened is not the 'Westphalian' state but its citizens and its internal infrastructure, as Donnelly argues: 'What is under attack is not the territory of the state but its fabric, the nature of its society, the functioning of its institutions, and the well-being of its citizens' (2001:1). Events like September the 11th and the rise of the extreme right wing in France in the last presidential elections are clear indications of the changed nature of international security (Hall and Fox: 2001).

The emergence of a new security environment causes both theoretical and policy implications. Neo-realist zero-sum thinking is considered an ill-equipped strategy to manage with these threats. Avoidance of co-operation is out of touch with a world of complex security interdependence. As a result, foreign policy objectives as well as instruments have to be revised. Hillal Dessouki and Bahgat Korany argue that: 'a state's foreign policy orientation –its general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment, its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and aspirations and for coping with persistent threat- may change as a result of significant change in the global system' (1991:17). In other words, in the post-Cold War era, we should not expect the pattern of behaviour that characterised states' interaction during the Cold War both on bilateral and multilateral level.

It is within this framework that we can understand the Greek-Turkish rapprochement. Faced directly with the new security environment due to their geographic proximity and neighbouring with conflict zones such as the Balkans, Central Asia, Caucasus and the Middle East, both states realised that zero-sum game strategy is mutually damaging and that a 'policy of co-operation is far more advantageous than continued confrontation' (Lindsay: 2000:216). Thus, in

1996 a few months after the Imia/Kardak hot incident the pair agreed in New York to embark on a 'step by step' rapprochement. Following neofunctionalist lines, the initiative aims by starting with 'low politics' issues such as immigration, environment, international terrorism, commerce and illegal drug trafficking, to be able to tackle and eventually peacefully solve the 'high politics' issues concerning both countries, the Cypriot problem and the dispute over the Aegean Sea (Kranidiotis: 1999).

The process has been intensified since two earthquaques hit both countries in 1999. The immediate help that both countries provided to each other brought their societies closer and 'exploded myths alleging eternal Greek – Turkish enmity and the burden of history' (Couloumbis and Veremis: 1999:152). Friendship groups and other multiple contact routs were created and the media in both countries spread the feeling of mutual gratitude within their populations. As a result, popular support has been generated for the 'step by step' process of Greek Turkish rapprochement.

The Helsinki developments in a way open the way for the step by step approached that the Greek government had proposed in Washington in 1996 and had further discussed in 1999 on a foreign ministers level in New York. As a result, nine bilateral agreements were signed between Greece and Turkey on "low politics issues" i.e in no controversial areas. These agreements include co-operation on: tourism, finance, technology and science, sea transport, culture, customs, protection of investments, protection of environment, fight against international organised crime and illegal immigration[vi]. In these meetings the foreign ministers of both countries also agreed on the creation of Joint Task Force -a special committee- of Greek and Turkish officials that was going to help

and advice Turkey, based on the Greek experience, on the adoption of the aquis communitaire[vii]. The Greek-Turkish co-operation was also expanded in agriculture, energy and fight against natural disasters. In more details the ministers of agriculture of Greece and Turkey signed in June 2000 a protocol of technological, scientific and financial co-operation on the agriculture sector. Also in 28 of March 2002 an agreement was signed in Ankara by the ministers of energy of both countries for the construction of pipeline that is going to transport natural gas from Iran via Turkey to Greece and consequently to Europe[viii]. At the same time a series of other agreements for co-operation on low politics issues has been signed between the two countries. Their ratification, however, is still pending.

Is the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement identical with Security Community Building?

It can be argued that the first tear of our theoretical model can also be seen in this rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. The new security environment that emerged in post Cold War Europe combined with the foreign policy priorities of the two states and their common exposure to natural disasters constitute not only a threat for their societies but also the realization that the international social reality has changed drastically after the end of bipolarity. As a result Greece and Turkey had to co-operate. The most important aspect of this phase is the creation of an institutional setting for the co-operation and the increase of interactions between officials, diplomats, businessmen, scientists, doctors, youth groups and citizens from both states.

Without a doubt the co-operation on low politics issues between Greece and Turkey has been proved operational and mutually beneficial. Testimonies

from both sides of the Aegean confirm such a claim. The then Turkish finance minister Kemal Dervis stated in a greek newspaper that the close economic, tourist a energy co-operation between Greece and Turkey has a great potential[ix]. At the same time Greek –Turkish investments in the region are playing an important role in the regional economic reconstruction and development (Koutsikos: 2000:66). Simultaneously, the so called human touch between the societies of the two countries has been developed even at a local government level. The example of the municipality of the island of Hydra and the municipality of the Istanbul suburb Eregli is one good example. Sometimes such initiatives have been sponsored by the European Commission. The "Greek-Turkish civic dialogue" programme of 2003 involved more than 5000 people from both countries who exchanged experiences and realised the great similarities between the two nations[x].

However, the main goal of the low politics co-operation was not the expectable benefits but the creation of a solid basis for co-operation which could gradually lead to the building of trust between the two states and eventually to the peaceful resolution of high politics issues. Within this context discussions on the implementation of confidence-building and risk reduction measures took place. As our theoretical model requires, this will be the move on from tier one to tier two. The question therefore which must be address is whether or not there is any sight that both countries can trust each other. A good indication of such a trust will be any progress that has been made on high politics issues or at least in the process of the confidence building measures.

The Greek –Turkish discussions on the confidence building measures is not an easy process. The two states have agreed to divide the areas where they

want to establish confidence building measures in three categories, technical and operational which are going to be arranged on a bilateral level and military which are going to be discussed on a NATO level. Despite of this, however, there is no a spectacular progress that have been achieved in any of the categories of the CBM[xi]. This fact according to Panagiotis Tsakonas is due to mainly to the high politics issues in the Aegean that remain unresolved (2003:85).

This apparent deadlock in the process of CBM may explain the decision taken by Greece and Turkey on April 2002 to initiate a process of "investigating contacts" or, as is usually called, a pre-negotiation strategy. The aim of these "investigating contacts" between Greek and Turkish diplomatic officials and experts in the Greek-Turkish relations is to find out common ground and common interests in the resolution of high politics issues. This process does not commit any of the parties concerned. So far, however, there has not been any progress.

Obviously therefore, the prospect of a bilateral Greco-Turkish security community has not gone further than the beginning of the second tier-phase for the completion of such an aim. The government of Ankara has repeated many times that any attempt by Athens to extend, by evoking a legal right deriving from the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, its territorial waters to 12 miles will be received from its side as a casus belli. Such a declaration, which has been also embraced by the Turkish National Assembly in 1995, it is obviously against the Helsinki spirit. Furthermore, Turkey several times in the post Helsinki era has raised claims of "grey areas". The most well known example was during the NATO exercise "Destined Glory" when Turkey asked the exclusion of the Greek islands of Lemnos and Ikaria from the exercise. As a result Greece withdrew

from the exercise. At the same time, Turkey continues to violate what Athens believes to be the Greek airspace and as a result makes the rapprochement more fragile. In addition, Turkey, despite Athens consent to be characterised a candidate state for EU membership, has not made any gesture of good will towards Greece. The opening of the Halki theological school for example would be a good starting point. The lack of a gesture of good will on behalf of Turkey is not conducive to the maintenance of public support for the rapprochement process in Greece.

Conclusions

All in all, the current rapprochement between Greece and Turkey has the potential to lead towards the creation of a bilateral Greco-Turkish pluralistic security community. This is due to three main indications. Firstly, there is domestic support in both countries. Secondly, since 1999 Greece has shifted its foreign policy as far as its relations with Turkey is concerned towards a more positive sum game. In particular it reproduces the EU's foreign policy that of security community building. Behind this shift in the Greek foreign policy lies the realisation in Greece, and this should be the case for all EU members, that deviating from EU's foreign policy at the end of the day is against their own interests due to the great economic and political interdependence that exist among them since they form a security community. Thirdly, the agreements signed between the two countries have created economic interdependence between the two states which as time pass will become more and more developed and as a result will lead both states to further co-operation and also towards the peaceful resolution of their disputes. As Panagiotis Tsakonas notes Greek-

Turkish trade and investments were more than double in the year 2000. (2003:77)

From the other hand, however, the rapprochement process in the Aegean is very fragile given the reluctance so far of Turkey to make any gesture of good will towards Greece. Furthermore, co-operation has taken place only on non controversial issues leaving longstanding differences unresolved and thus a possible cause of tension. Even worse Turkey continues to challenge by flying its jets over Greek islands and is still raises claims of grey zones in the Aegean, without however resorting to the International Court of Justice for a verdict. Lastly, despite the fact that the Greek Turkish rapprochement has, or should have, its own independent nature it seems that is totally dependent on the Turkish European prospect. Turkey should realise that can benefit greatly from the creation of a pluralistic security community with Greece. This will definitely make its way to the EU easier.

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[i] See Lesser, I, et.al, Rand, Greece's New Geopolitics, 2001, p.36

[ii] See Marks, G. et.al. 'European Integration from the 1980s: State–Centric v. Multi–level Governance', in Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 341-375, Vol. 34, No.3 September 1996, Marks, G, et.al. 'Governance in the EU', London 1996 and Hooghe, L. 'Cohesion Policy, European Integration', Oxford, 1996 and Bomberg,E, and Peterson, J. 'European Union Decision – Making: the Role of Subnational Authorities', in Political Studies, pp. 219-235, Vol. 46, 1998

[iii] Based on an interview with Alexandros Papadoggonas, Minister of Public Transport (1974-1978), Minister of Commercial Navy (1978-1981), Alternate Defence Minister (1990-1993), Hellenic Republic, 23/04/02

[iv] Doyle, M, 'Liberalism and World Politics'', in American Political Science Review, vol.80, No.4 pp.1151-1169, December 1986

[v] European Commission, DG 1.A, loc. Cit (qf Kahl: 1997:169).

[vi] Http://www.mfa.gr/foreign_policy/Europe_southestern/turkey/bilateral/html(6/5/2002)

[vii] See Droutsas D. and Tsakonas Pangiotis, "Turkey's "Road Mp" to European Union: Implications for Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Issue", Hellenic Studies, pp. 71-100 Vol.9, No.1,2001

[viii] See article in Eleftherotypia 31/03/02 "The Diplomacy of Natural Gas"

[ix] " To Vhma" OikonomikosTaxydromos, "Kemal Dervis: There is a gigantic potential of co-operation between Greece and Turkey" (20/04/02).

[x] The author of this paper was a member of the Psychology Workshop of this Programme.

[xi] See Tsakonas P, "Turkey's Post-Helsinki Turbulence. Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue", Turkish Studies, pp 1-40, Vol.2, No. 2, Autumn, 2001.

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Title: 'Greece and Gulf War II'

Author: George Tzogopoulos,
        PhD researcher on U.S. foreign
        policy and the media,
        Loughborough University.

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

The first semester of 2003 was marked by Gulf War II. On 20 March 2003 the United States together with Great Britain undertook a military operation against Iraq aiming at disarming Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein's regime. A lot has been already said and written about this military initiative of the U.S. This essay focuses on the position of Greece regarding Gulf War II. Its purpose is to analyse whether Greece was for or against the war on Iraq, to explain the reasons for its stance and to outline its attitude before and after the war.

Initially, the official position of Greek Administration concerning the war on Iraq will be defined. This position will be justified on the basis of political, economic, historic and domestic factors. For instance, did Greece follow the same policy during Gulf War I and II and why? And also, how did the high possibility of war on Iraq influence the Greek economy? Moreover, a special emphasis will be put on the role of Greece as President of the European Union in 2003. For example, which initiatives did it undertake within the EU and how did it represent the Community at the United Nations? In addition, the use of military facilities with which Greece provided the U.S. will be analysed. Furthermore, the debate within the Administration and the Greek Parliament will be assessed, while the role of the Greek media, mainly the Greek press will be outlined. Finally, the conclusion that will be reached will endeavor to examine whether Gulf War II was positive or negative for Greece.

GREEK POSITION

Prime Minister Costas Simitis's declaration on 21 March 2003 mirrored the official Greek position regarding Gulf War II: 'Greece is not participating in the war and will not get entangled in it.'[1] In addition, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou expressed Greece's opposition to the U.S. going it alone in Iraq.[2] Not only PASOK's Administration, which at that time was in power in Greece but also the opposition parties in Greece shared the same position regarding the war on Iraq. New Democracy (ND), which is was the strongest opposition party in Greece, opposed the war as well.[3] In addition, the other two parties of the Greek Parliament, namely the Communist Party (KKE) and the Greek Left Party-Synaspismos saw the war as proof of U.S. expansionist policy and its imperialistic aspirations in the Middle East.[4]

Opposing Gulf War II did not mean that Greece ignored George W. Bush's accusations for Saddam Hussein's attitude on the basis of his 'Axis of Evil' speech of 30 January 2002. Greece, which expressed its solidarity with the U.S. after 11 September terrorist attacks, considered the U.S. accusation 'for possession of weapons of mass destruction and the incitement of terrorist groups by Iraq as serious issues.'[5] Thus, it demanded the disarmament of Iraq and the destruction of any WMD it

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[1] George Gilson, 'Split EU Watches War Unfold' in: http://www.athensnews.gr, (Athens News internet edition), 21/03/2003, p. A07.
[2] Gilson, 'Iraq: Greece's Hot Potato', in: http://www.athensnews.gr, 04/10/2002, p. A03.
[3] Synediassi 27/03/2003, Karamanlis's speech in:
http://www.parliament.gr/ergasies/showfile.asp?file=es0327.txt (Greek Parliament webpage), I' periodos.
[4] 'Hi Agonia ton Kommaton gia tis Synepies' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr (To Vima internet edition), 12/01/2003.
[5] Author's interview with Ambassador Panagiotis Vlassopoulos- Director of Middle East Department of Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, 23/07/2003, Athens,Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

possessed in line with the UN position.[6] Nonetheless, Greece did not agree with Bush's strategy of pre-emptive war as a means of fighting terrorism. By contrast it was in favor of settling the dispute over Iraq by diplomatic means and not by force.

Greece is a peace-loving country and has suffered the devastating consequences of war through the ages. It strongly believes that the use of violence is not a panacea.[7] This principle is Greece's standing position. For instance, when 'Operation Desert Thunder' took place in 1997-1998, Greece opposed the use of violence and hoped that a peaceful solution could be found.[8] Within the framework of this principle, there was a common belief in Greece that the application of force could not bring positive and desirable results in the case of Iraq in 2003.

Summarising, Greece was against the U.S.-led war on Iraq. At this point, the question that is important and has to be answered is why Greece adopted this position! As such, it is interesting to outline the reasons which drove Greek Administration to oppose Gulf War II.

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[6] Extract from the speech by C. Simitis before the European Parliament, in: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/4/18/2544/, 26/03/03.
[7] K. P. Papadiochos's interview with George Papandreou, 'Den Theloume Polemo sto Irak' in: http://www.kathimerini.gr (Hi Kathimerini internet edition), 26/01/2003.
[8] Synedriassi 22/02/1998 in: Praktika tis Voulis, Olomelia (Vouli ton Hellinon, Athina 1998), Th' periodos, 24/02/1998-18/03/1998, vol. 8, p. 5931.

REASONS FOR NOT ENTERING THE WAR

Comparing Gulf War I and II

Unlike Gulf War II, Greece supported the war of 1990-1991. [9] Analysing the reasons for Greece's opposition to Gulf War II, a comparison of its stance during this crisis and that of 1990-1991 is inevitable. Although it is about two different wars, which took place at different times, this comparison reveals that the principal causes of Greece's participation in Gulf War I justify its stance during the recent Gulf Crisis.

Following international law

In his address to the Greek nation of January 1991 Constantinos Mitsotakis, who was Prime Minister of Greece from 1990 to 1993 declared that Greece participated in Gulf War I since international law had been broken by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.[10] Due to the violation of international law by Iraq the UN supported the liberation of Kuwait even by war. Specifically, UN Security Council Resolution 687 of 29 November 1990 authorised Member States to 'use all necessary means' in order 'to restore international peace and security in the [Persian Gulf] area.'[11] Therefore, Greece participated in Gulf War I in order contribute along with many other countries to the defence of international law and the national independence of Kuwait.

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[9] Constantinos Mitsotakis's interview at CNN, Constantinos Mitsotakis Historic Archive, (Constantinos Mitsotakis Foundation), polog/1991/052.42, 10/01/1991.
[10] Mitsotakis's address to Greek people, Constantinos Mitsotakis Historic Archive (Constantinos Mitsotakis Foundation), polog/1991/052.52, 19/01/1991.
[11] UNSCR 687, 29/11/1990 in: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/iraqsit/un/678.pdf (EU webpage).

The specific distinction of Gulf War I and II was the role that the UN played in each case. Unlike Gulf War I there was no UN mandate which gave the U.S. the right to undertake a military operation against Iraq in 2003. That it because there was no evidence that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction or that Iraq was linked with Al-Qaeda as U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell had claimed. Thus, international law did not authorise a U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq.

Greece did not want to ignore the role and importance of the UN by supporting the U.S.-led war against Iraq. Prime Minister Simitis pointed out that Greece's standing position was respect for UN decisions.[12] 'Greece's foreign policy is based on multilateralism and international law enforcement.'[13] So, Greece followed the UN route in the recent Gulf crisis as it did in the war of 1990-1991.

The Turkish factor

Furthermore, Greece participated in Gulf War I because it had national interests at stake. Apart from the above mentioned reason, Greece entered Gulf War I since Turkey entered the war as well.[14] By supporting Gulf War I Turkey tried to improve its international position concerning its relations with the EU and the U.S. and managed to upgrade its strategic importance.[15] As Greek-Turkish relations have always been of major

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[12] Stavros Efstassiadis's interview with Costas Simitis, 'To Schedio mou gia tin Hellada tou 2004' in http://tovima.dolnet.gr, 05/01/2003.
[13] Author's interview with P. Vlassopoulos.
[14] Mitsotakis's address to Greek people, 19/01/1991.
[15] Sotiris Rizas, Apo tin Krisi stin yfesi, Ho Constantinos Mitsotakis kai hi Politiki Proseggisis Helladas-Tourkias (Ekdoseis Papazisi, Hidryma Constantinos Mitsotakis, Athina 2003), p. 122.

importance for Greek foreign policy, 'it would have been dangerous for Greece to stay out of war.'[16]

In contrast to Gulf War I, the role of Turkey was totally different during Gulf War II. Turkey was not disposed to serve U.S. interests in the Middle East. 'By denying thousands of American troops the use of Turkish soil as a launching pad, Turkey stood accused of throwing Pentagon war plans into disarray and, with them, more that fifty years of strategic partnership with the U.S.'[17] On that basis Greece saw no national interests at risk as in 1990-1991. In other words, it did not have to counter-balance the role of Turkey since Gulf War II could not influence Greek-Turkish relations at its expense. Thus, the Greek Administration was not in a dilemma as regards its decision on the Iraq issue. Greece had no reason to support a war which on the one hand had no international legitimacy and on the other did not put its national interests at stake.

Domestic response

Public opinion in Greece was overwhelmingly against the war on Iraq. A poll published on 4 April 2003 showed that 90.7% of Greeks were totally opposed to the intervention in Iraq while 3.4% were quite opposed to it.[18] Only 1.4% agreed completely with the war and 2.0% agreed to an extent.[19]

Greek public opinion's opposition to Gulf War II reflected the strong anti-American feeling of Greek people. Specifically, Greek people are

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[16] Mitsotakis's address to Greek people, 19/01/1991.
[17] 'A Friendship on Hold', in: The Economist, 29/03/2003, p. 26.
[18] Nikos Costandaras, 'Owners of the Truth' in: http://www.ekathimerini.com, 04/04/2003.
[19] Ibid.

biased against the U.S. considering it as responsible for the maintenance of the 'military junta' in Greece from 1967 to 1974 and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. After the end of the Cold War Greek people started to envy the U.S. since it remained the sole superpower and was economically, politically and militarily strong enough to deal unilaterally with international affairs. This gave Greek people the opportunity to vent their anti-American feeling. For example, anti-Americanism was on the rise during the Kosovo war in Greece. It should be noted that anti-Americanism has been growing since 11 September terrorist attacks, not because of those attacks but because America has, since then, been using or talking about using military force.[20] Thus, Greek people did not welcome the U.S. military operation in Afghanistan.

Gulf War II was the most recent case in which Greek people expressed their opposition to U.S. policy. Many demonstrations took place with people shouting anti-American slogans and marching to the U.S. Embassy in Athens and the U.S. consulate in Thessaloniki. For example, on 14 February 2003 approximately 100.000 people participated in the anti-war demonstration in Athens.[21] In addition, nationwide strikes were called by the two general trade union federations in Greece, namely the GSEE (private sector) and ADEDI (public sector) to protest the war against Iraq. These strikes shut down public services, private companies, schools, universities, shops etc. in order to give people the chance to express their opposition to the U.S.-led war against Iraq. Very often from February to April 2003 the center of Athens was turned into a huge protest arena.

[20] 'On the Rise' in: The Economist, 04/01/2003, p. 12.
[21] 'Ochi Ema gia to Petrelaio' in: http://ta-nea.dolnet.gr, (Ta Nea internet edition), 17/02/2003.

People of all ages and political parties participated in the anti-war demonstrations.

   In this way, another reason that drove Prime Minister Simitis to denounce the war on Iraq was Greek public opinion. The war on Iraq took place at a point when PASOK's popularity was on the ebb and New Democracy seemed to be strong enough to win the next elections.   A poll organised by Metron Analysis after the war had broken out showed that New Democracy had a lead of 6.5%.[22] People in Greece were disappointed with PASOK on issues such as unemployment, high prices, pensions, education etc. So, PASOK could not ignore Greek public opinion. On that basis, PASOK had no other choice than to denounce the war. Prime Minister Simitis observed that PASOK might, if not improve, at least not aggravate its image by supporting public opinion on the Iraq issue.

Historic ties with Arab countries

Greece traditionally maintains good and friendly relations with Arab countries due to their geographical proximity, economic co-operation and strong historical and cultural bonds, dating back to ancient times.[23]   Greek autocephalous orthodox churches as well Greek communities in the Arab world contributed to the forging of Greek-Arab solidarity and friendship. Since the end of World War II, Greece has supported the Arabs on the

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[22] I. K. Pretenteris, 'O Polemos Sozei to PASOK' in: http://tovimadolnet.gr, 06/04/2003.
[23] 'Middle East, Gulf, North Africa' in: http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/amii/ (Hellenic Republic-Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage).

Palestinian question and on their decolonisation rhetoric.[24] In the 1950's
the Cyprus problem added a new dimension to its solidarity with the
Arabs.[25]

   Since 1979, when Saddam came to power Greek-Iraqi political relations
have been good but limited due to Iraq's totalitarian regime.[26] Official
agreements signed by Greece and Iraq demonstrate the spirit of solidarity
and co-operation by which relations of both countries are marked. For
instance, in 1979 Constantinos Karamanlis, who was then Prime Minister
of Greece, visited Baghdad; during that visit both sides signed a co-
operation agreement on technical and economic issues.[27] Moreover, during
the Iran-Iraq war there was co-operation in the field of war material. For
instance, in 1985 the Greek company PYRKAL provided Iraq with $ 77
million worth of munitions and in 1987 the Greek company EBO provided
approximately $ 83 millions worth of munitions.[28]

   After Gulf War I UN sanctions were imposed on Iraq. Greece supported
the oil for food programme as it was interested in the future of the Iraqi
people. As a result of its economic embargo Iraq owes high amounts to
Greek companies on the basis of their co-operation during the Iran-Iraq
war.[29] Despite Iraq's international isolation both countries continued their
co-operation. Specifically, in 1998 Greece and Iraq signed a scientific and
cultural co-operation agreement which included co-operation between Iraqi

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[24] Panos Tsakalogiannis, 'Greece' in: D. Allen and A. Pijpers (eds.) European Foreign
Policy-Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, The Hague,
Boston, Lancaster, 1984), p. 107.
[25] Ibid, p.107.
[26] Author's interview with P. Vlassopoulos.
[27] Constantinos Svolopoulos (ed.), Constantinos Karamanlis, Archeio, Gegonota &
Keimena (Hidryma Constantinos Karamanlis, Ekdotiki Athinon), vol. 11, pp. 311-319.
[28] Synedriasi 07/02/1991 in: Praktika tis Voulis, Olomeleia (Vouli ton Hellinon, Athina
1992), Z' periodos, 23/01/1991-04/03/1991, p. 5866.
[29] Author's interview with P. Vlassopoulos.

and Greek universities regarding degree recognition, the granting of scholarships and the teaching of ancient and Modern Greek in Iraq.[30] In addition, in June 1999 the President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Iraqi Parliament visited Athens, as did the General Director of the Iraqi News Agency, who signed a co-operation agreement with the Athens News Agency.[31] Furthermore, in June 2000, the eighth Meeting of the Mixed Economic Committee of the two countries took place, and upon its conclusion a Text of the Agreed Minutes was signed.[32]

It can be concluded that Iraq is a friendly state to Greece. In this way, Greece did not want to support a military intervention against a friendly state, and in particular without UN authorisation. Moreover, Greece sought to avert a tragedy for the Iraqi people who would suffer a third war within 23 years. Greece also desired to maintain the spirit of solidarity with the other Arab countries, which also opposed the war against Iraq. However, what should be declared, at this stage, is that Greek-Arab-Iraqi friendship cannot be seen as a crucial, but only as an additional, reason for the Greek Administration's decision to oppose Gulf War II. If international law had been broken, Greece would have likely overlooked its friendly ties with the Arab world.

Economic repercussions

History shows that wars have deeply affected the economy of the world. Gulf War II could not be an exception. In December 2002, for instance,

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[30] 'Greek-Iraqi Scientific, Cultural Co-operation Agreement' in:
http://www.hellenic.org/news.apeen/1998/98-07-24.apeen.htm (Hellenic Resources Network webpage), 24/07/1998.
[31] 'Greece and Iraq Bilateral Relations'.
[32] Ibid, p. 2.

Europe's top banker, European Central Bank Governor Wim Duisenberg argued that 'a war was bad news for the economy.'[33] At this stage, it is interesting to investigate the economic issues the Greek Administration took into account when it decided to oppose Gulf War II.

Economic and Finance Minister of Greece Nikos Christodoulakis warned that a war in Iraq would have serious repercussions on the economies of Greece and Europe.[34] The war on Iraq was likely to influence negatively the European economy, which was on the brink of détente.[35] As regards the Greek economy Christodoulakis said it was not unassailable and 'the uncertain geopolitical climate had led to greater reticence in undertaking certain economic transactions, such as investments.'[36] Prime Minister Costas Simitis also told reporters on 28 January 2003 that the possibility of war had already affected developments.[37] The Greek stock exchange was on a downward trend, investments were below the normal rate and there was a sense of uncertainty.[38] Gross rate of GNP in Greece might decline from 3.8% to 3. 1% since private consumption and exports were likely to decline.[39] The inflation rate in Greece, as in other European countries, would rise as well. The Governor of the Bank of Greece Nicos Garganas, warned that the inflation rate in 2003 would be higher than 3, 6%, which

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[33] 'Iraq War Poses EU Challenge for Greece' in: http://www.ekathimerini.com, 30/12/2002.
[34] Dimitris Yannopoulos, 'Government Worried about Economic Effects of War' in: http://www.athensnews.gr , 31/01/2003, p. A14.
[35] Z. Tsolis, 'Polemika Senaria gia tin Ikonomia' in: http://www.tovima.dolnet.gr, 28/01/2003.
[36] Yannopoulos, 'Government Worried about Economic Effects of War', p. A14.
[37] Ibid, p. A14.
[38] Ibid, p. A14.
[39] Tsolis, 'Polemika Senaria gia tin Ikonomia'.

was its rate in 2002.[40] Within this framework, the Greek economy was likely to show a new deficit since the expenses of the Olympic Games of 2004 and of government's social policy were high.[41]   Thus, the Greek government was disposed to freeze public sector wages and stop hiring public employees except in the areas of health and education.[42]

Moreover, according to the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the consequences of war in Iraq of 26 March 2003 an increase in oil prices had started in anticipation of a possible conflict.[43]   Christodoulakis said that both he and his European counterparts were concerned about the effects of war on international oil prices, although European economies were not based on Iraqi oil and warned that that a rise in oil prices to 40 dollars per barrel for a period of a few weeks - as in the first Gulf War of 1991 - could not be ruled out.[44]   He declared, however, that 'as in the past, the effects on inflation and deficits would be temporary and easily absorbed by the European economies, unless the crisis lasted longer.'[45]

On the basis of the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament of 26 March 2003 European aviation was

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[40] D. Charontakis, 'Pros Anazopyrossi tou Plithorismou' in: http://www.tovima.dolnet.gr, 23/03/2003.

[41] Tsolis, 'Polemika Senaria gia tin Ikonomia'.

[42] Tsolis, 'O Polemos Pagonei Misthous, Proslipsis kai Dapanes' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr 23/03/2003.

[43] Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the consequences of the war in Iraq for energy and transport in: htpp://www.europa.eu.int/comm./dgs/energy_transport/iraq/com_2003_164_en.pdf, 26/03/2003, Brussels.

[44] Yannopoulos, 'Government Worried about Economic Effects of War', p. A14.

[45] Ibid, p. A14.

likely to be affected.[46] War would likely lead to closure of airspace in the Middle East region, congestion of airspace above Europe and a fall in revenue at world level of around 6 billion euros in the event of a war lasting three months.[47] Within this framework, the frequency of Olympic Airways and Aegean Airlines flights might decrease.[48] For instance, after the outbreak of war Olympic Airways canceled its flights to Dubai, Beirut and Alexandria and limited its flights to Cairo, Tel-Aviv and Jedda.[49] In addition, Athens International Airport Eleftherios Venizelos would probably suffer a loss.[50]

In should be also taken into account that the war against Iraq might also influence Greek-Arab economic relations, which account for 6% of Greek exports and 5% of Greek imports.[51] Oil, construction, marine supplies, fish cultivation, pharmaceutical products, tobacco, telecommunication equipment etc. are traded within the Greek-Arab market. In March 2003 the president of Greek-Arab Chamber of Trade and Development Antonis Antonopoulos expressed his fear that the impact of war on the economies of the neighboring countries of Iraq might limit Greek-Arab transactions and business activities.[52] He pointed out that Greek-Arab trade had showed a decline due to the imminent war but was optimistic that the crisis could be overcome if the war did not last for long.[53]

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[46] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 26/03/2003.
[47] Ibid.
[48] P. Mpouloukos and Ch. Colybas, 'Me Crach Apeilountai hi Aerometaforis' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr, 23/02/2003.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Discussion between Ch. Corfiatis and A. Antonopoulos, 'Pligmata alla kai Eukairies stis Aravohellinikes Ikonomikes Schesseis' in: http:/www.to-vima.dolnet.gr, 23/03/2003.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

Furthermore, a U.S.-led war on Iraq would also influence tourism in Greece. The Bank of Greece said on 13 March that the tourism industry would be harder hit than other eurozone countries in the event of a war in Iraq.[54] Tour operators like TUI, Neckerman and ITS argued that their bookings for holidays in Greece showed a decline of 30-40%.[55] On the basis that the tourism sector accounts for some 15 percent of Greece's overall economic output and employs about 10 percent of its workforce[56], it becomes clear that the decline of tourism would seriously affect the Greek economy.

The problem of the refugees

The possible humanitarian fallout was another important issue that drove Greece to oppose a US-led war on Iraq. The war might push countless Iraqi civilians to the nearest border and thousands were likely to make their way to Greece.[57] UN officials warned that the impact of a U.S.-led war on Iraq would be worse than the humanitarian crisis caused by Gulf War I.[58] As many as 3,000,000 Iraqis were expected to flee in the event of a U.S.-led attack.[59] 100, 000 of these refugees were expected to pass to Europe through Greece.[60] That is because Greece is one of the easiest routes to Europe for immigrants and asylum seekers due to its long coast and

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[54] 'Spring Tourism Drops' in: http://www.athensnews.gr, 14/03/2003, p. A13.
[55] Sp. Ctenas, '30-40% Miomenes hi Kratissis gia to 2003' in: http://tovima.dolnet, 09/03/2003.
[56] 'Spring Tourism Drops', p. A13.
[57] Kathy Tzilivakis, 'Bracing for Iraqi War Refugees' in: http://www.athensnews.gr, 04/10/2002, p. A06.
[58] Ibid, p. A06.
[59] T. Bozaninou, 'Hi Hellada Perimeni 100, 000' in: http://www.tovima.dolnet.gr, 23/02/2003.
[60] Ibid.

proximity to Turkey.[61] Nonetheless, Greece was not prepared and did not seek to host new refugees. It should be noted Greece has the lowest refugee recognition rate in the EU.[62] Only 36 asylum-seekers were granted refugee status in 2002 and 58 were granted temporary humanitarian protection while more than 5.600 applications were submitted.[63] There are 11 reception-shelters in Greece for some 1.200 asylum seekers, and so, thousands of them are homeless.[64]

In this way, the possibility of war operations in Iraq would give a new dimension to the problem of illegal immigration.[65] In general terms, Greece's coastline is under extreme pressure with respect to illegal immigration.[66] Even more so after 11 September incidents and given the increased surveillance in order to cope with organised crime and the possibility of extremist Muslim terrorism.[67] Especially after the beginning of Gulf War II, many Iraqi refugees due to their need for a new home were likely to be smuggled with the help of organised crime groups. In this way, Europe, and among other countries Greece, 'with large minorities at home and Islamic neighbors next door worried more about the spillover of Middle East instability.'[68]

The imminent war on Iraq and the expansion of the phenomenon of illegal immigration would seriously affect Greece. Its effort to create an

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[61] Tzilivakis, 'Bracing for Iraqi War Refugees', p. A06.
[62] . Ibid, p. A06.
[63] Ibid, p. A06.
[64] Ibid, p. A06.
[65] 'Sea borders and illegal immigration' in:
http://www.mmm.gov.gr/mmm/politics/immigration/illegal/en/index.asp, (Hellenic Republic – Ministry of Mercantile Marine website).
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Moravcsik Andrew, 'Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain' in: Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 4, p. 76.

'area of freedom and justice' for all European citizens would be complicated.[69] In parallel, the organization of the Olympic Games of 2004, which created new security demands for Greece and intensified the need for safeguarding Greece's sea borders against any type of organised crime - inter alia - illegal immigration, would be put in jeopardy.[70]

Implications for the MEPP

The Greek government, which supports the creation of a Palestinian state within the framework of EU policy and its own sympathy for the Palestinians, also worried about the consequences for the Middle East Peace Process the war on Iraq might bring. Europeans, among them Greece, agreed on the urgency of moving forward the MEPP especially after 11 September as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could give rise to international terrorism. For example, George Papandreou declared: 'In our discussions in the EU, we have unanimously demanded of the international community to put the MEPP first on the list of priorities.[71] If we talk of regional and world stability, then this issue must finally be addressed and resolved. '[72]

 Nonetheless, Europeans had realised that the MEPP could not be revived without a U.S. contribution. In spite of the creation of the Quartet in May 2002 and the agreement for the roadmap for peace, the U.S. first priority was not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but the removal of Saddam. As a

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[69] Ibid.
[70] Ibid.
[71] George Papandreou's sppech at the Arab League summit. Sharm el-Sheikh in: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/3/2/2121, 01/03/2003.
[72] Ibid.

result, the roadmap for peace would be dealt with after the Iraq crisis. So, 'the EU was baffled by observing the U.S. to be obsessed with Iraq.'[73]

Apart for the transference of publication and implementation of the roadmap for peace the EU worried about the post-war situation. The danger of destabilisation of the Middle East was high. Consequently, the MEPP was likely to be blocked again. At this stage, Philip Gordon argues that while it is true that Saddam's defeat in Gulf War I and the collapse of the Soviet Union were in part responsible for the Palestinian decision to accept the Oslo agreements, Saddam's regime toppling in 2003 might not convince them to stop using violence and trying to destroy Israel as the U.S. hoped.[74] By contrast, an attack against Iraq could have unintended consequences and aggravate the situation in the Middle East. For instance, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al Shara warned that in the case of war the Middle East region would be in shambles.[75] That entailed 'more violence, more terrorism, more anarchy, less prosperity, more divisions, bloodshed and so many things', he said.[76]

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[73] Philip H. Gordon, 'Bush's Middle East Vision' in: <u>Survival</u>, vol. 45, no. 1, p. 155.
[74] Ibid, p. 161.
[75] Gilson, 'EU Gives Iraq Ultimatum' in: http://www.athensnews.gr,07/02/2003, p. A03.
[76] Ibid, p. A03.

GREECE AS PRESIDENT OF THE EU BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

In January 2003 Greece took on the presidency of the EU. Greece's leader Simitis had high hopes for its EU Presidency but faced big problems.[77] One of the most important issues on the agenda of the Greek Presidency was the imminent war on Iraq. Greece sought to play a significant role in order to try to avert the war on Iraq. Greece aimed at boosting its international position, being internationally recognised as a serious and respectable country and demonstrating that it was ready for responsibilities. Greece also wanted to show that any mistakes it had made in the past belonged only to the past. Specifically, in 1983, when Greece first held the Presidency of the EC, it riled other member nations by blocking the group from condemning the Soviet Union for shooting down a South Korean Airliner.[78] In 1994, when Greece last held the presidency of the EU its approach to the volatile states of the former Yugoslavia, particularly its support for Serbia, was so unpopular and so unrepresentative of West European opinion that its economic embargo against FYROM was brought before the European Court. At this stage, it is worthwhile to investigate the initiatives Greece undertook as President of the EU regarding Gulf War II.

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[77] 'Taking the Chair-Greece and the European Union' in: <u>The Economist</u>, 04/01/2003, p. 29.
[78] Frank Bruni, 'Greece Enters Europe's Spotlight under Skeptical Eyes' in: http://www.nytimes.com (New York Times internet edition), 11/01/2003.

Forging a common position

Although Greece had its own policy on the Iraq issue, Prime Minister Simitis argued that its role as EU Council President dictated a neutral posture, especially within the EU. [79] That is to say that Greek Prime Minister did not want to let domestic opposition to Gulf War II influence Greece's role as EU President. Simitis explained his government's stance at a press conference on 26 March 2003.[80] 'The role of the Presidency is not to express its own view as that of the EU, nor is it to attribute right to one or another side.[…] The Presidency must preserve as a basic value-the unity of the Union', he said.[81]

  Within this contexte, Greece's role as President of the EU was to forge a common EU position regarding the war on Iraq. On 27 January 2003 EU Foreign Ministers under Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou discussed the situation regarding Iraq. The General Affairs & External Relations Council adopted a common conclusion which 'reaffirmed that its goal remained the effective and complete disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.'[82] 'The Council fully supported the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq with all relevant resolutions of the Security Council.[83] In particular, the EU supported UNSCR 1441 of 8 November 2002, which - inter alia - recognised Iraq's non-compliance with Council resolutions, and decided that Iraq had been, and remained, in

[79] Gilson, 'Simitis Wears Two Hats on Iraq' in: http://www.athensnews.gr, 28/03/2003, p. A08.
[80] Ibid, p. A08.
[81] Ibid, p. A08.
[82] Extract of GAERC on Middle East in:
http://europa.eu.int//comm/external_relations/med_mideast/intro/gac.htm#me270103, 27/01/2003.
[83] Ibid.

material breach of its obligations and afforded it with a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.[84] 'The Council therefore urged the Iraqi authorities to engage in full and active co-operation with UNMOVIC and IAEA.'[85] 'It expressed its appreciation for the work accomplished by the inspectors and reiterated its confidence and full support for Dr. Blix and Dr. El. Baradei to complete their mission with UNSCR 1441.'[86]

Greece's role as President of the EU became particularly difficult on 30 January 2003 when eight European states expressed their solidarity with the U.S. Specifically, Britain, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, and three new members of the EU, namely the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary lined up with the Americans on Iraq.[87] Greek Premier Simitis declared that this initiative of the above-mentioned European countries did not contribute to a common EU position and argued that the Greek Presidency would keep elaborating on EU unity.[88] On that basis, Greece invited the EU's 15 divided heads of government to an emergency summit on the Iraqi crisis at the beginning of February 2003.[89] Indeed, the European Council held an extraordinary meeting on 17 February 2003 to discuss the crisis over Iraq. The European Council reaffirmed the conclusions of the GAERC of 27 January, reiterated its full support for the ongoing work of the UN inspectors and called on Baghdad to co-operate immediately and

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[84] UNSCR 1441, 08/11/2002 in:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/world/iraqsit/un/1441.pdf.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Kyra Adam, '8 Carfia sto Soma tis Europis' in: http://www.enet.gr (Eleftherotypia internet edition), 31/01/2003.
[88] Ibid.
[89] 'Greece Plans Iraq Emergency Summit' in:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2744375.stm (BBC webpage), 10/02/2003.

fully.[90] It declared that 'the Iraq regime alone would be alone responsible for the consequences if it continued to flout the will of the international community and did not take this last chance.'[91]

Nonetheless, the Greek initiative to call an extraordinary meeting of the European Council about Iraq was not fruitful. Europe was united in theory but divided in practice. Although EU member states agreed on a common conclusion, the fact was that the EU remained split down the middle.[92] Except for Britain, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Portugal, the Netherlands and Ireland lined up with the Americans as well.[93] In the be- more-patient camp were Germany, France, Belgium, Greece, Finland, Sweden and Austria, while Luxemburg seemed paralysed by indecision.[94]

Greece and the UN

The role of Greece as President of the EU at the UN was not easy. In its attempt to avert the war against Iraq Greece sought to strengthen Europe's position based on its traditional anti-war philosophy at the Security Council. There is no question that Greece's attempt to strengthen Europe's role at the UN was mirrored on its effort to forge a common EU position concerning the war on Iraq. Greece was spinning its hopes on the fact that four of the EU's big players were members of the UNSC in January. Britain and France had been joined by Germany and Spain giving Europe a

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[90] Extraordinary European Council on Iraq in:
htpp://www.europa.eu.int/comm./external_relations/iraq/intro/ec170203.htm, 17/02/2003, Brussels.
[91] Ibid.
[92] 'United in Theory, Divided in Practice' in: The Economist, 22/02/2003, p. 41.
[93] Ibid, p. 41.
[94] Ibid, p. 41.

powerful voice.[95] For example, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou arranged a special meeting with his EU counterparts whose countries had a seat on the SC before the meeting of all 15 EU Foreign Ministers on 27 January.[96]   Nonetheless, on the grounds of Europe's split Greece's ambition was a non-starter from the beginning. In any case, what should be pointed out is that even if Europe was practically united as regards the war on Iraq and all its member states opposed the use of violence by the U.S., normally it could not convince Washington to listen.

Despite Europe's split the Greek Presidency of the EU aimed at finding a common denominator among the countries which were in the war camp and those who were in the anti-war camp.[97]   If the UN route had to be followed, that would entail only the vote for a second UN resolution that would give the U.S. the right to invade Iraq.[98] That is because the U.S. was powerful enough to be deterred if the UN did not have the will to authorise war against Iraq. At this stage, Michael Glennon compares successfully the U.S. Administration of 2003 with the Athenian generals of the 5th century b.c, who told the hapless Melians according to Thucydides: 'You and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do'[99]. Nevertheless, a second resolution was opposed by China and Russia as well as France and Germany.[100]   In this way, the SC became deadlocked and Greek Presidency had no important role to play.

[95] 'To Schedio mou gia tin Hellada tou 2004'.
[96] Gilson, 'Greece: Iraq Tests EU unity' in: http://www.athensnews.gr, 24/01/2003, p.A04.
[97] Author's interview with Vlassopoulos.
[98] Adam, Zitima 1on, Irak' in: http://www.enet.gr, 12/01/2003.
[99] Michael F. Glennon, 'Why the Security Council Failed' in: Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 3, p. 18.
[100] Ibid.

Greece could only apply pressure for more time. For example, on 4 February 2003 George Papandreou told Colin Powell that the inspectors had not finished their work in Iraq and called on him to wait for the next report.[101] Even after 24 February 2003, when the U.S., Britain and Spain introduced a resolution that would have had the SC declare that Iraq had failed to implement UNSCR 1441[102] and the failure of the SC started to be clear, Greece continued proposing giving Iraq more time. Greece's last hope was that as long as UN inspection continued a peaceful solution could be found and Iraq would have disarmed. For instance, George Papandreou along with Javier Solana and Chris Patten held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington on 27 February 2003.[103] Papandreou argued: 'I continue to stress even at this final hour that war is not unavoidable, that the EU and the Greek Presidency will do all we can to find a way, if possible, to resolve this crisis peacefully […] Until now we do not have the full co-operation the UN wants.'[104]

What should be pointed out is that Greek Presidency's attitude aimed at cultivating a good climate between the EU and the U.S. Since EU – U.S. relations entered a period of high tension due to the Iraq crisis, especially after France declared its intention to cast a veto at the SC, Greece preferred to maintain a balance. The Greek Presidency handled the crisis moderately. Therefore, Greece did not follow the policy of hard opposition to Washington as Germany and France had done. Thus, it did not condemn

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[101] Th. Tsitsas, ''Giorgos me Paouel: Ischyro Mynima na dosoume sto Irak' in: http://www.enet.gr,06/02/2003.
[102] Glennon, 'Why the Security Council Failed', p. 18.
[103] Gilson, 'Papandreou Tries to Bridge Troubled Waters' in: http://www.athensnews.gr, 28/02/2003, p. A06.
[104] Ibid.

U.S. foreign policy and its decision to invade Iraq. For example, a few days before the war broke out Premier Simitis said in a mild way: 'World peace is in danger.'[105] Furthermore, George Papandreou spoke again of the possibility of a peaceful solution, satisfying the EU, but he also spoke of the need for regime change in Iraq, satisfying the U.S.[106]

Nevertheless, it should be reiterated that the transatlantic crisis over Iraq was so serious that the margin for a successful Greek mediation was narrow. At a point when a 'hyperpower' like the U.S. and powerful countries like France and Germany were opposed on the Iraq issue, how successful could the role of a small state like Greece be? That does not mean that Premier Simitis and Foreign Minister Papandreou were not capable or that they lacked skill and diplomatic effectiveness. Whoever had been in their position the result would have been normally the same.

Putting pressure on the Arabs

In its effort to avert a war on Iraq, while UN inspections took place, Greece undertook diplomatic initiatives in co-operation with the Arab world. On 5 February 2003 Greece delivered a public demarche to the Embassies of Iraq in Athens, Brussels and New York. In this demarche Greece warned Iraq of devastating consequences if it did not comply with UNSCR 1441.[107] Nevertheless, Greece did not manage to put pressure on Iraq as

[105] Adam, 'Hi Vavel tis Europis gia tin epithessi sto Irak', 09/03/2003.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Statement on the situation in Iraq by the Alternative Foreign Minister of Greece Mr. T. Giannitis in: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/2/12/1897, 12/02/2003.

the demarche of 4 February was no new warning for Saddam.[108] It is also worth-mentioning that Greece did not close the Iraqi Embassy in Athens as the Department of State demanded but it expelled a high-ranking diplomat of Iraq in order to show its disaffection with Iraq's non-compliance with UNSCR 1441.[109]

In addition, Greece led an EU diplomatic mission to the Middle East. At the beginning of February 2003 Foreign Minister George Papandreou visited Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in his capacity as president of the European Council of Foreign Ministers. His tour in the Middle East aimed at discussing possible means of averting war and seeking a diplomatic solution[110]. Papandreou sought to find out the position of the Arab nations and the Arab League and to try through the Arabs to put pressure on Saddam to comply with Resolution 1441.[111] He wanted to urge the Arab states to play a bigger role in mediating between the U.S. and Iraq. In this direction, on 1 March 2003 Papandreou addressed the 22-nation Arab League in Sharm el-Sheikh.[112] Among others he declared: 'Although the clock is counting down, we have not reached the final hour. We know the major role the Arab world can play. The EU supports this role. We know your message to Saddam Hussein - with our backing - is of utmost importance. We are ready to give you any necessary support in order to take an initiative in this direction.'[113]

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[108] Author's interview with Hikmat Mazid Altaif - Secretary of Embassy of Iraq in Athens, 28/07/2003, Embassy of Iraq, Athens.
[109] Stravros Lygeros, 'Politiki Lepton Isorropion' in: http://www.kathimerini.gr , 28/03/2003.
[110] Nevine Khalil, 'Tied and Bound' in: Al-Ahram weekly, 13-19/02/2003, p. 2.
[111] Author's interview with Mr. Vlassopoulos.
[112] George Papandreou's speech at the Arab League summit.
[113] Ibid.

At the beginning of March 2003 representatives from Arab countries were in New York invited by George Papandreou.[114] The invention of a formula which would allow Saddam abandoning Iraq to find asylum in another country was dominating diplomatic talks.[115] However, Arab representatives did not manage to find an authoritative U.S. interlocutor who could provide Saddam with guarantees on behalf of the U.S.[116]

AFTER THE WAR HAD BROKEN OUT

Although Greece tried as President of the EU to contribute to a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis, this did not become a tangible reality. When the war broke out Greek Presidency could not but look to the future. Despite the severe split among EU members, Prime Minister Simitis expressed hope on some kind of common communiqué on the crisis after the war had broken out.[117] That entailed expressing dismay that diplomatic efforts had failed and hopes for a quick end to the crisis with a minimum of casualties.[118] He also wanted to discuss with other European leaders the European role in post-war Iraq.[119] In this way, on 20 March 2002 the 15 declared their commitment 'to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty, the political stability and the full and effective disarmament of Iraq in all its territory as well as to the respect for the rights of the Iraqi people, including

[114] A. Papachelas, 'To Telesigrafo: Triti 17 Martiou' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr, 09/03/2003.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Gilson, 'Split EU Watches War Unfold', p. A07.
[118] Ibid, p. A07.
[119] Ibid, p. A07.

all persons belonging to minorities.[120]   They also expressed their belief

that 'the UN must continue to play a central role' and their 'commitment

that the EU should be actively involved in the field of humanitarian

needs.'[121]   The member states also stressed the importance of

'reinvigoration of the Middle East Peace Process', declared their

'determination to strengthen the capacity of the EU in the context of the

CFSP and ESDP' and focused on the importance of the transatlantic

partnership.[122]   On 26 March 2003, in his speech before the European

Parliament, Premier Simitis concentrated again on the above-mentioned

issues.[123]   At this point, it is worthwhile outlining the initiatives the Greek

Presidency undertook after the outbreak of war.

Iraqi Administration

Would the post-war administration of Iraq be U.S. or UN-led? That was the

most important issue after the outbreak of the war. It was an important

success of the Greek Presidency that all members of the EU, principally

those which participated at the SC agreed on the central role of the UN in

post-war Iraq.[124]   Since even Britain agreed on the common communiqué

of 20 March 2003, the EU could put pressure on the U.S., which did not

intend to cede authority to the UN after an invasion, which had cost

American blood. Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou admitted that U.S.

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[120] Statement on Iraq in:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/intro/council200303.htm,
20/03/2003, Brussels.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Ibid.
[123] Extract from the Speech by C. Simitis before the European Parliament, 26/03/2003/
[124] Anni Podimata, 'Diplomatiki Machi gia to Rolo tou OIE' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr,
30/03/2003.

and British forces would remain in charge for an undetermined interim period and suggested that the UN would not be able to step in during that precarious period.[125]   He did not support the idea of an American general in charge of Iraq since that idea was totally different from the formation of an Iraqi government or from setting up a process through the UN.[126]

On 4 April 2003 Papandreou said after discussions between the EU, NATO and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell: 'We must discuss in a clear way, in an open way with the U.S. and clarify as equal parties, with mutual respect the role of the UN.'[127] 'The crisis with Iraq could not be cause for a clash between civilizations and the Greek Presidency had undertaken initiatives in the direction of dialogue in 2003', he added. [128]

The statement issued by the Greek Presidency on 16 April 2003, which reiterated EU's support for a central UN role, said that 'the EU welcomed the appointment by the UN Secretary General of a special adviser in Iraq.'[129] On 17 April 2003 a meeting between Simitis and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan took place on the sidelines of the European Conference in Athens.   Simitis welcomed Annan's presence at the European Conference and expressed EU's support for every effort of the UN to resolve disagreements in order for there to be political settlements of the Iraq and Middle East problems at the earliest.[130]

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[125] Gilson, 'EU Seeks post-war legitimacy', 04/04/2003, p. A06.
[126] Ibid, p. A06.
[127] 'FM briefs PM on talks with Powell on Iraq crisis and transatlantic relations' in: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/4/4/2442/, 04/04/2003.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Presidency's statement on Iraq in: http://www/eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/4/17/2538/, 16/04/2003.
[130] Meeting between Prime Minister Costas Simitis and UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan in Athens'in: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/4/18/2546/, 17/04/2003.

In general terms, and on the basis of a UN central role the European Commission and the Greek Presidency supported the right of the Iraqis to choose their own political future. They strongly believed that the interim administration could combine existing Iraqi administrative structures with a role for the diaspora and proposed the revision of Iraq's sanction's regime.[131] The EU had acquired a practical experience and knowledge in reconstruction operations, for example in Kosovo and Afghanistan.[132] The creation of a sound basis for an international contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq would give Europe the chance to become involved in this process. This involvement entailed an economic and political role for the EU in post- war Iraq. For instance, after the formation of an interim government in Iraq the EU could support the institution building in Iraq and the reform of its legal system and the holding of national elections.[133] It might also support the development of energy, water, transport and communication infrastructure.[134] It should also pointed out that the EU wanted the creation of an international framework concerning the administration of post-war Iraq since many of its members, mainly Germany and France sought to get more contracts and economic benefits for themselves.

In this way, on 22 May 2003 the Greek Presidency welcomed the unanimous adoption by the UNSC of a resolution of post-conflict Iraq.[135]

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[131] Contribution of the European Community and the Greek Presidency: Options for a significant EU role in reconstruction in Iraq' in:
http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/2/2653/ , 02/05/2003.
[132] Ibid.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Presidency's statement on 22/05/2003 UNSCR on Iraq in:
http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/22/2877/, 22/05/2003.

Resolution 1483 achieved one of the main objectives pursued by the EU, namely that the UN must play a central role in the reconstruction process of Iraq.[136] The Presidency also welcomed the creation of the post of UN Special Representative for Iraq.[137]

Reconstruction of Iraq

The European Commission did its best in order to deliver aid after the war broke out.[138] The humanitarian aid provided by the European Commission aimed at satisfying the needs of the refugees who might seek refuge in neighboring countries as well as of the Iraqi population. Greece as President of the EU sought to supervise this operation. Deputy Foreign Minister Andreas Loverdos sent a letter to EU Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Poul Nielson on 18 April 2003.[139] In his letter, Loverdos expressed on behalf of the Greek Presidency Greece's enormous interests in the progress of efforts being made for humanitarian aid to reach its final destination, the suffering people of Iraq, and particularly the vulnerable groups of population, women and children, given the difficulties that have arisen due to the transitional situation in the country.[140] Loverdos reaffirmed the Presidency's support for the efforts of the European Commission and appealed to the Humanitarian Aid Office to

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[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid.
[138] See, for example Prodi's comments om humanitarian situation in Iraq in: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iraq/intro/me03_70.htm, 26/03/2003.
[139] Iraq-humanitarian aid: Letter of Greek Deputy Minister Loverdos to Commissioner Nielson in: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/4/22/2572/, 22/04/2003.
[140] Ibid.

do everything necessary to ensure that the needs of the Iraqi people were met immediately.[141]

In parallel, Greece played an important role in order to cope with the crisis in Iraq. On 31 March 2003 Loverdos announced the financing of humanitarian action in Iraq and its neighboring countries amounting to 3 million Euros.[142] This set of humanitarian activities included setting up and operating refugee camps, medical care and food distribution.[143] The humanitarian aid, which would be forwarded through Greek Embassies and mainly through Non-Governmental Organisations in the Middle East region, was supported by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in close co-operation with other Greek Ministries, such as the Ministry of Health for example.[144] NGO's such as the Hellenic Red Cross, Medecins du Monde, Pharmacists of the World and Hellenic Rescue Team participated in the humanitarian aid programme.[145] Apart from the above-mentioned humanitarian aid Greece provided the UN with 1 million USD and the International Committee of Red Cross with 300, 000 euros.[146] Greece also provided international organizations and bodies of the UN, such as UNICEF, with voluntary contributions.[147]

It should be also noted that Greece as President of the EU also focused on the protection of the cultural heritage of Iraq as part of the world's cultural heritage. For example, the statement issued by the Greek Presidency on 16

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[141] Ibid.
[142] 'Greek contribution to Iraq' in: http://mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/iraq/iraq1.html
[143] 'Greece undertakes urgent humanitarian action in order to cope with the crisis in Iraq' in: http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/iraq/iraq4.html.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Ibid.
[146] 'Greek contribution to Iraq'.
[147] 'Greece undertakes urgent humanitarian action in order to cope with the crisis in Iraq'.

April 2003 said that that 'the coalition had also the responsibility to ensure a secure environment, including for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the protection of the cultural heritage and museums.'[148] Indeed, on 6 May 2003 the Council of the EU expressed 'its deepest concern at the tragic destruction of cultural goods, archeological sites, and monuments of irreplaceable historical value in Iraq, and the vandalism and looting of the museums and libraries.'[149] Thus, it stressed 'the need to protect in an efficient way the cultural goods of Iraq and to return the objects illegally removed from museums or archeological sites, without allowing them to become objects of trade.'[150] Within this framework the EU declared its actice support of UNESCO, governmental and non-governmental related activities.[151] Transatlantic co-operation was important as well. Foreign Minister Papandreou and U.S. Secretary of State Powell focused on this issue.[152] There is no question that Greece has a tremendous amount of experience in the field of antiquities and cultural property regarding identification and restoration.

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[148] Presidency's statement on Iraq, 16/04/2003.
[149] Declaration of the Council on the tragic destruction of cultural goods, archeological sites, monuments and libraries in Iraq in: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/5/6/2687, 06/05/2003.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Ibid.
[152] State Department Daily briefing in: http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/text2003/0414state.htm, (U.S. Department of State webpage),14/04/2003.

MILITARY FACILITIES

Since Greece supported Gulf War I, it provided the U.S. with military facilities. It offered the use of the Souda base for the refueling of both war planes and ships along with air corridors for allied craft en route from Germany to the Persian Gulf.[153] The Aktion base in Preveza was used as a station for AWACS.[154] In addition, the Greek frigate 'Limnos' was sent to the Persian Gulf.[155] However, what would happen in Gulf War II? Would Greece refuse to provide the U.S. with military facilities because it officially opposed the war?

Although Greece denounced Gulf War II, it did not bar the U.S. use of Greek military facilities in the invasion of Iraq. In this way, Greece offered the U.S. military facilities in 2003 as in 1990-1991. Greece wanted to honor its treaty obligations with the U.S., namely the use of the strategically crucial Souda air and naval base on the island of Crete.[156] Foreign Minister Papandreou declared: 'We are talking about the standard measures that any alliance would take in case of a crisis to defend its interests and to protect the treaties it has signed.'[157] Prime Minister Simitis argued that Greece abided, by the Greek-American Technical Agreement of 1977, by the Greek-American Treaty of Co-operation of 1990 and by the Greek-American Comprehensive Technical Arrangement which was

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[153] Gilson, 'Iraq: Greece's Hot Potato', p. A03.
[154] Ibid, p. A03.
[155] Mitsotakis's speech, <u>Constantinos Mitsotakis Historic Archive</u> (Constantinos Mitsotakis Foundation), polog/1991/052.53, 17/01/1991, p. 3.
[156] Gilson, 'Split EU Watches War Unfold' in: <u>htpp://www.athensnews.gr</u>, 21/03/2003, p. A07.
[157] Gilson, 'Allies Seek Peace, Prepare for War', p. A04.

ratified by the Parliament in 2002.[158] In addition, Greece abided by the legal status of NATO member states.[159] So, it allowed AWACS to use Greek airspace and Greek bases such as those of Aktion, Andravida and Araksos. It also agreed with Turkey's airspace guard from an Iraqi attack under the condition that Turkey would not attack North Iraq.[160] In this way it did not follow the policy of Belgium, Germany, France and Luxemburg which impeded NATO support to Turkey.

Stavros Lygeros wrote in 'Kathimerini' that Greece's policy to provide the U.S. with military facilities was the right choice.[161] He argues that Greece tried to keep a balance, and thus, could not oppose Washington.[162] In the final account, Greece had no reason to oppose Washington at a point when it had no national interests at stake.[163] It is worth-mentioning that Iraq tried to convince Greece to bar the U.S. use of the Souda base. Farouk Al-Fityan who was Charges d' Affaires at the Embassy of Iraq in Athens put pressure on the Greek Government to revoke its decision to provide the U.S. with military facilities.[164] His effort was unsuccessful.

What should be pointed out is that Greece did not want to send Greek armed forces to the Persian Gulf. Greek Defence Minister Yiannos Papantoniou told the U.S. Ambassador to Greece Thomas Miller that Greece was not disposed to risk Greek lives during Gulf War II.[165] Nonetheless, this danger was not improbable. That is because Greek

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[158] Synedriassi 27/03/2003, Simitis's speech.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Chassapopoulos interview with Y. Papantoniou, 'Hi IPA Echoun Apotychi Politika' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr, 30/03/2003.
[161] Lygeros, 'Politiki Lepton Isorropion', 28/03/2003.
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Author's interview with H. M. Altaif.
[165] N. Chassapopoulos, 'Hi Dieukolynseis pou Zitoun hi IPA apo tin Athina' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr,12/01/2003.

personnel, for example pilots, participated in the AWACS, while frigates of the Greek Navy, namely 'Ksenos', 'Stavrakis', 'Hydra' and 'Elli' were involved in inspection missions in the Mediterranean.[166]

DEBATE IN GREECE

Since all Greek political parties agreed with Greece's opposition to U.S.-led war against Iraq, there was no debate about the official stance of the country regarding the war. What provoked debate in Greece was the way PASOK's government expressed its opposition to the U.S. military initiative against Iraq and the U.S. use of Greek military facilities. At this point, it is interesting to outline this debate.

PASOK

As is mentioned above, although the Greek government opposed the war, it followed a neutral policy as EU president. This stance did not satisfy all PASOK members who wanted the government to express its strong opposition to U.S. policy. Ruling socialist PASOK's members were determined to offset Prime Minister Simitis's restrained stance and statements by Foreign Minister Papandreou, who was sometimes criticised by members of his party as exceedingly supportive of U.S. positions.[167] For instance, Greek Parliament Speaker Apostolos Kaklamanis expressed his strong opposition to the U.S. by accusing it of acting as if it felt all

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[166] Ibid.
[167] Gilson, 'Simitis Wears Two Hats on Iraq', p. A08.

powerful and dominated humanity.[168]   PASOK's Secretary Costas Laliotis

also offered scathing criticism of the U.S.-led war by linking PASOK to

the anti-war movement and participating in the massive popular protests

against the war.[169]

   The debate within PASOK concerning the government's stance on the

Iraq issue reveals the different philosophy between its modern and old

members. Modern members like Costas Simitis and George Papandreou

follow a center-right policy. They have as a model Romano Prodi's and

Tony Blair's political parties in Italy and in the UK respectively.[170] On the

other hand, old members like Apostolos Kaklamanis and Costas Laliotis

belong to the center-left and abide by PASOK founder Andreas

Papandreou's socialist policy. They follow a more populist policy as

Laliotis's participation in the anti-war demonstration shows.

   The clash between Prime Minister Simitis and PASOK's Secretary

Laliotis became clear in July 2003.   At the beginning of July 2003 Simitis

sacked Laliotis. It is worth-noting that Laliotis pointed out that the

displeasure of the U.S. and its ambassador to Greece Thomas Miller over

his anti-American stance before and during Gulf War II had an impact on

Simitis's decision.[171] That is to say that Simitis sought to create a new

PASOK, to maintain good relations with the U.S. and to bring its center-

left anti-American members under his whip.

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[168] 'Greece Plans EU Peace Tour to Arab Nations' in: http://www.athensnews.gr/,
10/01/2003, p. A03.
[169] Pretenteris, 'O Polemos Sozei to PASOK'.
[170] K. P. Papadiochos and N. Tsioutsias, 'Pasok metaksy Elias kai Blair' in:
http://www.kathimerini.gr, 04/07/2003.
[171] Giorgos Papachristos, 'Antio me Echmes' in: http://ta-nea.dolnet.gr, 04/07/2003.

New Democracy

In general terms, New Democracy agreed with PASOK's European policy.[172] For example, ND's leader Costas Karamanlis praised the Greek presidential initiative to call an extraordinary European meeting on 17 February 2003.[173] He also agreed with the need for reinvigoration of the Middle East Peace Process and stressed the importance of co-operation between the EU and the U.S.

  Nevertheless, ND accused PASOK's Administration of following an ambivalent attitude concerning the war on Iraq. On 27 March 2003 Costas Karamanlis argued in the Greek Parliament that there was a clear differentiation between PASOK's position at home and the government's stance as EU President.[174] 'You cannot say the party has one policy and the government another', he pointed out.[175] 'When government members say they wear two or three different hats, then surely there is a problem', he added.[176] In this way, Karamanlis observed PASOK as an unreliable political party. According to him, PASOK's ambivalent stance regarding the war in Iraq proved the lack of seriousness of the Greek government on important issues such as foreign policy.[177] To be more straightforward Karamanlis underlined the difference between the pro-American stance of Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou and the anti-American attitude of PASOK's Secretary Costas Laliotis.

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[172] 'Skytali Karamanli gia tin Euroamyna' in: http://www.kathimerini.gr, 28/03/2003.
[173] Synedriasi 27.03/2003, Karamanlis'speech.
[174] Ibid.
[175] Idid.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid.

In conclusion, ND's attack against the PASOK's government during Gulf War II was based on its clear position during the crisis of 1990-1991. In Gulf War I, when ND was the ruling party in Greece, there were no contradictions within the government. From the very beginning ND had declared its support for Kuwait's liberation even by war.

KKE and Synaspismos

The Communist Party of Greece accused PASOK's Administration of dishonesty in claiming it does not support the war.[178] On 27 March 2003 KKE Secretary Aleka Papariga attacked the 'hypocrisy' of the government. She argued in Parliament that Greece participated in the war against Iraq by providing the U.S. with important military facilities such as the bases of Souda, Araksos and Androvida and Greek airspace.[179] She also blamed the government for sending the Greek frigate 'Koundouriotis' to the Persian Gulf.[180] Simitis's answer was that this frigate participated in the 'enduring freedom programme' within the framework of fighting terrorism and had no relation to Gulf War II.[181]

KKE also pointed out that the clash of views within the EU and NATO was a clash of views among criminals with reference to the sharing of the spoils of Iraq. KKE Secretary pointed out that the oil factor was the reason for the war.[182] She also argued that the U.S. did not have the right to

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[178] Synedriasi 27/03/2003, Papariga's speech.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ibid, Simitis's speech.
[182] Ibid, Papariga's speech.

decide about the future of Iraq.[183]   In this way, Greece should not have lined up with U.S. foreign policy goals.[184]

   In addition, Synaspismos's leader Nikos Costandopoulos also challenged the idea that Greece was obliged by bilateral agreements to offer its bases to the U.S. by claiming: 'Offering military facilities in an illegal war is illegal.'[185]   He also objected to NATO member Greece sending AWACS pilots to guard Turkey's airspace against an attack by Iraq.[186]

GREEK MEDIA

The Greek media have always constituted a very influential institution. According to the U.S. Department of State webpage the Greek media are usually aggressive, sensationalist, and frequently irresponsible with regard to content.[187]   This observation proved to be correct during the Iraq crisis. The Greek media were biased against the U.S. and its foreign policy motivations. They viewed the war on Iraq in an one-dimensional way on the basis that Saddam was right because the U.S. was against him.[188]   That is to say that the Greek media started to condemn U.S. policy towards Iraq and influenced the majority of Greek people to take the war to heart as if they were protagonists in the conflict.[189]

   Greek television channels and most newspapers focused on the most sensational images of the suffering of Iraqi civilians and the tragedy of the

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[183] Ibid.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid, Costandopoulos's speech.
[186] Ibid.
[187] 'Background Note: Greece' in: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3395.htm
[188] Costandaras, 'Owners of the Truth'.
[189] Ibid.

Iraqi people.[190] This created a skewed picture of what was happening in Iraq and helped drive the anti-war movement.[191] On the other hand, viewers of television in other Western countries have been getting far more of the U.S. and British action from the safer side of their guns and bombs and less of the results of their actions [192] In this way, a whole generation of young Greeks was growing up with the message that the U.S. was responsible for nothing other than war.[193]

To be more straightforward it is interesting to mention some headlines of Greek newspapers when the war broke out. 'Burning hell in Baghdad' was the headline of *Ta Nea* on 21 March.[194] 'Deadly bombing' wrote *Rizospastis* on the same day.[195] In the following days, the headlines were not different. 'Human sacrifice' wrote *Eleftherotypia* on 26 March[196] and 'Disaster' wrote *Kathimerini* on 27 March.[197] At the same time, *To Vima*, which is the most widely-read newspaper in Greece, included many anti-American articles. 'The war for the spoils of Iraq has begun' and 'The illegal war' are two characteristic anti-American titles.[198]

There is no question that the Greek media had the right to express their own view on the Iraq issue. Nonetheless, they should have also been objective by presenting the arguments that the U.S. had, as well as the positive results of a war that Americans foresaw. In this way, the Greek Media saw the oil factor as the reason for war, while they observed the

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[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Ibid.
[193] Ibid.
[194] Ta Nea's headline in: http://ta-nea.dolnet.gr, 21/03/2003.
[195] Rizospastis's headline in: http://rizospastis.gr, 21/03/2003.
[196] Eleftherotypia's headline in: http://www.enet.gr, 26/03/2003
[197] Hi Kathimerini's headline in: http://www.kathimerini.gr, 27/03/2003.
[198] St. Eftstassiadis, 'Archise ho Polemos gia ti Leia' and P. Cartalis, 'Ho Paranomos Polemos' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr, 09/03/2003 and 23/03/2003.

terrorist attacks of 11 September as a pretext for U.S. expansionist aspirations. It is characteristic that a poll organised by Alco showed that 91.5% in 94.5% of Greek young people who watched television, read newspapers and listened to radio during the war believe that the U.S. invaded Iraq for economic reasons while only 2.7% to fight terrorism.[199] According to the same poll 93,.2% of Greek young people had a negative image of George W. Bush.[200] As Nikos Costandaras argues people read in newspapers articles and saw on talk-shows Greece's intellectuals trying to outbid each other in the extravagance of their condemnation of the U.S.[201]

APPRAISAL

This paper was first written in the summer of 2003 and it was then too early to conclude if Gulf War II would have positive or negative results for Greece. Greek public opinion was not optimistic in April 2003. Survey figures gathered by the RASS Research Company showed that an overwhelming majority of those polled (75%) responded that the war would have a negative impact on Greece's economy, while two in five (38%) said Greek-Turkish relations might be strained and that Greece's international standing would suffer (42%).[202]

Nonetheless, looking at the impact of Gulf War II on Greece in 2005, two years after the writing of this paper, and so, on a long-term basis, it can be

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[199] L. Stavropoulos, 'Pos Idan hi Nei ton Polemo' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr, 13/04/2003.
[200] Ibid.
[201] Costandaras, 'Owners of the Truth'.
[202] 'Iraq War Negative for Greece' in: http://www.athensnews.gr, 25/04/2003, p. A09.

concluded that the situation in Greece after the war was not discouraging. Greek economy started to recover after the initial uncertainty. For instance, in August 2003 the Greek stock exchange reached the highest point of the year. Analysts strongly believed that September 2003 would be a crucial month; if the U.S. economy continued to recover that would affect European economies and Greek economy would benefit as well.[203] Indeed, Greek economy grew by 5% in the final quarter of 2003 and continued its good performance for the year of 2003, which was above government targets.

Furthermore, Gulf War II did not lead to a dangerous expansion of illegal immigration as the Greek government had feared. So, Greece did not face particular difficulties after the war in tackling the problem of illegal immigration. At the same time, according to data published by the Greek Ministry for Public Order 2879 Iraqis sought asylum in Greece in 2003 while their number was 2567 in 2002.[204] That constitutes a 12.5% variation which was less than expected. The percentage increase of asylum seekers in Greece in 2003 of people from other countries, like from Iran and Pakistan for example, was significantly higher.

In addition, not only the international standing of Greece was not strained but it also managed to improve its international position due to its handling of the Iraq crisis as EU president. That is because the Greek Presidency elaborated in a prudent and moderate way on EU's unity before, as well as after the outbreak of the war. European leaders praised Greek Presidency.

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[203] Nicos Nicolaou, 'Ta Matia Strammena stis IPA' in: http://tovima.dolnet.gr, 03/08/2003.
[204] See the ECRE Country Report 2003 about Greece in http://www.ecre.org/country03/10.20%Greece.pdf.

For example, European Parliament President Pat Cox declared during the EU summit of 20-21 March 2003: 'We appreciate the determined leadership effort of the Greek Presidency.'[205] Moreover, Prime Minister of Italy Berlusconi whose country took the EU Presidency in July 2003 expressed his hope that the Italian Presidency would be as successful as the Greek.[206]

On the other hand, going beyond the above mentioned developments, some other thoughts should be made concerning Gulf War II which are related not only to Greece but also to the international community in general.. The SC's failure on the Iraq issue constitutes the most important blow of Gulf War II to Greece as to many other countries. The U.S. invasion of Iraq without UN mandate demonstrated that the world structure is unipolar and not multipolar. The fear that the UN will be splanted as regards similar cases to that of Iraq is high. Will international law be followed in the case of Iran and North Korea? As Michael Glennon observes, after Gulf War II 'all who believe in the rule of law are eager to see the great caravan of humanity resume its march.'[207]

In parallel, as regards Greece and the other EU member states Gulf War II was another proof of their impotence to form a CFSP. It is certain that Gulf War II was a missed challenge for the EU to act in international affairs with one voice. The EU has a long way to go in order to be an equal partner with the U.S. as it wishes. The initiative taken by Germany, France, Luxemburg and Belgium for an autonomous European foreign and security policy was a step in the right direction. Greece endorsed this initiative but

[205] Gilson, 'Simitis Wears Two Hats on Iraq', p. A08.
[206] Filios Stagos, 'Egomia gia tin Proedria' in: http://ta-nea.dolnet.gr, 02/07/2003.
[207] Glennon, 'Why the Security Council Failed', p. 35.

its EU Presidency dictated a neutral stance. The EU Constitution, if adopted, can bring new hopes for a successful EU foreign policy. However, predictions are highly risky in this case.

Finally, what should be pointed out is that the outcome of Gulf War II will depend on its contribution to Middle East stability.[208] Two years after Gulf War II developments in Iraq are not positive. Although democratic elections have taken place, the continuation of the guerilla cannot guarantee a good future for the Iraqi people. Iraq looks as fragile as ever and many analysts are predicting a civil war. Nevertheless, it is true that in the first months of 2005 the situation in the Middle East has started to change. Besides the Iraqi elections, Jordan has announced a plan for regional elections, Egypt will held a sort of presidential elections, Saudi Arabia has called municipal elections, Syria has started to withdraw from Lebanon, and the Palestinians already have a democratic leadership. Does George W. Bush deserve a credit for that? The answer of this question is not easy. What is certain is that the U.S. ambition to democratise the Arab world may last many years. Philip Gordon comments that the defeat of communism and the spread of democracy and freedom to Eastern Europe and Russia took 70 years to achieve but is now a tangible reality.[209] It would be a great success for the U.S. if Gulf War II signaled the beginning of Arab world's democratisation.

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[208] Author's interview with P. Vlassopoulos.
[209] Gordon, 'Bush's Middle East Vision', p. 158.

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