


# The Economics of Steering the Transition to a Low Carbon Economy

Monday 20 <sup>th</sup> October: Understanding Climate Risk		
10.30 – 11.30	Session 1:	A framework for the economics of low-carbon change
11.30 – 12.00	<i>Break</i>	
12.00 – 13.00	Session 2:	Exploring the Apparent Trade-Offs Between Reducing Climate Risk and Fostering Growth
13.00 – 15.00	<i>Lunch</i>	
15.00 – 16.00	Session 3:	The Dynamic Net Economic Costs of Transition
16.30 – 17.00	Session 4:	Wrap-up and Open Discussion

# Dynamic Net Economic Costs of Transition

Dimitri Zenghelis  
Monday 20<sup>th</sup> October  
Session Three



# Dynamic Net Economic Costs of Transition

**Part I:** Understanding the Dynamic Net Economic Costs of Transition

**Part II:** Political economy


**Part III:** What makes the problem 'wicked'?

**Part IV:** The size of the 'green' opportunity

**Part V:** Policy

**Part VI:** Why metrics need to be broadened

**Part VII:** How history can help us when conventional analysis reaches its limits.





# Part I: Understanding the Dynamic Net Economic Costs of Transition

Pick up discussion about TFP from session I

**Ability to achieve absolute decoupling and growth depends on innovation and substitution opportunities**

**Scope for substitutes? Energy easy** electrons ultimately from **sun**.

Moore's law in renewables; competitive soon; shale gas in transition

But essential 'elements' (minerals like phosphorus, potassium, arable land, soil, biodiversity, water) **hard to substitute**

Until a decade ago, there appeared to be empirical support for the view that commodities were becoming more economically abundant (Johnson, 2000), given the long-term trend of declining commodity, food, mineral, energy prices over the 20th century (Dobbs, Oppenheim and Thompson, 2011)\*

Past decade: **reversal of century long commodity price declines**

Supply increasing to meet demand but prices likely to remain higher: **the characteristics of this resource crunch differ from previous periods**




\*D. Johnson, 'Population, Food, and Knowledge', *American Economic Review* 2000. R. Dobbs, J. Oppenheim and F. Thompson, 'A new era for commodities', *McKinsey Quarterly*, November



# Part I: Understanding the Dynamic Net Economic Costs of Transition


- But **greater efficiency** can reduce pressure on these prices. (King 2012, HSBC 2012)
- McKinsey&Co (*Resource Revolution* 2011) show **15 areas with great scope for improvement in efficiency**, including: energy efficiency in the built environment; increasing yields on large-scale farms; reducing food waste; reducing municipal water leakage; increasing transport fuel efficiency; reducing land degradation; improving irrigation techniques; and improving the efficiency of power plants
  - ◆ See also, e.g. “Sustainable Materials - with Both Eyes Open: Future Buildings, Vehicles, Products and Equipment - Made Efficiently and Made with Less New Material” <http://withbotheyesopen.com/>
- Population control? Better addressed through education and empowerment of girls/women



# Part I: Understanding the Dynamic Net Economic Costs of Transition

- Rising prices of resources have derailed many past recoveries and growth episodes
- But **greater efficiency** can reduce pressure on these prices. (King 2012, HSBC 2012)
- McKinsey&Co (*Resource Revolution* 2011) show **15 areas with great scope for improvement in efficiency**, including: energy efficiency in the built environment; increasing yields on large-scale farms; reducing food waste; reducing municipal water leakage; increasing transport fuel efficiency; reducing land degradation; improving irrigation techniques; and improving the efficiency of power plants
  - ◆ See also, e.g. “Sustainable Materials - with Both Eyes Open: Future Buildings, Vehicles, Products and Equipment - Made Efficiently and Made with Less New Material” <http://withbotheeyesopen.com/>
- Population control? Better addressed through education and empowerment of girls/women


**NOT COMPELLING ENOUGH FOR  
COORDINATED EARLY ACTION?  
WHY?**



## Part II: Political economy

- Action involves **radical change**; there will be **dislocation** – not all ‘win-win’
- **Losers** easier to identify; will **lobby hard** against action. Winners potential and diffuse. Asymmetry in political influence
  - ◆ **Vested interests** will **oppose change**: “merchants of doubt” industry
  - ◆ First-mover risk: highest cost and lowest returns
- Policy must practically manage change; support, **re-skill and retool**
- **People ready to act responsibly** if they understand the scale of risks to future generations and have clear sight what can be done (leadership and expectations)
- It is vital therefore to **understand the political economy of change**, problems in **communication** and misinformation, and the role of public opinion
- **Open public discussion and engagement** and building a common understanding is essential for democratic choice, functional governance and the sustainability of actions – role of functional **democracy** and accountable representatives
- Policies must be made attractive and convenient rather than coercive and complex for households

Many barriers to early action are **cultural, institutional, political** not technological or economic. **Changing social norms** means resource-efficient activities will be accepted in time (witness initial response to smoking, seatbelts and drink driving)





# Part III: What makes the problem 'wicked'?


'Hot air' – much talk; little action. Fundamental essence of the problem we face:

- Global commons: incentives to free ride
- Uncertainty
- Long term and gradual
- Pervasive, non-marginal and irreversible impacts
- Subject to lock-in and path dependent dynamics
  - ◆ Technologies; infrastructure; mind-sets and behaviours
- Network externalities

Leads to:

- Incentives for delay; fear of early moving
- Large critical masses and thresholds effects


How can policy be designed to escape the deadlock?



# Part III: Managing change: tough love

Change is a fact of life:

- Comparative advantages always shift reflecting technology breakthroughs and evolving tastes and preferences
- Human and physical assets can be left stranded
- Economies that embrace and manage change prosper
- Lax regulations can be detrimental to firms and countries over the long term
- Regulations impact firms asymmetrically and often raise competitiveness concerns
- Economic reasoning and empirical evidence suggest that such concerns are often overplayed
- 'Tough love' enhances productivity and drives vital structural change




# Part IV: The size of the 'green' opportunity

- **Even in the present uncertain global green policy environment** with lack of ambitious, coordinated policy response:
  - ◆ Renewable energy generation and energy efficiency investment has **quadrupled since 2004** according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF);
  - ◆ New investment in **clean energy surpassed investment in conventional energy** generation in 2010, rising to between US\$180 and US\$200 billion
- HSBC forecasts the global low-carbon energy market (revenues) will **triple** to US\$ 2.2 trillion p.a. **by 2020** (HSBC, 2010):
  - ◆ Around US\$10 trillion in cumulative capital investments required 2010-2020;
  - ◆ **Energy efficiency themes will surpass low-carbon power** as the major investment opportunity by 2020, including, electric vehicles;
- Investors have to take a medium to long term view and high-carbon investments are looking ever riskier

# Part V: Policy - pricing

- **Pricing – transparent and efficient; broad and non-discriminatory:**
- **Under-valuing natural assets → over-consumption and depletion of scarce resources**, especially ones owned in common, such as fish in the ocean or clean air. **Distorted the development of advanced economies** (price creates value)
- **Pricing staunches ‘rebound effect’** from policy induced efficiency gains
- Price internalises environmental externalities and non-discriminatory signal/incentives to change behaviour. Efficient.
- Limits ‘rent-capture’ by vested interests seeking to influence policy-makers (Helm 2010)\*

\*Dieter Helm, ‘Government failure, rent-seeking, and capture: the design of climate change policy’, *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 2010




# Part V: Policy – beyond pricing

- Different **market failures** point to different policy instruments, but the collection is mutually reinforcing (Bowen et al 2010):
  - ◆ **Mispriced resources:** carbon taxes / cap-and-trade / regulation / fish;
  - ◆ **R,D&D** (research, development and deployment): tax breaks, research grants, feed-in tariffs (FIT) for deployment;
  - ◆ **Imperfection in risk/capital markets:** risk sharing/reduction through guarantees, equity, feed-in tariffs, floors on carbon prices. FIT straddles first 3 imperfections;
  - ◆ **Networks:** electricity grids, public transport, broadband, community-based insulation schemes. Government frameworks needed;
  - ◆ **Efficiency** – some real costs, but many structural barriers
  - ◆ **Information:** labelling and information requirements on cars, domestic appliance, products more generally. Awareness of options;
  - ◆ **Co-benefits:** valuing ecosystems and biodiversity, valuing energy security, regulation of dirty and more dangerous technologies
- **Institutional arrangements** can play a major role in combatting some of these failures. For example, a Public Investment Bank can reduce policy risk (governments become more reliable) and enhance the sharing of risks (convening power from trusted institution)

# Part V: Policy – strategic choices

- Innovation does not happen in a vacuum
- More than correcting market failures. About governments helping to create **new markets** through clear policy signals. Not picking winners but making **strategic choices**
  - ◆ E.g. space race, military-industrial commitment or the “war on cancer” induced innovation.
  - ◆ So the setting of resource efficiency or green innovation challenges can be expected to create substantial knowledge-spillovers, boosting Schumpeterian innovation and productivity across a broad number of sectors
  - ◆ Help firms reap increasing returns to scale by supporting **new networks**
  - ◆ **Shift tax base** towards materials and resources, and away from intellectual activity

Key point: should not see these policies and institutions in terms only of static re-allocations or corrections: **policy concerns the dynamics of change and learning**



# Part VI: why metrics need to be broadened

**Gross domestic product (GDP)** – a measure of market value.

**Excludes:**

Some consequentialist **non-market value** welfare, (e.g. environment and health);

Non-consequentialist welfare, e.g. **security, rights, opportunities, fairness and equity.**

**Not a measure of wealth or assets** (physical or natural)

Earthquakes boost GDP; so climate disasters!

But **is a known quantity**, understood, consistently measured


Evidence suggests **GDP gains correlate with (if not cause):**

**happiness** (Coyle 2010)

**reduction in poverty** (Kanbur 2001 Collier, 2007)

gender equality, **tolerance**, social mobility, physical/**mental health** and education opportunities, rule of law, lower crime/conflict

No informative assessment in a single dimension/metric such as output/happiness. Need “**dashboard**” of human development indices such as GDP, health, education, environment, happiness, freedom of expression, and transparency...



# Part VI: why metrics need to be broadened


- England's Natural Capital Committee (NCC) is tasked with advising on how to integrate natural capital into National Statistics
- Valuing natural capital in government accounts would enable a more comprehensive assessment of the total wealth of a country, and better identify policy to improve the environmental quality\*
- In parallel, better measures of exposure to climate and other environmental risks are also needed
- Corporate natural capital accounts that document an organisation's ownership and extended reliance on natural capital, together with related assets and liabilities, allow for a more comprehensive assessment of the value of corporate assets and enable better management of business
- The financial statements produced by firms fail to provide all the information investors need so they can assess risks and opportunities and allocate their capital efficiently and limit systemic risk

\*Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2014. *UK Natural Capital: Initial and Partial Monetary Estimates*. Available at: [http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766\\_361880.pdf](http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_361880.pdf).

Natural Capital Committee (NCC), 2013. *The State of Natural Capital: Towards a framework for measurement and valuation*. Available at: <https://www.naturalcapitalcommittee.org/state-of-natural-capital-reports.html>.

NCC, 2013. *The State of Natural Capital: Towards a Framework for Measurement and Valuation*.


Bloomberg, M. and M. Schapiro, 2014. Give investors access to all the information they need. In: *Financial Times*, 19th May 2014. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d9ccea6-db66-11e3-94ad-00144feabdc0.html#axzz32fJkv7y7>.





# Part IV: how history can help us when conventional analysis reaches its limits

## Waves of innovation




Source: DONG Energy (2009); diagram based on Perez (2002) drawing on report by Merrill Lynch (2008) (schematic not precise quantitative vertical axis).

Copyright © LSE 2014



# Part IV: how history can help us when conventional analysis reaches its limits

Wind turbines can generate 100 times the power of 30 years ago



YEAR	1980 – 1990	1990 – 1995	2000 – 2005	2011	Eiffel Tower
ROTATOR DIAMETER	17 m	30 m	100 m	126 m	324 m
RATING	75 kW	300 kW	3,000 kW	7,500 kW	

# Part VII: how history can help us when conventional analysis reaches its limits

- In the last 10 years, new and improved materials have driven down the cost and improved the performance of wind and solar energy
- In the US, over 30% of new electricity generation capacity added in 2010–2013 involved solar and wind power, up from less than 2% in 2000–2003.
- Advances in materials have also facilitated large improvements in the efficiency of lighting and appliances, including the rapid emergence of light-emitting diodes (LEDs)
- Enabled a broad array of technologies that improve the energy efficiency of the building envelope, and they have enabled continual improvements in the fuel efficiency of vehicles.


US Energy Information Administration, 2014. [EIA projects modest needs for new electric generation capacity](http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17131). *Today in Energy*, 16 July. Available at: <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17131>.

International Energy Agency (IEA), 2013. *Technology Roadmap: Energy Efficient Building Envelopes*. Paris. Available at:

<http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/TechnologyRoadmapEnergyEfficientBuildingEnvelopes.pdf>.

Sperling, D. and Lutsey, N., 2009. Energy efficiency in passenger transportation. *The Bridge*, 39(2). 22–30.


Available at: <https://www.nae.edu/File.aspx?id=14867>.



# Part VII: how history can help us when conventional analysis reaches its limits

- **Networked technologies** are also gaining traction through a range of new business models that reduce capital- and energy intensity across the economy
- **'Smart grids' and 'smart cities'** allow resources to be monitored and managed
- **Earth observation:** a combination of digital, terrestrial and satellite data and cloud computing can also help communities to manage resources
- **Digital technologies** at the individual level facilitate behaviour change: car- and ride-sharing schemes, guide riders through public transit, and help motorists avoid congested roads and find parking more quickly, data-rich systems to control heating and lighting
- In some cases, these technologies have the potential to scale rapidly: China has already installed nearly 250 million smart meters\*.

\*Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2014. China Out-spends the US for the First Time in \$15bn Smart Grid Market. 18 February: <http://about.bnef.com/press-releases/china-out-spends-the-us-for-first-time-in-15bn-smart-grid-market/>.



# Part VII: how history can help us when conventional analysis reaches its limits

- Quantitative models are one part of the tool-kit required to understand the relationship between growth and climate policy
- Deal badly with structural change
- History can also help to better understand the long-run transformation story described in this chapter and report, providing valuable insights on managing change
- We have the advantage of learning from several transformations since the industrial revolution, including the current information and communications technology (ICT) revolution, and there is a rich Schumpeterian tradition of analysis on medium- to long-run technological transformations.
- The potential of ICT to transform industries and activities has barely been realised.


Crafts, N., 2010. The contribution of new technology to economic growth: Lessons from economic history. *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 28. 409-440. Available at: [http://rhe-ijlaeh.com/?page\\_id=380](http://rhe-ijlaeh.com/?page_id=380).

Pearson, P. and Foxon, T., 2012. A low carbon industrial revolution? Insights and challenges from past technological and economic transformations. *Energy Policy*, 50. 117-127. DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.07.061.

Perez, C. 2010. Technological revolutions and techno-economic paradigms. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 34(1). 185-202. DOI: 10.1093/cje/bep051.

Freeman, C., 1994. The Economics of technical change. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 18(5). 463-514.

Schumpeter, J.A., 1939 (1982 edition). *Business Cycles*. Philadelphia: Porcupine Press.



# Conclusion

- Uncertainty is a reason to act
- Innovation is the key to decoupling growth from resources
- Innovation depends on history and expectations
- Lock in and path-dependency are features of long-term growth because:
  - Spill-overs complement learning = networks and scale economies
  - Technological, infrastructural and behavioural lock-in make for path dependency
- Standard models assume all this away and therefore of limited use
- History can also help to better understand the long-run transformation
- Barriers are not economic, technological; they are political, institutional and cultural
- But path dependency and growing case for action means likelihood of tipping dynamics: once the system tips it will tip fast.

# Key reading

Ackerman, F. and Daniel, J., 2014. *(Mis)understanding Climate Policy: The role of economic modelling*. Synapse Energy Economics, Cambridge MA. Prepared for Friends of the Earth and WWF-UK. Available at: <https://www.foe.co.uk/sites/default/files/downloads/synapse-misunderstanding-climate-policy-low-res-46332.pdf>.

Aghion, P.; Howitt, P.; (2009) *The economics of growth*. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Press: Cambridge, US. <http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17829/>

Aghion, P., Hepburn, C., Teytelboym, A., and Zenghelis, D., (2014). *Path-dependency, innovation and the economics of climate change*.

Simon Dietz & Nicholas Stern, (2014). *Endogenous growth, convexity of damages and climate risk: how Nordhaus' framework supports deep cuts in carbon emissions*, GRI Working Papers 180, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Working-Paper-159-Dietz-and-Stern-2014.pdf>

Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2014. *Better Growth, Better Climate: The New Climate Economy Report*, Chapter 5, Available at <http://newclimateeconomy.report>

Mazzucato, M. (2011), *The Entrepreneurial State*, London: Demos.

Stern, N (2007): *The economics of climate change*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

