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POLITICAL SCIENCE

Drivers and Constraints of State Confiscation of Elite Property in the Ottoman Empire, 1750-1839

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Abstract

This paper examines the motives, timing and informal constraints of state confiscation in the Ottoman Empire, focusing on one of its most turbulent and confiscatory periods, 1750-1839. Utilizing a new dataset uncovered from confiscation inventories, I first demonstrate that confiscations were practiced on a selective basis, targeting some office-holders and tax farmers. Second, employing a two-step econometric framework inspired by the gradual nature of Ottoman confiscations, I argue that the initial decision whether to send an agent to confiscate one's wealth was driven mainly by severity of war and expected costs of confiscation, while attributes of wealth and bargaining power of families vis-à-vis the central administration shaped the outcome of the second step.

1 Introduction

In 1786, Sultan Abdülhamid I (1774-1789) asked the opinion of the Grand Vizier whether it was appropriate to confiscate the wealth of a major tax farmer in central Anatolia. The response of the vizier was negative because the center could need the tax farmer's family in future. The vizier reasoned his opinion as such: (1) the family was constantly manning the imperial army, and (2) its local know-how was immense that it could not be replaced easily by a centrally appointed official (Uzunçarşılı 1974). To put it differently, the family's bargaining power vis-à-vis the center functioned as a mechanism of protection. Archival records explicitly demonstrate that confiscation attempts did not necessarily end with full confiscation of assets that other scenarios were possible. Some were more capable of protecting their wealth against the threat of confiscation. This paper studies what exactly led to these varying levels of protection.

The practice of confiscation is one of the least studied topics of Ottoman history. One reason for the lack of a systematic analysis could be the nature of sources, which are quite dispersed, and therefore require a tremendous work to locate. The well-established view that it was a non-codified convention applying to whoever made wealth by imperial grant is arguably another reason by making historians think of it as unworthy of examination. The most dubious assumption of this view is that it treats the practice of confiscation as a unit, overlooking its temporal, spatial, political and economic contextuality. (Abou-El-Haj 2005: 48). Moreover, some economic historians have presented it as one of the culprits of economic underdevelopment (Kuran 2010) (Çizakça 2010). What these works inherently assume is that productive classes were greatly suffering from the threat of confiscation. The themes and method of this paper are new to the historiography, while it contributes to the above debate only indirectly by showing who were the most affected and why.

The paper has a relevance beyond Ottoman history. Confiscation by the ruler was histor-ically a common phenomenon not only in the Ottoman Empire but in many parts of the world. Dating back at least to Adam Smith, it has long been argued to be detrimental to prosperity primarily due to its adverse effects on incentives.[1] More recently, it was new institutional economics (NIE) that brought the question of state predation back into the center of growth literature (North and Weingast 1989) (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The proponents of NIE have acknowledged that a state powerful enough to protect prop-erty rights and enforce contracts can use its power to confiscate the wealth of its subjects (Weingast 1995). Focusing on type of political institutions that constrain political execu-tives, many studies find a positive relationship between precocious development of such institutions and economic growth (see, for example: (DeLong and Shleifer 1994))

It must be recognized that historical growth literature is recently shifting away from the predatory state paradigm. An increasing number of works concentrate on the capacity of states not only to maintain law and order but to tax their subjects. It is argued that political and jurisdictional fragmentation, not predation, was the main problem of stagnant econ-omies of pre-modern period (Epstein 2000) (Grafe 2012). Although it has been acknowl-edged that property rights protection should be considered as a private, not public good, in pre-modern context (Epstein 2000: 14-15), the following questions are yet to attract sufficient interest. If there was not such a thing as unconstrained sovereign, what informal constraints and strategic calculation prevented rulers from confiscating more than they did? Similarly, on what basis did they allocate the public good of protection? How did 'ab-solutist' states confiscate in times of crisis? Answering these questions can contribute to a more balanced understanding of historical state predation and limits of state power, and potentially explain why state predation was not the important culprit for underdevelop-ment.

It is not that the whole literature ignored these issues, but that many did not choose to make them engines of their arguments. Like what happened in the opening anecdote, Veitch (1986) conditions the happening of confiscation to the availability of an alternative group to serve the same function as the confiscated group. According to Olson (2000), expectance of short tenures is responsible for the sovereign's becoming confiscatory. In an anarchic world, he writes, roving bandits would confiscate everything that is produced, which is why people prefer stationary bandits who would confiscate consistent with revenue maximization. Hirschman (1970) inspired many subsequent scholars with his theory of the relationship between power and predation. He suggests that asset mobility determines one's ability to escape from state predation. In a similar vein, Vahabi (2016) presents the role of appropriability of assets as the most important factor limiting government confiscation. Bargaining power of wealth-holders vis-à-vis the ruler was emphasized by Levi (1988) and Greif (2008). Given the lack of centralization in most of early modern world, rulers heavily depended on other actors possessing military, economic and political resources (Glete 2002). The degree of this reliance was a determinant of their policies including confiscating the wealth of their agents. This paper interrogates such claims by employing the Ottoman case as a testing ground.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a historical background of the Ottoman practice of confiscation as well as the period under question. Section 3 offers important theoretical considerations regarding the ruler's incentive structure. Section 4 introduces the data while presenting some descriptive statistics to help understand the nature of Ottoman confiscations. Section 5 presents the empirical strategy, whereas section 6 discusses results and their broader implications. Section 7 concludes.

2   Historical Context

Confiscation by the ruler was known as *müsadere* in the Ottoman Empire. This convention as well as its name have been adopted from earlier Muslim states, where it had been used essentially as a punitive measure to prevent corrupt behavior of administrative agents such as bribery, embezzlement and overexploitation of tax payers. Over time, it evolved into a practice targeting those who made wealth by imperial grant irrespective of commitment of a crime and was used as a tool of revenge and threat (Tomar 2007). Many medieval and early modern Muslim states resorted to confiscations though with varying motives (Islam 1985). Islamic law allows the ruler's discretionary confiscation only if practiced as a method of punishment.[2] Although it has never been mentioned in Ottoman codifications of law, confiscation remained an influential convention of and a useful tool in the hands of the sultans circa from 1453 to 1839.

This long period cannot be treated as a single unit. It is essential to distinguish two periods of müsadere, namely those before the eighteenth century and those during the long-eighteenth century. During the first period confiscations were mostly directed at officials after their death. In the eighteenth century and especially during its second half, it was arguably employed more arbitrarily, that is, began to target traditionally untargeted groups such as local elites engaged in tax farming. A second distinction is that earlier examples comprised of efforts to distinguish between one's personal wealth (usually left to family) and the wealth gained by office-holding (usually confiscated), such efforts simply disappeared later partly due to its impracticality (Barkan 1980). Furthermore, the process of confiscation became more sophisticated in this century considering new methods of enforcement and agents introduced to the system.

These differences partly stemmed from the political atmosphere of the eighteenth century. At that time the Empire was relatively decentralized marked by the rise of local elites to power. Deriving their sources of revenue from the practice of life-term tax farming introduced in 1695, these new actors gradually took control of a significant part of provincial resources. Enrichment, however, did not come without risks. From the second half of the century, they turned into new targets of confiscation. Yet archival records explicitly show that they did not face insecurity of property equally despite the official claim that sometimes pops up in sources was that whoever made wealth by office-holding shall be confiscated upon death or punishment (Yaycıoğlu 2016). One of the aims of this paper is to understand the dynamics of these varying levels of protection.

A final dimension of historical context concerns the period covered by the data, 1750-1839. This period was characterized by a fiscal and political crisis that threatened the very existence of the Empire. Fiscal innovations were not sufficient to increase tax revenues of the central administration necessary for financing wars abroad and containing domestic revolts. The Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 turned a new page in the history of the Ottoman Empire due to its military and fiscal weaknesses becoming apparent (Neumann 2006). To remedy these problems, the sultans have undertaken a series of reforms such as establishing a Western-style army and treasury. However, given the current institutional setting, waging wars and implementing reforms could not be achieved without the support of provincial elites. Some put explicit support, while some were not willing and even occasionally rebelled against the center when their interests were harmed. This was both the cause and outcome of a centralization project launched by Mahmud II (r. 1808-1839). He partially managed to curb the power of local elites by the 1820s (Shaw and Shaw 1977: 14-16).

Does the fact that the chosen period was exceptional in some ways pose a problem? It does not because this paper does not generalize its findings to earlier periods of Ottoman history. They reflect, before anything else, the characteristics of confiscations during this period. The advantage of focusing on this turbulent period, on the other hand, is that it allows to quantitatively measure the impact of wars and rebellions on the confiscation activity. That the first twenty years of the period was relatively more peaceful is benefited for comparison.

3 Theoretical Considerations

What are the main drivers of state confiscation and what can limit it? This section offers a theoretical perspective to this question. The context-specific model proposed here relies on an extended version of rational behavior, which considers not only economic but political incentives. It focuses solely on quantifiable behavior, however. That is, two types of observed behavior are excluded: agent cheating and military resistance of families.

Under these assumptions, the sultan has two types of payoff, namely monetary and political. Like every rational individual, he tries to optimize his gains and not to incur losses. To do so, he needs to calculate how profitable each case of confiscation is both in monetary and political terms. This approach is consistent with historical reality. Confiscation records sometimes contain a section of monetary calculation. However, it was not uncommon that wealth with unworthy or even negative net values was also confiscated, which makes it necessary to include the calculation of political payoff though in a more hypothetical sense.

For simplicity, first consider the case where political payoff is zero, meaning that political costs and benefits are equal. If this is the case, the decision to confiscate would be governed entirely by monetary calculation. Monetary payoff here concerns the profitability

6

of confiscation as the monetary value is the transferable amount or net value of wealth, which equal the total value of wealth and receivables minus debts and direct costs of confiscation (Vahabi 2016: 154). Direct costs are the costs of transportation and agency. Agency costs are the commissions paid to confiscators and other less important agents taking part in the enforcement. Even though the value of these commissions was also determined by the duration of the process, which is a function of the complexity, costs of agency and transportation were largely governed by various aspects of asset confiscability.

The components of asset confiscability are, to a large extent, associated with spatial constraints. This stems from the intuition that the capacity and willingness to confiscate of the sovereign should be unevenly distributed.[3] I mainly consider here the distance from the physical location of the wealth to where it is transported (Istanbul with few exceptions) and to the sea, although there are other spatial constraints such as the conditions of the road to the destination and the administrative status of the location. The proximity from the destination matters as it affects direct agency and transportation costs. There was indeed a positive relationship between the distance and the confiscator's commission. As for transportation costs, most assets were sent to the capital in kind, or else as cash acquired from auctions in which they were sold. In fact, the spatial aspects of asset confiscability could have been influenced by organizational, administrative and transport technology as well. However, the impact of technological change is rather negligible since, to the best of my knowledge, there was not any significant technological progress in the Ottoman Empire during the period of concern. The non-spatial elements of asset confiscability are the concentration, specificity and measurability of assets. The more liquid assets are, for example, the more confiscable they are.

7

Political payoff, however, was hardly zero, especially when it comes to the confiscation of those who were closely linked with the central government politically and economically. Although, in theory, sultans had an unquestionable authority, there existed forces that balanced their power. In the eighteenth century, these forces derived mainly from the increasing influence of local elites. It is true that their capacity to impact government policies, after all, proved insufficient to produce formal institutions that could effectively and sustainably constraint the sovereign power (Pamuk 2012). Nevertheless, sultans were hardly free from the risk of dethronement even though they were invariably replaced by other members of the same dynasty once dethroned. In addition to this risk, under intense external threat, the ruler could turn to confiscation as an extraordinary source of revenue regardless of whether it would have paid off monetarily.

Another constraint of the ruler is facing a trade-off regarding whose wealth to confiscate. In that, they consider the bargaining position of the potential victims. That is, in the Ottoman case, targeting an individual or family with high bargaining power was costlier for three reasons. First, some who were organized as patrimonial families had their own troops in which they had been investing for decades. They could and did sometimes use their military power against the central government. Certainly, the center's military strength was superior to theirs. But the fact that they possessed armed troops had the effect of deterrence, especially when the opportunity cost of fighting a local trouble-maker was high. More importantly, many potential targets of confiscation had a symbiotic relationship with the imperial center, which required them to provision wars abroad by manning imperial armies or sending food and munition to warzones (Yaycıoğlu 2016). Credibility of these threats depended also on the nature of fiscal markets they operated. As for provincial elites, some enjoyed monopolies, while some had to compete with others. A

family particularly successful in rent-seeking, that is, capturing monopoly rents of its area of influence, was unlikely to be replaced when its wealth and power was fully confiscated.

4   Data and General Patterns

This study is based on information collected from confiscation inventories (*muhallefat defterleri*) preserved in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. These inventories were mostly prepared by an agent (*mübaşir*: literally bailiff), that I prefer to call confiscator, sent to the location of wealth. These documents typically contain three parts. The introductory protocol consists of a summary of the case including the name, occupation and location of the individual and the names of third parties involved in the enforcement process. The second part provides a list of assets owned by the confiscated individual. Ranging from a single page to tens of pages, these lists come either with or without property categories. The third section, which lacks from some inventories, contains a brief calculation of net value.

My sample includes 1,017 cases of confiscation. It must be stated at the outset that inevitable barriers make a 'perfectly' random sampling difficult. It is nearly impossible to know the entire population (N) and its characteristics primarily because we do not know if an inventory was prepared or survived for all confiscations. Thus, we cannot estimate the crucial ratio of n/N where n=1,017. Equally important, I had to rule some confiscations out due to important missing variables, especially the dependent variable. One positive point about the representativeness of the data is that the catalogue, where most inventories used in the data come from (See: Appendix B), show a reasonable degree of diversity in terms of location, social groups, and period, and met my expectations on where and when confiscations were known to be the most prevalent. For example, as expected, the share in Istanbul is relatively higher than other locations.

What information was gathered in confiscation inventories? The introductory protocol provided the identity and location of wealth-holders. Titles present in official sources are quite telling, especially when it comes to the elites that constitute the focus of this paper. From one's title, the historical can tell his or her gender, religion, secular title, social group as defined in Ottoman political thinking, family affiliation and whether he completed pilgrimage.[4] A wealth-holder's profession was mostly affixed to the title as well. For women, however, profession was invariably missing. The protocol occasionally gives the justification for confiscations (390 cases). The date included in the data set is the end date of the process of confiscation evident in the date of final inventory. In addition to the identity of

Table 1.

Targets of Confiscation by Occupation, 1750-1839

Occupation	Frequency	Percent
Military Officials (*Askeriye*)	267	26.25
Administrative and Palace Officials (*Kalemiye-Saray*)	231	22.71
Legal Officials (*İlmiye*)	11	1.08
Provincial Elites (*Ayan*)	349	34.32
Merchants (*Tüccar*)	47	4.62
Artisans (*Esnaf*)	9	0.88
Moneychangers (*Sarraf*)	13	1.28
Peasants (*Köylü*)	47	4.62
Missing	43	4.23
Total	1017	100

**Source:** *See appendix B for data sources.*

the wealth-holder, the protocol almost invariably specifies their location. Normally, the location is detailed down to village level. But a high majority of the individuals targeted

were urban dwellers. Finally, the size and distribution of wealth was obtained from the actual list of assets and/or the section of calculation at the end of inventories.

Table 1 shows that the prime targets of confiscation were private tax contractors and government officials. The first three rows represent state officials expressed in three categories, i.e. military, administrative and legal officials. The fourth row displays provincial elites who were involved in the business of governance as private tax contractors yet were not officially affiliated with the center. It can therefore be argued that at least 83 per cent of the targets of confiscation were those benefiting from the fiscal system. In other words, people engaged in productive economic activities such as commerce and industry were not under direct threat. As the table displays, merchants and peasants represent 4 per cent of the sample population.[5] Similarly, the shares of artisans and moneychangers are quite marginal, both around 1 per cent. Among these findings, the most surprising one is the relatively high proportion of peasants. To figure out why the wealth of ordinary peasants was being confiscated, we need to look at how these were justified. It appears that 21 out of 28 confiscations of peasant wealth for which I could identity official justification, out of a total of 47, were crime-related. These were invariably due to their participation in rebellion as the only type of crime they could commit against the central state. Figure 1 demonstrates the temporal changes in the frequencies of the targets of confiscation expressed as a percentage of total number in the decades during the period 1750-1839. What is most striking in this figure is that it shows a boom in the number of local elites compared to the other groups. The figure reveals that starting from 13 per cent in 1750-1759 the share of provincial elites moves around 40 per cent between 1780 and 1820. The period 1780-1820 was a time of centralizing efforts. The power of major provincial power-holders was curbed by the 1820s.

Figure 1.

Occupational Distribution of Confiscation Targets over Time

Source: See appendix B for data sources.

A high majority of the targets of confiscation included in the dataset are Muslim men. Due to the lack of population data, it is not possible to argue in relative terms that non-Muslims faced less confiscation. However, if the data must be trusted, two factors explain why. First, they were generally not allowed to serve as government officials except for those in translation and minting. Likewise, they were not able to bid in tax farming auctions either, though they were involved in the fiscal system as moneylenders who lent to tax farmers needing capital. Second, those non-Muslim financiers and merchants, who constituted the majority in these professions in the eighteenth century, mostly operated under the legal protection of major European powers. That is, European consulates in the Ottoman lands were selling property rights to Greeks and Armenians, who were hired by consulates as

12

dragoman (translators) though only on paper (Kuran 2010: 199). Regardless of European protection of non-Muslims, the Ottoman center must have recognized the role of trade for prosperity and developed a new institutional framework, guaranteeing the security of property and life of merchants (Kaymakcı 2013: 16-36).

Map 1.

Frequencies of Confiscation Attempts in Ottoman Locations and Provinces, 1750-1839

Source: See appendix B for data sources.

Notes: Provincial borders shown here are approximately drawn based on a geocoded map created by Harvard Geospatial Library accessed at http://hgl.harvard.edu:8080/opengeoportal/ on 18 January 2017. This map displays provincial borders of the Ottoman Empire, circa 1790. The Kaptanpaşa province is shown in the middle of Aegean Sea as it did not have clear-cut territories. Similarly, those confiscations conducted in frontier castles are shown at the top of the Black Sea under the name of 'Frontier Castles.'

How was the confiscation activity distributed spatially? Map 1 displays spatial frequency of confiscation at both location and province levels. The map illustrates that the largest number of confiscations took place in Istanbul, followed by such major cities as Bursa,

13

Antalya and Manisa. The common feature of most cities with a higher number of confiscations is that they are either coastal or very close to the coast. This finding leads to two potential hypotheses. First, coastal regions could be more appealing since they were relatively developed due to greater commercial exchange stemming from port presence and favorable climate. But that merchants were not confiscated much disproves this hypothesis. It seems more likely that undertaking confiscations on the coast was less expensive because sea transport was historically cheaper than inland transport. Whether this was the case is left as an open question to be answered in the next section.

Figure 2.

Frequencies of Confiscation Attempts and Full Confiscation, 1750-1839

Source: See appendix B for data sources.

Figure 2 gives a broad sense of the timing of confiscations. The blue area shows the annual number of confiscation attempts while the red area represents the number of cases which

14

resulted in full confiscation. Apart from the years with dramatic falls, number of confiscation attempts follows a generally increasing trend after the 1770s, coinciding with the deterioration of state finances after the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774. A decreasing trend begins after 1820, continuing until the abolition in 1839. This is overall in line with the view that the crisis triggers confiscation activity. However, it is also important to note that the proportion of 'full confiscation' outcome in total number of attempts falls during the time of crisis. Like in the case of spatial patterns, this is also a question that can be best studied with an econometric approach.

5   Empirical Strategy and Descriptive Statistics

Empirical strategy adopted in this paper builds on two unique features of the process of Ottoman confiscations. The first one is that the enforcement of confiscation was most typically a two-step process as described below, though various scenarios were possible depending on whether it was conducted after one's normal death or punishment (See: Figure 3). Second, the process did not necessarily end with confiscation of all assets. The first step is the step before an inventory was made. Once informed by a potential case of confiscation, the sultan and his agents follow one of the strategies below:

Outcome 1

- ■ Send confiscator
- ■ No confiscation
- ■ Inheritance Tax

Importantly, this initial decision was made without full information on the attributes of wealth because there was no existing inventory yet. Only if the outcome of the first step

was "send confiscator," the process proceeded to the second step. By sending a confiscator, the center already incurred the costs of agency no matter what the outcome of the second step would be. The outcome of "no confiscation" refers to the waiving of confiscation, which resulted in no further action. The "inheritance tax" outcome implies that the family were to pay the amount of cash set by the central administration or offered by the family. This amount was mostly open to negotiation.

Figure 3.

Steps of Confiscation Process

The second step is the one lasting from the sending of a confiscator until the end of the process. Its main difference from the first step is the revealing of more information gathered from the prepared inventory. At this step, the sultan and his agents possess more precise information on the family's power and the attributes of their wealth, such as its net value and liquidity. With this revealed information, the question of how worthwhile it is to confiscate becomes clearer. The process ends with one of the following outcomes:

Outcome 2

■ Confiscation

16

- No confiscation

- Inheritance Tax

Table 2.

Definitions of Explanatory Variables

Variable name	Definition
WAR	War pressure index based on war casualties.
REBELLION	The number of internal conflicts including revolutionary movements.
DISTANCE	Interaction of distance from Istanbul and distance from a port.
RELIGION	1 if Muslim, 0 if non-Muslim.
GENDER	1 if female, 0 if male.
TITLE	1 if the wealth-holder has a title, 0 if he does not.
FAMILY	1 if the wealth-holder is a member of a prominent family, 0 if not.
WARZONE	Distance of the wealth-holder's
ELAPSED	The number of years elapsed after enthronement of the sultan.
JUSTIFY	1 if justified, 0 if not.
NET VALUE	Net value of the wealth in tons of silver.
LIQUIDITY	Percentage of liquid assets, jewelry, slaves and watches, to total assets.

The main dependent variable of the analysis is thus the outcome of the confiscation process. It is a categorical variable taking two different forms, outcome 1 and outcome 2, in the two multinomial logistic models. One would ideally employ the exact share of confiscated wealth to the total value of wealth. It was impossible, however, to identify this proportion for all cases, though I was more successful in determining which of the above categories each confiscation fell into.

17

The analysis employs multinomial logistic regression model (MNLM) to estimate what determined the 'outcome' of the two steps of the process of confiscation.[6] MNLM is a type of logistic model used when the number of dependent variable categories is greater than two and there is no natural order between them. The formal models are presented in the two-step framework identified above. The information in the step each confiscation outcome has happened has been gathered from a pool of over 7,000 correspondence documents.

Table 3.

Frequency Table of the Dependent Variable, 'Outcome'

Outcomes	Frequency	Relative frequency
All		
Confiscation	601	59.10
No Confiscation	214	21.04
Inheritance Tax	202	19.86
Total	1017	100
Step 1		
Send confiscator	832	81.81
No confiscation	110	10.82
Inheritance tax	75	7.37
Total	1017	100
Step 2		
Confiscation	601	72.24
No confiscation	104	12.50
Inheritance tax	127	15.26
Total	832	100

Source: *See appendix B for data sources.*

18

In explaining the determinants of state confiscation, the impact of the following factors on the outcomes of the process of confiscation are of special interest: (1) conflicts or deteriorating state finances, (2) geographical limitations, (3) bargaining power of families, and (4) attributes of wealth such as magnitude and liquidity.

Table 4.

Frequency Table and Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables

Variable Name	Min	Max	Mean	SD	Freq.	Relative Freq.	Obser-vation
War	0.007	0.302	0.134	0.107			1017
Rebellion	0	4	0.74	0.90			1017
Distance Istanbul	1	2409.02	374.43	367.36			1017
Distance Port	1.64	1454.26	269.53	173.19			1017
Elapsed	0	31	10.16	6.82			1017
Net Value	-33.12	106.08	1.13	5.57			828
Liquidity	0	100	29.00	33.12			357
Justify							
Yes					305	70.01	1017
No					712	29.99	
Gender							
Male					979	96.26	1017
Female					38	3.74	
Religion							
Muslim					957	94.10	1017
Non-Mus.					60	5.90	
Family							
Yes					135	86.73	1017
No					882	13.27	
Title							
Yes					306		1017
No					771		

Source: See appendix B for data sources.

19

In doing so, I control for a set of variables such as one's identity, the number of years elapsed after the ruling sultan's enthronement, and the way confiscation was justified. The variable *WAR* is used to estimate whether wars have driven confiscations.[7] Due to the lack of data on state revenues, it also serves the function of proxying fiscal distress as most revenues were spent on wars during the chosen period. Instead of the number of wars, which would not capture their magnitude, I use a war pressure index based on the number of causalities. Another potential determinant of the decision to confiscate could be internal conflicts, since this was a period of rebellions and independence movements. Unlike wars, there is no data on causalities from domestic conflicts. Thus, I use a dummy variable reflecting the number of rebellions that took place in each year of confiscation. To measure the impact of spatiality or of the direct costs of confiscation, I use an interacted distance variable, *DISTANCE*. This variable is an interaction of distance from Istanbul (the destination of confiscated assets) and distance from major ports.[8]

As for bargaining power, the analysis employs two variables. One of them is a dummy variable called *FAMILY*, showing whether the wealth-holder was a member of a prominent family. Admittedly, this variable has certain limits. The family's bargaining power vis-à-vis the ruler is indeed the matter of a complex long-term relationship, reflecting not only how much the sovereign values the past conduct of the family but also how he thinks his dependence on the family will change in future. It is not possible to know the entire history of these mutual interdependences between the center and all 1,017 families. The potential weakness of this variable is then mitigated using another variable of bargaining power. After considering that wars were important for the nature of dependence between the sultan and the confiscation targets, I created the variable *WARZONE*, which is the distance from the nearest warzone at the time of confiscation.[9] It captures how the existence of a war nearby impacted the decision to confiscate the wealth of the family.

20

In the second-step regression, I introduce two additional variables regarding the wealth under target. Both are used to measure whether the outcome was shaped by cost-benefit calculation. The variable *NETVALUE* represents the transferable amount of capital. *LIQUIDITY*, which could be calculated only in 357 cases, shows the proportion of liquid assets such as jewelry, cash, slaves and watches to total assets. Variables used in the first step and included in the second step regression are those that are time-specific that could have changed during the process of confiscation, which could at times take years.

6   Results and Discussion

The main results of the MNL models are presented in tables 5, 6, 7 and 8. The independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption inherent in the MNLM was tested with a Hausman-McFadden test (Hausman and McFadden 1984). The results are reported in relative risks rather than coefficients as the latter's interpretation in the MLNM are inconvenient. Interpreting relative risks is like that of the odds ratios in binary choice models. That is, relative risk reflects the change for a one-unit change in the independent variables. Each regression treats a category of the outcome variable as base category. The first-step regression uses 'send confiscator' as its main base category since the decision to send a confiscator means incurring agency costs regardless of the outcome of the second step and is costlier than the other two outcomes, namely 'no confiscation' and 'inheritance tax.' Because sending a confiscator has greater costs, it is more convenient to interpret the results compared to the category of 'send confiscator.' The main reference category for the second-step regression is 'confiscation' simply because the other outcomes represent either a lesser degree of confiscation (inheritance tax) or no confiscation at all. Where necessary, I also take another category as reference category to see the interaction between the other two outcomes, which is not shown by one single comparison.

21

6.1 First-Step Estimates

The first-step estimates are given in table 5. Before proceeding to the impact of wars and expected costs, it is necessary to have a brief look at two seemingly surprising results. At first sight, the direction of the relative risk of *TITLE* seems surprising. It suggests that holding a title increases the odds of the outcome 'send confiscator' compared to both comparison groups of 'inheritance tax' and 'no confiscation.' That is, the central government was more willing to continue the process of confiscation if the wealth-holder had a title. One may think that title-holders would be more capable of escaping confiscation due to their better bargaining position. Yet we must consider here that all who benefited from the ruler's revenue pie were title-holders one way or another. What this implies is that a person with no title could be tolerated more than one with a title.

ELAPSED represents the number of years that elapsed after the enthronement of the ruling sultan. As it goes up, 'send confiscator' is the least likely outcome, while 'no confiscation' is more likely than 'inheritance tax.' In other words, the longer the sultan stays in power, the less likely he is to continue the process of confiscation. If we assume that ruling for longer makes the sovereign more powerful and able to confiscate, this result curiously refers to a negative relationship between power and confiscation. A potential explanation for the first result is that sultans were arguably more interested in confiscation in the early years of their rule to finance their projects. Or, the above assumption does not hold true that their power just deteriorated with time.

An insignificant result needs also to be interpreted. *FAMILY* is not significant in both comparisons shown in columns 1 and 2 because it was only after certain attributes of wealth were revealed via an inventory that a healthier analysis of the political costs and benefits of confiscation could occur. Since 'no confiscation' and 'inheritance tax' were outcomes

22

that could also be realized in the second step, the central government possibly did not want to decide before the value and liquidity of wealth was revealed by the confiscator.

6.1.1 War Pressure: A Driver of Confiscation?

It is generally argued that under fiscal distress created by external and internal wars, rulers confiscate more of the wealth of their subjects. First-step estimates reported here refer to an adverse relationship between war pressure and confiscation options of the sovereign. The relative risks of *WAR* shown in panels 1 and 2 of table 5 reveal that one-unit increase in war pressure makes the category of 'send confiscator,' 8.852 times less likely than 'no confiscation' and 6.860 times less likely than 'inheritance tax.' This is to say that in relative terms, an increase in war pressure made the Ottoman rulers choose not to confiscate or obtain inheritance tax over continuing the process of confiscation by sending a confiscator.

There might be two reasons why. First, the time and resources of the center were spent on warzones during wartime. Unlike full confiscation which could have occurred at the end of the second step, inheritance tax was a quick and low-cost alternative even though extracted revenue was lower. The second reason is related to the symbiotic relationship between the center and some targets of confiscations. Relative risks of 1.068 and 0.907 shown in the row of *WARZONE* lends further support to this mutuality. They imply that the proximity of the physical location of wealth to a warzone at the time of confiscation attempt made 'no confiscation' more likely relative to both 'send confiscator' and 'inheritance tax.' In other words, the more proximate to a warzone, the more they were able to escape confiscation. Like in the opening anecdote, this finding shows that elite cooperation was more needed during wartime. It also helps to understand why 'inheritance tax' is not necessarily superior to 'no confiscation' as expressed in the insignificant relative

risks of *WAR.* To be more precise, though inheritance tax pays better than no confiscation

in terms of its monetary value, during wartime monetary value was not necessarily the

Table 5.

Relative Risks of the Outcome of the First Step of the Process of Confiscation

DV categories		NC/SC	IT/SC	IT/NC
Conflict	Interstate Wars	8.852**	6.860*	0.774
	Rebellion	0.899	0.888	0.987
Spatiality	Distance	1.482***	1.863***	1.256
	Gender			
	Male	1	1	1
	Female	0.224	0.791	3.521
	Religion			
	Muslim	1	1	1
Identity	Non-Muslim	0.675	0.922	1.480
	Title			
	No	1	1	1
	Yes	0.336***	0.346***	1.032
	Family Affiliation			
Bargaining Power	No	1	1	1
	Yes	1.215	0.592	0.487
	Warzone	1.068**	0.969	0.907**
Sultan Behavior	Elapsed	1.067***	1.003***	0.939**
Rules	Justification			
	No	1	1	1
	Yes	0.308***	0.581**	1.882*
	N	1015	1015	1.015
	Pseudo R²	0.1485	0.1485	0.1485
	LR Chi²	180.25	180.25	180.25
	Prob Chi²	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Source: *See appendix B for data sources*

Notes: ****, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. C: Confiscation, NC: No Confiscation, IT: Inheritance Tax. The reference category is always the one after /. If relative risk is greater*

most important element of the process. Elites' military support was much needed and confiscating their wealth was not the priority of the sultan.

Although another variable of conflict, *REBELLION* is not significant, it refers to a reverse relationship between conflict and confiscation. That is, with more rebellion happening at the time of confiscation attempt, the sovereign was more likely to send a confiscator. The reason why this result is the opposite of that of *WAR* is that confiscations were sometimes the result of rebellion. This cannot be confirmed though as the result is not significant.

6.1.2   Expected Costs: A Constraint of Confiscation?

Expected costs of confiscation also had an impact on the outcome of the first step. The relative risk of *DISTANCE* is higher than 1, which means that an increase in expected costs made both 'no confiscation' and 'inheritance tax' more likely compared to 'send confiscator.' With increased distance from Istanbul and major ports, the sultan would prefer to not continue the process, by not sending a confiscator. When it comes to the decision between 'no confiscation' and 'inheritance tax' in a distant location, he is rather indifferent. This decision is determined by the proximity to a warzone, time elapsed after enthronement of the sultan and whether there was a justification (See: IT-NC comparison). These findings are consistent with the expected transport costs hypothesis as they demonstrate that the sultan is more hesitant to confiscate in remote areas. Another reason distance matters can be that the power of the center generally decreases with distance from the capital. Less power or legitimacy increases the expectance of resistance that would result in undesired costs.

6.2 Second-Step Estimates

Table 6.

Relative Risks of the Outcome of the Second Step of the Process of Confiscation

| DV categories		1			2		
		NC/C	IT/C	IT/NC	NC/C	IT/C	IT/NC
Conflict	Interstate Wars	1.893	4.937*	0.528	11.973	19.582**	1.635
	Rebellion	1.152	1.162	1.008	1.888**	1.119	0.593
Wealth	Net Value	0.691***	1.293***	1.870***	0.595***	1.323***	2.220***
	Liquidity				0.968**	0.954***	0.985
	Family Affilia-tion						
Bar-gaining Power	No	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Yes	1.839	4.906***	2.667**	1.833	4.819***	2.628
	Warzone	0.935*	1.051	1.123**	0.993	1.028	1.035
	N	774	774	774	344	344	344
	Pseudo R^2	0.1247	0.1247	0.1247	0.2512	0.2512	0.2512
	LR Chi^2	138.71	138.71	138.71	116.62	116.62	116.62
	Prob Chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Source: See appendix B for data sources.

*Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. C: Confiscation, NC: No Confiscation, IT: Inheritance Tax. The reference category is always the one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference category are higher compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the outcome is more likely to fall in the comparison group.*

The second-step estimates are shown in table 6. It reports the results with and without *LIQUIDITY* in panels 1 and 2. The second part of dependent variable categories are the base categories. The most striking result in this table is the relative risks of *NETVALUE*, which is highly significant in all columns. Those in the first two columns show that as the value of wealth increases, the sultan is more likely to confiscate relative to 'no confisca-tion.' However, the same is not true with 'inheritance tax.' It appears that the likelihood of inheritance tax was higher for high value inheritances in comparison with confiscation.

Figure 4.

Graphs of Correlation in the First and Second-Step Regressions

Notes: These figures does not show results in relative terms. Although changes might not seem significant, it must be considered that the likelihood of sending a confiscator was already much higher than those of other outcomes at 0.

Figure 4 clearly shows the impact of an increase in net wealth on the outcome of the confiscation process. Until a point, it increases the likelihood of confiscation relative to both 'no confiscation' and 'inheritance tax.' But after that point, the confiscation-inheritance tax comparison changes in a way that inheritance tax becomes more likely. This is the explanation of the reverse U-shape that can be seen in the figure.

This finding is better read in combination with the value of relative risks of *FAMILY.* That is, being a member of a prominent family increases the probability of the 'inheritance tax' outcome compared to 'confiscation' by a factor of 4.906 and 4.819 with or without *LIQUIDITY* respectively. This is closely related to their power to bargain with the central government primarily but not exclusively for the reasons mentioned above. Another variable of bargaining power, *WARZONE*, still has the same effect as in the first-step models in that it increases the likelihood of 'no confiscation' relative to the other two categories.

To evaluate these results in light of qualitative sources, prominent families used their military, economic and political sources of power to negotiate the institution of inheritance tax and even sometimes succeeded in reducing the amount of it. Thus, the interpretation of the variable *FAMILY* helps to explain why inheritance tax was more likely to occur with an increase in the amount of wealth. The reason why family affiliation is significant in the second step and not in the first step is that the first step outcome is of more of a decision while that of the second step is not necessarily so. As an outcome, it reflects a process during which both parties test their power.

Panel 2 of table 6 reports the results with *LIQUIDITY* added as one of explanatory variables. Unfortunately, the number of observations is inevitably reduced to 344 due to the lack of liquidity data for many observations. In panel 2, we see that liquidity is highly correlated with the outcome of the second step. More liquid assets were not only more easily

convertible but also more easily transferable. As asset liquidity increases, confiscation turns into a more likely outcome relative to both comparison outcomes. An additional regression with 'no confiscation' as the base category was also estimated and presented in the last column of the table. The insignificant relative risks of *LIQUIDITY* in the inheritance tax-no confiscation comparison indicate that the sultan was somewhat indifferent between these categories as liquidity level changed.

Overall, the value and liquidity of wealth as well as the bargaining power of the family predict a good deal of the second step outcome. When the confiscation process reaches this step, the central government takes a final look at the confiscation inventory and the outcome is determined partly by the center and partly by 'nature' depending on the specifics of the case.

6.3   Robustness Checks

Appendix table A1 accounts for all variables without considering steps and liquidity, while appendix table A2 does the same with liquidity. Panel 1 of these tables shows the results with log transformed net value, while the second panel uses the actual value of wealth. The reason for this is that logged net value reduces the number of observations although log transformation is generally better for our purposes due to the very high standard deviation of that variable. Most results are consistent with the step regressions in tables 5 and 6. However, inconsistent ones do not weaken but strengthen my analysis since they justify the use of the two-step framework. If we focus on the results that are inconsistent with step regressions, we first notice that the impact of interstate wars becomes less visible when considered without steps. Nevertheless, 'inheritance tax' still proves to be significant more likely than 'confiscation' with an increase in war pressure. Although it is not

significant, the sign of the relative risks of no confiscation-confiscation comparison remains the same. Another difference of the regressions without two-step framework is that even though the sultan was indifferent between 'no confiscation' and 'inheritance tax' as expected transport costs increased, here is more likely to obtain inheritance tax rather than waiving confiscation.

Table 7.

Relative Risks of the Mode of Transfer of Confiscated Wealth

		1 (W/O Liquidity)		2 (W Liquidity)	
DV categories		**SK/SC**	**M/SC**	**SK/SC**	**M/SC**
Wealth	Net Value	0.935**	0.992*	0.859*	1.404**
	Liquidity			1.034***	1.019**
Seasonality	Month Included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Spatiality	Distance	1.553***	1.744***	1.738***	1.713***
	N	633	633	290	290
	Pseudo R^2	0.1563	0.1563	0.3050	0.3050
	LR Chi^2	133.48	133.48	143.96	143.96
	Prob Chi^2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Source: See bibliography for data sources.

*Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. SK: Sent in Kind, M: Mixed, SC: Sent in Cash. The reference category is always the one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference category are higher compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the outcome is more likely to fall in the comparison group.*

Second, I test the impact of cost-benefit calculation in an alternative analysis. This looks specifically at the role of transportation costs. If the outcome of the confiscation process was confiscation, the next decision of the government was how to transfer confiscation gains to the public treasury. It must be noted at the outset that the analysis excludes those gains that were occasionally sent directly to warzones for military use. Apart from that, there were three modes of transfer: (1) transportation of all assets to Istanbul in kind, (2) auctioning all assets on premise and transferring revenues in cash and (3) a mix of these

modes. Independent variables included in the model are an interaction variable of distance from Istanbul and distance from the nearest major port, the month of confiscation, net value of wealth and liquidity. In contrast to previous regressions, the month of confiscation controls here for the effect of seasonality or whether climate or any other features of seasonality had an impact on the decision. If the decision to transfer was governed by minimization of transport costs, then this test should provide further proof for the above argument that cost-benefit calculation played an important role even in this stage which we might call the third stage of the process.

As displayed in table 7, controlling for other variables, two of three variables of importance lend support to the cost-benefit argument. This includes the finding that as the size of wealth increases, it becomes more likely for it to be sent in cash. That is, auctions were more often held in more distant regions. There were presumably costs of auction, but these costs can be negligibly included in the costs of agency that were already paid. As the liquidity increases, the assets are more likely to be sent in kind. This is because, in contrast to property such as real estate, liquid assets were easily moveable. Most liquid assets in the dataset are jewelries and cash. Yet the distance variables in the table do not support our hypothesis. The distance from Istanbul suggests that the more distant a location was; the more likely assets were to be sent in kind.

Finally, one can also look at the official reasoning behind the non-confiscation outcomes. 150 cases, for which I could identify the reasoning, support the argument that confiscations were conducted in light of cost minimization. If we look at the stated reasons behind 'no confiscation' we see that there were essentially six reasons displayed in table 8. The most frequent two reasons are: (1) the person had too much debt, and (2) net value of wealth was insignificant.

31

Table 8.

Official Reasoning Behind the Non-Confiscation Outcomes

Reason/Outcome	No Confiscation	Inheritance Tax	Total
Having too Much Debt	49	10	59
Appearance of Heirs	3	0	3
Insignificant Sum	40	1	41
Requests by Mediators	6	0	6
Mercy of the Sultan	33	2	36
Pardoning of the Punished	3	3	6
Total	134	16	150

Source: *See appendix B for data sources.*

7   Conclusion

Ottoman rulers have confiscated elite property throughout centuries. However, enforcement of confiscations during the chosen period was not smooth. They had to take many things into account when confiscating. Most importantly, during wartime they tended not to confiscate the wealth of an individual who was needed by the state. They also abstained from confiscation in remote areas, preferring locations proximate to Istanbul, where confiscated assets were transported. Once these factors led to a decision to send a confiscator to the location of wealth to prepare an inventory, the second step outcome was based on the attributes of wealth and the family's bargaining power. If the magnitude of wealth was bigger, confiscation was a more likely outcome. Likewise, confiscation was more likely to happen if the wealth was more liquid. A powerful family had a higher chance of turning a

potential full confiscation into inheritance tax in which case they were to pay an amount of cash to the public treasury.

This paper does not aim to deny either the act of violence or arbitrariness embedded in Ottoman confiscations. Rather, it argues that confiscations were conducted in light of the above constraints. Historians have long emphasized the problem with the notion of 'absolutism.' Economic historians have drawn attention to the fiscal, legal and administrative capacity of states as an important element of long-run economic growth. This paper contributes to this line of literature by showing how low capacity of a state where the ruler was not constrained by a formal system of checks and balances could, in turn, determine the way government confiscation was practiced. In other words, low state capacity, caused by the size of the empire and its persistent dependence on local elites, decreased its ability to confiscate too.

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Appendix A.

Appendix Table A1.

Relative Risks of the Outcome of the Process of Confiscation without Liquidity (Full sample)

DV categories		1			2		
		NC/C	IT/C	IT/NC	NC/C	IT/NC	IT/NC
Wealth	Net value	0.663***	1.319***	1.987***	0.737**	1.003	1.360**
Conflict	Interstate wars	0.564	6.087*	10.786	1.276	4.933*	3.863
	Rebellion	1.222	1.113	0.910	1.303**	1.030	0.790
Spatiality	Distance	1.164***	1.365***	1.172*	1.150***	1.377***	1.197**
	Gender						
	Male	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Female	0.267*	0.184	0.821	0.223**	0.167	0.751
	Religion						
	Muslim	1	1	1	1	1	1
Identity	Non-Muslim	0.164**	0.287*	1.788	0.130***	0.269**	2.069
	Title						
	No	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Yes	0.217***	0.292***	1.347	0.209***	0.389***	1.853**
Bargaining Power	Family Affiliation						
	No	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Yes	1.626	4.115***	2.530*	1.232	4.615***	3.745***
	Warzone	0.925**	1.029	1.112**	0.940**	1.052	1.118***
Sultan Behaviour	Elapsed	0.951**	1.005	1.056*	0.969*	1.001	1.032
Rules	Justification	0.347***	0.523***	1.507	0.516**	0.559**	1.042
	N	775	775	775	826	826	826
	Pseudo R^2	0.2162	0.2162	0.2162	0.1819	0.1819	0.1819
	LR Chi^2	241.57	241.57	241.57	203.14	203.14	203.14
	Prob Chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.000

Source: *See bibliography for data sources.*

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. C: Confiscation, NC: No Confiscation, IT: Inheritance Tax. The reference category is always the one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference category are higher compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the outcome is more likely to fall in the comparison group.

Appendix Table A2.

Relative Risks of the Outcome of the Process of Confiscation with Liquidity (Full Sample)

DV categories		1			2		
		NC/C	IT/C	IT/NC	NC/C	IT/NC	NC/C
Wealth	Net value	0.553***	1.319***	2.385***	0.895*	1.010	1.128*
	Liquidity	0.968**	0.958***	0.989	0.969***	0.957***	0.986
Conflict	Interstate wars	3.319	23.318**	7.024	4.400	33.457**	7.603
	Rebellion	1.893**	0.909	0.480**	1.796**	0.809	0.450***
Spatiality	Distance	1.103	1.302***	1.180	1.062	1.357***	1.277**
	Title						
Identity	No	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Yes	0.302**	0.364**	1.201	0.254***	0.453**	1.782
	Family Affiliation						
Bargaining Power	No	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Yes	1.464	4.331***	2.957**	0.896	4.275***	4.771**
	Warzone	0.952	1.005	1.055	0.949	1.042	1.097
Sultan Behavior	Elapsed	0.930*	1.027	1.104**	0.957	1.030	1.076*
Rules	Justification	0.314*	0.462**	1.471	0.745	0.450**	0.603
	N	344	344	344	360	360	360
	Pseudo R^2	0.2451	0.2451	0.2451	0.2475	0.2475	0.2475
	LR Chi^2	144.92	144.92	144.92	128.45	128.45	128.45
	Prob Chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.000

Source: See bibliography for data sources.

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels. C: Confiscation, NC: No Confiscation, IT: Inheritance Tax. The reference category is always the one after /. If relative risk is greater than 1, the odds of reference category are higher compared to the comparison category. If it is lower than 1, the outcome is more likely to fall in the comparison group.

Appendix B: Sources of Data

Ali Emiri Sultan Abdülhamid I

304/20407

Ali Emiri Sultan Mustafa III

26/1797, 193/15240

Ali Emiri Sultan Selim III

5/244, 70/4188, 144/8720, 174/10429, 189/11380, 221/12949, 269/15545, 357/20462, 361/20660, 410/23604

Başmuhasebe Kalemi Muhallefat Halifeliği Defterleri

5618, 12442, 12456, 12571, 12585, 12586, 12587, 12590, 12591, 12592, 12593, 12594, 12597, 12603, 12606, 12609, 12612, 12617, 12618, 12619, 12620, 12629, 12634, 12635, 12636, 12637, 12639, 12640, 12652, 12653, 12654, 12656, 12657, 12659, 12660, 12662, 12663, 12664, 12666, 12668, 12669, 12670, 12671, 12673, 12674, 12675, 12676, 12677, 12678, 12679, 12680, 12681, 12682, 12683, 12684, 12685, 12686, 12690, 12691, 12694, 12695, 12696, 12697, 12698, 12699, 12701, 12702, 12703, 12704, 12705, 12706, 12708, 12710, 12711, 12712, 12713, 12714, 12717, 12719, 12720, 12721, 12722, 12723, 12725, 12726, 12727, 12728, 12730, 12731, 12732, 12733, 12734, 12735, 12736, 12739, 12746, 12748, 12749, 12750, 12752, 12754, 12756, 12757, 12758, 12759, 12761, 12763, 12766, 12769, 12771, 12772, 12774, 12775, 12777, 12778, 12779, 12781, 12782, 12784, 12785, 12786, 12788, 12789, 12790, 12793, 12794, 12796, 12797, 12799, 12800, 12801, 12802, 12803, 12805, 12806, 12807, 12808, 12809, 12810, 12812, 12813, 12814, 12815, 12816, 12817, 12818, 12819, 12822, 12823, 12826, 12828, 12829, 12830, 12831, 12832, 12836, 12837, 12838, 12839, 12840, 12841, 12842, 12843, 12844, 12846, 12847, 12848, 12849, 12852, 12853, 12854, 12855, 12856, 12858, 12859, 12860, 12861, 12862, 12863, 12864, 12865, 12866, 12867, 12868, 12869, 12870, 12872, 12873, 12876, 12878, 12882, 12883, 12884, 12885, 12886, 12887, 12888, 12889, 12890, 12892, 12894, 12895, 12896, 12898, 12899, 12900, 12901, 12902, 12906, 12907, 12908, 12909, 12910, 12912, 12913, 12914, 12915, 12917, 12918, 12919, 12920, 12921, 12922, 12923, 12924, 12925, 12926, 12928, 12929, 12930, 12931, 12932, 12934, 12936, 12937, 12938, 12939, 12940, 12941, 12942, 12943, 12945, 12946, 12948, 12949, 12950, 12952, 12955, 12956, 12957, 12958, 12960, 12961, 12962, 12963, 12964, 12966, 12967, 12968, 12969, 12970, 12972, 12975, 12979, 12980, 12981, 12982, 12983, 12984, 12985, 12986, 12988, 12989, 12990, 12992, 12993, 12995, 12996, 12997, 12998, 12999, 13001, 13002, 13003, 13004, 13005, 13006, 13007, 13008, 13009, 13010, 13011, 13012, 13013, 13014, 13015, 13016, 13017, 13018, 13020, 13022, 13023, 13024, 13025, 13027, 13028, 13029, 13030, 13031, 13034, 13035, 13036, 13037, 13038, 13039, 13040, 13044, 13046, 13047, 13048, 13049, 13050, 13051, 13052, 13053, 13055, 13056, 13057, 13059, 13060, 13061, 13062, 13063, 13064, 13068, 13069, 13070, 13071, 13072, 13074, 13075, 13076, 13077, 13079, 13081, 13082, 13084, 13085, 13086, 13087, 13088, 13089, 13090, 13091, 13092, 13093, 13094, 13095, 13097, 13098, 13099, 13100, 13101, 13102, 13103, 13107, 13110, 13111, 13112, 13114, 13115, 13116, 13117, 13119, 13120, 13121, 13122, 13123, 13125, 13126, 13129, 13130, 13131, 13132, 13133, 13134, 13135, 13136, 13137, 13140, 13141, 13142, 13143, 13144, 13145, 13151, 13152, 13153, 13155, 13156, 13158, 13159, 13160, 13161, 13162, 13163, 13164, 13165,

13166, 13167, 13168, 13170, 13171, 13172, 13173, 13174, 13175, 13176, 13177, 13179, 13180, 13181, 13182, 13183, 13185, 13186, 13187, 13188, 13190, 13191, 13192, 13193, 13194, 13195, 13196, 13197, 13198, 13199, 13200, 13202, 13203, 13204, 13205, 13206, 13207, 13208, 13209, 13210, 13211, 13215, 13216, 13217, 13218, 13220, 13221, 13222, 13223, 13224, 13225, 13226, 13227, 13228 ,13229, 13231, 13232, 13234, 13235, 13236, 13237, 13238, 13239, 13240, 13241, 13244, 13246, 13247, 13248, 13251, 13252, 13253, 13254, 13255, 13256, 13257, 13258, 13259, 13260, 13261, 13262, 13263, 13264, 13265, 13267, 13268, 13269, 13271, 13273, 13275, 13277, 13278, 13279, 13281, 13282, 13283, 13284, 13285, 13286, 13289, 13290, 13291, 13292, 13293, 13294, 13295, 13296, 13297, 13298, 13299, 13300, 13301, 13302, 13303, 13304, 13305, 13306, 13307, 13308, 13309, 13310, 13311, 13312, 13313, 13314, 13317, 13318, 13319, 13320, 13321, 13323, 13324 ,13325, 13326, 13327, 13329, 13330, 13331, 13332, 13336, 13337, 13339, 13340, 13341, 13342, 13343, 13345, 13347, 13348, 13349, 13350, 13351, 13359, 13360, 13361, 13362, 13363, 13365, 13366, 13367, 13368, 13369, 13370, 13371, 13372, 13373, 13374, 13375, 13379, 13380 ,13381, 13382, 13383, 13384, 13385, 13386, 13387, 13389, 13390, 13392, 13393, 13395, 13398, 13399, 13403, 13405, 13412, 13423, 13429, 13432, 13436, 13437, 13440, 13443, 13444, 13445, 13446, 13448, 13451, 13452, 13454, 13455, 13463, 13464, 13465, 13466, 13467, 13469, 13470, 13472, 13473, 13474, 13476, 13477, 13490, 13492, 13493, 13496, 13497, 13500, 13511, 13512, 13515, 13518, 13525, 13526, 13527, 13528, 13529, 13530, 13532, 13533, 13536, 13537, 13538, 13540, 13541, 13543, 13544, 13545, 13546, 13547, 13548, 13552, 13553, 13555, 13557, 13561, 13562, 13563, 13564, 13565, 13566, 13569, 13572, 13575, 13576, 13577, 13579, 13580, 13582, 13583, 13586, 13587, 13594, 13599, 13601, 13604, 13605, 13607 ,13608 ,13610, 13611, 13612, 13613, 13614 ,13616 ,13617 ,13619 ,13620, 13621, 13622, 13623, 13626, 13627, 13628, 13629, 13631, 13633, 13634, 13635, 13636, 13637, 13639, 13664, 13665, 13666, 13667, 13668, 13669, 13670, 13671, 13672 ,13673, 13674, 13675, 13676, 13677, 13678, 13680, 13681 ,13682, 13683, 13684, 13685, 13686, 13687, 13688, 13689, 13690, 13692, 13694, 13695, 13696, 13697, 13701, 13702, 13703, 13704, 13708, 13710, 13711, 13712, 13713, 13714, 13715, 13716, 13717, 13718, 13719, 13720, 13721 ,13722 ,13723 ,13724, 13725 ,13726, 41354

Başmuhasebe Kalemi Zimmet Halifeliği

13937

Büyük Ruznamçe Kalemi Sergi Halifeliği

21300, 21303

Cevdet Adliye

9/566, 61/3687, 84/5073, 101/6095, 104/6253, 105/6277, 25/1512, 45/2751, 54/3288, 55/3327, 60/3628, 61/3673, 62/3729, 62/3730, 63/3754, 93/5603, 93/5604, 95/5687, 703/28713

Cevdet Askeriye

1041/45716

Cevdet Dahiliye

2/83, 142/7090, 156/7795, 159/7901, 175/8713, 177/8815, 182/9098, 188/9381, 217/10808

Cevdet Maliye

39

42/1942, 69/4129, 70/3229, 82/4979, 95/4268, 95/4269, 95/4270, 105/4660, 144/6093, 167/7001, 189/7845, 227/9489, 243/10117, 243/10130, 255/10503, 269/11038, 317/13048, 326/13431, 336/13768, 336/13774, 339/13926, 357/14626, 358/14690, 369/15158, 373/15355, 374/15389, 375/15406, 376/15449, 389/15918, 395/16165, 427/17283, 428/17301, 445/17993, 448/18138, 451/18257, 481/19623, 481/19624, 489/19929, 492/20005, 504/20468, 504/20496, 505/20550, 558/22906, 576/23646, 578/23731, 583/23998, 613/25271, 624/25689, 650/26610, 662/27099, 703/28713, 714/29165, 719/29421, 735/30007, 748/30460, 749/30520, 759/30930, 30930, 762/31051, 769/31398, 774/31578, 776/31697, 777/31744, 780/31846, 784/31951

Darphane-i Amire

692/1245, 9/427, 693, 1246

Hattı Humayunlar

105/4117C

Kamil Kepeci Defterleri

2397, 2448, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2455, 2456, 2459, 2460, 2462, 2463, 3294, 3295, 3296, 3297, 753

Footnotes

[1] The roots of this view can be traced back to early modern intellectuals such as (Machiavelli 2007), (Smith 1937), (Bodin 1955).

[2] Halil İnalcık writes that "although Islamic law strictly forbids confiscation of private property from either Muslims or non-Muslims, the property of the tax-farmer or any government-related fortunes were always suspect as to their origin and were therefore subject to confiscation." Yet the breakdown of the traditional fiscal-military system in the eighteenth century significantly made the practice of confiscation more selective than before. Thus, we cannot consider, at least in the eighteenth-century context, what İnalcık claims as a rule applicable to all periods of Ottoman history.

[3] New Economic Geography suggests that economic activity is inherently unevenly distributed in terms of space (Mackinnon and Cumbers 2007: 27). The same logic can be applied to the spatial use of sovereign power. For this, see: (Allen 1997: 65-69)

[4] Working with Ottoman titles is somewhat tricky. For example, it could well be that someone was mentioned with more than one title in different sources. When it comes to social class, I mean the one identified in Ottoman political terminology, primarily the well-known dichotomy between askeri and reaya (military-administrative and ordinary subjects). For more on the interpretation of Ottoman titles, see: (Coşgel and Ergene 2015: 182)

[5] Property rights of merchants were generally well-respected. This is evident, for example, in a story narrated by the chronicler Naima. Here Derviş Mehmed Paşa, the governor of Basra reports the misbehavior of a certain Murtaza Paşa who was allegedly confiscating the wealth of merchants in this port city: "Our majesty! That castle at the shore is under the protection of the sultan. For many years the commodities of the merchants are kept there safely, and no one attacks this castle. The wellbeing of Basra and other port cities depends on the merchants, and confiscation of these commodities will result in the ruin of the country. Merchants are the immaterial treasure of the sultans. Persecuting merchants and confiscating their money and commodities can be observed neither in Islamic countries, nor in others. Be generous and surrender this ambition (Naima 1968)."

[6] Choice models are widely used in migration economics. In these, various choices of migrants such as whether to migrate, where to migrate, or which occupation to choose are estimated by choice models, either binary or nominal. The use of multinomial regression is not popular either in economics or economic history. For one of the exceptions, see: (Dribe, Olsson, and Svensson 2012)

[7] The baseline data on war pressure has been gathered from Şevket Pamuk. I have adjusted it according to the needs of this study by employing their main source: (Clodfelter 2008). Formula used in (Pamuk and Karaman 2013) can be found in the appendix of their paper. It suffices to say here that the variable is based on the number of casualties, including captives and missing soldiers and leaving off deaths among civilians.

[8] Ports considered as major ports are: Thessaloniki, İzmir, Antalya, Mersin, Beirut, Samsun and Trabzon. Istanbul was excluded for it is irrelevant for our purposes. The names of major ports have been derived from: (Balzac 1992).

[9] The data on warzones comes from: (Clodfelter 2008).