Divided Interests, Divided Migrants. The Rationales of Policies Regarding Labour Mobility in Western Europe, c.1550-1914

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Introduction

“Migrations have been part of human history since the dawn of time”.¹ Yet, in the wake of long-term economic transformations over the past five hundred years, human migration and mobility have assumed a dimension which has proved new both in scale and in character. The gradual transformation of the relations of production to a wage-labour economy, and the increasing spatial integration of economic relations, altered significantly the scope and structure of the labour market in which the movement of ‘human beings as factors of production’ takes place. This paper aims to illuminate how the regulation of this movement by western European political authorities over roughly the period 1550-1914 responded to and impacted upon the long-term economic changes which eventually modified the nature and quantity of labour mobility up to the level of today’s ‘globalised labour market’.²

The changing role of labour mobility throughout this ‘long modernising period’ was essentially conditioned by structural transformations in the nature, supply and demand of labour in the context of a developing wage-labour economy. These transformations amounted in macro terms to a process of proletarianisation: an increasing dependency on wage labour for the income of an increasing part of the population. Temporal and spatial discrepancies in the uneven development of the nature, demand and supply of this wage labour turned

mobility into a vital strategy for finding employment and for mobilising labour. This movement in turn was both object and subject of various interventions by different political authorities, both structuring and regulating the nature of labour mobility. This paper focuses on the rationales behind these policies, i.e. on the motives, concerns and interests of the policymakers. The basic research question involves identifying the rationales behind the policies governing labour mobility in relation to changing trajectories of labour mobilisation over roughly the period 1550-1914.³

Most scholarship on political activity in the domain of migration regulation implicitly or explicitly regards it as a novelty of the past one or two centuries at most, in other words as a (by-)product of the formation of modern nation states, international economic expansion and integration, and increased transnational mobility.⁴ Where studies do trace migration policies further back in time, the focus remains predominantly on precedents of international and intercontinental migration.⁵ Studies

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³ 'Labour mobility' is used to denote plainly the movement of people in search of work. The concept 'labour mobilisation' refers to the active ways in which this movement of labour supply was structured, mobilised, organised, channelled and regulated by employers and policymakers.
operating within this ‘national’ framework have explicitly linked different rationales and forms of these migration policies to strategies of labour mobilisation related to the needs and the state of national labour markets. The preoccupation with national categories in such analyses of migration policies, however, may itself be more a product of the rise of nation states in modern western history and ideology than the fact of migration regulation itself. To be sure, comprehensive and extensive migration policies at a national level appear only at the end of the nineteenth century at the earliest, and these were indeed profoundly influenced by the dynamics of state formation. But they did not arrive out of the blue. Various levels of political authority were, at least in Western Europe, active in the domain of the regulation of labour mobility for many centuries before the rise of nation states.

It is the contention of the present paper that a long-term view of such mobility regulation in western Europe from the sixteenth century onwards is illuminating both for a proper historical understanding of the development of modern national migration policies and for the dynamics

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of labour mobility regulation in the context of the structural economic and political transformations over the past five centuries in general. This paper thus aims to complement the ‘national’ perspective on migration policies by taking an approach ‘the other way round’, with the focus of analysis following the changing locus of policymaking on the rhythms of economic integration and political centralisation throughout the period ca. 1550-1914.

The analytical research question is centred on the relationship between migration policies and the structural limits and possibilities of labour mobilisation in relation to the economic and political ‘macro’-developments of proletarianisation, economic expansion and integration, and political centralisation, that have altered the face of Europe and eventually the globe from the sixteenth century onwards. In respect to these developments, the period ca. 1550-1914 can be regarded as one ‘long transformatory period’ over which structural and uneven transformations through space and time modified the economic and political ‘macro’-context, eventually to the level of a new constellation of political and social nation-states with an integrated economic structure centred on wage labour and operating within an internationalising economy.

There are two major reasons why such a focus on the regulation of labour mobility, although confined to western European policies, can make an important contribution to the writing of global history. Firstly, to the extent that the development of a wage-labour economy eventually shaped the production relations of today’s ‘capitalist world economy’, the European history of these relations of production is of ‘global’ interest.\(^9\)

\(^9\) Cf. Marcel van der Linden and Jan Lucassen, *Prolegomena for a global labour history* (Amsterdam: IISH, 1999), pp. 10-11. I do not wish here to engage in the debate whether the development towards a ‘modern industrial economy’ was an ‘internal’ European or ‘external’ global process with or without a Europe at ‘the core’ (Cf. the discussions between Immanuel Wallerstein, Andre Gunder Frank, Robert Brenner,
Secondly, as economic relations integrated on a greater spatial scale in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these policies in Western Europe explicitly acquired an international dimension that impacted upon human movements on a global scale, movements which are a central economic and political issue throughout the present-day world.  

What this paper will not do is give a descriptive overview of all policies relating to migration in Western Europe over the period 1550-1914; there is neither room nor much point in undertaking such a project within the proposed research layout. The focus is analytical, not descriptive. The approach to the analysis of the structural changes in migration policies in relation to long-term ‘macro’-developments is comparative and literature-based, and analytically structured around a ‘model’ of policy interests, presented in chapter II, that serves as the conceptual and analytical guideline for the historical analysis pursued in the chapters III, discussing the early modern period, and IV, dealing with ‘the long nineteenth century’. The concluding chapter will also leave room to reflect on the question to what extent the rationales of previous migration policies left their mark on the dynamics of migration policies in the radically changed ‘macro’-context of the twentieth century.

Patrick O’Brien and many others. Neither will I elaborate on the possible role of an ‘international division of labour’ – characterised by varying degrees of skill and coercion – in the development of the ‘Modern World Economy’, an important and interesting topic in world-system analysis. (Cf. Marcel van der Linden, "Global labour history and the modern world-system": Thoughts at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Fernand Braudel Center," International Review of Social History 46 (2002).) The important observation here is that in any case early modern Europe experienced extensive economic transformations – whether or not of ‘internal’ or ‘external’ origin – deeply affecting the relations of production in this area, of which the outcome – the industrial relations between capital and labour – today are replicated on a global scale; which makes this European evolution a ‘global’ topic in its own right. This does not, on the other hand, imply viewing modern labour relations in other parts of the world as mere ‘replicates’ or ‘expansions’ of a ‘universal’ European model.  

The analytical focus on the role of policies in relation to changing trajectories of labour mobilisation is limited to its relation to spatial patterns of labour mobilisation. There will be little reference to the ways in which political intervention has impacted on the overall development of supply and demand of wage labour;¹¹ the emphasis is only on how political activity in the domain of migration regulation was related to the patterns of movement of labour within the long-term uneven development of the labour market.

Conversely, the interest lies not so much with migration policies as such, but with their relation to structural patterns of labour mobility in connection to long-term economic and political transformations. To highlight the structural and long-term dynamics of policies governing labour mobilisation in relation to the changing 'macro-context' – the *longue durée* – attention will also be focused on those systems of labour mobility which Leslie Page Moch has termed “the relative quotidian and invisible movements”, rather than the salient movements brought about by war and persecution.¹² The latter are of course the forms of migration most intimately linked to direct political intervention, and have been analysed as such by many scholars.¹³ The present analysis, however, focuses on the more “quotidian and invisible” ways in which policies have structured and regulated the more “quotidian and invisible” forms of mobility in the long run.


1. The Conceptual and Analytical Framework

This chapter will spell out theoretically what is believed to have been the principal ‘logic’ behind the content of ‘quotidian’ migration policies in Western Europe over the ‘long transformatory period’ from ca. 1550 to 1914 in relation to trajectories of labour mobilisation. It must be stressed that the ‘dynamics’ sketched out in this chapter are not intended to add up to an exhaustive explanatory framework to account for all observable variations in migration policies and their relation to labour mobilisation. It is contended, however, that this ‘logic’ shaped the structural background of policymakers’ motivations in the long run. The theoretical dynamics sketched out in this chapter serve as a guideline for the historical analysis of the following chapters, which aim to highlight the structural and long-term dynamics of policies governing labour mobilisation in relation to the changing macro-context.

At a fundamental level it is proposed that ‘three broad domains of concern’ have shaped the interests of policymakers involved in designing the content of ‘quotidian’ migration policies in western Europe over the period under consideration: (1) political order and control, (2) resource entitlements, and finally (3) labour market regulation. It is the role of the last ‘domain’ that we are principally interested in, i.e. the relation of migration policies to strategies of labour mobilisation. The relation between this domain and the other two has, however, been of crucial importance in shaping limits and possibilities of labour mobilisation strategies. I shall first sketch summarily the content of the general concerns related to these three ‘domains’, then take recourse to an ideal, typical and static model to clarify the interests of policymakers at stake, and finally flesh out the model in relation to the principal dynamics that governed the ways in which the ‘other things’ did not ‘remain equal’.
1.1 Three broad domains of concern

Political order has in some ways always required some societal stability, compliance and control mechanisms. Mobility itself did not necessarily run counter to such aspirations, for some patterns of migration actually constituted a stabilising element of the societal structure in which they were imbedded.\textsuperscript{14} However, perceptions of sudden or structural changes in the character and scale of mobility, in particular, would often be seen as destabilising society and therefore as a threat to the existing political order.\textsuperscript{15} High levels of turnover might moreover


jeopardise an existing power base by altering the composition of the communities from which it derived its legitimisation.\textsuperscript{16} At a more practical level, high population mobility was also inconvenient to the extent that political order was based – and increasingly so – on an ability to define the members of society in terms of their ‘political duties’: taxes, military conscription, and the like. People ‘running around’ did not easily allow for adequate political control in this practical respect.\textsuperscript{17}

‘Resource entitlements’ is a term used to refer to the claims of households on forms of ‘communal resources’, a term covering a whole range of ‘public goods’ from commons and wastelands to forms of poor relief through to modern welfare provisions. Formally or informally, these entitlements have always been based on some form of ‘belonging’ to the community, which was ultimately defined in spatial terms. The organisation of these entitlements therefore has implications for migrational behaviour: it might deter members from leaving or attract newcomers. Depending on the elasticity of entitlements, the users and providers of these resources have in principle a negative interest in newcomers.

Mobility could constitute a vital strategy for workers to find adequate or better employment, or even be used as a bargaining strategy in collective action.\textsuperscript{18} Employers, on the other hand, have an interest in commanding a labour supply as large as possible, the more so in the

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. Clark observed how Kentish towns could take a particular negative attitude against ‘respectable immigrants’, which often lead attacks on the established urban oligarchies towns: Clark, ”The migrant in Kentish towns,” pp. 150-51.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. for instance in early modern France, with its high tax and conscription demands on its population: Moch, Moving Europeans, pp. 10-11.

context of fragile supply elasticity. In contexts of high fluctuations in labour demand and limited supply elasticity, a relative surplus of labour in situ then serves not only to pressure wages but also as a ‘reserve-pool’ for peak periods.

1.2 A model of elite interests

To clarify analytically the issues at stake in these three ‘broad domains of concern’ underlying mobility regulation, assume that the policymakers (‘elites’) hold all political power and resources, and that those subjected to their regulation (‘poor’) have only their labour and resource entitlements by which to survive. To maintain their position, the former need labour power and political compliance from the latter. For the poor to survive, the sum of their two sources of income needs to be at least at subsistence level.

Now distinguish the poor in terms of a ‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ status. ‘Productive’ refers to the ones in permanent adequately paid employment in no need of resource entitlements, ‘reproductive’ to those unable to work and wholly dependent on resource entitlements. As this status is influenced by one’s individual (sex, age, training, infirmity) and family (dependency ratio) life cycle in relation to labour market fluctuations (wages, employment opportunities), the status of the majority of the poor is situated along a continuum between the two statuses, and combines some (potential) productive capacities and reproductive requirements (e.g. temporary unemployment, young children, insufficient wages).

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To conclude the analytical exercise, envisage one geographical area that is economically and politically integrated internally under the dominance of ‘elites’ with no interests outside this area.

As only resource holders, then, the elites have an interest in limiting the entitlements of labour. As employers of labour, on the other hand, the generosity of these entitlements is inversely related to the cost of maintaining labour – both employed and ‘reserve’ labour. Both limited resource entitlements and high relative labour surpluses, in turn, could present a threat to political stability as unemployed poor took to the road or rebelled. Transferred to the domain of migration (See Table 1), the overall interests of the ‘elites’ in the ‘three domains of concern’ remain opposite respectively (Line 1): in their role as political power holders, they have an interest in limited overall turnover; as resource holders, they favour departures and disfavour arrivals; as employers of labour they have a preference towards in-movement and against out-movement. But the strength of their respective positive (+) and negative (-) interests in the presence of migrants is overall balanced if potential migrants are differentiated along their position on the continuum between ‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ status.
Table 1: The interests of elite groups with regard to migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elite Groups</th>
<th>Balance Between Elite Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Holders</td>
<td>Resource Holders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Migrants</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive Status (P)</td>
<td>0 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reproductive Status (R)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance Within Elite Groups</td>
<td>0 (+ P)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minus and plus signs indicate a negative or positive interest in the presence of migrants respectively, further differentiated in relation to migrants’ productive (P) or reproductive (R) status. A zero indicates an interest in limited overall turnover. A double sign indicates a strong interest, a single sign a weaker interest. The totals of columns and rows express the overall balance of interests (respectively within and between elite groups) with regard to migrants, differentiated in relation to migrants’ productive (P) or reproductive status (R). In making up these totals, two opposite signs cancel each other out.

The negative interest of resource holders is much stronger towards those on the reproductive side of the continuum than towards those on the productive side (column 2). Conversely, employers have a stronger stake in relatively productive immigrants (column 3). In principle, political power holders have an interest in limited emigration and immigration. As long as it does not jeopardise political stability, however, turnover is tolerated. To the extent that the unemployed might more easily rebel, the interests of power holders might even be slightly biased towards the entrance of productive migrants and the exit of reproductive ones (column 1). When all members of the elite are as much resource holders as employers as power holders, and thus have an equal stake in the different concerns, the eventual policy ‘compromise’ would be a migration policy that favours relatively productive migrants and disfavours reproductive ones (column 4).

Migrants do not necessarily carry both their productive capacities and resource entitlements with them. If migrants’ resource entitlements
are rooted in their area of origin, the resource holders of the area of
destination lose their negative interest in the presence of migrants. In this
situation, the overall interest bias towards ‘productive’ status and against
‘reproductive’, instead of taking the form of a selective migration policy
favouring highly productive migrants, could result in a strategy of spatially
separating the productive and reproductive statuses of potential migrants.
This strategy might be of considerable importance if it is remembered that
‘productive’ and ‘reproductive’ statuses are only poles of a broad
continuum. The respective possibilities of pursuing a selective
immigration policy and a spatial separation of ‘statuses’, would result in a
mobility policy that mobilises as many migrants as possible while bearing
as little responsibility for their resource entitlements as possible, as far as
such a policy does not jeopardise political stability.

The one geographical area of our model, of course, implies at least
one other one, where the first area’s immigrants originate from and its
emigrants go to. As an ideal typical replicate of the first area, the elite
interests of both areas are contradictory. However, differences in
employment opportunities would offer a way of aligning these conflicting
interests. If potential migrants have a higher chance of being unemployed
in their area of origin than in their area of destination, their migration can
be positive to elite interests on both sides, as the more ‘reproductive’
migrants that the first area loses are then more ‘productive’ immigrants to
the second area.

The essential balance of elite interests in the above model, then,
comes down to a separation of the productive and reproductive statuses
of the poor. It must be stressed that forms of spatial separation through
selective migration only constitute one way in which this could be
envisaged.\textsuperscript{21} It is this one that is focused upon in relation to this paper’s topic.

So far for the ideal typical model. Let me now introduce some principal corrections, which should also allow me to introduce some dynamic elements into the essentially static model.

1.3 Fleshing out the model

Firstly, the ‘elites’ did not necessarily hold all resources. The ‘poor’ could have their own independent resources and need not have been completely dependent on wage labour for their income. The process of proletarianisation, as it both increased wage-dependency and constrained access to such resources, transformed the position of the ‘poor’ in ideal typical terms from ‘independent’ to ‘dependent’ as in the above model. In his by now classic and frequently cited study, Charles Tilly estimated the proportion of the European population dependent on wage labour for (part of) their livelihood to have risen from roughly 24\% in 1550 to 58\% in 1750 and to 71\% by the middle of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{22} Today this proportion of Europe’s occupational population is thought to approximate 90\%.\textsuperscript{23} However, this was a hybrid and very uneven historical process, which defies teleological interpretations of a unilinear evolution towards a ‘modern proletariat’.\textsuperscript{24}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} For instance, the combination of rural industrial activity with subsistence agricultural activity in ‘pluri-active’ household economies might possibly be regarded as a non-spatial separation of productive use and reproductive requirements of labour, cf. the intense debate on ‘proto-industry’ as a precursor to capitalist factory industrialisation: among others, Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick, and Jurgen Schlumbohm, Industrialization before industrialization. Rural industry in the genesis of capitalism (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), passim.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Charles Tilly, "Demographic origins of the European proletariat," in Proletarianization and family history, ed. D. Levine (Orlando: Academia Press, 1984), pp. 30-36.
\item \textsuperscript{24} For instance, carrying out wage labour could be part of a family strategy to maintain an essentially non-proletarian existence, like with the French Montagnards performing seasonal labour in the plains to be able to hold on to their plot of land: Abel Poitrineau,
\end{itemize}
The best conceptual framework by which to understand patterns of labour market participation in their historical hybridity and complexity is that of the ‘adaptive family economy’. The composition of a household’s ‘income-pooling’ can best be understood as governed by the attempt to balance income maximisation with risk minimisation in relation to potential sources of income in a given setting. Schematically, these potential sources of income were threefold: independent resources, entitlements to communal resources, and wage labour. Dependency on wage labour involved high vulnerability to market fluctuations. In the absence of sufficient ‘risk insurance’ in the form of adequate entitlements to communal resources, a recourse to independent resources was a vital strategy by which households could avoid or minimise the risk associated with reliance on wage labour.


The behaviour of an individual in the labour market, then, was principally governed by the nature and content of the total ‘income-pooling’ of his or her household. Flexibility of wage labour behaviour would typically be limited by the potential trade-off against risk and the extent to which it jeopardised other sources of income. The availability of ‘communal resources’ as opposed to ‘independent resources’ increased in principle the flexibility of labour market participation, but then a lot depended on the conditions and nature of these entitlements. For instance, if they were tied to one specific place, labour mobility would likewise be limited to the extent that it would not be allowed to jeopardise these entitlements – for instance by not moving so far away that a return would be difficult if unemployed.27

The extent to which the ‘poor’ had own independent resources offered yet another way by which to separate productive use and reproductive requirements. The advantage of lower dependency of the poor on resources provided by the elites, however, presented a trade-off to elite interests as it also lessened the dependency of the poor on labour-market participation. Likewise, the dependency of the poor on resource provisions, whether independent or provided by elites, limited their overall spatial labour mobility to the extent that their access to these resources was tied to a specific place. Any strategy separating the productive uses and reproductive requirements of the poor placed some limitations on overall labour flexibility. Conversely, forms of spatial segregation always implied some trade-off with labour mobility. These trade-offs can, as in the model, be related to the different interests of elites as resource holders as against their interests as employers of labour. Likewise, the advantages and disadvantages of limitations on

labour mobility for any given employer – respectively in helping to keep
the ‘indigenous’ labour supply available, but in limiting labour mobilisation
from elsewhere – is analogous to the conflicting interests of employers of
the two ‘areas’ in the model.

Secondly, the nature of this trade-off in terms of overall labour
flexibility incorporated in the separation between productive and
reproductive statuses, was not only related to relative elite interest
balances but also by the nature of the labour demand itself. If there were
limited employment opportunities, other things being equal, the overall
balance of interests would shift to a more restricted labour mobilisation. If
labour demands were highly fluctuating, casual and irregular, the interest
in ways of shifting the maintenance of unemployed labour to other
spheres was very high. If employers on the whole needed a relatively
steady and stable labour force with certain qualities, the disadvantage of
limited supply responsiveness and relatively high turnover would weigh
heavier against the advantage of savings on resource provisions.

Thirdly, there has never been a complete overlap between
policymakers and the three ‘elite groups’ that we have distinguished,
either in social, economic, political or spatial terms. The group of
‘resource holders’ was almost always bound to be greater than that of
employers, and could contain elements of the ‘poor’. In this situation, the
costs to employers as resource holders for maintaining ‘reproductive’
labour would be lowered by the extent to which other groups contributed
to resource provisions. This ‘free ride’ opportunity for employers could in
principle be mobilised not only to maintain reserve-labour, but also to pay
lower wages, making the status of the employed more reproductive.28
Dependent on the relative political power of the resource holders and

27 Solar, "Poor relief," pp. 8-9; Knotter, "Problems of the ‘family economy’."
employers, the existence of this opportunity moves the eventual balance of the ‘policy compromise’ (column 4) towards a more restrictive (column 1) or more encouraging (column 3) immigration policy respectively. In all situations, the relative number, interest, and political power of elites might make for different problems of collective action impacting on the eventual ‘compromise’ of both policy and practice.

In spatial terms, all ideal typical distinctions are blurred by the fact that there existed a multitude of different ‘areas’ that existed not only side by side, but also to a considerable extent overlapped and were overlapped by greater ‘areas’ incorporating smaller ones. The interests and power of the various elite groups which in the original model were confined to one and the same ‘area’ could themselves extend or overlap into different ones. The meanings of ‘immigration’ and ‘emigration’ for elite members were thus relative to the variable spatial confinement of their reproductive responsibilities, labour mobilisation, and political power. The spatial organisation of political power was thus a critical factor shaping possibilities and limitations of collective action and determining the eventual ‘policy compromise’ at different levels of policymaking.

Lastly, let me remark that the model also allows for the ideal typical distinctions between ‘elites’ and ‘poor’ to be relative concepts. One could for instance be part of the ‘elite’ as a contributor to communal resources, yet part of the ‘poor’ as a performer of wage labour. Potential political influence of the ‘poor’ would, other things being equal, strengthen the interests of the ‘resource holders’ – if we regard labour as a ‘resource’ whose value is diminished by newcomers. A lot depends, however, on the relative stability of their respective entitlements both to resources and to employment.

1.4 Long-term dynamics in changing trajectories of labour mobilisation

From the above theoretical outlines of what is assumed to have shaped the principal 'logic' behind migration policies in relation to labour mobilisation, it is clear that the macro-processes of proletarianisation, economic expansion and integration, and political centralisation, altered both the nature of labour mobility and the stakes of policies governing labour mobilisation over the long run. Of course policies towards some groups of 'highly productive labour' have always been quite outside the 'logic' sketched out, because their 'productive value' was deemed to outweigh by far any considerations of the trade-off against their reproductive requirements. But these are part of an exceptional story. Here, the focus of interest lies with the policies towards the majority of labour, somewhere on the continuum between productive value and reproductive requirements.

There is no room to trace the whole evolution of the dynamics related to these trajectories through space and time for the whole of Western Europe for the whole of the period 1550-1914. Instead, I will focus on stylised 'examples' that are assumed to be representative for the ways in which the limits and possibilities of labour mobilisation policies were shaped by the above macro processes through space and time.

29 Like highly trained artisans who were the object of active recruitment policies and often (normative) emigration restrictions of mercantilist states and early modern cities. Likewise, some policies were outstripped of any considerations about labour mobilisation, because the targeted groups were no labour at all – like wealthy merchants – or because aggressive strategies of political power mobilisation on the basis of 'purification' dominated the mindset of policymakers – like with the expulsion of religious dissenters. In these instances, other factors were in play, like the perceived political or economic competition of the targeted groups, and/or their value in terms of capital assets – not labour assets. Cf. Lucassen and Lucassen, "Migration," p. 26; Sassen, *Guests and aliens*, pp. 9-10.
2. Various Policy Levels in Transitional Early Modern Economies

It is contended that spatial labour mobilisation strategies in the early modern period were dominated by a separation of productive uses and reproductive requirements, governed by the irregular or seasonal nature of most of the labour demand.\(^{30}\) There are many ways in which this could be achieved – the long-distance seasonal migration to the coasts of the thriving Dutch Republic is a case already brilliantly elaborated by Jan Lucassen.\(^{31}\) It is contended that the ways in which this separation could be realised depended crucially on the income-pooling basis of labour households, and consequently on the overall socio-economic structure. Likewise, the limits and structure of early modern political organisation made the local sphere the dominant locus (that is, our ideal typical ‘area’) of policies governing labour mobilisation, although the interrelationship with ‘higher’ levels of policymaking structured the eventual limits and possibilities of overall labour mobilisation.\(^{32}\) To illustrate the impact of these socio-economic and political determinants on the ‘logic’ and practice of migration policies in relation to labour mobilisation, I focus on the ‘examples’ of England and France. These two ‘classic opposites’ are nevertheless believed to have some wider reference to the western European experience as a whole, as two stylised

\(^{30}\) I owe much of the conceptual idea to a quotation of Jan-Luyten van Zanden’s economic theory of ‘merchant capitalism’ (i.e. a specification of early modern capitalism as contrasted with industrial capitalism): “Merchant capitalism is viewed as an open system: it arises and develops as a capitalistic ‘island’ in a world that is dominated by pre-capitalist modes of production. […] The reproduction of labour power occurs largely outside of the sphere of merchant capitalism, namely, in the pre-capitalist modes of production. […] In merchant capitalism a dualistic system often evolved, in which the reproduction of labor power and the production of the surplus were separated from each other.”, cited in Lucassen, "Mobilization of labour," p. 171., yet unfortunately enough I have been not been able to consult the original work.


\(^{32}\) Early modern state authorities did also engage in the formulation of what can be interpreted as ‘national migration policies’, but these were limited in scale and impact and/or mostly related to another ‘logic’ than labour mobilisation (Cf. notes 8 and 29 above) – because of the limited room and relevance I shall not discuss them here.
poles of the colourful continuum that characterised the social, economic and political early modern context through space and time.\textsuperscript{33}

2.1 An optimal allocation of labour within limits: early modern England

Of all western European countries, early modern England probably experienced the most profound societal transitions in the centuries up to its ‘First Industrial Revolution’. Population increased well over twofold in the ‘early modern transformatory period’ from the 1500s to around 1750, and the urban proportion grew from a mere 3% to almost 17%.\textsuperscript{34} Demographic pressure and dynamics of enclosures and land concentration raised the proletarian proportion of the population to by far the highest in Europe. Patterns of wage labour became dominant in widespread agricultural commercialisation and industrial expansion.\textsuperscript{35} All these transformations of course entailed serious societal dislocations and often high levels of population mobility, which provoked various policy attempts of regulation. The institutional-political context of this regulation


\textsuperscript{34} De Vries, \textit{European urbanization}, pp. 36, 39.

was also distinctive in that England achieved a relatively high degree of political integration within a central framework, particularly after the political upheavals of the seventeenth century. A particular mix of central direction and legal codification on one hand, and local autonomy and inter-parish relations on the other, formed the politico-institutional nexus of its early modern social policy.  

The central feature of England’s social policy with great relevance to migration policies was its specific organisation of ‘reproductive resource entitlements’. The ‘Elizabethan Poor Law’ of 1598-1601, although it took a century to be universally implemented, laid the legislative basis of a universal parochial system of poor relief, financed by a compulsory tax on rateable value and administered by local poor-law guardians. As such, it was a limited acknowledgement of the ‘reproductive needs’ of increasingly proletarianised poor, undoubtedly stimulated by the ‘high-pressure’ instability of the ‘long sixteenth century’. However, its intent – although not necessarily its practice – was directed only towards those whose reproductive status was absolute, like the elderly and disabled; the English Poor Law remained a form of discriminate ‘residual relief’ throughout its history.  

The reproductive needs of those of a more (potential) productive status were denied in the legislative initiatives of the ‘long sixteenth century’. The able-bodied poor continued to be regarded as ‘idle’ and thus ‘undeserving’. This idleness moreover was a threat to the moral order of society and therefore spurred repressive activity. Labour, vagrancy and poor relief legislation reiterated the obligation to work and criminalised free mobility of the poor. Any ‘masterless man’ could be punished (with

37 Slack, The English Poor Law, pp. 11-12; Solar, "Poor relief," p. 17.
38 Lees, The solidarities of strangers, pp. 14-16.
varying harshness) and sent back home where he was to be put to work.\textsuperscript{39}

The sense of ‘belonging’ of the poor implied both by the local organisation of relief and by the practice of sending vagrants ‘back’, was formalised only in 1662. From then onwards every poor person had a legally defined ‘settlement’: the parish responsible for relief. Both in content and in origin, this Act of Settlement was still very much the product of the notion that ‘the poor should stay put’: it allowed all newcomers to a parish to be swiftly removed, except those renting a house of more than £10 annual rental value.\textsuperscript{40}

The negative attitude towards labour mobility shows little room for our ideal typical employer interests in sixteenth and early seventeenth century legislation, which seems mostly driven by concerns for societal order. On the other hand, it did allow for extra-economic pressure on existing labour supplies.\textsuperscript{41} But crucially, in the limited theoretical adjustment to the changing economic role of labour, and the overall uneven development of supply and demand, the poor were valued only as ‘decreasing the wealth of the kingdom’.\textsuperscript{42} Poor migrants, then, were perceived only as a reproductive burden on parish resources; especially those less regulated like wastelands and commons.\textsuperscript{43} As worries about

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\textsuperscript{41} Woodward, "The background."; Lis, Soly, and Van Damme, \textit{Op vrije voeten?}, pp. 60-61.
\textsuperscript{43} Cf. the preamble to the 1662 Settlement Act is illustrative: "Whereas by reason of some Defects in the law, poore People are not restrained from going from one Parish to another, and therefore doe endeavour to settle themselves in those parishes where there is the best Stock the largest Commons or Wastes to build Cottages and the most
the political order declined, communal resources other than poor relief became increasingly limited for the poor, and economic activity based on increasing wage-dependency and labour mobility further expanded, room was made also in legislative theory for the possible productive use of migrants.

A more positive appraisal of labour migration was evident in changes in the Settlement Law from the end of the seventeenth century onwards, designed explicitly to support productive forms of labour mobility. Now a migrant could earn a new settlement on the basis of productive merit: the completion of an apprenticeship or a one-year service. However, parish boycott strategies, quick legislative restrictions, and declining importance of these traditional labour relations would soon curtail these possibilities, officially abolished again in 1834.

Woods for them to burn and destroy and when they have consumed it then to another Parish and att last become Rogues and Vagabonds to the great discouragement of Parishes to provide Stocks where it is lyable to be devoured by stangers" Taylor, "The impact," pp. 49-50; Landau, "The regulation," pp. 558-59, 62, 67. 44 Cf. in stark contrast to the 1662 Act, the preamble to the innovating Act of 1697 reads: "Forasmuch as many poor Persons chargeable to the Parish, Township or Place, where they live, meerly for want of Work, would in any other Place where sufficient Employment is to be had, maintain themselves and Families without being burthensome (...)but are...) not permitted to inhabitt elsewhere though their Labour is wanted in many other Places, where the Increase of Manufactures would implo[m]ore Handes".

45 The 1691 Act introduced also two other new ways of gaining a settlement: paying parish rates and serving a year in a public office, Taylor, "The impact," pp. 50-52.

Indeed, the fourfold increase in poor relief expenses over the eighteenth century put the limiting of relief responsibilities, whether potential or real, firmly in place as the primordial concern in parish migration policies. Although the thread of older vagrancy laws was continued, their intent and use became increasingly focused on removing ‘parasitic’ migrants.\textsuperscript{47} In this respect, the other legislative innovation of late seventeenth-century Settlement Law – certificates – catered more adequately to parish needs. A certificate was a migration document in which a migrant’s home parish stated responsibility for his relief, and protected the migrant from removal unless he became chargeable. At the end of the eighteenth century, this protection against removal was extended to all migrants.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{48} Certificates had existed before, but the Act of 1697 was of vital importance in making them binding legal documents, Cf. Philip Styles, "The evolution of the Law of Settlement," \textit{University of Birmingham Historical Journal} 9, no. 1 (1963): pp. 48-52. The Act of 1795, in turn, made them superfluous. Snell and Landau have engaged in an intense discussion whether this last act made a great difference to practice. Snell maintains that the Settlement Laws were only applied selectively to migrants who were (soon to be) a charge on the poor rates, so that the 1795 Act did not make much difference, while Landau maintains that they were more extensively applied to ‘monitor’ migration, an option curtailed by the 1795 Act. Yet, relevant to our interest, they both agree that the aim and result of parish migration policies was to restrict ‘reproductive’ burdens on their resources (among others by selective removals and avoiding settlement; see above and below) – only Landau thinks these were broader than poor relief (commons, etc.) while Snell does not. Landau herself suggests that the importance of these other ‘communal resources’ declined in the second half of the eighteenth century, so that legislation aligned with practice by 1795. It seems indeed likely that parochial policies to restrict ‘reproductive burdens’ focused on all parochial ‘communal resources’, and likewise became exclusively focused on poor relief somewhere between 1662 and 1795 as these other resources lost importance. Snell, \textit{Annals}; Norma Landau, "The laws of settlement and the surveillance of immigration in eighteenth-century Kent," \textit{Continuity and Change} 3, no. 3 (1988); Landau, "The regulation."; Norma Landau, "The eighteenth-century context of the laws of settlement," \textit{Continuity and Change} 6, no. 3 (1991); Snell, "Pauper settlement."; K. D. M. Snell, "Settlement, Poor Law and the rural historian: new approaches and opportunities," \textit{Rural history} 3, no. 2 (1992); Norma Landau, "Who was subjected to the laws of settlement? Procedure under the settlement laws in eighteenth century England," \textit{Agricultural History Review} 43, no. 2 (1995).
The changes in late seventeenth and eighteenth century mobility regulation clearly reflected a concern to separate the productive uses and reproductive responsibilities of migrants, inspired by the increasing economic importance of wage labour and a concern to limit resource entitlements. The legislative apparatus provided parishes with a legal arsenal to pursue selective migration policies that allowed them the benefits of labour without the responsibility to care for it if not needed. And it is clear that they used these means.

The impact of early modern English legislation governing settlement and mobility between parishes is a much-debated subject in English historiography. Originally condemned as an infringement on ‘natural liberty’ or as an instrument of repression towards the labouring classes by classic economic liberals and labour historians respectively, a more mixed and refined ‘revisionist’ appraisal of its impact on labour mobility has emerged from more recent detailed studies of its practice. For sure, Adam Smith was right in maintaining that this legislation ran counter to the ideal of free labour mobility, and undoubtedly much personal grievance resulted from its implementation. On the other hand, its practice does not seem to have hindered mobility much as such, which was overall high, but only the transfer of migrants’ ‘reproductive requirements’. In the early modern context, then, it may overall actually have contributed more to economic growth than that it hindered it.

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Recent studies examining the practice of mobility regulation at parish level show that removals were biased against migrants of a relatively ‘reproductive status’, like elderly and single-parent households with children, and also followed the rhythms of seasonal and cyclical unemployment. In dealing with fluctuations in labour demand, removals were but the least fluid strategy. The threat of removal was actually a more convenient and widespread method, to pressure home parishes to provide certificates and make them contribute to the maintenance of an unemployed sojourner. Indeed, home parishes often provided out parish relief to cover the needs of out resident migrants if the alternative of the migrant’s return was deemed even less advantageous. Conversely, if the presence of temporarily unemployed migrants was valued in the longer run, parishes of residence also granted forms of casual relief to non-settled residents. These practices of course depended on the political weight of employers, and there are known instances where ratepayers succeeded in pressuring employers to employ only certificated migrant labour. A whole range of official and off-the-record inter-parish


52 Also complicated by the possibility of litigation, cf. Styles, "The evolution," p. 62.

53 ‘Sojourner’ is used to denominate someone residing in a parish which is not his or her parish of settlement.


56 There is very little documented on interest conflicts between different groups of parish ratepayers relating to migration and relief policies, yet it is assumed that they were ubiquitous and it is suggested that certificates offered a way of overcoming these: Landau, "The regulation," p. 561 n.49; Wells, "Migration," pp. 95-96, 127.
relations thus shaped the practice of migration regulation, based on parish control over the distribution of relief, the legally defined responsibilities of relief, the internal balances of power, and the theoretically almost unfettered possibility of removal.

Naturally, these subtle separations of productive uses and reproductive responsibilities implied that there were winners and losers. As parishes would be reluctant to see very 'productive' migrants leave and be even more reluctant to contribute to their maintenance elsewhere, such situations were acceptable only if these migrants would have been highly 'reproductive' at home, i.e. if their employment opportunities were smaller at home than at the destination. Overall, then, these intricate arrangements and policies of selective migration in practice enabled a spatial distribution of labour in relation to relative demands and as such amounted to a subsidy in 'human capital' to expanding sectors and areas.\(^{57}\) Furthermore, from the perspective of the potential migrant, the relative certainty of relief at home and the many mechanisms to mobilise such entitlements elsewhere, probably eased the personal risks involved in migration.\(^{58}\)

Within the limits of the fragmented nature of labour markets and the localised nature of political power, however, most of this labour distribution and subsidisation did occur within spatially limited economies. As local employers were not keen on having their 'productive' labour move far out of reach in case it was needed, communication possibilities and information channels over long distances were limited, and as much labour demand was of a seasonal nature, forms of circular migration in function of complementary and changing demands over small areas was

\(^{58}\) Solar, "Poor relief," pp. 11-12.
predominant. An extreme – and also frequently seized on by contemporary critics – example of such subsidised local migration was the situation of ‘open’ and ‘close’ parishes, the first supplying the labour to the neighbouring latter, where residence was strictly restricted to save on relief expenses. Another example was how farmers in the south came to use their political power over relief administration as a way of maintaining a ‘reserve army’ of labour for their increasingly seasonal labour demands, by using outdoor allowances as unofficial unemployment benefits in their ‘implicit contracts’ and by limiting labour movement to short-distance circulation.

All in all, the specific nature of English inter-parochial migration regulation was conducive to an efficient allocation of labour, but within the limits of early modern economic development and political organisation. As these limits were gradually eroded from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, these mechanisms would help in overcoming the precarious labour markets of early industrialisation, and then pose their own limits to its further development.

2.2 Limited regulation in a precarious economic and political context: early modern France

Early modern France often figured and figures as the ‘classic other’ in comparison with England. A far bigger and more populated country already at the beginning of the period, its population increased only by a

60 Although Sarah Banks, "Nineteenth-century scandal or twentieth-century model? A new look at 'open' and 'close' parishes," Economic History Review 41, no. 1 (1988). has tried to argue that these ‘open’ and ‘close’ parishes were more a construction of nineteenth-century anti-Settlement Law propaganda than a historical reality, more recent appraisals again confer historical importance on these concepts: Solar, "Poor relief," pp. 15-16, n. 107; Song, "Landed interest," pp. 475-79, 83-85, n. 52.
quarter over the period between the 1500s and the middle of the eighteenth century. Urbanisation also increased at a more modest pace than in England, the proportion of the population living in cities growing from 4% to 9%. Rural transformations were less profound, and the country as a whole remained dominated by relative small-scale peasant ownership. Relations of production at the locus of more modest agricultural commercialisation and industrial expansion were typically characterised by dispersed semi-proletarian ‘pluri-active’ peasant households in conjunction with high-quality city production in a stronger corporative tradition. Although the French as a whole remained more ‘attached to the land’, this did not preclude high population mobility. Forms of seasonal, temporary and circular migration especially, proliferated in the income pooling of pluri-active peasant households. These supplied growing towns, ports, and seasonally labour-intensive agricultural activities – like the large-scale grain-growing farms of the Paris basin or the vineyards of the Mediterranean – with relatively flexible labour supplies from the pays de petite culture in strongly patterned, sometimes long-distance, movements to-and-fro.

The politico-institutional framework of social policy was very different from England. Although classically portrayed with the rhetoric of an absolutist state, France was in reality much more politically fragmented. The assertion of central authority was involved in a permanent struggle with rival local and regional powers which structurally

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62 De Vries, European urbanization, pp. 36, 39.
63 Hufton, The poor, pp. 11-24; Lis and Soly, Poverty and capitalism, pp. 67, 70-72, 76-78, 89-91, 120-25, 33; DuPlessis, Transitions to capitalism, pp. 59-63, 105-07, 64-71, 237-43.
delimited its manoeuvrability and influence in the domain of social policy. These struggles in the context of France’s turbulent political history have also preoccupied its historians, with the *raison d’État* looming large in the analysis of social policy, in particular that of the state’s continual attempts to regulate and control the mobility of its population. The content and rhetoric of central activity in the domain of social policy certainly fit with the idea of an overall concern for political order, preoccupied as it was with eradicating the destabilising ‘threat’ of vagrancy and wandering beggars and with passport regulations to control internal and external movement. Furthermore, the institution in charge of the implementation of this repression and control was itself the symbol par excellence in the state’s assertion of authority against rival claimants: the national *Maréchaussée.*

However, whatever the ambitions of the central state and their politico-philosophical and symbolic importance in the light of further political developments, the practical impact of state policies in early modern France was overall relatively modest. The great symbolic meaning of the national police force notwithstanding, its numbers were very small in relation to the country’s size. Moreover, it was dispersed in

small brigades of some five officers located in cities, where their actions were intermingled with those of local police organisations.  

The central locus where the ‘logic’ of migration regulation was really articulated in practice remained in early modern France, as in England, the local sphere. The very different organisation of the ‘reproductive needs’ of labour, however, made for a different set of parameters in this logic. Firstly, there never was a uniform comprehensive framework of assistance like the English Poor Law. Although the less influential and directive role of central social policy played a part in the lack of anything similar, one must also appreciate that the differences in social and economic structure made for a different context of needs, functions and possibilities of assistance. The only partial proletarianisation and relatively egalitarian structure of the pays de petite culture made both for a lesser functional need of providing assistance and for a comparative lack of elites who would have an interest in it and means of providing it. As the organisation of assistance was left to local initiative, it should not surprise us that it was disproportionately located in the cities, where the proletarian population was mostly located. Although less systematised, these forms of assistance also functioned to overcome problems of unemployment and difficult periods in life- and family cycles, however contrary sometimes to their original intention.

Forms of labour mobilisation that were based on temporary labour of semi-proletarian peasant households, then, offered a widespread and

66 Gutton, La société et les pauvres, pp. 352-55, 442-47; Hufton, The poor, pp. 220-24. This is not to deny the great impact of the ‘offensive’ on vagrancy and begging with the Grand Renfermement of the late 18th century when many thousands were locked up in the Dépôts de mendicité. It is worth noting, however, that the total numbers of convicted vagrants in England, solely arrested by local authorities, in the same period was probably greater than in France per head of the population: William Olejniczak, "English rituals on subordination: Vagrancy in late eighteenth-century East Anglia," Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850: Selected Papers (1994): pp. 630-31.

distinct way of separating productive use and reproductive needs of migrants. Harvest failures or other subsistence crises distorting the family income-pooling could, however, frequently jeopardise the balance in these patterns and drive migrants in disproportionate numbers to cities to benefit from their assistance provisions and alarm public fears about wandering ‘vagrants’. Cities, for their part, frequently had available means and institutions designed to chase away and remove unwanted ‘reproductive’ migrants. Forms of assistance were often exclusively designed for their ‘own’ residents, and the criteria often amounted to between three and seven years of residence. In the context of central directives for the grand renfermement of all beggars and vagrants, cities often successfully opposed the indiscriminate – and costly – reception of non-residents in their hôpitaux. All in all, then, both the control over relief entitlements and the powers of removal enabled cities to enforce selective migration policies and separate productive uses of and reproductive responsibilities towards migrants, in much the same logic as seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English parishes.

However, the mechanisms that existed to forcefully separate the productive and reproductive status of migrants seem to have been much blunter and less flexible than the ones existing in contemporary England. For one thing, the generally less systematic and discriminate nature of most forms of assistance would make control over migrants via their reproductive claims less feasible. The lack of an overall legislative organisational framework rendered the problems of concerted collective action for different elite groups probably insurmountable. Moreover, cities as such acted on their own. There was no room for anything like the English intricate and subtle web of inter-parish bargaining over the uses

of and responsibilities for migrants. Real comprehensive activity in the forceful removal of migrants, then, also appears to have been mostly of an ad hoc nature in crises or high-pressure periods, and much less attuned to regional fluctuations in labour demand. A relatively blunt and indiscriminate attitude to migrants is also evident in the actions taken against vagrants by the Maréchaussée. Although legal provisions often explicitly protected seasonal migrants from being identified as vagrants, they often made up a significant part of those arrested.

Adequate and flexible forms to deal ‘productively’ with migrants, then, were limited by a precarious social-economic structure that fled labour markets with an uncontrolled oversupply in times of crisis and by the lack of an organisational framework that allowed migration and relief entitlements to be monitored in the light of demand-focused labour mobilisation. As long as patterns of labour mobility of ‘pluri-active’ households were adequately tuned to regular fluctuations in labour demand, these mechanisms probably provided the most convenient sources of ‘free gifts of human capital’. Increasing rural ‘push’-forces in the second half of the eighteenth century, driven by demographic pressure and land fragmentation, would however increasingly pressure these century-long patterns beyond the limits of labour-supply elasticity. Coupled with mounting problems in rural and urban industries, the closing decades of the French Ancien Régime were the scene of increasing

societal distress and dislocation that rekindled the long-standing concerns of political order.\textsuperscript{72}

3. **Nation States in Industrialising Societies**

In this chapter, it will be argued that the very different strategies of separating the productive and reproductive status of the majority of labour of the early modern period ran into increasing contradictions with the dynamics of economic expansion, industrialisation and urbanisation and the political dynamics of centralisation and nation construction in the ‘long nineteenth century’. To illustrate the impact of the economic evolution, I elaborate on the ‘example’ of England, while the experiences of France and Germany are used to illustrate the impact of the interrelationship of political and economic dynamics on migration policies.\textsuperscript{73}

3.1 The contribution and limits of ‘divided migrants’ in English industrialisation

The earlier ‘revolutionary’ view of the magnitude and suddenness of the social and economic changes wrought by England’s Industrial Revolution have recently been scaled down in favour of a more evolutionary perspective that stresses continuities and more gradual change.\textsuperscript{74} Likewise, ideas of a ‘mobility transition’ and a one-way labour transfer from the relatively overpopulated agricultural south to the


\textsuperscript{73} Limited space impels me to treat the great European emigrations of the period, subjected to little European regulation, as a ‘given’ in the following discussion. How its role as a ‘safety valve for surplus labour’ might have impacted upon internal mobility policies would undoubtedly be an interesting question to more closely elaborate upon.
industrialising north have in the light of recent research been replaced by an acknowledgement of an essential continuity of pre-industrial patterns of migration until well into the nineteenth century.\(^\text{75}\) Certainly, urban growth was impressive, and mostly concentrated in London and in the manufacturing districts.\(^\text{76}\) Yet, the eventual redistribution of population occurred within a wavelike pattern of predominantly short-distance moves in various directions eventually culminating in urban industrial areas. Although the volume of migration increased, there is no sign of an obvious widening of the overall geographic range of movement nor of an increasing general concentration on specific regions until the late nineteenth century. This makes the patterns of labour movement in industrialising England governed by a paradox of high wage gaps between – to use a simplifying shorthand – an overall labour-short industrialising north and an apparently overpopulated agricultural south.\(^\text{77}\)

However, the apparent oversupply of labour in the south masked the heavy seasonal peaks in labour demand which increased even more with certain technological innovations and further crop concentrations. To insure adequate labour for the intense harvest demands, keeping overall ‘redundant’ labour \textit{in situ} in slack periods still had clear benefits to farmers, who continued to mobilise their political power over relief

\(^{75}\) Cf. Whyte, \textit{Migration and society}, pp. 138-41.
administration in their ‘implicit contracts’, even after the 1834 New Poor Law had sought to end these practices.78

The growing demand for industrial labour in the north, on the other hand, was marked by heavy fluctuations and irregularities. The counterpart of nominally high wages was often high employment insecurity, as a fluid labour mobilisation characterised employers’ strategies to cope with overall market fluctuations.79 As the majority of residents in industrial areas was often composed of sojourners,80 spatial separation of their productive use and their reproductive requirements when their labour was not needed could often be an important strategy in coping with labour costs in precarious markets.

On the one hand, practices of out parish relief were widespread towards industrial sojourners.81 On the other hand, depending on the political power of manufacturers, forms of casual relief could be mobilised to cover temporary unemployment of valuable labour.82 Still, removals were also frequent. In normal situations, they were – as might be expected – biased against migrants of a high ‘reproductive’ status, like widowed or single women with children. In times of widespread industrial slump, on the other hand, they covered a quantitatively and qualitatively much wider range of people.83 The grandiose failure of the government-assisted programme of migration towards industrial townships due to the

industrial slump of the 1840’s illustrates the limited overall absorption capacities – that is, with respect to both productive use and reproductive requirements – of the irregular early industrial labour market.  

Migration to industrial regions was characterised by a lot of movement to and fro, and return migration to agricultural areas in times of slumps, both forced and voluntary, was manifest. Pollard has termed these “drifting and nomadic workers” as part of “the shock troops and buffers of an erratic and ill-organised labour market” of early industrialisation. I would expand the argument further and pose that the possibilities at hand to separate spatially the productive uses and reproductive responsibilities of labour, via movement to and fro and via inter-parish bargaining over poor relief, was a crucial and possibly vital strategy to cope with the costs of labour mobilisation for the irregular demands of early industry. However, these strategies had their limits.

The second half of the ‘long nineteenth century’ is the scene of a series of legislative changes cumulating in a move away from the options for separating reproductive responsibilities and migrant presence at internal level, expanding the ‘area’ of reproductive entitlements from the parish over the parish union to eventually the nation with the beginning of the development of ‘modern’ welfare provisions in the early twentieth century.

86 Cf. Taylor, Poverty, pp. 174-75.
87 Firstly, the parochial basis was steadily substituted for a greater ‘area’ of settlement, the parish unions, greatly reducing the total number of ‘areas’ by a ratio of about 23:1; a move completed with the Union Chargeability Act of 1865: Rose, "Settlement," pp. 28-31; Anthony Brundage, The English Poor Laws, 1700-1930 (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 104. Secondly, various acts limited the options of removal, even for migrants receiving relief – eventually three years residence conferred irremovable with the Act of 1865: Rose, "Settlement.". Thirdly, the influence of central authority over local practice was steadily enhanced by various reorganisations: Brundage, The English Poor Laws, pp. 61-74, 90-98, 110-16.. Finally, the introduction of national pension, insurance and unemployment schemes in the run up to World War I marked the beginning of the reformulation of ‘resource
I would argue there were at least four factors relevant to this development. Two of them, the move towards political centralisation and the worries about increasing labour agitation and revolutionary threats, can be – for the limits and sake of the argument here – regarded as relatively ‘external’ to the ‘logic’ of the separation of productive and reproductive spheres, but with great impact on its reorganisation. The two other factors, the role of the Irish, and the changing nature of the overall labour market, give further insight into the limits and possibilities of this separation in a changing economic context.

The principal role of the Irish can be summarised as a reservoir of flexible ‘unlimited labour supply’ for the lowest segments of rural and urban labour markets. Their numbers, both as temporary and as settled migrants, assumed quick economic importance from the Napoleonic wars onwards and even more with the great post-famine influx. As they had no official claim to poor relief in England, their cheap and elastic labour supply was not counterweighted by a responsibility for ‘reproductive needs’. Channelled to the most tedious, low skilled, insecure and badly paid jobs, their principal impact was a crowding out of English labour at the bottom end of the irregular rural and urban labour markets as the other “mobile shock troops of the industrial revolution”.

At the same time, as mechanisation spread further and industrial markets stabilised and expanded, the need for a more stable, better trained and disciplined labour supply in other segments of the labour entitlements’ on a national basis, from local poor relief to ‘modern’ welfare provisions: Cf. Brundage, *The English Poor Laws*, pp. 140-42.

Although one might pursue the idea that the separation between productive use and reproductive requirements in general was a crucial factor arousing labour agitation. Although the Irish were eventually included in the 1846 Irremovable Act, and received casual relief at the discretion of the poor relief authorities. Rose, "Settlement," pp. 38-39; Pollard, "Labour," pp. 112-15, 60; Armstrong, "Rural population growth," pp. 681-83; Harris, *The nearest place*, pp. 130-83; D. Feldman, "L'immigration, les immigrés et l'état en Grande-Bretagne aux XIXe et XXe siècles," *Le Mouvement Social*, no. 188 (1999): pp. 50-57; Whyte, *Migration and society*, pp. 165-72.
market assumed importance against the trade off in savings on reproductive responsibilities. In this context, the movement to and fro that the strategy of spatially separating reproductive needs and productive uses of labour implied, became less and less adequate in catering to changing labour demands.\textsuperscript{90} If coupled with pressure of labour agitation, the movement towards higher wages and a national welfare system from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards can be understood as a movement towards reunification of the productive and reproductive status of more high-quality labour whose productive value had risen.\textsuperscript{91} Likewise, the increasing concentration of labour demands in urban areas made ‘insurance schemes’ divided over small areas less sustainable in the wake of an increasingly concentrated relocation of the population.\textsuperscript{92} In the context of the further spatial integration of the labour market helped greatly by improving means of transportation and communication, employers’ interests were now best served by a nationally freed labour market on which the spatial limitation of the reproductive entitlements of labour placed no barriers.

3.2 An ‘inclusive’ labour-short nation: France

The evolution of the regulation of mobility in ‘long nineteenth century’ France allows us to look at how the overall ‘logic’ was influenced by the dynamics of nation construction. With the Revolution, the French state embarked on an explicit political project in which national sovereignty was embodied by 	extit{citoyenneté}. French scholarship, with its strong politico-philosophical tradition and preoccupation, has paid a lot of attention to the ways in which the mobilisation of this inclusive concept of

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\textsuperscript{92} Cf. Solar, "Poor relief," p. 18.
\end{flushright}
nationhood in the organisation of political power and order implied and was consolidated against a definition of the excluded other, the non-citizen. For all its ideological and philosophical dimension, this logique nationale had a very material impact in the wake of increasing political influence over society and state bureaucratisation. The bureaucratic translation of ‘the dominance of the national category’ was a self-reinforcing dynamic of categorisation and labelling of the population as a mechanism of political control, in which the division between citoyen and étranger was the ultimate centre of gravity.\textsuperscript{93} Moreover, with the political turmoil on the Continent in the nineteenth century and the changing regimes in France, the concern for political order and for the control of ‘foreign’ elements – in particular of political exiles – was no loose concern for the various regimes. The most concrete instrument of this political-bureaucratic dynamic were the passports, reintroduced in the heyday of the revolutionary period, and increasingly perfected as a means to control both the internal movement of the French population and to recognise and monitor the ‘foreign’ element in its ‘imagined community’\textsuperscript{.94}

On the other hand, the changing socio-economic structure increasingly ran up against the limits of the traditional mechanisms by which labour had been mobilised. In a first phase, the labour needs of the spatially very limited regions of industrial expansion could be fed by the domestic and seasonal labour of the ‘pluri-active’ peasant households.


But as mechanisation proliferated and industry expanded, these sources became increasingly inadequate. The transformation of small-scale peasants into permanent industrial labour was a very slow and only partial process. In the middle of the nineteenth century, half of the French population was still occupied in agriculture, and this proportion would not fall below 40% before World War I (and not much lower before the end of World War II), a point exceeded in England already before the end of the eighteenth century. Moreover, the French population continued its traditionally slow pace of population growth in a period when that of the rest of modernising Europe rapidly expanded. Even in the absence of any great emigration movement, the attachment of the French to the land, also politically protected by strong peasant property rights, and the slow pace of population growth provided inadequate sources of labour for the expanding demands of industrialisation. This peculiar state of affairs led France to find itself in the times of the great European emigrations in the exceptional state of a predominantly immigration country.

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97 Whereas France’s population of nearly thirty million at the end of the eighteenth century still accounted for about 15% of Europe’s population, by the dawn of World War I its forty million inhabitants only represented 9% of the equivalent. Cf. Lequin, "Labour in the French economy," p. 296.

The numbers of foreigners in France expanded rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century, from about 400,000 to over one million, complemented by a lot of seasonal and commuting labour mobility from the same areas of origin. Most were Belgians and Italians and to a lesser extent Germans, attracted by better employment opportunities and ‘pushed’ by the socio-economic transitions and disintegration of rural livelihoods in their home areas. Their high spatial concentration reflected both their cross-border origins and France’s industrial geography. Although the settled immigrants made up only 3% of France’s total population before World War I, their proportion represented up to 16% of the industrial and coal mining départements of the north, east and southeast. Their function as a complement to France’s inadequate supplies of labour in relation to the changing demands of industrialisation is evident in their occupational distribution. In 1901, only 15% of immigrants worked in agriculture as against almost half of the French, but 70% as against one third in industrial sectors respectively.99

Up to World War I this influx of labour was the result of private initiative of labour and employers, who sometimes set up considerable recruitment programmes. Their presence was often greeted by much hostility and xenophobia on the part of French workers.100 The economic need for foreign labour confronted the political project of nationhood with a new étranger which bore in quantitative and qualitative terms little resemblance to the erstwhile small communities of artisans, merchants or political exiles. The new tension was eventually resolved in favour of a project of ‘inclusive nationhood’: the law of 1889 opened the door for

99 These immigrants represented one third of France’s population growth between 1851 and 1886, and over 80% of that between 1886 and 1891, a contribution enhanced by their favourable age structure compared to the indigenous population. Lequin, "Labour in the French economy," pp. 298-302; Sassen, Guests and aliens, pp. 66-68; Blanc-Chaléard, Histoire de l'immigration, pp. 9-11, 18-21.
100 Sassen, Guests and aliens, p. 68; Blanc-Chaléard, Histoire de l'immigration, p. 13.
large-scale naturalisations on the basis of the residential principle of *ius soli*. As the project of *l'état nation* was complemented by that of *l'état social* with the first social welfare programmes from the late nineteenth century onwards, citizenship became the qualifying entitlement not only for political but also social inclusion. Again, the changing economic needs and rationales had contributed to a reunification of the increased productive uses – by the way, not only economically, but also militarily – and the reproductive responsibilities on a national level. The counterpart of France’s ‘quasi-colonial’ *modèle assimilateur*, however, remained the complete exclusion of the non-national.  

An inclusive project of nationality was not the only possible resolution of the conflict between the project of the construction of a political and social nation and an economic need for foreign labour, as a brief reference to the German *Polenpolitik* illustrates.

### 3.3 An ‘exclusive’ labour-short nation: Germany

The large recourse to labour from regions further east in the eastern provinces of the *Reich* became a hot debated issue in the project of nation building of the young empire in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Most of these eastern immigrants were proletarianised serfs who came to fill the agricultural labour shortages in the eastern *Länder* aggravated by the out movement of ‘indigenous' labour in a western direction, mostly to the industrialising Ruhr-Rhine area and the Americas.  

The German state went to great lengths to monitor and control the movement of these eastern ‘foreigners’ with elaborate systems of passports and work permits that were designed to limit their settlement.

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Much of this suspicion towards these easterners, mostly ‘ethnic Poles’, had to do with the ethnic construct in the nation project of the German state. In the corporate political and social nation unified under Bismarck, political power was mobilised more on the basis of an ethnic concept of a *völkisch* nation than on that of a political concept of *citoyenneté*, as the prevalence of *ius sanguinis*—that is, on the basis of birth and ‘blood ties’—over *ius solis* in the construction of nationality illustrates. Moreover, the awakening Polish nationalist movement posed a potential threat to the territorial basis of the state as well, as the residents of ‘divided Poland’ were distributed over the border regions of the Russian, Austrian-Hungarian and German empires. Worries about *überfremdung*, that is ‘alien infiltration’ in the nation, shaped the contours of the hotly debated *Polenpolitik*.¹⁰³

The dynamics of mass expulsions of these residents defined as ethnic ‘aliens’ in the 1880’s (together with eastern Jews) were, however, halted by the economic need for their labour. Agrarian interests pushed for a compromise that again strongly controlled their in movement and forced them into the position of temporary migrants, having to return ‘home’ every winter. In their exclusion from the social and political nation, both their ‘reproductive needs’ and their political identity were separated from their productive uses. The separation was feasible in this context of the relatively ‘unlimited’ supply of labour from impoverished ‘freed’ peasants in relation to the low-skilled casual labour demands of

agriculture. In the dynamic of (re)unification of the productive and reproductive status of labour under the concept of nationality within the new political and social nations of western Europe, the non-national was now the excluded element, which could in turn be subject to various economic and political status separations in new migration policies within the logic of the changed economic and political context.

4. Conclusions and a Look Ahead

I have tried to argue that the basic dynamic of migration policies in early modern Europe was a labour mobilisation strategy that spatially separated the productive uses of labour from their reproductive requirements. The limits, possibilities and advantages of such strategies were governed by the hybrid and uneven development of labour demand and supply, related to the macro-processes of economic reorganisation of production and proletarianisation. The spatial limitation of the ‘reproductive requirements’ of labour – of entitlements to forms of poor relief as exemplified by the sophisticated practices in highly proletarianised England or of independent resources as in the example of the ‘pluri-active’ peasant households of France – permitted in respectively more and less flexible ways the mobilisation of ‘free gifts of human capital’ for the highly irregular and often seasonal labour demands of the early modern economy. The trade-off in terms of overall labour flexibility that the spatial separation of statuses implied, however, assumed greater importance relative to the savings on the ‘reproductive’ cost with the changing nature and spatial concentration of labour demands of maturing industrialisation of the nineteenth century.

104 Herbert, A history of foreign labor, pp. 14-45; Moch, Moving Europeans, pp. 125-26; Sassen, Guests and aliens, pp. 59-61.
Dynamics of political centralisation and new projects of power mobilisation and legitimisation – ‘nationalism’ – acted together with these structural economic changes to increasingly contradict previous strategies of labour mobilisation based on spatial separations of labour statuses between sub-national ‘areas’. Internal labour mobilisation strategies in Western Europe eventually converged to a unification of the productive and reproductive status of labour as ‘nationals’ of the developing political, social and eventually welfare states.

The story does of course not end at the national level or with World War I. The unification of the statuses of labour under the concept of ‘nationality’ occurred within an increasing internationalisation of the labour market. Likewise, the dynamics of ‘inclusion’ allowed and implied new forms of ‘exclusion’ of the non-national. Up until World War I, national immigration restrictions and regulations had been limited or non-existent in most western European countries. The twentieth century, on the other hand, became the scene of intense state activity in this domain. To some extent, then, these nations might be regarded as new greater ‘areas’ in a widening global context, with the general ‘logic’ of migration policies of the model transferred from the local to the national level.

The experience of the nineteenth century had already signalled how new forms of the ‘rationales’ would come into play at this national level in the attitude towards ‘immigrants’. On one hand, the ideological dimension of power mobilisation on the concept of nationality could have a certain impact of its own – as the difference between the ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ strategies of France and Germany show. Yet, beneath these ideological differences lay also a structural difference in the labour profile of the migrants in question. As the immigrants to France mostly ‘filled up its gaps’ in the industrial labour supply, the same characteristics of the labour needs in this modernising sector that I have argued contradicted with a spatial separation of labour statuses, may well have been the
principal factor governing the French ‘inclusive’ attitude and its *modèle assimilateur*. On the other hand, the Poles and in another way also the Irish formed a relative elastic supply for irregular and casual labour demands at the bottom of two other labour markets – which may be a reason why their ‘excluded’ status was both feasible and deemed advantageous, as with the early modern spatial separations of productive and reproductive statuses. An important factor governing official national attitudes towards immigrants, then, would be their position and function on the internally segmented labour market – or, in the terms of the model, their ‘productive status’.

The dynamics and practice of migration policies in the twentieth century are of course complicated by the excesses of nationalism, the international tension and suspicion of ‘the long war’ between 1914 and 1945, and the massive dislocations wrought by war, persecutions and refugee flows. Yet, in the background we might discern some of the same ‘logics’ that governed labour mobilisation strategies of early modern Europe on a different spatial scale. For instance, the elaborate guest-labour programmes of post-war Europe to fill the gaps in the lower segments of the labour market, seem conditioned by the same pursuit to separate productive and reproductive statuses and reap ‘free gifts of human capital’; the intention was after all that these workers would return when no longer needed. Today immigration from outside Europe – the European Union by the way is well on the way to becoming the new ‘area’ of the model – is restricted, and if we stretch the model we could explain this by a dominance of concerns about political order in the wake of the spread of racist and xenophobic attitudes among the electorate. On the other hand, ‘highly productive’ immigrants can still avoid these restrictions via work permit schemes, and economic pressure for more comprehensive selective labour mobilisation is growing. Between political restrictions and economic needs we also find a new ‘divided productive
migrant’ par excellence: the illegal immigrant, filling up casual demand at the bottom of the labour market, with no potential ‘reproductive’ claim whatsoever.


Martin, Philip L. "Guest worker policies: an international survey." In *Migration and refugee policies: an overview*, edited by Ann


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