A Regional Market in a Globalised Economy: East Central and South Eastern Africans, Gujarati Merchants and the Indian Textile Industry in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

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Introduction

Over the past two decades or so there has been a perceptible growth in interest in the history of the Indian Ocean as an arena of integrated economic, political and cultural interaction. Approaches to this history have differed and – in similar vein to recent efforts to define and theorise the Atlantic ‘world’ – defining the Indian Ocean spatially, temporally and conceptually has been a challenge for scholars. Despite some differences, these appear to be in general agreement that the ‘essential’ unity of the Indian Ocean was determined and maintained by the ebb and flow of intersecting circuits of maritime commerce, a conclusion that ‘Atlanticists’ would perhaps share. How one defines the vast oceanic space of the Indian Ocean depends ultimately, it would seem, not only on one’s particular vantage point but also on the historical period one chooses to examine. Nevertheless, a useful working model may be to see the Indian Ocean as constituted by distinct regions

that, while they may have contained particular networks and circuits of exchange that
catered for particular markets, overlapped and intersected in complex webs of
economic and cultural relationships to create an integrated ‘inter-regional arena’.  

At the centre of these circuits of exchange was South Asian textiles. For
centuries, the Indian subcontinent had produced and supplied textiles of varying
quality and size to markets that stretched beyond the Indian Ocean, from
northwestern Europe and West Africa, to the eastern Mediterranean, Southeast Asia
and the Americas. This global flow of textiles was sustained by high productivity and
low prices, and in turn fuelled by high consumption and demand. Within the region of
the western Indian Ocean, one of the flows of textiles linked South Asia to East and
East Central Africa, bringing African consumers into relation with South Asian
producers. This intra-regional engagement was mediated in critical ways by networks
of Indian mercantile groups, chief among them the Gujarati Vāniyā, whose presence
in the waters of the Indian Ocean was of longstanding duration.

In this paper I explore the particularities that structured the chains of relation
connecting Gujarat in northwestern India to Mozambique and East Central Africa
between the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries.
Although the place of Gujarat in western Indian Ocean commercial systems through
to the nineteenth century has been regarded correctly as central, that of East Africa
(broadly understood) has tended to be marginalised in general accounts of the
history of the Ocean. This paper suggests that one way to reinsert East Africa into
the picture is to emphasise the interrelation between these two regions of the western
Indian Ocean; I thus emphasise the importance of uncovering links of connection for

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5 Frank Broeze (ed.), Brides of the Sea: Port Cities of Asia from the 16th-20th Centuries (Sydney: New
South Wales University Press, 1989), pp. 3, 21, quoted in Pearson, Indian Ocean, p. 13, Bose,
‘Space and Time,’ p. 368.
7 Sanjay Subrahmanyam has recently referred to Gujarat as the ‘linchpin’ of western Indian Ocean
trade. Cf Of Imārat and Tijārat: Asian Merchants and State Power in the Western Indian Ocean,
developing an understanding of the dynamics that shaped relationships in this oceanic space.

Prominent in the analysis is a consideration of the role played by Gujarati Vāniyā (Hindu and Jain merchant communities resident primarily in western India with inter- and intra-regional commercial, social and cultural ties in the Indian Ocean) operating from the territories of Diu (and to a lesser extent Daman) in Kathiawar (western Gujarat) in mediating the links between African consumers and Indian producers. This was a function they were able to perform effectively because of their embeddedness in local, regional and international networks in Africa and India underpinned by the circulation of financial and social capital. Gujarati merchants (both Hindu and Muslim) had been prominent in the Indian Ocean for centuries, and though their relative importance in the waters of the ocean generally, and in those of the western Indian Ocean specifically, changed over time (in relation to Persian and Arab merchants, for example), it is fair to say that Gujarati merchants particularly played one of the most important integrative roles in the economy and culture of the ocean as mediators of ‘cross-cultural’ and cross-regional contact. By the eighteenth century this role was increasingly confined to the western Indian Ocean for reasons I have discussed elsewhere.

This paper will show that Gujarati merchants enjoyed a comparative advantage over the Portuguese settlers, merchants and State, as well as the ‘Swahili’

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8 For a fuller discussion of the term, including how it was employed by contemporary observers, see Pedro Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks in Mozambique, 1777-c.1830,’ PhD, School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), 2005, chapter 2.


11 Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks.’
and ‘Arab’ merchants, of the northern coast of Mozambique in the tightly-controlled
hold they exercised over the importation of cotton textiles produced in western India.
These were in great demand as exchange commodities in the African trade of the
Portuguese territory. It was thus no exaggeration to claim, as the Portuguese often
did, that Gujarati cotton textiles were the ‘currency that is accepted in ports.’ 12 Widely
utilised throughout the north, centre and south of Mozambique and the East Central
African interior, Gujarati textiles served a critical function in African trade because of
their use as a primary measure of value for which ivory, slaves and other
commodities were exchanged in areas which effectively constituted cloth currency
zones. 13

The importance of Indian textiles to the pre-colonial economy of Mozambique
and East Central Africa and their place in the dynamics of African trade has been
recognised by scholars. 14 This work, however, has offered either overly-generalised
accounts of the trade or focused almost exclusively on consumption. 15 In order to
arrive at a fuller understanding of the dynamics of this commercial nexus, and the
regional interrelation that it produced, this paper examines not only African
consumption. It takes a detailed look at the production and procurement processes in

12 A(rquivo) H(ístorico) U(ltramarino), Moç., Cx 46 Doc 31, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque to
Crown, 12 August 1783.
13 The term ‘cloth currency zones’ is taken from Richard Roberts, ‘Guinee Cloth: Linked
XXXII (4), 1992, pp. 597-627. For further details of the particularities of these commodity trades see
Pedro Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks’.
14 See, for example, Justus Strandes, The Portuguese Period in East Africa, 4th Edition (Nairobi,
1989); Alexandre Lobato, A Expansão Portuguesa em Moçambique de 1498 a 1530, 3 Vols. (Lisbon,
1960), Vol. 3; Lobato, Evolução Administrativa e Economica de Moçambique 1752-1763 (Lisbon:
Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1957); Lobato, História do Presídio de Lourenço Marques (1787-1799),
Africa: Changing Patters of International Trade to the Later Nineteenth Century (London:
Heinemann, 1975); M[jichael] N. Pearson, Port Cities and Intruders: The Swahili Coast, India, and
Portugal in the Early Modern Era (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1998).
15 The exception here is the recent study by Pearson, Port Cities, in which the author provides an
overview of the supply-side of the trade. This is perhaps not surprising given that Pearson is a
specialist in Indian history.
India which supplied the African market and trade. It was not only Gujarati access to African consumers, which had been established through their distributive networks in Mozambique, that gave them an advantage over competitors in the market, but also the organisational strength of their procurement networks in western India.

A central argument of this paper is that demand was shaped by the local particularities of African consumer tastes, and as such dictated the varieties of textiles that entered the Mozambique market. Thus, far from being marginalised in this commercial nexus, African consumers were able to negotiate the terms of trade and their engagement in relations of exchange of which they formed an integral part. In turn, the level of demand had an influence beyond the continent in that it stimulated productive capacity in Jambusar in Gujarat, where the bulk of the western Indian textiles for the Mozambique and East Central African market were manufactured. To maintain marketability the Vāniyā needed to supply this market with textiles which were in demand, and in order to do so effectively and successfully they had to ensure that their information on the types of cotton textiles which were sought in each trading season was always kept up-to-date. In identifying the influence of African consumption this work thus contributes to the growing appreciation that Africans, historically ‘under-considered populations’ in narratives of regional and global interconnectivity, exerted leverage in defining material relationships through processes shaped by ‘direct reciprocities,’ a view that is challenging conceptions of seemingly marginal actors as ineffective in influencing larger frameworks of economic exchange.

Equally important, the capacity of the Vāniyā to supply this market relied on regular access to centres of textile production in western India to which information

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on textile types could be transmitted annually. Far from exercising control over the supply and production of textiles for the Mozambique market, however, Indian merchant procurement of these supplies was secured through middlemen with whom they agreed oral contracts on an annual basis. Merchants thus had to negotiate contracts regularly with brokers who were ultimately responsible for acquiring the textiles from weavers, and for providing the merchants with their export cargoes. I will show that the trade in Indian textiles in Mozambique, and East Central Africa generally, thus depended for its success on the dynamics of the interrelation between both demand and supply. In order to trade successfully, Gujarati merchants needed to balance the intricacies of these economic factors through networks of information and agents in both spheres of their operations in the Indian Ocean. Ultimately, it was their ability to connect both ends of this transoceanic trade nexus which gave them the advantage over competitors.

The paper begins with an overview of the diffusion of Indian textiles in the Indian Ocean, concentrating on East and East Central Africa, which contextualises the discussion that follows. I move then to consider the nature of consumption and demand for Indian textiles in Mozambique, a section that discusses the level of consumption of cotton cloths, and explores both the differentiated nature of this demand for Indian manufactures and the Vāniyā response to its changing nature. I also discuss the oppositional stance adopted by the Portuguese state in its attempts to restrict cloth importation; a ‘project’ that was unsuccessful. This is followed by an examination of the procurement process and structure through which demand was translated and relayed to producers in Gujarat; the organisation and effective operation of this procurement structure was fundamental to the success of the Gujarati merchant network in connecting South Asia and East Central Africa. Equally important to this process was the production of weaving labour. Located in a temporal frame when merchants in South Asia were attempting to exert greater control over weavers as a way of undermining producer autonomy and thus
determine price, my discussion examines the structure of production in a particular Gujarati locale, as well as in Diu and Daman, and addresses the reasons why the Vāniyā did not pursue similar strategies. The paper ends with a consideration of the inter- and trans-regional challenges that the arrival on the market of increased ‘foreign’ cloth posed to continued Gujarati commercial engagement in East Central Africa in first half of the nineteenth century.

The Diffusion of Indian Textiles in the Indian Ocean

Before we examine the particularities of consumer demand and supply in East Africa and Gujarat, it is first necessary to consider a broader context for Indian textiles in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to East and East Central Africa. For centuries cotton textiles produced in India were used in commercial exchanges in the Indian Ocean. They were particularly dominant in the overseas markets of Africa and Asia. Noting the widespread importance of Indian cotton textiles in the pre-Industrial world, an historian of the Indian textile trade has suggested that ‘before the discovery of machine spinning and weaving in Britain in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Indian subcontinent was probably the world’s greatest producer of cotton textiles.’18 One of the greatest strengths of the Indian textile industry was its specialisation in serving distinct networks of long-distance trade. The Indian textile industry was highly adaptable and had a capacity for product differentiation. This resulted in the creation of extensive regional markets, and made it unique among Asian manufacturing industries.19 The main production areas which

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specialised in the manufacture of cotton textiles for export were located in Gujarat, the Coromandel coast, Bengal and the Punjab, and Sind.\textsuperscript{20} Cloths woven in the latter regions were mainly destined for the markets of Afghanistan, eastern Persia, Central Asia, Masqat and Basra.\textsuperscript{21} Outlets for the products of Coromandel and Bengal were found primarily in Southeast Asia, though there was some trade with the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. While Gujarati textiles were traded extensively to Southeast Asian markets, it was to the western Indian Ocean that the bulk of its cotton textiles were sent, particularly to the markets of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, and to a lesser degree those of East Africa.\textsuperscript{22}

The way that Indian (particularly Gujarati) merchants and producers responded to nuances of demand in these markets will be observed in this paper in the East African context in the early modern period. I will show how the introduction in the seventeenth century of new demand from the European market did not undermine supply to East Africa which remained an important export market for Indian textiles.

Cotton was grown and processed in the rich black soils of the river valleys of Gujarat, and weavers in the main manufacturing centres of Ahmadabad, Pattan, Baroda, Broach and Surat produced cotton textiles of many different qualities and in an impressive range of styles and colours for both internal and foreign markets.\textsuperscript{23} The technical advantages enjoyed by Indian handicraft production (such as the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Chaudhuri, ‘Structure of Indian Textile Industry,’ p. 41.
\item Ibid, p. 41, Chaudhuri notes that while it is difficult to arrive at precise estimates of the number of textile exports sent by Gujarat, the Coromandel coast and Bengal to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the ‘descriptive material available indicates that the volume of textiles carried to these areas from western India was very large.’ See also Raychaudhuri and Habib, \textit{Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. I}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
development of multiple shafts and peddles which allowed weavers to maximise productive capacity), coupled with the availability of relatively inexpensive dyes such as indigo which was grown in Sarkhej near Ahmadabad, and skilled labour engaged in all the stages of textile production from cotton growing to the spinning of thread, printing and weaving resulted in an extremely efficient and highly competitive industry.24 Moreover, it has been argued that what contributed significantly to the expansion and continued success of Indian textile production and trade, and gave it a comparative advantage over its competitors, was the availability of low wage labour which added little to the final price of the commodity.25 This view has recently come under attack in work which suggests that in pre-colonial India wages may have been higher than scholars have allowed, and was thus not a significant factor in production. This view argues that the position of producers in South India was superior to that of producers in England.26 What is clear, nonetheless, is that before the development of machine-production in Europe in the nineteenth century no other region could compete with the price or quality of Indian textiles.

When the Portuguese arrived on the East African coast in the late fifteenth century, they soon established how far participation in coastal trade relied on the import of Gujarati textiles. Although gold extracted from Shona mines and exported north through Sofala was used as a currency along the coast, Indian textiles served a critical and widespread function in a largely non-monetized world as currency against which the value of goods could be calculated. Cloths were not used solely for their

exchange value but also had 'use' value, 'as a means of bestowing moral and social qualities, of marking both high and low status.'

Besides their use as a form of conspicuous consumption, textiles could also have political uses through exchanges which established, and helped underpin, networks of ties between people. Cloth givers could, in this way, ensure that receivers were committed ‘to loyalty and obligations in future’. Furthermore, textiles were utilised in investiture ceremonies where rulers legitimised the power of successors or regional chiefs.

Clearly, Africans used imported and local textiles in ways which were socially, politically and economically sophisticated, and whose complexity scholars are only now beginning to appreciate.

The dominance of Gujarati textiles in East African trade should not obscure the fact that there was widespread textile production on the coast, islands and interior. A vibrant weaving industry existed before the sixteenth century which served local demand, and textile production took place in many East African towns between Mogadishu in the north and Sofala in the south.

Cotton was grown at Kilwa, and artisans in Sofala, Angoche and the Querimba archipelago were known to weave cotton textiles which were used in local and long-distance trade.

What is clear from this discussion is the important place which Indian textiles, particularly cotton textiles, occupied in the economic, social, cultural and political milieu of much of the East African coast and parts of the interior by as early as the

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sixteenth century. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these textiles entered a ‘vacuum’. Rather, we need to place Indian imports within the broader context of local textile production and see them as supplementing local supplies in this early period.\textsuperscript{31} Still, there can be little doubt that Indian textiles were regarded as integral to the nexus of the East African textile trade which stretched from the northern coast down to the Zambezi Valley where they were 'consumed' in their original state, i.e. the design was not altered in any way. They were then sent to the interior directly from the coast. Every indication for this period points to Indian manufactures being considered as necessities for a market whose consumers could afford the foreign imports. It appears that the growth in preference for imported textiles over locally-produced textiles in East Africa dates from this period but this topic requires greater attention.

Although East Africa was not the biggest export market for Gujarati textiles in this period, the greatest number going to Middle Eastern markets, the way this trade operated provides an illuminating example of the particular desirability of Indian textiles, and the ability of Indian merchants and producers to maintain supply. Gujarati merchants and producers, like their counterparts in other regions of India, were able to adapt to different markets because of price competitiveness, specialization in production, the existence of a highly skilled workforce and access to natural resources like quality dyes. The recognition that until around the first quarter of the nineteenth century it was indigenous merchants who controlled the majority of textile exports from India is one which will gain greater acceptance as historians come to appreciate more fully the true place of respective mercantile interests in the Indian textile trade.

\textsuperscript{31} Pearson, \textit{Port Cities}, pp. 124-25.
Consumption of and Demand for Gujarati Textiles in Mozambique

The dominance of Gujarati textiles in the import trade of Mozambique continued into the eighteenth century as it became an important trade area for the Portuguese possessions of western India.\textsuperscript{32} For the Gujarati merchants of Diu and Daman, this provided the possibility to expand their textile exports to a region which undoubtedly provided the most stable trading environment on the East African coast and where demand, if anything, had grown for Indian manufactures as supplies through the northern coast no longer fed the market. It also enabled them to secure their control over the carrying trade in these manufactures. In previous centuries, even though Indian textiles were overwhelmingly procured by Gujarati merchants, they were sent to Mozambique from Portuguese Indian ports, for the most part, on Portuguese (Crown) vessels due to regulations aimed at monopolising cross-oceanic trade. From the eighteenth century this changed markedly as the Vāniyā assumed complete control over the direct shipment of textiles to Mozambique, and thus were able to command a powerful presence in its economy.

Before we proceed, it is necessary to discuss the definition of ‘piece’ which I will use in my discussion of textile exports. Textiles from Diu and Daman were imported into Mozambique in \textit{corjas}, which were bundles consisting of 20 \textit{peças}, or pieces, of textiles. Due to the range and qualities of Gujarati textiles that circulated in Mozambique, and their different exchange values, in Mozambique these ‘pieces’ were sorted and arranged into \textit{bars} of 400 \textit{panos}, or cloths, of different types. It was these \textit{panos} that were the ‘currency of the land’ against which commodities such as ivory were exchanged. Cloths measured ‘8 mãos in length, and 1.5 [mãos] in width,’\textsuperscript{33}


or approximately 3.52 metres long and 0.66 metres wide.\textsuperscript{34} As the range of textiles that entered Mozambique was great and varied, the ‘conversion rates’ of imported peças into cloths also varied greatly. Alexandre Lobato has calculated the conversion rates for some of the imported textiles such as samateres and ardians, each peça of which corresponded to 8 and 3 panos respectively. In other words, 10 pieces of \textit{samateres} actually corresponded to 80 cloths of \textit{samateres}, while 10 pieces of \textit{ardians} equalled 30 cloths.\textsuperscript{35} No matter the number of textile pieces contained in the \textit{bar}, the number of cloths in it always had to total 400, according to the official measurements established for the conduct of trade in Mozambique. Official conversion rates of peças into panos were set by the Portuguese to regulate the exchange of commodities into cloths, and as a control over price fluctuations. However, as we shall see below, official valuations were often ineffective because the Portuguese were powerless to control the price for which cloths were exchanged in the interior for commodities such as ivory and slaves, and/or the conversion rates of pieces into cloths. Given the latter, textile piece-goods which the Vâniyã imported annually into Mozambique, and which I have been discussing, actually represented a higher number of trade cloths against which trade goods, and even provisions, were obtained from African suppliers. Where I discuss Vâniyã textile exports to, or imports into, Mozambique, I am therefore referring to the number of ‘pieces’ of textiles, rather than to the number of ‘cloths’ that these subsequently represented in African commerce. When the latter is intended, it shall be made clear in the text.


Records relating to textile exports to Mozambique improve considerably from the 1750s as Portuguese efforts to quantify this trade produced greater details. Imports of textiles under State contract into Sena (Zambezi Valley) alone, to which the greatest number of textiles were sent, are recorded at around 120,000-160,000 pieces per annum; imports for the rest of the colony are placed at approximately 200 bares (80,000 pieces). Thus, taken together, these textile imports total between 220,000-240,000 pieces. However, Lobato goes one step further in cogently suggesting that in a year like 1753, when ‘the introduction of free trade goods in the Rivers of Sena in relation to Crown goods ‘was considerably higher, the numbers of textiles that entered Mozambique from India expanded to a level which he estimates at half a million pieces.36 These were overwhelmingly obtained from the Vāniyā, either in India or on Mozambique Island where the textile needs of the Fazenda Real (Royal Treasury) were established, leading an official to comment that ‘when these [Indians] fail [in their textile imports] will be when there is no longer any cotton in the world …’37

Fritz Hoppe believes the opening of trade to Crown subjects in the 1750s raised the import of Gujarati textiles to between 800,000-1,000,000 pieces annually.38 Hoppe does not consider this to be an excessively high figure but it does seem to be an overestimate, especially when compared with more complete evidence from the 1780s during which highly favourable customs tariffs were introduced in Mozambique. It seems that the increased number of textiles that entered Mozambique is discernible from the 1760s. An official placed the value of the import trade from Portuguese India in this decade at the considerable sum of 350,000

36 Lobato, Evolução administrativa, p. 258. This is drawn from the ‘Oficio de 20 de Novembro de 1753 do governador e capitão-general de Moçambique Francisco de Mello e Castro,’ also published in Memoria e Documentos, pp. 166-67.
37 AHU, Moç., Cx 29 Doc 56, Baltazar Manoel Pereira do Lago to Crown, 12 August 1769.
38 Hoppe, África Oriental Portuguesa, p. 219.
xerafins,\textsuperscript{39} of which the proportion from Diu and Daman represented 66 per cent.\textsuperscript{40} Although not specified, the bulk of these imports were overwhelmingly made up of textile cargoes. The importance of these had become so acute that by the late 1760s whenever vessels from Diu and Daman failed to arrive, officials and merchants complained about resulting shortages of Gujarati textiles in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{41}

The evidence therefore seems to suggest that from the middle of the eighteenth century, annual imports of Indian textiles from Diu and Daman stood at 300,000-500,000 pieces, with the bulk of these sent through Diu. This can be most clearly seen in textile export lists. Diu export lists, which are most complete from 1780, show that in the five years up to 1784 a total of (approximately) 1,785,915 pieces of assorted textiles were sent to Mozambique.\textsuperscript{42} If we accept Lobato’s estimate that approximately 500,000 pieces of textiles were annually imported at Mozambique Island from Portuguese Indian ports in the early 1750s, and our projection for the subsequent years leading up to the 1780s, then it is clear that the vast bulk of the textiles that entered Mozambique was supplied from Diu.\textsuperscript{43}

Using this evidence I have generated tables to assess the quantitative impact which the changes the Portuguese made to the customs regime in 1786\textsuperscript{44} had on exports. These show, for a selection of years, that the average number of pieces

\textsuperscript{39} Silver coins worth 300 réis. Indo-Portuguese coinage was largely silver based, and can be understood in terms of the fictitious unit that was used as an imperial currency of account, the real (pl. réis). It was convertible against the currencies that circulated in western India.

\textsuperscript{40} Anon., ‘Memorias da Costa d’Africa Oriental…1762,’ in RMS, p. p. 218.

\textsuperscript{41} AHU, Moç., Cx 27 Doc 94, Ignacio de Mello Alvim to Pereira do Lago, 20 August 1767.

\textsuperscript{42} These figures have been calculated from tables contained in H(istorical) A(rchives) of G(oa), CD 999, ‘Mappa Geral de todas as Fazendas e mais Generos que desta Praça de Dio forão para a Capital de Monssambique nos annos de 1780, 1781, 1782, e 1784,’ n.d.

\textsuperscript{43} See Lobato, \textit{Evolução administrativa}. The Vānīyā made this clear in a statement to the Portuguese Governor in 1788. See H(istorical) A(rchives) of G(oa), CD 1003, Indian merchants to Governor, 25 April 1788.

\textsuperscript{44} Reform of Portuguese imperial commerce was a feature of the second half of the eighteenth century. The changes introduced to import and export tariffs in the 1780s went further than previous efforts, and reflected the desire of the Portuguese State to establish liberalized commercial conditions in the Portuguese Asian empire, and thus stimulate trade and consequently increase revenue. For details see Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks.’
exported in 1787, 1788 and 1789 were a little over 381,000. These are very close to
the figures presented above, and confirm the steady level of textile exports from the
island-entrepot, which persisted to the end of the century.45 It is therefore not
unreasonable to argue that, by the final quarter of the eighteenth century, average
annual textile exports from Diu to Mozambique stood at around 360,000-400,000
pieces. A fall in exports in 1792 may have resulted from the threat of French corsairs
who were active in the Mozambique Channel from around this time, and who caused
problems for Vāniyā shipping.46 Textile exports did not stop in this difficult period,
and, despite the losses which the Vāniyā suffered in some years, hostilities with the
French did not severely undermine the importation of Indian textiles into
Mozambique. It is possible to estimate that between 150,000-250,000 pieces from
Diu entered Mozambique annually over the years 1793-1800. Table 2 provides a
breakdown of these exports.47 Exports from Daman are difficult to ascertain before
the nineteenth century but they were likely to have been up to 200,000 pieces a
year.48 Daman shipping lists show that this was certainly the case towards the end of
the century.49

Celsa Pinto has recently argued that '[T]he export of textiles from Goa to
Moçambique was also considerable,' but fails to provide any figures to support this
claim.50 The sizeable number of Goan exports indicate that they were re-exports from

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45 HAG, CD 1001, ‘Mappa dos Generos que trouxerão…,’ 16 June 1789.
46 For details see Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks.’
47 These figures, while valuable for arriving at a more accurate picture of the magnitude of this trade
than has been possible until the present time, are based on official figures, and as such do not
account for the cloth cargoes which may have left Diu ‘clandestinely’ for Mozambique.
48 That Daman was contributing only a small portion of the annual cloth cargo sent from Portuguese
India is indicated in the failure of its Indian merchants to supply the market at Mozambique in the late
1770s and early 1780s. See HAG, CDm 1057, João Gomes da Costa, Francisco Caetano Coutinho,
Javer Khushal, Hira (?) Raicarane (?) et. al to Governor, ant. 21 April 1784.
49 See, for example, AHU, Moç., Cx 69 Doc 95, Cargo of the pala de Viagem, March 1794; Cx 73
Doc 34, Cargo of the pala Azia Feliz, 11 March 1796.
50 Indeed, the only two pieces of evidence which this author cites of cloth exports sent from Goa to
Mozambique contradict her argument because of the seemingly small numbers of cloths involved:
she thus informs us of ‘a cargo…despached to Moçambique on board the ship Ferdinand’ in 1791,
Gujarat. Repeated references in the correspondence of Portuguese officials and merchants in Mozambique from the 1760s to the 1780s to the dominance of textiles from Diu and Daman, and their concern when vessels from these ports failed to arrive on the East African coast, challenge the position advanced by Pinto. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, the shipment of textiles from Goa was destined primarily for other markets: the continental Portuguese and West Central African markets, and for a short period in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the Brazilian market. This was the result of reforms aimed at stimulating imperial commerce.

The large numbers of Indian cotton textiles which began entering Mozambique in the final quarter of the eighteenth century became of growing concern to the Portuguese authorities, who sought to achieve full regulatory control over the trade throughout the territory. Besides attempting to control textile imports from India, the Portuguese also sought to exert control over their distribution in Mozambique. The latter had already become a matter of grave concern in the 1760s, and led the Governor-General Pereira do Lago to complain bitterly about the ‘damage’ being done to trade by the ‘free introduction of cloths into the interior.’ His logic was that if it were possible to prohibit merchants from sending textiles into the interior, then African traders would be forced to travel and bring their goods to towns and fairs where exchange could be better regulated, and Crown profits more securely.


See, for example, AHU, Moç., Cx 26 Doc 55, Pereira do Lago to Secretary of State, ant. 12 August 1766; Cx 30 Doc 68, ‘Oficio do Pereira do Lago,’ 10 August 1772; Jeronimo José Nogueira de Andrade, ‘Descrição do Estado...de Mossambique nos fins de Novembro de 1789...,’ Arquivo das Colonias, I (1917), pp. 229-235; 275-280.


AHU, Moç., Cx 25 Doc 91, Antonio Joze de Mello to Juiz Ordinario, 4 December 1765.
obtained. As the importers of the vast bulk of the textiles that entered Mozambique, attention began to focus increasingly, and particularly from the 1770s, on the Vāniyā.

Bound up with mounting concerns about the unregulated ‘introduction’ of cloths into the Mozambique interior, were misgivings about the increased number of textile piece-goods that were arriving at Mozambique Island. Focused (at first) on the trade of the Gujaratis in Macuana (the mainland directly opposite Mozambique Island), to which the Indians sent *comissarios volantes* to trade with the Yao and Makua traders, the Portuguese argued that the circulation of large numbers of cloths had caused inflationary pressures in exchange transactions which served to benefit only the trade of the Indians, to the detriment of that of the State and of Portuguese merchants. The Portuguese were mainly concerned about the effect which increased imports of piece-goods exerted on the price at which African traders sold their ivory. It was believed that the exchange value of ivory had increased five-fold on Macuana by 1772. A decade later, the Indians were accused of lowering the value of the *bar* of cloths in the Rivers of Sena from 192$000 réis, the level at which the Royal Treasury had set it ‘for many years,’ to 120$000 réis, ‘leading in this manner to the Portuguese [merchants] losing more than 90 per cent in each Bar…’ Portuguese loss seems also to have been related to the price which they paid for a *bar* of cloths on Mozambique Island. Whereas a *bar* of cloth had previously secured 10-11 *arrobas* of ivory, with the arrival of greater numbers of piece-goods after the changes to the customs regime in 1786, pushed this down to 6-7 *arrobas*. The subsequent drop in import duties after 1793 further encouraged the import and distribution of cloth which thus

54 Ibid.
55 Itinerant African traders employed by Gujarati and Portuguese merchants in the Zambesi Valley of central Mozambique.
56 AHU, Moç., Cx 30 Doc 68, ‘Oficio de Pereira do Lago,’ 10 August 1772, which states that whereas ‘previously’ Africans had sold ivory for 2 cloths, they sold it for 10 cloths in 1772. See also Cx 46 Doc 31, Pedro de Saldanha de Albuquerque to Crown, 12 August 1783.
58 A weight measure of ivory, equivalent to 14,68 kg.
made it difficult for Portuguese merchants to exchange a bar for more than 4-4.5 arrobas of ivory.\textsuperscript{59} Prices in commercial exchanges in the interior were determined by economic factors of supply and demand, and as such could not be subject to the strict regulation which the Portuguese authorities ultimately sought. Despite their attempts to control the entry of piece-goods into Mozambique, and the free movement of the Vāniyā and their African agents in the interior of the territory, the Portuguese were unable to change the conditions that allowed for ‘variable’ exchange rates away from Mozambique Island.\textsuperscript{60}

It would thus appear that the influx of Gujarati textiles into Mozambique as a result of the customs changes introduced in the 1780s and 1790s had the effect of lowering the exchange value of these cloths. Edward Alpers has argued that, as a consequence of the tariff on imports from Diu and Daman being set at 10 per cent, ‘it is very likely that the Yao were forced to bear a large part of this burden by reducing their demands for cloth in exchange accordingly.’\textsuperscript{61} However, it seems that larger imports of textiles, a significant proportion of which were carried by Vāniyā vessels to Zambesia and ports such as Inhambane from around 1775 to 1825, may actually have presented African traders with more favourable terms of trade. In other words, African traders may have had to exchange less ivory to acquire more cloths in these years.\textsuperscript{62} The depreciating value of trade cloths appears to have been of particular concern to the Portuguese, who sought ultimately to maintain exchange price levels as stable as possible. This explains the criticism, faced even by Governors such as Joze de Vasconcellos, that more than twice the requirement of the state was

\textsuperscript{59} AHU, Códice 1366, fl. 23, Luis Pinto de Souza to D. Diogo de Souza, 7 October 1796; Alpers, \textit{Ivory & Slaves}, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{60} AHU, Moç., Cx 86 Doc 29, Pedro Antonio Jose da Cunha to D. Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, 9 October 1800.

\textsuperscript{61} Alpers, \textit{Ivory & Slaves}, p. 174.

\textsuperscript{62} This was to characterise commercial relations between Africans, and European and American merchants in East Africa later in the nineteenth century as the terms of trade shifted in favour of Africans. See Philip Curtin, Steven Feierman, Leonard Thompson and Jan Vansina, \textit{African History} (London: Longman, 1978), p. 393.
imported. Greater numbers of cloths on the market meant that their exchange value would be adversely affected in relation to commodities such as ivory. Thus, for example, although the Portuguese lamented that cloth imports into Inhambane in 1783 had ‘flooded’ the market, they admitted that ivory could still be purchased but at highly inflated prices. The lament, therefore, appears rather to have been for the inflated price of ivory which the increased numbers of cloths occasioned than for any fundamental ‘damage’ this may have actually caused to commerce.

These accusations did not go without response from the Vâniyã. Using language that was intended to mollify the Portuguese, the Vâniyã addressed the charge that they had inundated the market with large imports by presenting two letters to the Governor-General in July and August of 1781. In them they maintained that they and their ‘agents’ would not have to send cloths into the Terras Firme (the name used in reference to the mainland directly opposite Mozambique Island) and the interior if the Royal Treasury could afford to purchase all of their imports. Moreover, they stressed the fact that there were simply not enough Portuguese merchants on Mozambique Island to purchase their cargoes, and as such, these had to be distributed by them and their commissarios volantes throughout Macuana and the rest of the territory. In later communication with the Portuguese authorities, the Indians (along with some of the most prominent Portuguese merchants) also addressed the question of the variation in the price of the bar de fato. Agreeing that ‘in another time’ the bar had been set at a price ‘that was more moderate,’ this had changed gradually to favour the African purchasers of cloths. These merchants suggested that only with the establishment of an ‘unchangeable rule that in the

\[63\] AHU, Moç., Cx 43 Doc 30, Saldanha de Albuquerque to Martinho de Mello e Castro, 18 August 1783.
\[64\] AHU, Moç., Cx 42 Doc 44, Jose Ferreira Nobre to Governor-General, 7 June 1783.
\[65\] AHU, Moç., Cx 36 Doc 35, Reply of Vâniyã to Governor-General, 7 July 1781; Punjia Velji, Laxmichand Motichand, Jalal Ganesh et. al to Governor-General, 3 August 1781; Representação of Vâniyã, 4 August 1781.
\[66\] A standard measure of weight used in the ivory trade, equal to a little under 248 kg in Mozambique Island and 294 kg in Zambesia in the central interior of Mozambique.
interior all quality of cloths which the Africans received in previous times will be allowed to circulate' would it be possible to remove the volatility in its valuation. They maintained, however, that this measure was not feasible because 'cloths are to be found in the hands of many individuals who would only try to exchange them speedily to settle [debts] with their creditors…" 67

The Portuguese authorities also accused Indian merchants of undermining trade by importing 'falsified' cloths. These were so-called 'poor-quality' cloths that appear to have failed to conform to size and quality requirements. Although never specified, it is assumed that the Portuguese were referring to requirements across the spectrum of textile imports which the Vâniyâ shipped to Mozambique. The Portuguese do not seem to have produced piecegood lists with the 'correct' quality and size of each of the textiles that were traded in Mozambique. Nonetheless, they became concerned in the 1770s that the Vâniyâ were importing cloths of inferior quality and dimensions, and hence were jeopardising African trade. Although Vâniyâ merchants of Diu admitted to this practise, they felt they were justified in doing so. Their response is useful to quote at length:

It is certain that for many years the said cloths whose quality, length and width have been falsified have been going to Moçambique [sic]; however this is due to the low prices for which the said cloths are valued because as soon as our vessel arrives at that port [Mozambique Island] the Christian and Indian merchants gather and they are the ones who set the rate for which the cloths should be sold. Formerly, a corja of jorians or cotonias was priced at 120-130 cruzados, today it is set at 50-60 cruzados, and at customs pays 90 cruzados per corja; today the same duties apply but the price is less than half, and the same is true for most of the cloths; and given that the prices are similar to these, how can it be otherwise that cloths are not falsified. A large proportion of the cloth is brought from neighbouring ports, chiefly from the Straits [Gulf of Cambay] and it is from there that the cloths arrive falsified; however, everything can have a remedy and we can send the good quality cloths when the price matches the old

67 AHU, Moç., Cx 75 Doc 61, Shobhachand Sowchand, Jiv Sancarji, Antonio da Cruz e Almeida, Joze Henrique da Cruz Freitas et. al to Juiz Ordinario, 11 October 1796.
one … At present all of our trade is to Moçambique [sic] and should this stop so will the income for the customs house, and if we do not have foresight we will be unable to continue our commerce because sending cloths [to Mozambique Island] without their being falsified for low prices, or the [Governor General] burning the falsified cloths when they arrive, or us making a payment of some [additional] duty … will make it impossible for us to continue trading to that port [Mozambique Island], and we will be without a destination for our vessels.68

The Vâniyā appear to have continued importing textiles according to their specifications, for Portuguese concerns persisted throughout the decade, and were repeated in 1783.69 It does not seem to have elicited a similar response from the Vâniyā merchants.

What was inescapable was that demand for, and consumption of, Gujarati cloths was high throughout Mozambique, and the market was therefore able to sustain the large imports which defined this trade by the final quarter of the eighteenth century. In the Portuguese factories of Quelimane, Sena and Tete in the early 1780s, annual demand (even with fluctuations) was around 80,000-100,000 cloths. Taking into account private Portuguese trade it was likely this figure reached 200,000 cloths.70 Despite the occasional and ill-informed protestation that the African market was small,71 officials in Mozambique were in general - if often reluctant - agreement over the extent to which Gujarati textiles were needed for purposes ranging from acquiring cloths for sagoates (tribute payments),72 to payment of garrisons (whose soldiers could not trade for even the most basic provisions without

68 BN, Códice 8841, fls. 28-33, ‘Petição dos Mazanes,’ 21 December 1773.
69 AHU, Moç., Cx 42 Doc 70, ‘Representaçã da Camara,’ 7 June 1783.
70 AHU, Códice 1345, fl. 77, ‘Portaria do Provedor-mor da Fazenda,’ 13 May 1782; AHU, Moç., Cx 36 Doc 3, ‘Mappa da Receita e Despeza das Feitorias de Senna, Quelimane e Tete,’ n.d. [but 1781]. For cloths ordered by the factories of Sena, Inhambane and Lourenço Marques in 1786, see Cx 52 Doc 93, ‘Fato para os Rios de Sena,’ 30 October 1786.
71 See, for example, AHU, Moç., Cx 75 Doc 61, Rodrigues de Souza to Tenente General, 22 October 1796.
72 See, for example, AHU, Moç., Cx 33 Doc 27, Tenente General to Governor-General, 8 March 1780; Cx 38 Doc 59, Antonio Manuel de Melo e Castro to Tenente General, 6 June 1782.
cloth). Indeed, officials openly admitted that Gujarati textiles were essential as the ‘currency’ of the territory. When the Portuguese complained about markets being ‘flooded’ with cotton cloths, it seems that, rather than demonstrating any oversupply, this interpretation reflected a poor understanding of the demand in the market, or frustration at how distribution networks had been disturbed and their own stocks were not selling as favourably as they had hoped. More often than not, however, these complaints revealed a concern about price stability because of the difficulties both official and private trade faced in an open market. They were unable to compete with Gujarati merchants without the imposition of monopoly trading practices, or without the adoption of measures to restrict Indian trade, such as prohibiting the contact of merchants with – and movement in – the African interior. The role of the Vāniyā as suppliers of the cloths which were the commercial lifeblood of the economy of Mozambique, together with their invaluable contribution to Royal income through customs payments, meant that any attempts to control or undermine their trade were likely to fail.

Moreover, the Vāniyā possessed a well-developed understanding of the nuances in demand in the African textile market. Gained primarily through sustained contact with patamares/mercadores volantes in Makuana and, after they had established direct contact with Sena in the Zambezi Valley from the later 1770s, the vashambadzi, the Indians were careful to ensure that the makeup of their textile

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73 It was estimated in 1778 that ‘for the annual payment of the garrisons of the entire territory’ it was necessary to spend 100,000 cruzados ‘for the purchase of cloths from Asia on account of the Royal Treasury.’ See João Baptista de Monteury, ‘Moçambique, Ilhas Querimbas…c. 1788,’ in RMS, p. 346.
74 See, for example, AHU, Moç., Cx 38 Doc 14, ‘Memoria de Diogo Guerreiro Aboim,’ 24 January 1782; Cx 55 Doc 35, Antonio Manoel de Mello e Castro to Governor-General, 27 September 1787.
75 See, for example, AHU, Moç., Cx 30 Doc 68, ‘Oficio de Pereira do Lago,’ 10 August 1772; Cx 42 Doc 44, Jose Ferreira Nobre to Governor-General, 7 June 1783.
76 Restrictions had been placed on Indian movement and trade earlier but these intensified in the 1780s. For reasons I discuss in chapter 2 of ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks’ (related primarily to the centrality of the Vāniyā to the functioning of the Indian and African economies, of which the Indian merchants were fully cognisant), these were unsuccessful.
piece-good imports corresponded to demand in a particular season and/or region as was relayed to them by these knowledgeable agents. Patamares, African mixed-race trading agents of commonly slave status who traded on the mainland opposite Mozambique Island, and mushambadzi (pl. vashambadzi), ‘professionalised’ caravan leaders of also slave status who were responsible for organising trade caravans into the interior of the Zambesi Valley, were important figures in the chains of relation linking intraregional exchange and local consumers.

These African agents, similarly to caravan leaders in the later nineteenth-century East African interior, maintained direct contact with consumers and thus developed intimate knowledge of the contingencies of local demand. The valuable information they collected in the interior, including an understanding of the complexities of exchange equivalencies, was critical not only to the success of their own trade but also to that of the Vāniyā who sought, therefore, to maintain direct contact with African agents. Decried by the Portuguese, the Vāniyā appear to have understood well how indispensable this contact was for them. This is captured by two comments made in the 1780s:

...[Indian merchants] compete...to give cabayas that are in fashion, toucas...ordering them especially from Diu with new designs that are communicated to their partners in the monsoons, from which we can see that the Africans, seeing these painted cloths of a new fashion, every year hurry to the [Indian merchants] and not to any Christian [merchants], and when one [Christian] by chance does appear he leaves disappointed and will certainly not return on another occasion.78

In regard to the painted cloths of new manufacture that it is said...are brought from the north [Gujarat] in order that they can attract to themselves all the goods brought by the Yao; it is well known that the

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77 AHU, Moç., Cx 36 Doc 35, Joze Pereira Nobre, Duarte Aurelio de Menezes, et. al to Senado da Camara, 14 July 1781.
78 AHU, Códice 1345, fl., 44v, 'Resposta da Camara,' 2 July 1781.
cloths after the fashion or of new invention are brought [to Mozambique Island] by the [Vāniyā] merchants…

While the Portuguese suggestion that Gujaratis were unfairly ‘creating’ demand through the introduction of ‘new cloths’ may contain some truth, it reflects, rather, Portuguese frustrations that resulted from being unable to compete with either the distribution networks which the Indians had in place or the knowledge they possessed of the market. The latter was particularly indispensable because demand was not uniform throughout the territory in which Indian cloths were distributed. For example, at the Manyika fair of Masekesa it was noted with some surprise how cloths which were once in demand a few years previously no longer found a market in the mid-1790s:

…previously the best cloths were capotins and ardians, which generated a great deal of profit because they were not discounted and were cheaper, and now at this fair nothing is sold other than zuartes and some dotins, which are good quality cloths, that is, the mossambazes [mushambadzi] do not want to take any other quality cloth…the zuartes and dotins, besides being the most expensive cloths, are only of this particular quality…any other quality of cloth serves for [the acquisition of] provisions only…

Regional differences meant merchants who attempted to supply cloths had to possess intimate knowledge of the market. The following relates to demand at Lourenço Marques:

…an abundance of cloths caused the Africans to not want half ardians in exchange for provisions which are needed by the army, and only serve for the ivory trade in the Rivers [Zambesia]…it is damaging that the esteem for the other cloths has been lost…capotins and longuins were also not exchanged in great abundance for payments…and some are taken only as gifts by rulers…

79 AHU, Moç., Cx 36 Doc 35, Punji Velji, Laxmichand Motichand, Narsinh Ranchor et. al to Juiz Ordinario, 3 August 1781.
80 AHU, Moç., Cx 69 Doc 22, Joze da Samela (?) de Almeida to Governor-General, 26 October 1794.
81 AHU, Moç., Cx 64 Doc 19, Luis Correa Monteiro de Mattos to Governor-General, 12 May 1793.
A final example from the Zambesí Valley underlines how vital it was for merchants to know which particular cloths were in demand:

...the cloth which is consumed...is the chuabo, chuca, tucurins of Cambay....and a type of black cloth which has recently been introduced called busuarticos [zuartes]... 82

Clearly, merchants had to be aware of the fluctuations in demand, and failure to supply the required cloths to the market could result in disastrous consequences. Referring to two types of Gujarati cloths, capotins and ardiains, at Lourenço Marques it was lamented how these had been rejected: 'the Africans do not accept them for the purchase of provisions' because these had been of inferior quality than were normally traded. 83

Reflecting a lack of understanding of how demand changed among African consumers, and exposing racist perceptions of Africans as willing to accept any article of foreign production, the Portuguese labelled their tastes as 'fickle' and subject to random change. 84 While this kind of perception was common among other Europeans in different parts of Africa, it is not the case that Africans blindly accepted any objects and wares that were offered in trade to them.

A growing realisation that consumption and demand, at least as much as, if not more than, production, played a critical role in determining commercial transactions between European merchants and African consumers has recently prompted historians to consider precisely the extent to which these influenced pre-colonial economic exchanges. The work of David Richardson on West Africa has been particularly important in this regard, and has shown how the terms of trade between British and African merchants were determined by patterns of demand in the African market. Africans were able to negotiate the terms of trade by refusing to

83 AHU, Moç., Cx 31 Doc 7, Luis Correa Monteiro de Mattos to dos Santos, 15 June 1794.
84 AHU, Moç., Cx 40 Doc 9, Bernardo Jose Coelho to Joze Francisco da Fonseca, 21 October 1782.
accept goods which they did not want, and Richardson highlights how consumer tastes diverged and were locally contingent in West Africa. He is thus able to reveal the complexities of commercial relations between European merchants and African consumers. Crucially, Richardson directs historians to consider more closely regional variations in demand before an understanding of African economic development in general can be reached.85 Similar work on West Central Africa by Joseph Miller has shown how demand for Indian textiles determined the parameters of Portuguese and Brazilian trade between the third quarter of the eighteenth and the first quarter of the nineteenth centuries. This has led to the insightful observation that 'Imports are likely to prove more momentous for Africa's history than its better publicised exports, since what Africa received from abroad enabled people there to consolidate old, or to develop new, production techniques and productive relations.'86 Further work specifically on textiles and West African demand by scholars such as Carolyn Keyes Adenaike has established the understanding that 'African consumers' tastes dictated the market' where the latter were 'discriminating buyers whose tastes strongly influenced not only the marketing but also the production of cloth…'87 A similar view, that places demand in a 'global' perspective, has recently been advanced for nineteenth-century East Africa.88

This scholarship has alerted historians to the important role played by consumer demand in shaping pre-colonial commercial exchanges. However, we are

88 Jeremy Prestholdt, 'East African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization,' PhD, Northwestern University, 2003; idem, 'Global Repercussions'.
still some way from understanding how changes in consumption took place spatially and temporally in pre-colonial African societies. Perhaps a fruitful way forward may be to examine more closely than has hitherto been the case the specificities of textile consumption. These, Adenaike tells us, ‘must be studied locally, not in the sense of ethnic traditions but in terms of the styles, fashions and tastes prevailing in a particular town or local area at a particular point in time, and of their changes through time and across permeable and changing geographic boundaries.’ Though barely begun, it is only through work of this nature that the complexities of African demand, and hence the social and economic dynamics of African society, will be understood.

Understanding perhaps little or nothing about the dynamics affecting changes in patterns of demand for, and consumption of, particular types of cloths throughout the territory of Mozambique, the Vâniyä had nonetheless understood very early on that success in their trade depended on their attention to regional differences in such demand. Not venturing into interior markets, such information was provided by the patamares in Macuana and the vashambadzi in the Zambesi Valley, with whom the Indians maintained contact on a regular basis. They served as the lynch-pins in the system of exchange in (and with) the interior, providing links in the chains of relation between consumers and foreign producers. The Portuguese attempted to undermine this system by restricting Vâniyä movement from Mozambique Island, particularly in the late 1770s and 1780s, but this was unsuccessful because of the pressures which the Indians were able to bring to bear on the authorities if such policies were followed. Remote from the final consumers of their cloths, yet aware of the importance of demand to their trade, Gujarati merchants appreciated that there was no other way for the textile trade with the interior to be organised, if it were to be

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90 These African agents occupied a role similar to the one played from the middle of the nineteenth century by caravan leaders in the interior trade of East Africa. See Jonathan Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion, and Popular Consciousness on the Swahili Coast, 1856-1888 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1995); Prestholdt, ‘Global Repercussions.’
successful. Rather than risk giving up contact with the African agents who supplied them with the information of which particular cloths were in demand, the Vâniyâ continued to pursue their commerce with the interior of Mozambique as they were accustomed, and proved the financial worth of their trade to the income of the state. This included threatening the Portuguese authorities with suspension of textile imports if restrictions on their movement and that of their African agents was not removed.91

The complexities of demand are best seen in the vast array of textiles which were imported from Diu and, to a lesser extent, Daman, and which recall the range of textiles which Burton noted in Zanzibar in the 1850s.92 Burton, as the only European traveller to publish a detailed study of the specifics of consumer interests, provided an invaluable description of the textiles which were traded into the interior. While a comparable list does not exist for Mozambique, it is possible from the lists of cloths located in the sources to identify, and thus describe, some of these reasonably accurately.93 These represent only a proportion of the textiles which were supplied by the Vâniyâ to the Mozambique market, most of which are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to identify accurately given the lack of information and corrupted rendering of names in the Portuguese records. Despite the inherent difficulties in correctly identifying these textiles, in large measure because they refer to cloths that have disappeared from current usage, a fuller list of textiles with tentative

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91 AHU, Moç., Cx 38 Doc 59, Vicente Caetano da Maia e Vasconcellos to Martinho de Melo e Castro, 18 August 1781.
93 Lists of cloths were found in the documentation located at the AHU, Caixas de Moçambique and Códices, and at the HAG, CD & CDm and AD & ADm. We should note that Lobato, *História do Presidio*, Vol. II, pp. 328-29 also provides a list of a number of these cloths but does not attempt to describe them or trace their distribution throughout Mozambique.
descriptions is provided in Table 3. A number of the cloths appear to have been traded across large areas of Mozambique: *capotins*, blue and white chequered or striped cloths; *ardians*, plain dyed cloths of differing sizes; *dotins*, strong coarse cotton cloths; *canequins*, coarse indigo-dyed blue or black calicoes; *chauderres*, plain white calicoes, possibly of superior quality; *longuins*, longcloths which were white generally but were also found in blue or brown; *jorians*, plain white calicoes from Gujarat that varied in quality; and *samateres* and *zuartes*. The last two are difficult to identify. A. C. P. Gamitto described the former as ‘white, very narrow, rough, open and ordinary,’ and the former simply as ‘blue cotton,’ noting that ‘the best is of Jambuceira.’ Despite these descriptions, *samateres* and *zuartes* appear to have been among the most expensive and prestigious textiles available in Mozambique. The reasons for this are not easy to identify, but may have been due to the high value with which they were inscribed in the commerce of the interior.

What shaped particular markets were local contingencies in demand, and these were influenced, in part, by the way the cloths were used. In Manyika, *zuartes* and *dotins* were the textiles in greatest demand. Others which were sent to the Masekesa *feira* included *samateres*, *savagagins* and ‘primarily the Dotins…that are accepted in all the lands of Manica…’ Cured *savagagins* were worn by the royalty and nobility, while *samateres* were used for sacrificial ceremonies ‘performed in order to appease the Vadzimu’ and to denote mourning. It is clear, however, that

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94 I thank Professor Edward Alpers of UCLA for sending me an unpublished list of textile types imported into Mozambique in the 1750s that he compiled, against which I could compare the names of those cloths I have been able to collect.


from the 1780s, zuartes had increasingly become the most sought-after cloths as revealed in cases of vashambadzi refusing to accept any other textiles.100 The Mutapas received calicoes and other cloths, and the court was one of the biggest consumers of textiles.101 Although in the sixteenth century it seems the Mutapas did not wear foreign cloth, they began to from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as foreign trade expanded. In the Rozvi empire Gujarati cloths were sent by the emperor as part of the regalia at the investiture of new provincial chiefs. As we have already seen, cloths were also given as presents to the mhondoro, the Mutapa spirit medium, while rulers who regularly brought tribute to the Zimbabwe were rewarded with cloth.102

In Delagoa Bay, economic expansion by the end of the eighteenth century provided a fillip to the demand for Indian textiles.103 Among the established imports were capotins, ardians, zuartes, doutins and longuins. Unable to supply the market adequately, the Portuguese were challenged by English merchants in the 1780s whose imports from Bombay (but originating in Gujarat) were well received.104 Smith has argued that English success resulted from their being attuned to demand in the market, which allowed them to sell ‘larger amounts of their superior merchandise.’105 Despite the competition provided by English merchants, the Portuguese factory continued to trade in Indian textiles in the 1780s, and in 1792 the well-established Vāniyā, Laxmichand Motichand, together with Vitorino Joze Gracias (the prominent

100 AHU, Moç., Cx 69 Doc 22, Joze da Samela (?) de Almeida to Governor-General, 26 October 1794.
102 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
slaver with whom the former had entered into partnership on slaving voyages), jointly financed the supply of 59,000 cloths to Lourenço Marques. Of these, 33,000 were destined for Muslim traders to take into the interior in exchange for ivory, and possibly gold. \(^\text{106}\) Although the Portuguese factory at Lourenço Marques was destroyed by the French in 1796, trade was resumed from the turn of the century when, once again, Laxmichand Motichand and a new partner of long acquaintance from the slave trade, Carlos Joze Guezzi, sent *doutins, cutonias* and *ardians* to a market which had been deprived of imports because of the disruption caused by the French. \(^\text{107}\) Cloths were used in bridewealth, and accumulated by rulers as part of the *sagoates* which merchants were required to pay to be allowed to trade in their lands. \(^\text{108}\)

Further up the coast in Sofala, inventories show that *canequims, samateres, capotins, ardians* and *cutonias* (a striped cloth of mixed silk and cotton weave) were regularly traded but, in a development similar to that in Manyika, *zuartes* became the most in demand. \(^\text{109}\) *Doutins* and *capotins* were actively traded as cloths worn exclusively by the elites as markers of distinction and connection to a global trading world.

It is important to note that, despite the circulation of Indian textiles along much of the coast of Mozambique and its interior from Macuana down to Lourenço Marques and the Delagoa Bay area in the final quarter of the eighteenth century,


\(^\text{107}\) AHU, Código 1370, fl. 2v-4, ‘Representação de Lacamichande Motichande,’ 20 November 1801; Moç., Cx 90 Doc 4, Laxmichand Motichand and Carlos Joze Guezz to Juiz Ordinario, 4 December, 1801; BN, Arquivo da Casa da Tarouca: Coleção Tarouca, no. 53; Zimba, ‘Overseas Trade,’ p. 333.


\(^\text{109}\) João Julião da Silva, ‘Memoria Respectiva á Villa de Sofalla, seo Continente e Antiguidades mais notaveis...no anno de 1790...’ in Feliciano and Nicolau (eds.), *Memórias de Sofala*, pp. 144-45. We should point out that the editors of this collection of documents suggest that da Silva was writing after 1838 and had therefore constructed his narrative retroactively.
local African textiles continued to be manufactured and traded in at least two locales. Most well known are the *machiras* of the Zambesi and Shire region. Their durability has led Mudenge to argue that ‘throughout the history of their relations with coastal traders until the twentieth century, the Shona never replaced their indigenous products for imported ones. The animal skins and the roughly woven *machira* cloth both saw the dawn of the twentieth century.’\(^{110}\) *Machiras* were traded extensively on the *prazos* (inheritable Portuguese Crown estates leased to individuals in the Zambezi Valley), and were popular among the Nsenga Chewa, southern Lunda and Karanga-related peoples.\(^{111}\) They were also traded at Masekesa\(^{112}\) and throughout the Shire Valley.\(^{113}\)

Indeed, such was the popularity of *machiras* by the middle of the eighteenth century that the Portuguese authorities, concerned that the production of these local cloths would undermine the Royal monopoly of imported cotton cloths, attempted to prevent its manufacture but ‘with little effect because this could only be enforced in Crown lands and not in others…’\(^{114}\) Although there can be little doubt that Indian cloths were more prestigious, their durability and wide application made *machiras* valuable and accounts for their survival well into the early twentieth century. Locally-grown cotton was also woven in Sofala. Production of cloths, called *gondos*, continued well into the nineteenth century, and were traded to Zambesia where, perhaps among other applications, they were used as sails.\(^{115}\)

\(^{113}\) Alpers, *Ivory & Slaves*, p. 86.
\(^{115}\) João Julião da Silva, ‘Memoria sobre Sofalla,’ in Feliciano and Nicolau (eds.), *Memórias de Sofala*, p. 99; Gerhard Liesegang (ed.), ‘Resposta das Questeos sobre os Cafres’ ou *Noticias*
What the example of the *machiras* and *gondos* serve to confirm is that the trade in African textiles was not incompatible with the trade in imported Gujarati textiles. Rather, they complemented one another by not competing for the same market. Gerhard Liesegang argues that local textiles and bark cloth were affected by imports but suggests that this was a late nineteenth century development. He draws our attention to the weaving of thick cotton cloth on simple looms in a number of areas between the Limpopo and Rovuma rivers. In the north, a tradition among the Yao states that in ‘olden’ times locally-made cotton cloth was used by chiefs and ‘big’ men and bark cloth was used by poorer people. The use of bark cloth was also a feature of southern Mozambique, especially among the Tshopi in the interior of Inhambane. Liesegang argues that it was only between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that cotton cloth production ceased, and suggests that the production of bark cloth continued into the 1940s in northern Mozambique.\footnote{Gerhard Liesegang, *“A First Look at the Import and Export Trade of Mozambique, 1800-1914,”* in Liesegang, Pasch, Jones (eds.), *Figuring African Trade*, pp. 452-523.} It is worth noting for regional comparative purposes that Pier Larson has recently argued for Madagascar that imports of textiles from India from the 1780s, and especially after 1800 ‘when it gained momentum,’ weakened the domestic weaving industry so that ‘[l]Imported cottons appear to have supplanted local banana-bark fabrics by the turn of the [eighteenth] century …’\footnote{Pier Larson, *History and Memory in the Age of Enslavement: Becoming Merina in Highland Madagascar, 1770-1822* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2000), p. 128.} Further afield, in West Central Africa cotton imports substituted palm cloth,\footnote{Phyllis Martin, *The External Trade of the Loango Coast, 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations on the Vili Kingdom of Loango* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 106, 165.} but in the Niger River delta the local textile industry was not appreciably affected by textile imports.\footnote{David Northrup, *Trade without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 169-71.} This suggests that what determined whether local textile production was or was not undermined by imports depended on...
local contingencies such as the uses to which cloths were put, and how they were integrated into local systems of consumption. In Mozambique, Indian fabrics had clearly important functions in local societies but in Sofala, the Zambesi Valley and elsewhere these imports complemented the trade in local textiles because the latter retained their value and use for domestic users.

Indian cloths therefore had a variety of meanings for local consumers, from their prestige value as visible reminders of a person's place in society, to their social uses in initiation and investiture ceremonies. Cloths were also offered as gifts to rulers to allow merchants to conduct trade in their lands, and these were accumulated as a reflection of a ruler's wealth. However, one of the most important functions fulfilled by Indian cloths which has not been addressed thus far is their use as currency. Exchange in Mozambique was predominantly non-monetized, and apart from Mozambique Island, this was negotiated through the medium of imported Gujarati textiles which served a vital role in enabling the trade in ivory and other goods. In writing about the imports of guinée cloth into Senegal, Richard Roberts introduces the concept of a cloth currency zone on the Senegal River where French manufactured textiles from Pondicherry replaced locally produced cloth as the dominant exchange currency in the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{120} Cloth currency zones were found in various parts of Africa, including on the Loango coast (the coastal region between the Gabon and Zaire Rivers) where Phyllis Martin identified and analysed how cloths, both locally-produced rafia cloths and imported cotton cloths, were used in exchange transactions.\textsuperscript{121} In Mozambique, as I have shown, the \textit{bar} was used as a standard unit of currency for exchanges to acquire ivory, slaves and other export commodities. Cloths were used to purchase provisions,

\textsuperscript{120} Roberts, ‘Guinée Cloth.’
pay troops\textsuperscript{122} and as payment to regional chiefs to be allowed to conduct trade in their territories. While it is possible to identify some of the fluctuations in the value of the \textit{bar} in relation to a commodity like ivory in the final quarter of the eighteenth century, lack of detailed information prevents an in-depth analysis. Moreover, exchange values were never constant in the period covered by this thesis, and fluctuated across areas.

\textbf{Procurement of Textiles in Gujarat}

The importance of African demand in influencing textile imports from western India is clear. Success in the textile trade depended on a clear understanding of which types of cloths were in demand in the African interior, and providing these accordingly. Of equal importance to the success of this trade was supply. Without a regular supply of appropriate textiles for the Mozambique trade, the Vāniyā would have been unable to satisfy demand, and consequently would have been restricted in their trade with the African interior. Diu was a poor and unproductive area which had to rely for its textile supplies on mainland western Gujarat.\textsuperscript{123} Its position at the southern tip of the peninsula of Kathiawar (Saurashtra), close to Gujarati production centres, meant Diu was potentially well-placed to take advantage of this vast hinterland for its textile supplies. On the Gujarat mainland, Daman also obtained textiles from its rich-cotton producing lands.

When authors have looked at the importation of Indian textiles into Africa, their studies have generally tended to focus exclusively on the consumption-side of the equation and have therefore paid little or no attention to supply and production

\textsuperscript{122} See, for example, BA, 54-XIII-3 (3), Francisco Alves Barbosa, ‘Analyse Estatistica,’ 30 December 1821, for cloths being sent to Zambesia as payment for troops.

As a result, there is only a partial understanding of the dynamics of this trade, and therefore an incomplete appreciation of the extent to which production and consumption were intimately connected in economic relations. In order to provide a more balanced account of this trade, this section will explore the production and supply nexus by examining the procurement by the Vāniyā of textiles in India for trade in the specific and discerning Mozambique market.

Textile manufacture in India differed across the producing regions. In Bengal and the Coromandel, for example, the textile industry was found both in town and country, though there is evidence from Dutch records for the northern Coromandel suggesting that weavers were entirely dispersed in 'industrial villages' scattered throughout the coastal districts. By contrast, in the Punjab and Gujarat weavers were located in urban centres or close to the main cities. In the latter, it has been further noted that '[E]very provincial capital had a sizeable population of cotton weavers', and cities such as Surat served as a market for small weaving towns like Bardoli and Gandevi which were located a short distance away. Other major textile centres of Gujarat were all urban. There were certain advantages for producers in being located in or near an urban centre, not least of which was the concentration of large populations with regular consumption needs. Other no less important considerations were proximity to sources of raw cotton, skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour, and a supply of good quality water essential for dying.

Evidence suggests that Indian weavers were able to adjust their production to respond to changing consumer tastes in the different markets to which their textiles were sent. Export production in these textile manufacturing centres was therefore

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126 Chaudhuri, ‘Structure of Indian Textile Industry,’ pp. 39, 44.
127 ibid, p. 44.
distinguished by specialisation which was based on ‘product differentiation as well as market orientation.’\textsuperscript{128} Thus, weavers in Bengal produced textiles for the West Asian market, while those in the Coromandel supplied the Southeast Asian market. The capacity of weavers to adjust their production to conform to the tastes of purchasers in distant markets is perhaps nowhere more clearly seen than in the case of Gujarat where weavers, according to K. N. Chaudhuri, ‘had fully adopted their manufacturing techniques and the fabrics to suit the needs of the Middle Eastern buyers.’\textsuperscript{129}

While it is unlikely that entire weaving villages in Gujarat produced textiles exclusively for the East African market - the bulk of the production of Gujarat being destined for the markets of the Middle East - there can be little doubt that a number of weaver households in villages that supplied the Middle Eastern market simultaneously produced textiles for the African market. There is at present no way of establishing whether households which wove textiles for this market did so exclusively, or if they were able to provide textiles for both markets concurrently. Given that markets in East Africa were smaller than those of the Red Sea and Middle East, however, it would not be surprising to find that weavers in Gujarati towns and cities were able to produce textiles for both of these distinct regions.

Specialisation characterised production for the Mozambique market, for textiles for African consumption in Mozambique were, with few exceptions, produced in a single location, Jambusar. This was a weaving, cotton and indigo-producing town south-west of Baroda. Weavers manufactured textiles exclusively for Mozambique, and did so according to the specifications which Gujarati merchants of Diu and Daman provided for them annually through middlemen. Production in Jambusar was thus to some degree devoted to the African market, and as such confirms the insight that ‘[O]ne of the best indicators of a region’s industrial ties to a particular market

\textsuperscript{128} ibid, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{129} ibid, p. 42. Emphasis added.
area is the degree to which producers [are able to] adjust their products to consumer
tastes.\textsuperscript{130}

Indian merchants in Diu and Daman acquired their textiles for the
Mozambique market through a system of advances which rested on (verbal)
agreements between the contracting merchant and his broker on the number and
types of textiles which were required for the trading season. Prices for the different
types and qualities of textiles were also agreed with the broker. In turn, the broker
(who, as one case in Daman shows, could work for a number of merchants) took the
merchant’s order to Jambusar and presented the details to a further intermediary who
dealt directly with the weavers. The broker did not only devote himself exclusively to
working as an agent for merchants but was known to purchase textiles from weavers
to sell to merchants.\textsuperscript{131} That this was a widespread practice has been confirmed in
evidence for Southeastern India.\textsuperscript{132} The broker might have dealt directly with weavers
in Jambusar but there is evidence to suggest that he did not. This is in keeping with
what is known about other parts of India where brokers tended not to deal with
producers but with their representatives, such as headweavers in the South Indian
case.\textsuperscript{133} The broker also arranged for the finishing of the textiles which was generally
not the responsibility of the weaver. In a few cases shown in the customs records,
this was done in Diu and Daman, where by the second decade of the nineteenth
century there were ‘painters’ and ‘printers.’\textsuperscript{134} Arasaratnam has pointed to the

\textsuperscript{130} ibid, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{131} HAG, CDm 1068, ‘Representação de Panachande Galalchande,’ 30 May 1821.
\textsuperscript{132} Sinnapah Arasaratnam, ‘Weavers, Merchants and Company: The Handloom Industry in
\textsuperscript{133} For a discussion of headweavers, see Arasaratnam, ‘Weavers, Merchants and Company;’
Parthasarathi, \textit{Transition to a Colonial Economy}, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{134} HAG, AD 4955; Monções do Reino 193A, fl 496, ‘Mappa dos Estampadores, tintureiros e
Teceloens…,’ 14 Oct 1814; Monções do Reino 169C, fl. 567, ‘Mappa dos Estampadores, tintureiros,
teceloens nascionaes de Damao…,’ 31 Dec 1818.
complex social structure of weaving villages which prevented direct contact between weavers and brokers and thus offered weavers some protection.\textsuperscript{135}

As was found throughout India, advances to weavers in Jambusar were made in cash and the money was used to purchase necessary raw materials such as yarn. Research shows that weavers could refuse to honour their agreements with brokers, in many cases returning the advance if a higher offer was made.\textsuperscript{136} There are examples where weavers failed to return advances and placed brokers and merchants in awkward positions, without much chance for redress.

This procurement system worked well for both the merchant in Diu and Daman, the broker in Jambusar who travelled annually between the locations, and the weavers who produced the textiles for the export market. Merchants, removed from production centres, were supplied with the types and quantities of textiles needed for their trade on a regular basis. Weavers were provided with the capital for their work, and given access to export markets. In the case of weavers from Jambusar, this was to the large Mozambique market, which was provided through the orders of the merchants who guaranteed purchase. Additionally, they were protected from market fluctuations. The brokers, for their part, were allowed to operate through the money and credit arrangements that were made with merchants for their purchases.\textsuperscript{137}

Details do not exist about how prices were negotiated in Jambusar between brokers and weavers’ representatives. Historians who have explored this question have argued that prices were contingent on the price of cotton and food grains. They maintain that the price of cotton determined the cost of weavers’ materials, and the

\textsuperscript{135} Arasaratnam, ‘Weavers, Merchants and Company.’
\textsuperscript{136} ibid.
The price of yarn set their earnings.\textsuperscript{138} This has recently been challenged. Arasaratnam maintains that the incomes of weavers were not fixed but ‘determined by a process of bargaining over cloth prices.’ Based on findings for South India, Parthasarathi argues that increases in textile prices, ‘which through much of the eighteenth century accompanied increases in cotton and rice prices,’ were caused by the efforts of weavers to raise prices to counter the impact of their higher costs.\textsuperscript{139} With regard to weavers in Jambusar, insufficient details do not allow any similar statement and further research is needed before we can arrive at a definitive answer.

There is also not enough evidence at present about the organisation of weavers in Jambusar to allow for the kind of analysis undertaken by Brennig for the Coromandel,\textsuperscript{140} Arasaratnam for the Carnatic\textsuperscript{141} and Parthasarathi for South India.\textsuperscript{142} The clear importance of Jambusar as a textile-producing centre in Gujarat, while recognised in some literature, has not yet received the attention from historians that is needed for an analysis of its structure of production (castes of weavers, number of looms and weaver households, etc) and overall capacity.

In this procurement system, the relationship between merchant and broker was not without conflict. An example from Daman provides a good illustration.\textsuperscript{143} Panachand Jalalchand was a broker who had supplied merchants with textile cargoes from Jambusar for the Mozambique market over 25 years from the late eighteenth century. Jalalchand supplied the textiles on an annual basis through \textit{respondentia} loans which were settled approximately a year after they were issued.

\textsuperscript{139} Parthasarathi, \textit{Transition to a Colonial Economy}, pp. 22-23
\textsuperscript{140} Brennig, ‘Textile Producers and Production.’
\textsuperscript{141} Arasaratnam, ‘Weavers, Merchants and Company.’
\textsuperscript{142} Parthasarati, \textit{Transition to a Colonial Economy}.
\textsuperscript{143} The following is based on: HAG, CDm 1067, Testimony of Panachand Jalalchand, 30 May 1821; ‘Relação das Pessoas q. tem contas de dever e haver com Panachande Galalchande,’ n.d. [but 1821]; Governor of Daman to Viceroy, June 1821; CDm 1063, Panachand Jalalchand to Viceroy, 13 June 1821.
by him. He thus travelled to Daman from Jambusar every year to ‘settle accounts.’ When he arrived in Daman in early 1821 to deliver goods and settle his debts, however, he was ordered by the Governor to leave the territory promptly because of an alleged fraud he had committed against two merchants. According to the accusation, Jalalchand had dishonestly recorded the level of debt of Karamchand and Milabo (?) Amarchand (export merchants who traded to Mozambique on a regular basis). As a broker, Jalalchand was in a strong position in relation to the brothers Amarchand because they relied on his good character and name to supply them with piece goods at ‘honest’ prices. They also relied on him to record their debts correctly from year to year and, when necessary, to carry debts over into the following year if they were unable to settle accounts when they took delivery of their order.

Jalalchand was a prominent broker to whom approximately 30 merchants in 1821 owed in excess of Rs 60,000 for the supply of Mozambique trade textiles. He was described by some as a man ‘of public credit.’ His expulsion from Daman shortly after his arrival reveals another aspect of the merchant-broker relationship. The risk which merchants took in becoming indebted to brokers was calculated against projected future gains from ivory imports. Therefore, if a merchant who owed a broker money for textiles did not have a favourable trading season, he would be unable to settle his debt with the broker. Karamchand and Milabo Amarchand appear to have fallen into debt with Jalalchand, and as a result had approached the Governor of Daman with allegations of dishonesty against the broker. Moreover, it was alleged that he had ‘invented’ debts that had never been contracted.

Jalalchand maintained that he had always been honest in his dealings with the merchants of Daman. He complained that he had never faced expulsion from a territory for seeking to settle his debts, and that he could not leave Daman without being paid by the merchants with whom he had agreed contracts. Jalalchand was himself indebted to suppliers of textiles, and failure to collect payment in Daman
would leave him in an extremely precarious position, and harm his creditworthiness in Jambusar. He argued that the Governor had collaborated with the accusing merchants and accepted a bribe to expel him from Daman.

This example also reveals that the broker was probably a widely disliked figure among merchants, despite the critical role he occupied in the procurement of textiles for the export trade. Merchants were acutely aware that they relied on him for their supplies, yet felt a certain animosity toward him because of their indebtedness to him. The testimonies of eight merchants against Jalalchand expose a level of hostility that is most clearly reflected in the language they used to describe him: a ‘thief with a knavish character,’ who profited from ‘usurious practices both in the purchase of textiles and in the sale of ivory.’ Faced with allegations and counter-allegations, and a lack of details about any resolution, it is difficult to know which account was the more accurate. Certainly, Jalalchand could not have maintained dealings with Daman for over 20 years if he not had been a broker in good standing with the merchants and his own creditors in Jambusar. This is not to say, however, that Jalalchand was without blame in his business practices. No doubt, some of what the merchants of Daman said about him was true but it may not have been any worse than occurred elsewhere in western India at this time. The merchants’ case is considerably weakened by the fact that two of the merchants who had been supposedly wronged by Jalalchand fled Daman shortly after his arrival, presumably because they lacked the funds to settle their debts with him. Wherever the truth may lie, this case highlights the tensions which defined the relationship between merchants and brokers.

Although merchants from Diu and Daman were able to acquire piecegoods from a number of weaving centres in Gujarat, they procured their cloth almost exclusively from Jambusar. This small raw cotton and weaving centre, situated south-east of Cambay across the Mahi River and approximately 50 kilometres [check] north-east of Baroda, had been a collecting point for goods produced in the
surrounding areas in the seventeenth century, and owed its importance ‘to the fact that [it] lay along the trade routes and hence catered to the need of passing caravans.’\textsuperscript{144} It served also as a prominent indigo-producing town in the region.\textsuperscript{145} Coarse Jambusar indigo was undoubtedly considered inferior in quality to the indigo grown in Sarkhej and Bayana but was considerably cheaper and, its relative proximity to Surat, probably placed it at an advantage as an export commodity to the Red Sea.

The region in which Jambusar was situated was one of the most fertile in India due to the existence of extremely rich black-cotton soil which was watered by the Mahi, Narmada and Tapti Rivers. In particular, its location between the rivers Mahi and Narmada placed it in the ‘great Cotton district’\textsuperscript{146} of western India, which led one observer to note how ‘The soil of the Jamboseer [sic] purgunna [sic]is light and fertile, favourable….The western plains, of a rich black earth, produce abundant crops of wheat and cotton.’\textsuperscript{147}

The eighteenth century was one of prosperity for Jambusar for two related reasons. The first concerned the commercial policies adopted by the Marathas who controlled the area. Maratha potentates appear to have been aware of the value of commerce and production for the prosperity of their regimes, and were therefore eager to provide or maintain favourable conditions to this end. As a result, it seems trade grew over the period from the 1740s to the 1820s.\textsuperscript{148} The second reason contributing to the prosperity of Jambusar was the decline of production in Cambay.

\textsuperscript{144} Surendra Gopal, \textit{Commerce and Crafts in Gujarat 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} Centuries: A Study in the Impact of European Expansion on Precapitalist Economy} (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House, 1975), p. 151.
\textsuperscript{145} ibid, p. 197.
Within a context of growing Anglo-Maratha rivalry, the Marathas had declared freedom of trade in Cambay and its *parganas* in the 1740s which benefited the latter much more favourably than it did Cambay, due mainly to the unstable conditions which prevailed in the city. Indeed, production in the *qasbas* of Cambay declined considerably in the following years, along with it the revenue of the Nawab. By contrast, cotton production and trade in the *parganas* increased significantly as artisans and workers left the *qasba* and city of Cambay for nearby towns. One of the towns to which artisans migrated and which saw a growth in its production was Jambusar, which according to recent work, ‘began to prosper not only as a wholesale mart but also as a trading center that took away much of Cambay’s resources.’\(^{149}\)

The migration of weavers away from cities which Maratha rule had destroyed in the early eighteenth century, such as ‘beleaguered’ Ahmedabad, may also have benefited Jambusar.\(^{150}\) Although the Nawab of Cambay attacked the town, it recovered and appears not to have suffered any adverse effects. Production remained buoyant into the nineteenth century, and ‘a great trade was carried on from Jambusar in cotton piece-goods with Bombay and other places…’\(^{151}\)

It is not certain when the Vāniyā of Diu and Daman first established their procurement from Jambusar because it is likely that they had acquired piecegoods for coastal trade and the trade to East Africa from other production centres in Gujarat prior to the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, sources do indicate that by the start of the century they had started to acquire cotton textiles from Jambusar, and as it rose in prominence from the 1740s/1750s as an important production and trading town the Vāniyā concentrated their procurement there. From the final quarter of the eighteenth


century they did so to the almost complete exclusion of other weaving centres in Gujarat. This is clear in a careful analysis of the detailed customs house records and the correspondence of Diu and Daman. These allow us to estimate that between 85 and 95 per cent of the textiles were brought to these destinations from Jambusar. Fuelled by the high demand in Mozambique, this proportion amounted to a vast number of textiles, which must have had a significant impact on the economy of production in Jambusar.

Indeed, the popularity of Jambusar as a procurement centre for the Vāniyā was by the 1780s a constant source of irritation and frustration to the Portuguese authorities who felt that its role as the predominant textile supplier for Diu and Daman undermined their efforts to recruit weavers and establish production there. The following quote was a typical lament about how dominant Jambusar's manufactures were in the textile trade, and therefore how dependent the Portuguese merchants were on Indian merchants:

While ...Goa, Damao and Dio [sic.] do not replace the cloths of [Cambay] and Jambuceira [sic.], which today are responsible for almost all of the consumption of this continent [territory of Mozambique], I do not know how our commerce can overcome its present limits, nor its dependency on the Bania

The Portuguese accused manufactures from Jambusar of creating a relationship of ‘dependency’ for the merchants of Diu and Daman. Moreover, the authorities held that the purchase of textiles in Jambusar was a drain on merchant capital which should have been deployed in the development of production. An official in Daman summed up the frustrations of the Portuguese when he complained

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152 HAG, AD 4952-4968 & CD 995-1012; CDm 1055-1068.
153 AHU, Moç., Cx 55 Doc 3, Antonio Manoel de Mello e Castro to Francisco da Cunha e Menezes, 13 August 1787. See also, for example, HAG, CM 1445, Mello e Castro to da Cunha e Menezes, 14 August 1787.
154 HAG, CD 1003, Governor to Viceroy, 15 March 1799.
how ‘...the money extracted [from Daman] was circulating in the land [the interior]...’

Protests from the authorities could not, however, conceal the fact that the Vāniyā were unwilling to restructure the procurement system which had been in place at least since the second half of the eighteenth century. In contrast to the position of the authorities, private Portuguese merchants largely accepted the manner in which textiles were acquired for the Africa trade. A case in point is provided by two merchants trading in Mozambique who sent their Indian partners, ‘admirably knowledgeable of the cloths [of Jambusar],’ to Diu and Daman to acquire piece goods from Jambusar for their trade. It is telling that neither choose to obtain textiles from Bombay or Surat, where the Portuguese maintained a Factory and where both men had contacts. Instead, they arranged for piece goods to the value of Rs 84,000 to be purchased at Jambusar, whose manufacturers produced specific textiles for the Mozambique market. Clearly, the procurement structure contained advantages that were not as easily dismissed or replaced as the Portuguese state had hoped.

Although generally the Vāniyā tended not to act on the suggestions put forward by the Portuguese to increase production in Diu and Daman, there were a few instances towards the end of the century when they did respond positively. One of these took place in Diu in 1798/9. Inviting the most important Indian merchants to his residence, the Governor Graças Palha urged them to establish the manufacture of textiles like those that are ‘annually acquired from Jambusar [and] sent to Mozambique and ports of East Africa....’ If this were done, it was explained, the capital which usually left Diu to finance this trade would remain on the island. The Indian response was generous. Not only did the merchants who met with Graças Palha agree to ‘have the said textiles produced,’ they also agreed to pay the same

155 HAG, CDm 1061, Candido Joze Mourao Palha to Viceroy, 19 October 1801.
156 HAG, Feitoria de Surrate 2603, Jose Gomes Loureiro to Jorge Ribeiro, Bombay, 1 December 1788.
amount in duties for these goods as if they were imported from Jambusar.\textsuperscript{157} In return, no duties were to be charged on imports of yarn.

The Governor made a further proposition to the Indian merchants, which he regarded as ‘advantageous to the commerce of Diu,’ concerning the manufacture of Surat textiles in the Portuguese Indian island, ‘which are[to be] exported…to Portugal.’ This was also agreed upon, on the condition that the Portuguese authorities ‘protect the manufactures [and] send vessels - or at least their supercargoes - from Portugal to Diu to purchase these cloths….’ Within a month of meeting with the Governor, the Indian merchants who were interested in establishing manufacturing in Diu, including some leading merchants such as Natthu Samji and Anandji Jivan, pledged their financial support for the ‘new manufacture of the Jambusar textiles.’ A total of 200,000 xerafims was raised by the participating 67 merchants. In further indication of their dominance in the economy of the island, the Vâniyâ contributed 94 per cent of the capital.\textsuperscript{158} Weavers, it is assumed, were also brought to Diu for the production of these textiles.

In Daman, the Portuguese made similar proposals. As outlined earlier, in 1799 Indian merchants signed an agreement with the Portuguese authorities stating that future textile exports to Mozambique would be manufactured in Daman, and that they would also finance the production of textiles for the Portuguese market there.\textsuperscript{159} Furthermore, they agreed to ‘manufacture here Rs 40,000 of cloths like those from Jambuceira [sic.] which are the proper ones for the trade in Mozambique….’\textsuperscript{160} However, it transpires that what the Portuguese meant in this particular case was not that the Vâniyâ would employ weavers in the production of textiles. Rather, they would import finished ‘white’ (i.e. undyed) cotton piecegoods to the value of Rs

\textsuperscript{157} HAG, CD 1003, Joze Mourão Graças Palha to Viceroy, 15 March 1799.
\textsuperscript{158} HAG, CD 1003, ‘Rellação dos Mercadores que hão de entrar nas novas Fabricas das fazendas de Jambuceira e do Reino…,’ 15 March 1799. Only 4 of the participating merchants were Portuguese.
\textsuperscript{159} HAG, CDm 1061, Caetano de Souza e Pereira to Governor, 19 March 1799.
\textsuperscript{160} ibid.
40,000 from Jambusar, which would then be dyed in the pits [poços] of the *Fabrica Real* (Royal Factory) at a fixed price to be determined each year by the price of the dyes.\textsuperscript{161} It is not altogether clear why the Portuguese did not continue to pressure the Indian merchants to bring weavers to Daman, but it is not unreasonable to assume that previous failed attempts to establish production had led the authorities to change their approach to textile production and Indian merchant involvement. The alternative approach of importing un-dyed textiles to Daman had the attraction of placing one part of the productive process under state control, which in turn would allow for closer control over the quality that in the late eighteenth century had become of concern to the authorities. This is a topic which is developed later in the paper.

Although Indian merchants in Diu and Daman at the end of the eighteenth century pledged their support to Portuguese plans to either increase production by financing the immigration of weavers, or the finishing of textiles for export to Mozambique, it was soon evident that these plans were endorsed without the Vāniyā actually intending to carry them through to the extent which the Portuguese desired. The Vāniyā were only prepared to support State plans if they were advantageous to their trade in some way. If they were deemed a hindrance, or did not further the merchants’ interests, they were either contested or the Vāniyā selected only those elements that they found to be of use for their commerce. At times this was done as a measure to appease the State and maintain good relations. It was generally in the interests of the Indian merchants and the Portuguese authorities to maintain cordial relations, as both parties benefited from the relationship.

Examples from the end of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century demonstrate that, despite offering support for Portuguese plans, this was in fact nominal (or at best conditional) because the Vāniyā continued to procure the bulk of

\textsuperscript{161} There was not a single Portuguese merchant among those who made financial commitments to this cloth production. For details see HAG, CDm 1061, ‘Mercadores que contribuirão para a manufactura de fazendas,’ 23 February 1799.
their (finished) textile exports from Jambusar. These merchants invested heavily in Jambusar. For instance, in 1800 they committed the large sum of Rs 400,000 for the purchase of textiles in Jambusar expressly for the Mozambique trade. This information is significant because it reveals the capital resources to which the Vāniyā had access in this branch of their trade. Equally significantly, it reflects the sustained level of African demand for Indian manufactures, and highlights how consumer tastes affected seemingly distant economic processes. It uncovers, further, the importance of the relation of Mozambique to the vitality of one of Gujarat’s centres of production.

The Vāniyā investment was considered of such magnitude that the East India Company brokers, who were also interested in the acquisition of textiles in Jambusar, complained bitterly that it was proving an impediment to their own purchases there. Furthermore, it was alleged that procurement for the Company was complicated by the Vāniyā, or rather their brokers, offering high prices for ‘poor quality’ goods. Although the complaint was taken seriously by the English authorities, it is unclear whether the Company sought any action against these merchants, or attempted to prevent them from investing in the purchase of cotton textiles in Jambusar. Evidence in the nineteenth century from customs records and correspondence shows that merchants continued to procure their textiles from Jambusar, and indicates therefore that either the English did not attempt to stop it or, if they did, were unsuccessful.

There are a number of examples in Diu and Daman of Indian merchants who were seemingly interested in supporting Portuguese plans to develop textile production but failed to do so. One of Daman’s most prominent merchants, Jhaver Khushal, contributed the third highest sum of money for the import of ‘white’ cottons

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163 See, for example, HAG, AD 4952-4960; CD 1003, Sowchand Velji, Chaturbhuj Kunwarji et. al to Governor, 29 March 1805.
from Jambusar in 1799 but almost immediately reneged on the conditions of the agreement reached between the Indian merchants and the authorities by failing to include in his export cargo to Mozambique in that year a single piece of cloth which had been produced and/or finished in Daman.\(^{164}\) It appears that Khushal had little intention of changing how he acquired textiles for the African market. While care should be taken in reading too much into one case, some larger points might be extracted here. One might argue that Khushal was simply slow to organise the import of unfinished textiles into Daman from Jambusar, and could therefore have acquired and readied a cargo of finished piece goods instead. On the other hand, evidence contained in correspondence following the 1799 agreement makes it clear that Indian merchants did not fully support the procurement system so eagerly established by the Portuguese. Despite avowed ‘diligent efforts,’ the ‘best wishes’ of some officials, and the ‘…effort…to persuade them [Vāniyā merchants], searching for and facilitating the appropriate means for the effective execution [of the agreement],’\(^{165}\) less than a year after the agreement was reached Indian merchants were being accused of procrastinating in fulfilling their side of the agreement. It was maintained that they were ‘taking their time’ in bringing weavers and looms to Daman, which consequently meant that textiles would be dyed very late and would therefore not be ready for export to Mozambique by the beginning of 1800.\(^{166}\) However, in a letter to Goa which shows the divisions which at times existed between Portuguese officials, Caetano de Souza Pereira, the financial superintendent of Daman, argued that the merchants had not been given sufficient forewarning to acquire un-dyed textiles from Jambusar, and that there were not enough pits in which to dye these. Therefore, he made a plea

\(^{164}\) HAG, CDm 1061, Caetano de Souza Pereira to Governor, 3 March 1800.  
\(^{165}\) ibid.  
\(^{166}\) ibid, Caetano de Souza Pereira to Viceroy, 24 October 1799.
to the Viceroy for up to three pits to be made available to the Indian merchants ‘for this important objective.’

For their part, the Indian merchants rejected the accusations that they were ‘stalling’ on the purchase of the ‘white’ piece goods. They argued that ‘...we have imported yarn...and have promptly organised for the making of dotins in the district of this praça...’. They stressed, however, that their attempts to manufacture textiles had been frustrated because

...all of the weavers of the district were occupied in working to produce cloths for [capitão de Mar e Guerra] Jacinto Domingues because he had advanced them money ...[and because of this] we have not sent for more yarn. We shall instead have white cloths manufactured in the Straits [Gulf of Cambay] and they shall arrive from Jambuceira [sic.] in October.

The Governor found the response of the Indian merchants to be unacceptable, believing their claim that there was a shortage of weaver labour in Daman to be untrue. He also refused to believe that the dyeing pits of the Portuguese merchant Jacinto Domingues were not available. Domingues, later Director of the Portuguese factory in Surat, had established a ‘fabrica de tinturaria’ (dye factory) in the mid-1790s that had been favoured by the Portuguese authorities with an exemption of duties on both the import of undyed textiles from Jambusar or Surat, and on the export of finished/dyed goods from Daman. The support afforded him by the state, which included the leasing of land in the village of Varacunda and the granting of similar privileges to Parsi dyers who had been brought to Daman from

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167 ibid.
168 ibid, Response of Indian merchants to Governor of Daman, 25 October 1799.
169 BN, Codice 10801, nos. 126-139, ‘Reflexões sobre as causas da decadencia do Estado da India,’ n.d.
170 The exact date is uncertain but extant information from the records indicates that it was around this date that he established himself in Daman. See HAG, CDm 1060, Gabriel João dos Anjos to Sebastião Joze Ferreira Barroco, 29 August 1795.
Surat, was for the production of the prized indigo-dyed zuartes.\textsuperscript{172} It seems that this production was exclusively aimed at the Portuguese metropolitan market.\textsuperscript{173} In a show of state support for Portuguese merchants, the Vāniyā were encouraged by the authorities to use the pits owned by Domingues. However, Governor De Souza Pereira also ordered them to open the necessary pits to ‘dye cloths [that were to be imported from Jambusar] in them, [at the same time] being diligent to employ the necessary dyers and weavers to manufacture and dye the white cloths…’\textsuperscript{174} Although in their reply the Vāniyā maintained that they did not have the money for this work, they were able nonetheless to finance the ‘business of procurement of cloths from Jambuceira and Cambay which we normally undertake for our own business…’\textsuperscript{175}

This was a telling declaration because it sent an unequivocal message to the Portuguese authorities that the Indian merchants, entrenched in a procurement network that had been in operation for much of the eighteenth century, were not prepared to divert capital to production in Daman, at least not to the extent that the Portuguese desired. Moreover, while the possibility cannot be discounted that the Vāniyā did not at the time possess the capital for the opening of dyeing pits and the employment of weavers, it is more likely that the production and/or finishing of piecegoods in Daman was an uneconomic cost. In other words, it was cheaper to import finished textile pieces from Jambusar than it was to manufacture them in Daman. This interpretation is supported by the difficulties which Domingues continued to experience in the following years in getting Indian merchants to take

\textsuperscript{172} This account is based on Manoel Jose Gomes Loureiro, Memorias dos Estabelecimentos portugueses a l'este do Cabo da Boa Esperança (Lisbon: Typografia Filipe Nery, 1835), pp. 398-409.
\textsuperscript{173} For a recent overview of the commercial activities of Jacinto Domingues, see Celsa Pinto, Situating Indo-Portuguese Trade History: A Commercial Resurgence, 1770-1830 (Tellicherry: Institute for Research in Social Sciences and Humanities, 2003), pp. 47-66.
\textsuperscript{174} HAG, CDm 1061, Governor to Indian merchants, 14 December 1799.
\textsuperscript{175} ibid, Reply of Indian merchants to Governor, 17 December 1799.
undyed textiles to pits which had been established with the ‘sole purpose of dyeing
the yarn of the merchants [and weavers] of this praça….’

When we turn to Diu, we find a similar situation. Indian merchants there were
equally selective in their approach to Portuguese plans. Shipments of textiles to
Mozambique continued in this period to consist predominantly of piece goods brought
from Jambusar. While the evidence for Diu is not as detailed as it is for Daman, it is
clear from what is available that Indian merchants in Diu were acting in a similar
manner to those in Daman. This can be illustrated through evidence found in the
customs records. For example, in exports for 1804 it is clear that, except for a single
cargo, all the textile consignments shipped to Mozambique was brought to Diu from
Jambusar. This was true in earlier years, and remained so into the nineteenth
century.

It is worth pointing out that pressures were not always brought to bear on the
Indian merchants in the quite the manner wished for by the authorities in Goa. For
example, a Portuguese official in the early nineteenth century supported the
importation of textiles into Diu from Jambusar. This seemingly contradictory
endorsement is resolved once the financial motivation is considered. As it was
explained, ‘the cloths of Jambusar….are of great interest to this customs house
because they are charged import and export duties [whereas] the cloths of Diu only
pay export duties which are a low one per cent.’ In the final analysis, specific
financial considerations in Diu superseded the promotion of establishing full-scale
textile production there. This example indicates also how members of the Portuguese
State could differ in their analysis of the most expedient commercial and fiscal
remedies for the Indian territories.

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176 ibid, Viceroy to Governor of Daman, 8 July 1803.
177 HAG, AD 4952, Cargo of Pala owned by Nathu Samji, 11 February 1804. The one cargo that was
not brought from Jambusar had come from Cambay. See also, AHU, Moç., Cx 66 Doc 78, ‘Mapa da
carga do navio de viagem da praça de Dio….,’ 30 March 1794.
178 HAG, CD 1004, Antonio Leite de Souza to Francisco Antonio Veigra Cabral, Diu, 31 January
1807.
The unconditional support which the Portuguese hoped to receive from Indian merchants for the establishment of a textile industry in Diu was undermined by the aggressive behaviour of some officials towards these merchants. This had the effect of further alienating the authorities and their policies from the Vāniyā. An example drawn from the end of the century demonstrates this clearly. Thakarsi Jetha had imported cotton [thread] from ‘outside Diu,’ and sent it to weavers in the nearby village of Brancavara ‘to be manufactured into travatas, jorians and samateres….’ However, the weavers were harassed by merchants who, it was suggested, were acting on ‘superior orders’ of the state. As a consequence, Jetha suffered ‘great damage’ to his trade. He therefore complained against the comportment of officials who sought to use their positions in Diu to support the procurement of textiles by 'Portuguese' merchants over those of the Vāniyā.\(^{179}\) Other examples which exist of a similar nature strongly suggest that, despite the policy directives from Goa, the financial considerations in Diu (and Daman), occasional preferential treatment of ‘Portuguese’ merchants by the authorities and the investment of the Vāniyā in an efficient procurement system centred on Jambusar worked against the full-scale establishment of textile production for the African market in Diu.\(^{180}\)

In order to understand growing Portuguese concern over textile production and supply in India it is necessary to place European procurement in a broader context. European demand for Indian textiles began to develop rapidly from the middle of the seventeenth century, adding to pressures on textile producers. Dutch interest in Southeast Asian trade prompted them to establish factories in Coromandel, which, from the 1680s, also served their European markets.\(^{181}\) The English also established factories to secure textile supplies, notably in South India and Bengal, and from the second half of the seventeenth century began significantly

\(^{179}\) HAG, Registos Gerais da Feitoria de Diu 7970, Complaint of Thakarsi Jetha, Panjim, 16 May 1797.

\(^{180}\) See, for example, CD 1003, Francisco Antonio da Veiga Cabral to Governor, 7 August 1798.

to increase their investment in the textile and cotton trades.\textsuperscript{182} While incorporating elements of existing procurement practices, Europeans operated through the figure of the broker or \textit{dalal}. He was an Indian employee with extensive knowledge of local markets who would identify prospective intermediary supply merchants for companies. The merchant then brought about agreements with the prospective company to supply it under mutually agreed terms. It was thus intermediary merchants who were responsible for arranging textile supplies from producers through the well-established contract system, which involved giving a part of the value of the contract to the weavers in advance.\textsuperscript{183}

East India Company production was concentrated in Bengal which in the seventeenth century was a very important area for its investment. Textiles were also traded in Madras in this period but in both areas was done through brokers. However, in the eighteenth century procurement structures underwent significant change, especially from the middle of the century, as the requirement of the Company's textile trade expanded. With the granting of \textit{diwani} rights to the Company in Bengal in 1765, it assumed political power and increasingly came to exercise coercive power over weavers through its switch to the \textit{gumashta} system of procurement.\textsuperscript{184} In South India, once political control was secured in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the Company also moved to exert greater control over the productive capacity of weavers. This was repeated by the end of the century in Bombay and Surat.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{182} Chaudhuri, ‘European trade with India,’ pp. 382-407.
\textsuperscript{183} Prakash, \textit{European commercial enterprise}, pp. 167-168.
\textsuperscript{184} ibid, pp. 276-279. \textit{Gumashtas} were agents who purchased textiles for the English East India Company.
\textsuperscript{185} Details of the impact of these measures on producers is provided for Bengal in Hameeda Hossain, \textit{The Company Weavers of Bengal: The East India Company and the Organization of Textile Production in Bengal, 1750-1813} (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988); for South India in Sinnapah Arasaratnam, ‘Trade and Political Dominion in South India, 1750-1790: Changing British-Indian Relationships,’ \textit{Modern Asian Studies}, 13 (1979), pp. 19-40; and ‘Weavers, Merchants and Company,’ pp. 257-281; Parthasarathi, \textit{Transition to a Colonial Economy}. For western India, see Subramanian, ‘Power and the Weave.’
From early in the eighteenth century, the Portuguese, sought to emulate the growing prosperity from involvement in India’s lucrative textile trade in Coromandel and Bengal of their fiercest competitors, the Dutch and English. As such they became increasingly concerned with questions of their own textile procurement and production.186 With increased European competition for weaver output in the eighteenth century, the Portuguese began to direct their attention toward two different approaches to procurement. The first approach, an idea originating earlier in the century, was to establish factory production in Goa to supply (Portuguese) merchant needs for the European and African markets. This responded to the aggressive approach of the Company in the eighteenth century to procurement in western India generally, and in Surat particularly, where in the 1780s the English were trying everything ‘to deter the Portuguese from buying up piece goods on which the English East India Company had advanced money.’187 The second approach was to bring weavers to Diu, Daman and Goa, and echoed early attempts to exert greater control over production and quality.

However, while the Portuguese may have expressed interest in increasing textile exports to Portugal and Mozambique, for most of the century they were primarily concerned about how best to secure regular textile supplies for the coastal trade and, most importantly, for the export trade to Mozambique. The success which the English and Dutch were enjoying in their procurement practices stimulated the Portuguese Indian authorities to suggest that the best way to improve the acquisition of textiles was for buyers to enter into more direct contact with producers of textiles. In other words, the authorities began to encourage Portuguese and Indian merchants to bypass the middleman of the traditional procurement structure and assume control

186 Aware of English and Dutch operations in India, the Portuguese even declared their interest in following their European rivals ‘into the interior to have cloths manufactured’ in the early eighteenth century as a possible way of gaining more direct contact with weavers. See BN, Códice 4408, fl. 138, Conde da Ericeira to King, 18 January 1718.
over production by negotiating directly with weavers.\textsuperscript{188} As I will demonstrate, this position was articulated with growing regularity from the middle of the eighteenth century.

From the first quarter of the eighteenth century it is already possible to discern growing efforts on the part of the Portuguese authorities to address not only the establishment of regular supplies of textiles for official and private trade, but also their questioning of the quality of these textiles. Perhaps due to Diu’s proximity to the rich cotton fields of Gujarat and to centres of textile production, and therefore its potential both as a transhipment centre for raw cotton and finished textiles, the Portuguese appear to have directed their attention toward it early in the eighteenth century. Aiming to increase textile production through the development of a (permanent) textile industry in Diu, what the Portuguese proposed that all merchants work towards attracting greater numbers of weavers to the island. However, despite the desire for changes on the part of the authorities, this attempt to increase textile production did not meet with the anticipated success due, in large part, to the existence of ‘obstacles’ that proved difficult to overcome. These were the acquisition of indigo and the demands of weavers for fair pay for their work from ‘secular’ Portuguese and priests.\textsuperscript{189}

The dual realisation that the tax on indigo in Diu was actually hampering increases in textile production because of the delays caused in finishing piece goods, and that weavers were not being offered a ‘fair’ price for the product of their labour, prompted the Portuguese Crown to abolish the tax and insist that merchants ‘pay the fair price’ for the textiles they received from weavers. Clearly, the authorities understood that the tax on indigo was not only ‘of little use to the…Royal Treasury,’ but even more worriedly, discouraged weavers from moving to Diu from neighbouring areas. This was compounded by the fact that those who did go and

\textsuperscript{188} BN, Códice 4408, fls. 139-140, ‘Livro das Cartas…,’ 1718.
\textsuperscript{189} Viceroy to Crown, 18 January 1718 in PD, p. 241.
work on the island were paid less for their work than they were in Kathiawar or Gujarat. In a ploy that was used throughout the eighteenth century, weavers threatened that, unless they were offered favourable working conditions and paid ‘just’ prices for their textiles, they would refuse to migrate to the island.190

Although it appears that a small community of weavers and dyers were found on Diu by 1720,191 it is difficult to establish whether their number had actually increased due to official pressure and the threat of punitive action. It is reasonable to assume, however, that this did not have much impact because less than two decades later there was a renewed appeal and added pressure by the Portuguese authorities to attract weavers to Diu.192

The problem of attracting weavers to Diu, and later to Daman and Goa, proved intractable, preventing the Portuguese from establishing leverage over production, and thus supply (especially, though not exclusively, for the African market), as they sought to remould production structures in a highly competitive market where demand was being fuelled by Indian and European merchants. What the Portuguese faced in western India, particularly from the middle of the century, was that the labour of weavers was increasingly in high demand. Consequently weavers were able to maintain a high degree of control over to whom they chose to sell the product of their labour. Apart from the competition of Indian merchants in Surat and Bombay, the growing English presence in the region added significantly to the demand for textiles. This placed weaves in an advantageous position vis-à-vis buyers and allowed them to dictate the conditions under which they would work as well as the prices for which they would sell the product of their labour.

190 BN, Códice 4408, fls. 105-110, ‘Livro das Cartas…,’ 1718; Carta Regia of 1721 in PD, pp. 275-76.
191 A recent estimate of the town of Diu and the neighbouring villages of Gogola, Brancharva, Brancavara and Dangaruny puts the number of weavers and dyers at 4 per cent and 2.4 per cent of the population respectively. See Luis Frederico Dias Antunes, ‘Diu, the commercial activity of a small harbour in Gujarat (1680-1800): The Portuguese Documents,’ in Carreira (ed.), Sources européennes sur le Gujarat, p. 66.
192 AHU, Códice 1345, fl. 65, Portaria, 21 October 1744.
By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the aggressive behaviour of the East India Company began to change this. The Company sought, in order to maintain regular supplies and control over ‘quality’ in textile consignments, to exert control over the production process as had been achieved successfully in Bengal and southern India. Until the English East India Company consolidated its presence in Surat and Bombay, however, weavers were still able to exert considerable control over their terms of engagement. As such, the Portuguese found it extremely difficult to attract increased numbers of weavers to their territories in order to fundamentally alter the nature of the procurement process which was in Indian hands, as it had been throughout their involvement in India.

The measures taken by the English to exert greater leverage over production structures was partially mirrored in the actions of the Portuguese authorities. In the second half of the eighteenth century the Portuguese continued to seek more efficient systems for the procurement of textiles by encouraging merchants to bring weavers to their territories, but with limited impact. However, they intensified the pressure exerted on merchants by seeking to establish factory production in their territories. This attempt to place weaver labour directly under their control constituted a final effort by the Portuguese to bypass the strong vertical link that existed between marketing and industrial production. It was spurred by two motivations which, in turn, were related to the more activist role of the state in the second half of the eighteenth century: a desire to subvert the hold of the Vâniyâ on textile exports handled by Diu and Daman to the western Indian Ocean; and a willingness to increase their share of the European export market in the face of the growing English presence in western India. The widely-held conviction of the Portuguese authorities was that this improvement lay, at least in part, in the establishment of a solid manufacturing base in India.  

Sensing that their efforts in Diu and Daman were unlikely to succeed due to the lack of co-operation from Indian merchants, the Portuguese directed their attention to Goa. Textiles drawn from Gujarat, Bengal, south India and the Deccan had been exported through Goa to Africa, Brazil and Portugal prior to the eighteenth century. While some transhipment of textiles continued in the eighteenth century, the Portuguese considered it a requirement for the development of their colony to establish factory production in Goa in order to guarantee a regular supply of textiles for their commerce. As a first step, and in keeping with their earlier proposals for Diu, in the early 1750s the authorities concentrated on bringing weavers 'from other parts of India' to Goa.\footnote{Mention is made of establishing a ‘fabrica de tecidos’ (cloth factory) in Goa in 1753. See HAG, CD 995, Tavora to Rector of College of Diu, 26 October 1753.} Failing this, an alternative was suggested that ‘boys’ be sent from the Portuguese Indian capital to Bengal, Surat and Diu in order to apprentice themselves to weavers ‘with the aim of learning the weaver’s craft.’\footnote{HAG, Monções do Reino 125-B, fl. 570-581, ‘Carta do Vicerei para o Castelão de Diu,’ 5 January 1753. Cited also in Martires Lopes, \textit{Goa Setecentista}, p. 56.} While this proved unsuccessful due to the apparent reluctance of young families to emigrate from Goa,\footnote{HAG, Monções do Reino 125-B, fl. 586-590, ‘Carta do Marquês de Távora para o Secretário de Estado, Diogo de Mendonça Corte Real,’ 11 January 1753. Cited also in Martires Lopes, \textit{Goa Setecentista}, p. 56.} the Portuguese did manage to get weavers sent to the Indian capital who had been trained in Diu. However, not enough weavers came to Goa, adding greatly to the frustrations of establishing ‘independent’ production.\footnote{HAG, CD 995, Tavora to Castelão, 18 September 1752.}

Undeterred by their limited success, the Portuguese proceeded with their longer-term goal and founded the \textit{Real Fabrica das Sedas e Panos} (‘Royal Factory of Silks and Cloth’) in Goa in 1758, the idea for which had been raised around a decade earlier.\footnote{HAG, CDm 1056, da Costa to Viceroy, 12 June 1748.} Despite initial expectations, however, production volume was low and within a few years the factory was abandoned. Problems with attracting sufficient labour are once more at the heart of its failure because weavers from Diu and Daman
proved unwilling to move to Goa unless their wage demands were met. The few who did move, drawn perhaps by the prospect of regular demand on their labour, reacted adversely to subsequent constraints which the Portuguese sought to place on their labour times. Also, the textiles which were produced could not compete with the textiles coming from Diu and Daman for the African market, and from Surat for the Portuguese and European market. A further reason, recently suggested by Rene Barendse, is that the main investor in the project withdrew his capital after financial losses from three consecutive years had deemed the company a liability.200

Despite the complete failure of the Royal Factory, the Portuguese persisted in their approach. This was due in part to the influence of mercantilist ideology on Portuguese imperial policy in this period, which sought both to improve its gains from empire and ‘modernise’ Portugal.201 Although metropolitan authorities considered the establishment of a Royal monopoly company for India, the Crown was in no position to finance it. As an alternative, it made an allowance for the establishment of companies constituted by private capital, as well as sought to enter into contracts with private merchants. Moreover, trade within the Estado da India (collective term for Portuguese possessions east of the Cape peninsula), and between it and Mozambique, was opened to all Crown subjects. These measures were intended to stimulate commercial activity in the empire in the Indian Ocean. For the territories in the western half of the ocean this culminated in the Plano do Comercio (‘Commercial Plan’) of 1786 that aimed to stimulate trade between the Portuguese-administered territories of the western Indian Ocean through further reductions in import and export duties from Goa, Diu and Daman.202 Merchants of the latter territories were also

199 For example, in 1786, a ‘master’ weaver and 2 dyers were sent to Goa from Diu. See HAG, CD 999, Luis Caetano de…Velho e França to Viceroy, 20 January 1786.
200 The investor redirected his capital to the imminently more profitable tax-farming and money-lending. See R. J. Barendse, ‘Europe is literally the creation of the Third World,’ H-World Net Posting, 25 March 2002.
201 Hoppe, África Oriental Portuguesa, pp. 280-315.
202 For details see Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks,’ chapter 2.
granted advantageous trading conditions as the Portuguese looked increasingly to private trade to guarantee the financial survival and prosperity of their Indian possessions. Although not encouraged, foreign trade was tolerated, particularly in Goa where a significant proportion of its trade (most importantly in textiles) was conducted with ports outside of Portuguese control.\(^{203}\)

Furthermore, Portuguese imperial authorities continued to regard as important the improvement of trade with the metropole, and this applied to textiles. Indian textiles had been important imports to Angola but the competition they posed to Portuguese manufactures had resulted in a law being passed in the early 1720s that prohibited their direct entry into the Angolan market.\(^{204}\) The authorities sought, therefore, to continue the promotion of textile production in Goa with the establishment of two 'factories' in the early 1780s: the Fabrica Real de Cumburjua ('Royal Factory of Cambarjua') and the Fabrica Real de Taleigão ('Royal Factory of Taleigao').\(^{205}\) Significantly, the Crown allowed, indeed encouraged, private capital to become involved with production, and as a result other smaller textile fabricas were established elsewhere in Goa; their number, though, appears to have been small.\(^{206}\)

Accompanying these developments were efforts to promote cotton cultivation in Goa which was seen not only as another step towards the possible control of textile production in the Portuguese Indian capital (and by extension possibly also to Diu and Daman), but also as a potential benefit to the metropolitan industry.\(^{207}\) Although the Fabrica de Cumarjua produced cotton textiles that were consumed locally and exported to Mozambique and Portugal in the first few years of its existence (even running at a small profit by the end of 1787) Portuguese ambitions

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\(^{203}\) Martires Lopes, *Goa Setecentista*, pp. 57-72.
\(^{204}\) Hoppe, *África Oriental Portuguesa*, p. 285. Transshipment was permitted from Lisbon to Angola.
\(^{206}\) Martires Lopes, *Goa Setecentista*, pp. 57-72
\(^{207}\) HAG, CD 999, Viceroy to Belchior do Amaral e Menezes, 24 November 1788. See also Bauss, ‘Legacy of British Free Trade Policies.’
were once more frustrated. Production weakened and profits were eventually slashed, leading to financial losses of around 100 per cent ten years after its establishment.\textsuperscript{208} As a result, the Fabrica de Cumarjua was suspended, and full ownership transferred into private hands. However, despite being taken over by private capital, the fabrica could not operate profitably and was therefore abandoned sometime in the second decade of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{209} It seems that the Fabrica de Taleigão did not fare any better, with its textiles not finding buyers in the Lisbon market because of their poor quality.\textsuperscript{210} Attempts to sell them in Mozambique also did not meet with demand, primarily, it seems, because they had not been dyed to the satisfaction of African consumers.\textsuperscript{211} Expressing the frustrations of Portuguese capital to succeed in the establishment of manufacturing in India, a contemporary author argued that Goa faced insurmountable problems because of lack of funds and competition from ‘the lands…where the planting of cotton takes place, and where the skilled workers are raised and taught.’\textsuperscript{212}

This admission from a Portuguese merchant with considerable experience of the textile trade reveals that Portuguese factory production could not compete with the manufacture of piece goods woven in villages and towns outside of Portuguese territory, most importantly in Gujarat. Efforts between the middle of the eighteenth century and the 1780s to establish textile factory production by encouraging the immigration of weavers and capital to Goa had ended, if not quite in spectacular failure, then certainly without the attainment of significant success.\textsuperscript{213}

Faced with failure and the growing realisation that they were unable to compete with goods produced in western India, whose procurement was under the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{208} As calculated from figures in Pinto, \textit{Trade and Finance}, p. 192.
\item \textsuperscript{209} This is based on Gomes Loureiro, \textit{Memorias dos Estabelecimentos portugueses}, pp. 402-407; Pinto, \textit{Trade and Finance}, pp. 192-193; and BN, Códice 10801, ‘Reflexões…’, no. 94.
\item \textsuperscript{210} Martires Lopes, \textit{Goa Setecentista}, p. 58, fn. 132.
\item \textsuperscript{211} HAG, CM 1446, Melo e Castro to da Cunha e Menezes, 16 August 1791.
\item \textsuperscript{212} Gomes Loureiro, \textit{Memorias dos Estabelecimentos portugueses}, p. 404.
\item \textsuperscript{213} This might be contrasted with French success in establishing textile factory production in Pondicherry by the middle of the nineteenth century. See Roberts, ‘Guiné Cloth.’
\end{itemize}
control of Indian merchants and brokers, the Portuguese re-intensified their calls for
the establishment of textile production in Diu and Daman, and maintained their goal
of bringing production under the control of merchant capital. Daman was regarded as
a potential centre of textile manufacturing, but the Portuguese considered Diu to hold
the greatest prospects, not least due to the presence of a small weaver population
there by the 1740s. With this in mind, cotton cultivated in Goa was sent to Diu in
1753. Cotton was also sent to Daman in the same year. Although it is unclear how
much cotton was shipped north, it appears that few shipments were completed. This
is explained by the failure to establish commercial cotton cultivation in Goa over the
following years.214 Also, the bulk of any cotton which was grown would have been
used by the Portuguese for the Goa fabricas.

This re-direction of textile production in Portuguese India is revealed in the
words of a Portuguese official:

...acquiring cloths in our Portuguese territories in India for the trade of
the Kingdom and American and African Dominions is important, and
the procurement of cloths in Diu and Daman appears an effective way
to guarantee the supply of piecegoods for this trade...215

These words have to be regarded within the context of efforts by the
authorities to revitalise the trade of Portuguese India at this time, particularly Goa.
Officials, understanding the importance of African trade to the income of the state,
sought therefore to ‘promote’ and ‘animate’ the trade between Goa and Mozambique,
primarily by facilitating the entry into Goa of ‘goods [textiles] from the North, suitable

214 HAG, CD 1001, Diogo de Mello de Payo to Governor, 7 July 1790. While in 1791 cotton
cultivation produced the highest yield of all agricultural products (others included coffee and manioc),
it ‘did not prosper as much as was hoped...’ See Martires Lopes, Goa Setecentista, p. 55 fn. 122 &
p. 56. An urgent need exists for detailed work on agriculture and production in Goa. For some work
on these questions in the eighteenth century see the forthcoming second volume on the Arabian
Seas by R. J. Barendse.
215 HAG, CD 999, Gustavo Adolfo Hercules de Charmont to Franciscoc da Cunha e Menezes, 13
January 1787.
for the consumption of the African coast... Many were of paramount interest to the Portuguese, apart from the establishment of full-scale textile production in Goa, was the importation into their Indian capital of textiles that had been produced in Diu and Daman. Clearly the Portuguese aimed here to tempt merchants to reorient their direct (export) trade of Gujarati textiles to Mozambique south to Goa, so that it could be ‘better regulated.’

In 1788, the Portuguese reinstated the reduction in the import and export duties of Diu and Daman to one per cent below Surat as a further encouragement for merchants to produce textiles in Diu. This appears to have been implemented first in the 1740s, and possibly earlier, but had been partially neglected. The Portuguese understood that Surat, besides its importance as a financial centre, was also an important centre for the textile trade of western India in the second half of the eighteenth century. It could therefore threaten the trade from Diu and Daman if merchants there were tempted by more favourable conditions and redirected their trade and resources away from them. While it is reasonable to infer from the available evidence that merchants were dissuaded from investing heavily in the textile trade in, and from, Surat, the inducement to have them send textiles to Goa in the 1780s was largely unsuccessful. Certainly, a few shipments were made to Goa from Diu and Daman in 1788 and 1789 but in the following three years no shipments were made, indicating that merchants did not feel compelled to prepare shipments of textiles for the Portuguese Indian capital. Added to this was occasional Portuguese failure to collect textiles that had been readied for them because they lacked shipping

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217 HAG, CD 1001, Belchior do Amaral de Menezes to Governor, 28 April 1788.
218 HAG, CD 999, Francisco da Cunha e Menezes to Castellão, 24 November 1788.
219 AHU, Códice 1345, fl. 98v, Porteria, 21 October 1744.
220 HAG, CD 1001, Belchior do Amaral de Menezes to Governor, 28 April 1788.
221 This is based on the absence of material that refers to the relocation of capital to the Surat textile trade.
tonnage. These lapses antagonised the Indian merchants who had prepared the consignments.222

Yet, despite the limited success of Portuguese efforts, they persisted in their approach, and in 1797 issued an Alvara (Royal/Vice-regal decree) which set out the conditions by which textile manufacture would be governed in Diu, Daman and Goa. The most important of these concerned the exemption of duties on the import and export of piece goods from Diu and Daman to Goa.223 This was followed a year later in Diu with a Portaria (decree, issue by governor) ‘permitting’ merchants to manufacture textiles there, and in 1799 with an agreement that textiles shipped to Mozambique from Daman would be produced in the Portuguese territory.224 These renewed attempts to develop textile production in Diu and Daman for export, and for consignment to Goa, did not, however, meet with success. The Portuguese had once more failed to induce the participation of Indian merchants. Why were continued perquisites from the Portuguese authorities to expand the manufacture of textiles in Diu and Daman not seized by Indian merchants? Why were they seemingly so reluctant to take advantage of the favourable terms being offered to them?

The answer to these questions lie in the existence of a well-organised and effective procurement structure that extended through an interconnected network from Diu and Daman to Jambusar. It was in place by the second half of the eighteenth century and continued into the nineteenth century. This was in keeping with how coastal exporting towns and cities were connected to the textile-producing interior of Gujarat. While it was not the case that the Indian merchants of Diu and Daman ignored all the opportunities created by the Portuguese state, they were too firmly established within the Gujarat textile economy and marketing structure to seek dependence on, or patronage from the Portuguese to abandon their highly successful

222 See, for example, HAG, CD 996, D. Frederico Guilherme de Souza to Mazanes, 9 July 1783.
223 HAG, Registos Gerais da Feitoria de Diu 7970, Alvara, 7 April 1797.
224 ibid, Portaria, 26 April 1798; HAG, CDm 1061, Francisco Antonio da Veiga Cabral to Governor, 26 September 1799.
operations. In short, Indian merchants judged the Portuguese proposals to develop textile manufacturing in either Diu or Daman to not hold advantages which superseded those found in the system of procurement that functioned independently of Portuguese rule.

Although the Portuguese state in the late eighteenth century was enfeebled by its lack of territorial authority and Royal investment, it would be incorrect to assume that private Portuguese merchants were without capital resources in this period. While they did not possess the capital that some of their English rivals certainly did, Portuguese merchants active in India certainly commanded resources which were not insignificant. Indeed, historians are beginning to appreciate and understand that for a brief period between the mid-1770s and the 1820s Portuguese Euro-Asian trade revived in impressive fashion as ‘Crown shipping … increasingly gave way to private shipping’. The Portuguese commercial policy of 1783 lowered import and export duties significantly, and had immediate results with 24 vessels taking on cargo in Goa for Lisbon between 1784 and 1788. Goa thus (re)emerged in these years as an important port of call and transhipment centre for private and state Portuguese shipping. Besides the revival in trade with Lisbon, the period from late eighteenth to the second decade of the nineteenth century also witnessed a revival in private intra-Asian trade.

Investment in western India seems to have been concentrated primarily in Surat where the Portuguese maintained a Factory, even though private Portuguese

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227 Bauss, 'Legacy of British Free Trade Policies,' pp. 93-94. The effect of the commercial policy can also be seen in the fact that in the years immediately preceding the change of policy (1780, 1781 and 1782) the highest number of vessels leaving Lisbon for Goa in any of these years stood at 3, whereas already in 1783 this number was up to 3 and in 1785 increased to 9. See Pinto, Trade and Finance, Appendix 4, p. 270. See also Pinto, 'Lisbon investment,' Appendix 1, p. 230.
merchants and vessels were calling at Goa in the late eighteenth century in increased number. It was Surat’s textile trade and production, established in the eighteenth century, that provided these merchants with an outlet for their accumulated capital, rather than the uncertain gains from the establishment of textile production in Goa, Diu and Daman. Portuguese private investment had grown in Surat from the final quarter of the eighteenth century, allowing the Portuguese Director of the Factory, Jacinto Domingues, to order the purchase of ‘thousands of rupees’ worth of textiles’ in 1787.\(^{229}\) The accuracy of this statement is borne out by British reports that several *lakhs* (100,000s) of rupees were invested by the Portuguese in Surat textiles in 1796.\(^{230}\) The English became increasingly concerned at how Portuguese private investment in Surat offered 20 per cent more for inferior quality goods and did so with ready cash.\(^{231}\) It has even been suggested that Portuguese competition for Surat’s textiles contributed towards the Company’s exertion of greater authority and more control over textile producers by 1800.\(^{232}\)

Large investments by private Portuguese traders continued in western India, including some involvement in the Bombay cotton trade in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. Records show that the level of this private investment in Surat in the early nineteenth century overtook 1780s and 1790s levels. At the turn of the century this investment alone stood at over a million rupees.\(^{233}\) Such large investment, coupled with the neutrality of Portugal in the European wars of the period, helped to establish Lisbon as a major *entrepôt* for the importation of Indian textiles into Europe (at least until 1815 when the wars ended) which were sold at

\(^{229}\) HAG, Copiador Indiano da Feitoria de Surrate 2533, Jacinto Domingues to João Nogueira, 8 October 1787.
\(^{233}\) Pinto, ‘Lisbon investment,’ Appendix 5, p. 231.
considerable profit.\textsuperscript{234} However, the heavy concentration of Portuguese investment in
Surat made the goal of establishing textile production in Diu and Daman a largely
unattainable one. Moreover, it was reported that the actions and attitude of the
Directors of the Portuguese Factory contributed towards this failure:

The increase of our factories and commerce of Daman…and also of
Diu are incompatible with the maintenance of the Portuguese [Factory]
in Surat...If our vessels sell and purchase [goods] in Daman this will
increase greatly the income of the Customs; the goods of the newly
established [textile] factories will find a ready market, and to them will
be added the trade goods of Broach and the Straits [Gulf of Cambay].
All this will be lost with our vessels trading in Surat, to which the
aforementioned trade goods of Broach and the Straits are sent, as
happened this year through the secret efforts of the Loureiros…\textsuperscript{235}

Continued investment at Surat and elsewhere in western India by private
Portuguese merchants meant that investment in production in Portuguese India was
not forthcoming throughout the period under study and undoubtedly hampered these
efforts. A further outlet for private capital, the China trade in raw cotton from Gujarat
from late in the eighteenth century and the Malwa opium trade from the 1810s
through Daman\textsuperscript{236} also diverted investment away from the vagaries of investment in
production, as did the textile trade from Calcutta.\textsuperscript{237}

\textsuperscript{234} To follow the Bombay government’s concerns about how the peace between Portugal and
France, and the large investments of the Portuguese merchants, would potentially allow them to
\textsuperscript{235} HAG, Monções do Reino 178A, fl. 453, Viceroy to Souza Coutinho, 9 April 1799. For a discussion
of the Portuguese Factory see, for example, A. F. Moniz, ‘A Feitoria Portuguesa de Surrate: Sua
importancia Politica e Comercial,’ *O Oriente Português*, 15\textsuperscript{o} Ano, vol. XV (1918), Nos. 1&2 (January
& February), pp. 5-29; ‘Memorial e Informação das Feitorias Portuguezas na Costa de Malabar,’
*Annaes do Concelho Ultramarino* (parte não official), Serie I (1854-58), pp. 525-526; ‘Alguns
esclarecimentos dirigidos ao Ex.mo Ministro da Marinha e Ultramar…,’ *Annaes do Concelho
Ultramarino* (parte não official), Serie II (1859-61), pp. 1-4.
\textsuperscript{237} While the work of Carreira has started to identify the Portuguese merchants involved in the Surat
(and Bombay) trade, and their networks of interaction in India and Lisbon, much remains to be done.
See ‘O Comércio Português no Gujarat na Segunda Metade do Século XVIII: As Famílias Loureiro e
Ribeiro,’ *Mare Liberum*, No. 9 (July 1995), pp. 83-94; and ‘La Correspondance de Francisco Gomes
Textile Production

Having explored the business of procurement, what remains to be considered, as far as possible, is the position of weavers in this story and their relationship with merchants and the state in Diu and Daman. The Portuguese had enjoyed only limited success in attracting weavers to their territories, and this was only partly related to the absence of total support from Indian merchants. What was perhaps even more important was the role which weavers played in determining the extent to which they participated in the productive process in Portuguese territories, and with Indian and Portuguese merchants within them.

This can be illustrated with numerous examples. In Diu in 1791 weavers were unhappy with the manner in which some Indian merchants were treating them, accusing them of trying to force weavers to reduce their prices. In response the weavers simply left the island to find employment elsewhere. This stands in stark contrast to the image which the Portuguese presented of weavers as ‘weak and oppressed.’ In Surat, Goa and elsewhere in India in the late eighteenth century, weavers were able to challenge the authority of the State and merchant capital by moving away, or threatening to do so.

What these examples show, first of all, is that weavers had the ability to leave an area if they felt their interests were threatened. The mobility of weavers as a response to overbearing rulers and/or aggressive merchant behaviour has been recognised by historians. Besides offering relief when disasters such as famine struck, migration (or its threat) effectively acted as a weapon against unfair or

Loureiro Negociant Portugais au Gujarat,’ in Carreira (ed.), Sources européennes sur le Gujarat, pp. 77-120. See also Pinto, Commercial Resurgence.

ANTT, MR 602, Cx 705, D. Frederico Guilherme de Souza to Junta do Comercio, 22 December 1786.


An example for western India is the region around Surat which in 1630 was affected by famine. Examples exist in the literature of famine-induced migration. See Haynes and Roy, ‘Conceiving mobility.’
harsh treatment, and weavers resorted to it frequently in the eighteenth century, as they had in the previous century.\textsuperscript{241} Because they (usually) had few possessions and looms could (oftentimes) be carried with relative ease, weavers were able to migrate at short notice.\textsuperscript{242} Furthermore weavers were welcomed by rulers who stood to gain from the commercial activity which their presence stimulated in an area.\textsuperscript{243}

The examples from Portuguese India also alert us to the fact that the mobility of weavers allowed them to protest against unfair treatment on the part of a state or merchants, or on attempts to exert control over the productive process which, in the second half of the eighteenth century, was accelerated by the British throughout India. Work by Ashin Das Gupta on Surat has shown that already in the 1730s the English were coercing their weavers, a move which was unpopular and resulted in opposition from these producers who ‘were never entirely helpless.’\textsuperscript{244} Later in the century, resistance from weavers underlined for the British that partial political control in Surat did not allow for the enforcement of coercive mechanisms for the procurement of textiles.\textsuperscript{245} In Bengal, weavers also reacted against the gradual imposition of control by the Company by directing ‘not only against circumventing the authoritarianism of the Company’s official agents but also the system of appropriation.’\textsuperscript{246}

\textsuperscript{242} Parthasarathi reports weavers in the mid-1780s leaving the Pollams villages within 24 hours after they had been unable to resolve differences with the EIC. \textit{The Transition to a Colonial Economy}, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{243} For South India, see ibid, p. 30. For North India see, C. A. Bayly, \textit{Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770-1870}, 1\textsuperscript{st} Indian Edition (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 145.
\textsuperscript{244} Ashin Das Gupta, \textit{Indian merchants and the decline of Surat, c.1700-1750}, Reprint (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), p. 37. The ‘opposition’ in this case took the form of weavers returning advances to the English; we should stress that this was a crucial bargaining chip for the weavers in their dealings not just with the Company but with all buyers.
\textsuperscript{245} Subramanian, ‘Power and the Weave,’ p. 66.
Some of the ways weavers resisted English pressures included, not surprisingly, migration, refusal to accept advances and slowing down production.\textsuperscript{247} It has been argued that one of the chief characteristics of the South Indian weaving population was its mobility.\textsuperscript{248} Important new work by Parthasarathi has illustrated definitively how weavers were able to contest the impositions of merchants and states in the productive process. He shows that only once the Company ascended to political power in the final quarter of the eighteenth century and introduced new forms of state power to the region that weavers' independence was destroyed and their labour brought under state control.\textsuperscript{249}

There is general agreement among historians that the eighteenth century was a period of ‘significant economic transformation as mercantile capitalism consolidated itself, textile manufacture expanded and the needs for skilled labour increased.’\textsuperscript{250} This was a process characterised by the emergence of 'successor' states to the Mughal polity that promoted productive and market activity, and as a result may have led to the acceleration of weavers' mobility. It was also a period when the Company, in marrying economic and political power, rose to dominate coastal enclaves such as Calcutta and Madras where it set about refashioning productive structures by exerting control over weavers.\textsuperscript{251} In western India, as Subramanian has recently underlined, because Company intervention came later, weavers (and other local commercial groups) maintained their autonomy and were consequently able to challenge attempts by the Company to control the productive process: '[H]ere, alone of all the early British enclaves, were local manufacturing groups able to coalesce

\textsuperscript{247} Hossain, \textit{Company Weavers}, pp. 124-127.
\textsuperscript{248} Arasaratnam, 'Trade and Political Dominion;' and 'Weavers, Merchants and Company.'
\textsuperscript{249} Parthasarathi, \textit{Transition to a Colonial Economy}.
\textsuperscript{251} Subramanian, 'Power and the Weave', pp. 53-54.
and articulate their protests against the new dispensation of the English East India Company.\textsuperscript{252}

For the purpose of this thesis, the work of Parthasarathi has further importance because it demonstrates how Indian merchants used the novelty of the Company 'state' in South India to their advantage to extend control over textile producers. The difficulties which merchants faced in compelling weavers to abide by their agreements made the authority of the Company, with its strict adherence to contractual obligations, appealing because it undermined the autonomy of these producers. This resulted in 'an interlocking of colonial authority and dominant Indian groups [that] may explain the resilience of colonialism in India.'\textsuperscript{253} In light of this analysis, it may seem unusual that Indian merchants in Diu and Daman (and possibly in Goa) did not support the Portuguese proposals and plans for bringing weavers to Portuguese territories. The Portuguese clearly tried to centralise production in the second half of the eighteenth century in territories where it could be more closely monitored. As discussed, these efforts did not enjoy much success, and I have advanced reasons why this was the case.

However, a critical element, and crucial difference from Company rule, is that the Portuguese state was politically and economically weak. As a result, it could not employ the tactics which the Company state used so effectively to bring production under its control in its coastal enclaves. This may also provide a further explanation for the reluctance of the Vāniyā to fully support Portuguese efforts. Unlike their counterparts in South India, the Indian merchants of Diu and Daman were aware that Portuguese state attempts to establish production in its territories was unlikely to lead to the destruction of weaver autonomy. If there was little chance of undermining producer power, and thus influencing labour costs (and hence price), there was

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\textsuperscript{252} ibid, p. 75. See also Subramanian, \textit{Indigenous Capital}; Nightingale, \textit{Trade and Empire}.
\textsuperscript{253} Parthasarathi, \textit{Transition to a Colonial Economy}, p. 6.
relatively little incentive for the merchants to support state actions. This was hinted at in a letter to the Governor of Diu:

We, the merchants of Diu, so loyal to the Portuguese Crown, are not happy with the pressures placed upon us by some officials in this territory. Our trade benefits the income of the state and we do not wish to be treated badly. We feel that the interest of the authorities in bringing weavers to Diu is not without merit but we must not be forced to attract weavers here…

Moreover, as we have suggested earlier, the procurement system which was in place operated effectively to supply Diu and Daman with textiles for the Mozambique market in a cost-effective manner that functioned well for the Vāniyā. The risks involved in fully supporting the actions of a financially and politically weak state were too high. Therefore, in their trade to Mozambique these merchants continued to operate, for the most part, without direct access to weavers and to acquire textiles through their brokers.

Piece goods for the Mozambique market were produced overwhelmingly in Jambusar. Customs records of exports from Diu, and shipping lists of imports into Mozambique show this to have been the case. Of the piece goods which entered Mozambique from Diu in 1804 on the vessel *Brio do Mar*, for example, 81 per cent were from Jambusar. Similarly, imports of textiles from Daman make clear the dominance of manufactures from Jambusar: in 1802, the provenance of 127 of the 148 bales of textiles were from Jambusar. This reached an even higher proportion the following year when over 90 per cent of the consignment were from this single production centre. This persisted into the second decade of the nineteenth century when a similar proportion of textiles from Jambusar enter Mozambique from

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254 HAG, CD 1004, Sowchand Velji, Kalanchand Amirchand, et. al to Governor, 11 September 1806.
255 AHU, Moç., Cx 105 Doc 38, ‘Mappa da Galera de viagem, Brio do Mar,’ 18 February 1804. Other cargo lists confirming this dominance are provided in this source.
Daman. The trend of textiles from Jambusar dominating imports into Mozambique in the first two decades of the nineteenth century is confirmed by material contained in the customs records which show these piece goods making up 70-80 per cent of cargoes shipped from western India.

In the first decade of the nineteenth century, however, there appear in Mozambique textiles which were manufactured in Diu and Daman. The agreement in Daman in 1803 between Indian and private Portuguese merchants for the manufacture of textiles for the metropolitan market may have led to some production for Mozambique. The Vāniyā of Daman made the following statement:

…all the principal Bania merchants being summoned, the advantages that would result to them and to the well being of this fortress [Daman] in having imitation Surat cloths manufactured here was proposed to them…[and] they responded that they were prepared to manufacture the aforementioned cloths in so far as their financial position would allow, which shows that they are Loyal Vassals of Your Majesty…and desire more than anything to follow your will, to which end their people have already been sent to bring from the Straits [Gulf of Cambay] and other places, and are equally bound to bring from the ports already finished cloths…as soon as they are told that the aforementioned vessels will come to collect the cloths at Daman, which will be sold at Surat prices…and will also get weavers from outside to establish themselves here, all of which they are bound to satisfy by their free wills…

It is interesting to note that five of the Vāniyā who signed the agreement had maintained in 1799 that they (along with others) did not have the capital to finance production in Daman. What caused this change of heart is unclear, but the 1803 agreement was for textile production for the metropolitan market, and that it was to

257 See HAG, AD 4952-4956. See also HAG, Registos Gerais da Feitoria de Diu 7971, Bando, 11 December 1809.
258 HAG, CDm 1061, ‘Acordo entre mercadores Banianes e mercadores portugueses para manufacturarem roupas,’ n.d. [but agreement reached 14 February 1803].
be organised without interference from the state, may actually have been an attractive proposition. Some investment for this production was no doubt forthcoming from the Loureiro family which had been trying to establish production for the Lisbon market in Daman from the 1780s.\textsuperscript{259} Indeed, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, production in Daman was destined for the European market, and when it was not channelled into purchases at Surat (and Bombay) private Portuguese capital was being employed in the manufacture of textiles in Daman. Vāniyā merchants in Daman appear to have served this market by importing textiles from Surat, ‘thence to be embarked under the denomination of goods manufactured at Daman for Lisbon with a view to benefit by the exemption from duties upon such goods at Lisbon.’\textsuperscript{260} While figures for the numbers of weavers and looms in Daman before the second decade of the nineteenth century are seemingly unavailable, records from 1810 indicate that there was a steady increase in the number of weaver households and a significant increase in the number of looms between 1812 and 1828.\textsuperscript{261} We cannot discount the possibility that some textiles produced by this labour were exported to Mozambique. However, available customs records, and the fragmentary import lists for Mozambique, show that the textiles sent to Africa continued to come overwhelmingly from Jambusar as they had done in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{262} What this means is that the production of weavers in Daman may have been primarily destined to meet metropolitan demand, as well as local consumption. However, until we know more about the textile imports in Lisbon in this period, it is not possible to calculate what proportion of them were manufactured in Daman.

In Diu, we have no evidence of a similar agreement being reached between the Vāniyā and private Portuguese merchants. This is explained by the focus of

\textsuperscript{259} Carreira, ‘O comércio português.’
\textsuperscript{260} OIOC, P/419, Bombay Commerce: Internal and External Reports, Vol. 42.
\textsuperscript{261} The number of looms increased almost 20 per cent over these years. See HAG, Monções do Reino 193A, fl. 469, ‘Mappa dos Estampadores…,’ 14 October 1814; 169C, fl. 567, ‘Mappa dos Estampadores…,’ 31 December 1818; and Pinto, \textit{Trade and Finance}, Appendix 15, pp. 285-287.
\textsuperscript{262} HAG, CDm 4836-4843 and references in note 254.
Portuguese merchants on Daman, Surat, and eventually Bombay's production for the European market. Despite official interest in the ‘project’ of establishing production in Diu, as in Daman, there is clear evidence of sustained interest from private Portuguese merchants. Nevertheless, from early in the nineteenth century cotton textiles produced in Diu were entering Mozambique. For example, in 1803, 63 per cent of the manufactures which entered Mozambique on the vessel Nossa Senhora do Rozario São Miguel Arcanjo, owned by Anandji Jivan, were recorded as having been produced in Diu.263 A year later, an even higher proportion of the textile cargoes brought on Natthu Samji’s vessel were reportedly manufactured in Diu.264 This contrasts with the information provided in the customs house records for exports from Diu in the same years in which it is stated that over three quarters of the piecegoods that left the island were brought (as finished goods) from Jambusar.265 What are we to make of this discrepancy? Perhaps the cargo which entered Mozambique Island was not correctly recorded when it left Diu, or the vessel sailed without declaring its cargo. An alternative explanation is that goods recorded as having been manufactured in Diu were in fact produced in Jambusar. That there are textiles recorded as having been manufactured in Jambusar in the import list for Mozambique Island suggests that the first explanation was more likely.

Nevertheless, how can we explain this production if piece goods were indeed manufactured in Diu for Mozambique? It would seem that some textile production took place in Diu, even if sporadically, over the course of the second half of the eighteenth century, and continued into the nineteenth. However, from the first decade of the nineteenth century, this appears to have changed. An increase in production is reflected in the number of weavers present on the island by 1810: a total of 343

264 AHU, Moç., Cx 105 Doc 38, ‘Mapa da pala d’viagem,’ 12 February 1804. Around 70 per cent of the cargo was made up of cloth produced in Diu.
265 See HAG, AD 4952.
weavers were in the central part of the island and its adjoining villages.\textsuperscript{266} The low number of dyers in relation to weavers suggests that they did not service the produce of weavers from outside Diu.\textsuperscript{267} There was thus a weaver population of some importance in Diu at this time. What is less clear, is precisely what proportion of the piece goods that left Diu for the Mozambique market in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and indeed later, had actually been produced in Diu and what proportion were produced in Jambusar. Part of the answer is provided by the extant customs records which show that in the years between 1804 and 1809, the overwhelming proportion of textiles exported from Diu were produced in Jambusar.\textsuperscript{268} A gap in this material until 1818 does not allow for further calculations. From 1818 to the early 1830s evidence shows that textiles from Jambusar continued to dominate exports to the African market from Diu.\textsuperscript{269} This indicates, therefore, that production in Diu was not destined for Mozambique, and may instead have been for local consumption on the island or elsewhere in the region.\textsuperscript{270}

Information about the weaving population is also only available from 1810. In contrast to Daman, though, weaver households declined steadily over the course of this decade so that by 1818 there were 33 per cent fewer households.\textsuperscript{271} Whether this continued into the 1820s is unclear but the sharp and sustained drop between 1810 and 1818 would suggest that it continued to the end of the period under study. Weavers continued to exercise a degree of autonomy in Diu and Daman, and appear to have been relatively free to leave these territories unhindered by merchants.

\textsuperscript{266} Pinto, \textit{Trade and Finance}, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{267} The point about dyers was inspired by an argument made by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, ‘Rural industry and commercial agriculture in late seventeenth-century south-eastern India,’ \textit{Past and Present}, No. 126 (February 1990), p. 103.
\textsuperscript{268} HAG, AD 4952 and 4953.
\textsuperscript{269} HAG, AD 4956-4969.
\textsuperscript{271} HAG, Monções do Reino 169C, fl. 567, ‘Mapa dos Estampadores…’, 31 December 1818; Pinto, \textit{Trade and Finance}, p. 191.
Indeed, the drop in the number of weavers suggests that they retained their freedom to migrate, and the absence of reports to the contrary supports this interpretation.

A final possible explanation is that by this time textiles woven and bleached in Jambusar were printed in Diu, and customs officials therefore recorded them as having been produced on the island. A similar practice was common in Mandvi in Kutch, where unbleached textiles from Marwar were indigo-dyed before they were exported to Zanzibar.\textsuperscript{272} There is evidence from the mid-1840s of manufactures being imported into Diu that, after being printed with special patterns suitable for the Mozambique market, were given the name of fazendas do negro (lit. ‘trade goods for the negro’).\textsuperscript{273} When this practice started is difficult to ascertain. It would certainly have allowed merchants to keep a close eye on the designs for piece goods that were to enter the Mozambique market, and would thus have allowed them to be changed quickly. In addition, it added value to the final product.

What is remarkable to note is the sustained dominance of textiles manufactured in, and acquired from Jambusar in the Mozambique market. Although the export of Surat and Bombay textiles from Diu continued into the mid-to late 1810s, along with manufactures from Bhavnagar (discussed below), they reflected only occasional purchases rather than sustained procurement from ‘new’ areas, at least until the 1830s.\textsuperscript{274} Clearly, specialisation in production for the African market in Jambusar was distinguished by the longevity of its existence as a supplier of textiles from the middle of the eighteenth century to the second decade of the nineteenth century, a period of approximately 70 years. The survival in the Mozambique market of the manufactures of Jambusar is important for another reason: it shows the persistence of indigenous (artisanal) production, and the role of western Indian


\textsuperscript{273} HAG, CD 997, Macedo e Couto to Ferreira Pestana, 26 July 1845.

\textsuperscript{274} See, for example, HAG, AD 4967-4969.
Ocean markets in sustaining this production, especially in often overlooked East African markets. Furthermore, the Vāniyā continued to acquire textiles from Jambusar in a period of increased British penetration into western India. Although the establishment of control over Surat was a protracted affair, and the extension of British rule into other parts of Gujarat was only complete in the second decade of the nineteenth century, interest in raw cotton from Gujarat had intensified from the final quarter of the eighteenth century, primarily for the China trade. Raw cotton from Jambusar thus found its way to the coast in greater volume. However, British interest in Gujarat does not appear to have disrupted artisanal production in the town, and certainly not that serving the Mozambique market. Also, these findings suggest that historians need to pay far greater attention to the resourcefulness of indigenous merchants in exploiting markets in the Indian Ocean, and to the ‘survival’ of Indian handicraft textile production at a time of intensified competition from factory production. While there can be little doubt that India lost export markets in the nineteenth century, this was perhaps a more gradual process that accelerated only from the 1830s. It is likely that the case of Jambusar is not unique, and it is therefore necessary for historians to devote time to examining Indian Ocean markets which remained vital to Gujarat’s export production over the period from the late eighteenth century to the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

Trading with Textiles

I suggested earlier that in the years after 1793 the export of textiles to Mozambique from Diu may have dropped to between 150,000-250,000 pieces due to

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277 Lakshmi Subramanian has suggested that during these years Indian Ocean markets 'constituted the mainstay of Gujarat's cloth production…,' Personal Communication, 6 December 2001.
the heightened danger of attack from French corsairs which resulted in a drop in the number of Indian vessels arriving at the coast. This situation may have persisted into the first two-three years of the nineteenth century but thereafter the number of palas (Indian sailing vessels) calling at Mozambique rose to between two and four. The return of these vessels and their textile cargoes in the nineteenth century was also related to the growth of the slave trade. The growing dominance of the slave trade in the economy of Mozambique did not marginalise the Vāniyā who adapted their trade accordingly, and exported a greater number of African slaves to western India for which there was a small but significant market.²⁷⁸ Their primary interest remained the ivory trade but their shift into trading slaves reflected their responsiveness to economic change. However, the adaptive capacity of the Vāniyā rested also in Indian textiles continuing to be used in the purchase of slaves, just as they had been used for the purchase of ivory. Although imported firearms were used in exchange for slaves from the middle of the eighteenth century, and increasingly in the nineteenth century, the use of cloths as an exchange commodity was not displaced.²⁷⁹ Indeed, a well-informed contemporary author writing about Quelimane noted that just the opposite was true. Far from depressing textile imports from India, the slave trade had increased the number of piece goods that entered the colony:

It should be pointed out that this trade [in slaves] has not in any way diminished the importation of cloths from Asia to Mozambique but rather has increased it as is clear from the large exports of slaves…²⁸⁰

²⁷⁹ For details of the exchange of firearms for slaves, see Alpers, Ivory & Slaves, pp. 14; 96-97; 110-111; 152; 195; 198.
The importance of Gujarati textiles to the growing slave trade in Quelimane was understood and appreciated in Daman, where in 1802 the Governor was eager for the rapid departure of the *pala* owned by Kassanchand Manakchand ‘so that reaching there [Mozambique Island] on time, the cloths can be transported to Quelimane...’\(^{281}\) Writing later, Boteler commented on ‘dungaree’ and ‘coloured’ cloths being used for slave purchases in Quelimane.\(^{282}\) An increase in the importation of Indian cotton textiles as a result of a corresponding increase in slave trading was not uncommon in the south-western Indian Ocean. In Madagascar, for example, from around the mid-1780s, Gujarati textile exports from Surat began to arrive in greater number, and within a short time were established as the most common foreign textiles available at the weekly highland markets.\(^{283}\) Kilwa provides us with a second example: in the 1770s, when the slave trade was well established, for a voyage to be successful there, a list of trade goods were needed from Surat, the most significant of which were different types of cotton cloths. Africans ‘use the cloth from Surat, which they accept in exchange for their slaves and ivory.’ We may note that among the trade goods included on this particular voyage were *cannikens* imported from Diu and Daman.\(^{284}\)

Ivory remained the focus of Indian merchant activity in Mozambique at least until the 1820s, stimulated by elevated South Asian demand, and piece good imports from Diu and Daman were used to acquire large supplies.\(^{285}\) The continued purchase of ivory by the Vāniyā, combined with the rise in slave purchases in Mozambique in

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\(^{281}\) HAG, CDm 1061, Candido Joze Mourão Garcez Palha to Viceroy, 4 November 1802.


\(^{283}\) Larson, *History and Memory*, pp. 127-128.

\(^{284}\) The best *cannikens*, ‘striped in blue and white with large red stripes at the two ends,’ were recorded in the 1770s as coming from Daman, Diu and Masqat. Morice, ‘Observation on the list of Trade Goods from the other point of view,’ in G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, *The French at Kilwa Island: An Episode in Eighteenth-Century East African History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 144.

\(^{285}\) Details are discussed in Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks,’ chapter 5.
the first quarter of the nineteenth century, ensured that demand for Indian textiles
remained buoyant. This is reflected in the value of textile exports of Diu, for which the
most complete information is available. These are especially important because
exports from Diu dominated textile imports at Mozambique. Before we discuss these,
however, it is interesting to note that it was no coincidence that merchants who were
prominently involved in the slave trade, like Laxmichand Motichand, were also some
of the biggest exporters of textiles from Diu to Mozambique. The two trades were
intimately connected. Customs records show that the volume of textile exports from
Diu alone totalled around 1,853,000 pieces over the period 1804-1810.286 A large gap
in the evidence means that figures for 1810-1820 are absent. In the 1820s, however,
the quantitative record is once again reasonably complete, and from this we can see
that over the course of the this decade textile exports from Diu remained fairly stable.
In the first year of this decade for which there is information, 1824, there is an almost
40 per cent drop over 1819, in turn the only year in the second decade for which
there is export information; up to the end of the 1820s exports were quite stable, if
low compared to previous years. This may reflect the adverse affects which
increased slaving had on Vâniyā commerce in Mozambique. On the other hand, the
sharp increase in textile exports in 1829 may reflect heightened demand from slavers
who increased purchases of slaves before the 1830 treaty, which banned imports into
Brazil, came into effect. The Vâniyā continued to trade in cloths with the Makua in
Macuana in these years.287 Records for 1831 show a marked decrease in exports,
and, despite the unavailability of statistics beyond this year, it is reasonable to
assume that they continued to decline, particularly given the challenges which Vâniyā
trade faced by this time. The volume of textile exports from Diu is recorded in Table
2.

286 See Table 2.
287 AHU, Códice 1425, fl. 13v, ‘Para o Cheque de Sancul,’ 22 April 1831.
Other sources confirm the level of textile exports during the 1820s. For example, three Vāniyā vessels, the *pala de viagem* (Indian vessel to which were granted perquisites in oceanic trade), the *Nossa Senhora do Socorro* and the *Nossa Senhora do Mar Flor de Diu*, that arrived in Mozambique in 1820, were reported by a contemporary observer to have carried cargoes with a combined total of just over 179,000 pieces. This coincides with another contemporary observation of annual exports from Diu at this time, estimated at between 160,000-200,000 pieces.288 The evidence available in customs records suggests, though, that this may have been a conservative estimate. Demand for Gujarati cloths at ports such as Quelimane remained high, and in 1820 alone it imported around 130,000 cloths.289 The continued dominance of textile imports by the Vāniyā in this decade was recognised by an official who commented on how ‘[T]he Bania who most frequent the commerce of Mozambique…introduce a large proportion of the cotton cloths…’290

The value of the textile export trade to Mozambique through Diu is also available for the nineteenth century, and reflects the extent of African demand as a vital link in the chains connecting Mozambique and East Central Africa to western India. This ranged from 300,000 *xeráfins* in 1804 to close to 800,000 *xeráfins* in the second half of 1820.291 These values find confirmation in the work of Rudy Bauss. He has estimated in a recent article that the annual value of exports ‘around’ 1820 from Diu and Daman to Mozambique was between 35,000 to 42,000 pound sterling which, when the conversion rates provided by Bauss are applied, corresponds with the values presented here.292

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289 BA, 54-XIII-3 (3), Barbosa, ‘Analyse Estatistica,’ 30 December 1821.
290 ANTT, Junta do Comercio, Maço 62, Cx. 202, 26 April 1820.
291 Details can be found in Machado, ‘Gujarati Indian Merchant Networks.’
292 See Rudy Bauss, ‘Textiles, bullion and other trades of Goa,’ p. 284. Bauss uses the following conversion rates: 1 *xeráfin*=300 *reis*; 3,550 *reis*=1 pound sterling.
Although figures do not exist for either the volume or value of textile exports from Diu after 1831, the slowdown in the 1830s in slave exports, by this time undoubtedly Mozambique’s pre-eminent trade, meant that textile exports from Diu and Daman were adversely affected. However, it was not only the ending of the slave trade that undermined exports of textiles from Diu and Daman. Of at least equal significance in dealing a severe, and fatal, blow to textile production and to the textile trade (and therefore to the involvement of the Vāṇiyā in the commerce and economy of Mozambique) was the gradual intrusion of ‘foreign’ textiles into the colony. In the first years of the nineteenth century two American vessels called at Mozambique with cotton goods, but their cargoes were not substantial.293 Indeed, American imports did not trouble Indian merchants until later in the century. There did seem to be some American interest in acquiring cotton in Daman, however. For example, in March of 1805 unspecified American vessels called at Daman where they purchased cotton and textiles that were shipped back to Boston.294 Imports from Surat also began to arrive from the early nineteenth century and were likely related to the return of English trade to Delagoa Bay.295 This is reflected in English customs records which from 1802 begin to separately record the export of textiles from Surat to Mozambique (see Table 4).296 These provide figures for the value of the trade up to 1828, after which Mozambique is no longer recorded separately. The customs records do not, though, specify the ports in Mozambique to which textiles were sent, nor do they

294 HAG, CDm 1061, Joze Joaquim Lopes Pereira to Viceroy, 5 March 1805.
295 For details of English participation in the trade of Delagoa Bay which, it is argued, was interrupted between 1802/03 and 1815 because of war with the French, see Smith, Struggle for Control; and David William Hedges, ‘Trade and Politics in Southern Mozambique and Zululand in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,’ PhD, School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London), 1978.
296 In reference to 1805, Milburn states that ‘[T]he trade carried on between Mosambique and the British settlements in India is considerable…’ He provides the following figures for the trade of Fort St. George and Bombay with Mozambique: piece good imports from the former totalled 29,467 sicca rupees, while that from the latter were significantly higher at 267,293 sicca rupees. See Oriental Commerce, Vol. I, p. 60.
provide details on the exporting merchants. They do show, however, the widely fluctuating value of this trade that never exceeded Rs 268,000, not a very significant amount.

Still, they reflect a sustained trade that was believed to pose a threat to the trade of Indian merchants. An informed Portuguese official wrote that, though the importation of foreign textiles into Mozambique was prohibited, ‘[I]t seems to me, however, that it is necessary that the Governors of those territories [Diu and Daman] promote improvement in manufactures through their possible means in order that the Africans lose completely their love for English trade goods [from India]…to which they are growing accustomed, and which are a thousand times better.’\(^{(297)}\) It appears that implicit in this statement was the knowledge that the decision by the Portuguese Crown in 1810 to allow the ‘entry of English cotton goods…made Indian manufactures disappear…’\(^{(298)}\) This resulted from the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation that ultimately undermined Portuguese trade in the nineteenth century. Although concern was clearly mounting over the importation of textiles from England, and from English ports from the early 1810s, it does not seem that their entry into Mozambique severely undermined the trade of the Vāniyā at this time. Manufactures from England would, to be sure, subordinate Indian-manufactured cotton textiles, but this would be a later development.\(^{(299)}\)

What the Vāniyā appear to have considered as a grave danger to their textile exports and to their primacy in Mozambique from around the mid-1810s was the entry of other ‘foreign’ textiles into the Mozambique market. These appear to be cloths that came directly from other parts of Kathiawar, especially from Bhavnagar. For instance, in 1816 a vessel from there departed for Mozambique with textiles

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\(^{(297)}\) AHU, Moç., Cx 153 Doc 113, Joze Francisco de Paula Cavalcanti de Albuquerque to Marquez de Aguiar, 26 June 1817.
\(^{(298)}\) ANTT, Junta do Comercio, Maço 62, Caixa 202, 9 September 1815.
\(^{(299)}\) For the effects of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, and of British industrial production on Portugal and the Portuguese empire in this period, see Bauss, ‘Legacy of British Free Trade Policies.’
‘suitable for the consumption of that part of Africa.’\footnote{300} Where these textiles had come from is not specified. It is no coincidence that Bhavnagar exports troubled the Vāniyā merchants first because these were sent to Mozambique for slave purchases. Bhavnagar seems from the 1810s to have become possibly a secondary supplier of textiles for the Mozambique trade, and there are a few cases of Vāniyā merchants who collected textiles there, such as Goculdas Natthu. This was indicative of its potential as an exporter for the African market.\footnote{301} However, notwithstanding its potential as an alternative source of supply, it appears that the Vāniyā were unable to exploit its full potential, perhaps because they did not control the trade of Bhavnagar, and therefore they would have had to compete with other merchant groups to secure textile supplies. Another possible reason may have been that the Vāniyā were too heavily invested in the procurement network centred on Jambusar to have exploited other sources of supply. Officials regarded the threat of these imports of such magnitude to the export trades (and therefore income) of Diu and Daman that in 1817 they communicated the information directly to the exiled Portuguese Crown in Rio.\footnote{302}

The spectre of competition from foreign textiles in Mozambique clearly concerned Vāniyā merchants greatly. They expressed worries about how ‘three monsoons’ previously (i.e. 1815) their trade suffered ‘grave damages’ as a result of the arrival of merchant vessels from Bengal, Surat and Bhavnagar. It was argued that ‘[T]heir trade goods are given preference over those of the [Daman merchants] and merchants of Diu and Goa, on the pretext that they are of a better price…[because] unlike the [Daman] merchants they…do not pay duties in Maratha lands or at the Royal Customs house…’\footnote{303} Although it is unclear to whom these vessels belonged, there are indications that some of them may have been Kutchi Bhātiyā merchants. In

\footnotesize{
\begin{itemize}
  \item[300] HAG, CDm 1065, D. Jose Maria de Castro e Almeida to Manoel Joze Gomes Loureiro, 16 February 1817.
  \item[301] HAG, CD 1006, Palha to Viceroy, 18 September 1818.
  \item[302] HAG, CDm 1065, D. Jose Maria de Castro e Almeida to Manoel Joze Gomes Loureiro, 16 February 1817
  \item[303] HAG, CDm 1065, Karamchand Harchand, Haribhai Kesardas et. al to Governor, n.d. [but 1818].
\end{itemize}
}
1814 it was reported that vessels from Zanzibar and Kutch brought textiles to Mozambique. While some of the merchants involved in this commerce may have been from other merchant groups, it is likely that they were Bhātiyā merchants given what is know about their increased involvement in Zanzibar and other parts of East Africa in the nineteenth century, and subsequent commercial engagement with Mozambique. Concerns were expressed not only by the Vāniyā who felt the impact of the competition but also by Portuguese officials who were fully aware that the competition of textiles exported from ports outside Portuguese Indian administration meant their customs duties, and hence income, would suffer.\(^{304}\) There were further laments in 1817 in Mozambique from the Vāniyā against the entry of ‘foreign textiles,’ which resulted in their cloths ‘not enjoying the trade they needed.’\(^{305}\) It is not entirely clear why the Vāniyā were unable to resist the competition of ‘foreign’ textiles and ‘foreign’ merchants in Mozambique, a market in which, and about which, they had valuable experience. A possibility is that famine in Gujarat disrupted Vāniyā textile supplies from Jambusar, which allowed the entry of textiles from Kutch into Mozambique. Famines recurred in Gujarat with some regularity in the first half of the nineteenth century, and disrupted cotton production. Famines in 1811 and 1813 were particularly severe. However, the 1813 famine also devastated parts of Kutch, killing almost half of its population.\(^{306}\) The documentation I have consulted does not point to a disruption in supplies from Jambusar in these years. It is, therefore, difficult to understand why the Vāniyā were unable to resist the entry of these foreign textiles into the Mozambique market.

Never slow to place the blame for any downturns in commercial activity on Indian merchants, the Portuguese authorities believed that the Vāniyā had brought

\(^{304}\) HAG, Monções do Reino 193A, fl. 1378, Merchants to Antonio de Araujo de Azevedo, 31 December 1814.
\(^{305}\) HAG, CM 1447, Garcez Palha to Governor, 28 July 1817.
this situation on themselves because they had ‘sent for the consumption of this
captaincy falsified trade goods and of such poor quality that not even the Africans
want them.’ These were familiar charges. Previously, the Indians responded that
the importation of ‘falsified’ cloths was largely unavoidable for reasons already
discussed. The situation may now have been the same. However, the Portuguese
accusations appear to be overstated, as the figures presented above clearly show
the continued export of piece goods from Diu to Mozambique. The determination of
the Indian merchants to respond to the challenge of foreign textiles by ‘resolving to
export a greater number of cloths than in previous years’ meant that the trade
continued into the early 1830s.

Notwithstanding the vitality of the trade, concerns about the intrusion of
foreign textiles into the Mozambique market were not misplaced. Indian merchants
realised the scale of this problem in the 1820s, and by the end of the decade
expressed concerns in Diu in nervous language:

The capitão mor of the Banias and other merchants…has the honour
of placing before the respectful presence of Your Excellency [the
information] that in October of the last year [1827] we presented to
Your Excellency the inconvenience that we have been caused in the
trade of Moçambique [sic]…[with the] introduction of large number of
foreign goods that have resulted in the reduction and considerable
prejudice to the national goods…which has been the cause of the
decadence of the northern territories [Diu and Daman], as this is the
only branch [of commerce] in which there is activity…

307 AHU, Moç., Cx 154 Doc 105, Marcos Caetano de Abreu e Menezes to Conde de Baia, 25
September 1817.
308 HAG, CD 1006, Joaquim Mourão Garcez Palha to Viceroy, 16 October 1817. The news in 1817 of
the ‘expulsion’ in Mozambique of two vessels from Surat and Bhavnagar, along with 2 French brigs,
was received in Diu with great enthusiasm, and served to inspire confidence in the Vâniyâ to take on
greater cargoes in the following monsoons. See ‘Mappa da Carga da Palla Nossa Senhora do
Socorro,’ 10 October 1818. See also CD 1007, ‘Mazanes, mercadores, negociantes…’ to Viceroy,
n.d. [but 1822] for further evidence of the commitment of Indian merchants to increasing their cloth
exports.
309 HAG, CD 1011, ‘Requerimento dos Mazanes e Negociantes…feitas ao Governador,’ 5 October
1828.
Daman merchants also raised objections to the fact that foreign textiles were ‘hurting’ their trade in India and Mozambique, and they wanted them to be banned from entering Portuguese territories.\footnote{HAG, CDm 1066, Indian merchants of Daman to Castelão, 14 November 1823.} The level of concern in the 1810s clearly intensified during the 1820s, as the following extract demonstrates: ‘The territories of Dio [sic], Damão and Goa experienced in this year [1822] a considerable loss due to the lack of success of their goods, for the entry of foreign textiles has been allowed, which goes against the true interests of the Portuguese Territory [Mozambique].\footnote{ANTT, MR 602, Cx 705, Viceroy to Crown, 29 October 1822.} However, as already demonstrated, the Vâniyã in Diu continued to import textiles over the course of the 1820s.

A significant downturn, resulting from the arrival of textiles from sources in India other than Diu or Daman, began in the 1830s. The clearest demonstration of this is to be found with the cargo of the \textit{pala Asia Feliz} which, perhaps for the first time, arrived at Mozambique with not a single consignment of piece goods.\footnote{DAM, Vol. III, p. 695.} Of course, this may have been an exception but the evidence presented above, the drop in value of piece good exports from Jambusar to Diu and Daman as recorded by English customs sources (see Table 5),\footnote{OIOC, P/419, Bombay Commerce: Internal and External Reports, Vols. 56-66. They record only ‘official’ trade and therefore underestimate the real value of this trade. Indeed, the figures suggest higher values. They do, nonetheless, confirm a trend, namely the fall in the value of the trade which reflected the challenges I have been discussing.} and the complaints in the 1830s of the marked fall in exports, all point to the start of a terminal decline in the textile export trade, which continued up to the end of the 1830s and early 1840s.\footnote{See, for example, HAG, CD 1012, ‘Mapa da Estrela do Mar do Joguldas Nattu,’ 10 February 1831; CD 997, de Macedo to Ferreira Pestana, 5 July 1845. Further details provided in Bauss, ‘Legacy of British Free Trade Policies.’}

The effects of the entry of foreign textiles into Mozambique was exacerbated by the sharp decline in the slave trade. I have already suggested how intimately the trade of the Indian merchants became entwined with the slave trade. Rapidly growing...
pressures to end slavery meant that the textile trade also suffered. The decline was further speeded up by the increased arrival of American textiles in the 1840s and 1850s. A contemporary source noted how dominant cotton textiles from the United States had become by the late 1840s/early 1850s, and provided perceptive reasons for their primacy:

Americans dominate the trade of the entire coast, they trade to the ports or at times unload easily as contraband at any place they regard as convenient the goods [which are] suitable for exchanges with Africans, such as cloths. They [Americans] introduce better and cheaper cotton goods than those from Diu, Daman...which until now were used for this commerce, and which they [American textiles] are forcing out of the market...

As a result, American manufactures were

...establishing among the Africans a taste for finer and better patterned cloths, with grave damage to the manufactures of Diu and Daman, which were sustained by this commerce, the principal resource of those establishments.315

English manufactures appear also at this time to have been squeezing the textile exports of the Vâniyā out of the Mozambique market. Although this threat had been felt in the 1810s, Indian exports from Diu and Daman had been able to meet the challenge of these manufactures. However, by the 1840s and 1850s the full force of their impact was felt. The experiences of Gamitto capture the rapid decline. Writing in 1832, he remarked how the standard bale of cloths in the Zambesi Valley consisted of seven different varieties of Indian manufactured cloths; but by the time of his departure from Mozambique in 1853, he noted how cotton textiles of English and American manufacture ‘are preferred to the Indian weaves.’316

This precipitous fall was also noted by Livingstone who commented how English and American

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unbleached calicoes were the only currency in use in Tete.\textsuperscript{317} Whereas at the start of the nineteenth century piece goods from Diu and Daman had constituted approximately 90 per cent of Mozambique’s textile imports, by the mid-1850s they represented only about 25 per cent and declined further later in the century.\textsuperscript{318}

At the same time as machine-produced cotton textiles were undermining Indian weaves, the position of the Vāniyā was being challenged by Bhātiyā merchants from Kutch whose presence on the Mozambique coast became noticeable from the 1820s and 1830s. By the 1840s they were prominent in the import and export trades, leading to the observation that ‘[T]he old opulent Baniyas possess almost nothing today; the commerce they had with India has nearly all fallen into the hands of the Batias, from Kutch…’\textsuperscript{319} It therefore appears that the Indian cloths which Gamitto wrote about in the 1830s were possibly imports from Kutch, rather than from Diu and Daman. These Kutchi goods were also challenged by the machine-produced American and English cotton textiles but appear to have been successful in meeting this challenge for a short time for reasons which are unclear. Mill production in Bombay also challenged these North-West Indian goods but it was imports from the British textile industry which ultimately subordinated Kutchi (and Indian) textile exports by the third quarter of the nineteenth century.

This paper has sought to examine the relational dynamic that structured the linkages in the chains of connection between western India and East Central Africa in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It has done so by considering, primarily, the role played by a particular Gujarati merchant network of the western Indian Ocean, the Vāniyā, in mediating economic exchange structured around consumption and production of Indian textiles. The discussion offered here points to the importance of

\textsuperscript{318} HAG, AD, 4952-4953; Caldeira, \textit{Apontamentos}, pp. 105-106; Liesegang, ‘Import and Export Trade,’ p. 457.  
\textsuperscript{319} Caldeira, \textit{Apontamentos}, pp. 106-107.
consumer demand in affecting intra-regional exchange and in influencing productive capacities, and helps to challenge the view of Africans as marginal actors in the economy of the western Indian Ocean. My paper goes further, however, to suggest that historians need to pay far greater attention to the resourcefulness and dynamism of indigenous merchants and capital in exploiting markets in the Indian Ocean, and to the survival of Indian handicraft textile production in the face of intensified competition from factory production in the nineteenth century. While there can be little doubt that India lost export markets in the nineteenth century, it was perhaps a more gradual – and differentiated – process which accelerated only from the 1830s. The vitality of Indian Ocean markets – particularly those of East and East Central Africa – up to this period, and their importance to the export production of Gujarat, has been greatly underestimated by scholars who have emphasised the textile export trade to European markets. While the latter may have been dominated by European capital, that between India and much of the Indian Ocean was controlled by South Asian merchant capital.
Table 2: Textile pieces exported from Diu to Mozambique, 1780-1831

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER OF PIECES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>408,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>411,434</td>
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<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>306,229</td>
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<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>477,514</td>
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<tr>
<td>1784</td>
<td>182,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1787</td>
<td>391,080</td>
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<tr>
<td>1788</td>
<td>404,760</td>
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<tr>
<td>1789</td>
<td>349,480</td>
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<tr>
<td>1792</td>
<td>241,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1793-1800</td>
<td>1,200,000-2,000,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1804</td>
<td>264,348</td>
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<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>405,217</td>
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<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>286,087</td>
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<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>399,130</td>
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<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>421,739</td>
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<tr>
<td>1809</td>
<td>76,522</td>
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<td>1819</td>
<td>401,739</td>
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<tr>
<td>1824</td>
<td>246,087</td>
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<td>1825</td>
<td>271,304</td>
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<td>1826</td>
<td>370,435</td>
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<td>1828</td>
<td>357,391</td>
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<td>1829</td>
<td>681,739</td>
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<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>434,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1831</td>
<td>315,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL 1780-1831</td>
<td>9,304,648 – 10,104,648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: HAG, CD 995-1012; AD 4952-4969

320 This is an estimate based on the export of an average of 150,000 – 250,000 pieces per annum, as explained in Chapter 4.
Table 3: Selection of Gujarati cloths imported into Mozambique, 1777-c.1830

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME FROM SOURCES</th>
<th>IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ardians</td>
<td>Ardeas</td>
<td>Plain dyed cloth; probably from Gujarati adadhi/araadhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bastas</td>
<td>Baftas (?)</td>
<td>General term for plain calico of Gujarat; of varying quality; from Persian bafta ('woven')</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertangis</td>
<td>Betilles (?)</td>
<td>Linen cloth, muslin; sometimes dyed red and striped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canequins</td>
<td>Cannikens/Kaniki (?)</td>
<td>Calico cloth, coarse; dyed blue or black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cangas</td>
<td>Kangas</td>
<td>Cotton cloth, usually striped; used widely in East Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capotins</td>
<td>Capperees (?)</td>
<td>Blue and white chequered or striped cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chauder</td>
<td>Chautars</td>
<td>Calico cloth, plain white, of superior quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chellas</td>
<td>Chelloes</td>
<td>Cotton cloth, with red, blue and black stripes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherlins/Cheralins</td>
<td>Chirans</td>
<td>Calico, chequered, manufactured in western India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chircorians</td>
<td>Chirans (?)</td>
<td>Calico cloth, probably chequered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chircorians</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>White and off-white, striped cotton cloth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chittas</td>
<td>Chintes</td>
<td>Painted or printed calico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chucas</td>
<td>Chucklas/Chuclaes</td>
<td>Striped cloth, of silk &amp; cotton; usually striped; possibly from Hindi chakla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutunias</td>
<td>Cuttaneees</td>
<td>Mixed silk and cotton weave; usually striped; from Persian qutni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doutins (pretos; crus)</td>
<td>Dutties (black; raw)</td>
<td>Coarse cotton cloth; probably indigo-dyed; likely Gujarati dhoti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jadars</td>
<td>Chadar/or</td>
<td>A kind of shawl or dupatta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jorians</td>
<td>Joories (?)</td>
<td>Plain white calico cloth; possibly from Hindi jhuri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longuins</td>
<td>Lungi</td>
<td>Plain white cotton cloth; its name derives from its use in India as a form of dress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panos pretos</td>
<td>Black cloths, likely indigo-dyed cloths, of simple or no pattern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puncherans</td>
<td>Pitcharies (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saracas</td>
<td>Calico cloths; of varying colours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samateres</td>
<td>Sarassa (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travatas</td>
<td>Patterned cloth, either painted or woven; cotton or silk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zuartes</td>
<td>Taffeta (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Silk cloths but also probably applied generally to cloths of fine manufacture; from Persian <em>tafta</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blue cotton cloth; likely indigo-dyed; best from Jambusar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* HAG, CD 995-1012; CDm 1055-1068; AD 4952-4969; ADm 4836-4849
Table 4: Value of textile exports from Surat to Mozambique, 1802/3-1829/30:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Value (rupees)</th>
<th>Percentage as total value of exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1802/3</td>
<td>144,243</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1803/4</td>
<td>86,865</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804/5</td>
<td>131,255</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1805/6</td>
<td>267,273</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806/7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807/8</td>
<td>185,783</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808/9</td>
<td>183,713</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1809/10</td>
<td>152,206</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810/11</td>
<td>132,612</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811/12</td>
<td>90,257</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812/13</td>
<td>61,352</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813/14</td>
<td>97,617</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814/15</td>
<td>150,782</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815/16</td>
<td>137,730</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1816/17</td>
<td>142,933</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1817/18</td>
<td>81,673</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818/19</td>
<td>77,011</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1819/20</td>
<td>107,116</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820/21</td>
<td>156,468</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821/22</td>
<td>86,372</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822/23</td>
<td>35,068</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823/24</td>
<td>83,658</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824/25</td>
<td>89,518</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825/26</td>
<td>68,298</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826/27</td>
<td>128,064</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827/28</td>
<td>76,139</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828/29</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829/30</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIOC, P/419, Bombay Commerce: Internal and External Reports, Vols. 40-66
Table 5: Value of textile exports from Jambusar to Diu and Daman, 1819/20-1829/30:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>DIU (rupees)</th>
<th>DAMAN (rupees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1819/20</td>
<td>75,604</td>
<td>70,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820/21</td>
<td>122,721</td>
<td>56,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1821/22</td>
<td>86,542</td>
<td>50,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1822/23</td>
<td>32,183</td>
<td>41,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1823/24</td>
<td>24,658</td>
<td>31,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1824/25</td>
<td>32,017</td>
<td>37,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1825/26</td>
<td>43,038</td>
<td>6,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826/27</td>
<td>58,487</td>
<td>12,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827/28</td>
<td>18,746</td>
<td>6,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828/29</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1829/30</td>
<td>Na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIOC, P/419, Bombay Commerce: Internal and External Reports, Vols. 56-66