VPinP Symposium 2011

Voting Power in Social/Political Institutions:
Typology, Measurement, Applications

London School of Economics
20 - 22 March 2011 

Sponsored by The Leverhulme Trust

Workshop programme|

Abstracts|

Symposium papers

These were posted for the benefit of participants to read prior to the workshop. Often they are draft works in progress or have citation restrictions. Please do not quote from the texts without permission from the author. The papers are listed in alphabetical order of the presenting authors at the workshop.

• Power distribution in the Weimar Reichstag 1919-1933 by Fuad Aleskerov, Manfred Holler and Rita Kamalova
• An analysis of the intrinsic differences between the commonly applied voting techniques by Sreejith Das
• Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik indices in games with a coalition structure: a special case study by Maria Ekes
• Ordinal equivalence olf power indices by Josep Freixas
• Pathology or revelation? The Public Good Index by Manfred J Holler
• Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes by Serguei Kaniovski and Alexander Zaigraev
• Theorems for exchangeable binary random variables with applications (PPT)  by Serguei Kaniovski
• Optimal apportionment by Yukio Koriyama and Jean-François Laslier
• Power indices in large voting bodies by Dennis Leech
• The direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting by Nicola Maaser and Stefan Napel
• Fair apportionment in the Italian senate: which reform should be implemented? by Vincent Merlin, Fabrize Barthelemy, Gabriele Esposito and Mathieu Martin
• A priori voting power when one vote counts in two ways with application to two variants of the US Electoral College by Nicholas R. Miller
• A priori voting power when one vote counts in two ways with application to two variants of the US Electoral College (PPT) by Nicholas R. Miller
• The market value of votes: an experiment by Maria Montero, Alex Possajennikov and Martin Sefton
• Strategic vs. non-strategic voting power in the EU Council of Ministers: the consultation procedure by Stefan Napel and Mika Widgren
• Aspects of power overlooked by power indices by Hannu Nurmi
• A probabilistic `re-view' on F&M's Measurement of Voting Power by Friedrich Pukelsheim
• A probabilistic `re-view' on F&M's Measurement of Voting Power (PPT) by Friedrich Pukelsheim
• On the possibility of a preference-based power index: the strategic power index revisited by Dieter Schmidtchen and Bernard Steunenberg
• The Shapley index for games with r alternatives with a priori unions by Justyna Winnicka
• Square root voting system, optimal threshold and pi by Karol Zyczkowski and Wojciech Slomczynski