Working Papers

Volume 11 (2016)

1. Dietrich, F. Savage's Theorem Under Changing Awareness

2.  Osman, M., Baigentt, N., and Pupic, D. How Many Slaps Is Equivalent to One Punch? New Approaches to Assessing the Relative Severity of Violent Acts

Volume 10 (2015)

1. Baigent, N. Introducing Intransitivities in Social Choice Theory

Volume 9 (2013)

1. Heilmann, C. Time Discounting Functions as Measures of Radical Uncertainty about the Future?

2. Bradley, R. A Note on Transitivity and Incompleteness

3. Bradley, S. Weak Rationality and Imprecise Choice

4. Dietrich, F. and List, C.  Reason-Based Rationalization 

5. Dietrich, F. Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation

Volume 8 (2012)

1. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology

2. List, C. and Rabinowicz, W. Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Endorsement

3. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective

4. Dietrich, F., List, C., and Bradley, R. A Joint Characterization of Belief Revision Rules

Volume 7 (2011)

1. Perote-Peña, J. and Piggins, A. A Model of Deliberative and Aggregative Democracy

2. List, C. Free Will, Determinism & The Possibility to Do Otherwise

3. Pacuit, E. and Roy, O. A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality

4. Hájek A. A Poisoned Dart for Conditionals

Volume 6 (2010)

1. List, C. The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review

2. Cook, P. and Heilmann, C.  Censorship and Two Types of Self-Censorship

3. Baigent, N. Topological Theories of Social Choice

4. Bradley, R. Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals

5. List, C. and Vermeule, A. Independence and Interdependence: Lessons from the Hive

6. Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. Independent Opinions?

7. Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises

8. Nissan, I. Can An Irrational Agent Reason Himself to Rationality? A Triviality Result

9. Nissan, I. (Being fair as) Doing the Best One Can

10. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Where Do Preferences Come From?

Volume 5 (2009)

1. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change

2. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Propositionwise Judgment Aggregation

3. Bach, C.W. and Heilmann, C. Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction

4. Moscati, I. and Tubaro, P. Random Behavior and the as-if Defense of Rational Choice Theory in Demand Experiments

5. Dietrich, F. Bayesian Group Belief

6. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice

7. Douven, I. and Romeijn, J.-W. A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem

8. Gajdos, T. and Vergnaud, J.-C. Decisions with Conflicting and Imprecise Information

9. Fleurbaey, M. Assessing Risky Social Situations

Volume 4 (2008)

1. Bradley, R. Beckers Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change

2. Dietrich, F. The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem are not Simultaneously Justified

3. Bradley, R. and List, C. Desire-as-belief revisited

4. Dietrich, F and List, C. The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory

5. Dietrich, F.: Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework

6. Heilmann, C.: Measurement-Theoretic Foundations of Time Discounting

Volume 3 (2007)

1. Dietrich, F. Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism

2. Voorhoeve, A. Heuristics and Biases in a Purported Counterexample to the Acyclicity of "Better Than"

3. Bradley, R. Reaching a Consensus

4. Voorhoeve, A. Scanlon on Substantive Responsibility

5. Rabinowicz, W. Modeling Parity and Incomparability

6. Moscati, I. Interactive and Common Knowledge of Information Partitions

Volume 2 (2006)

1. van der Rijt, J.  The Ruin of Homo Economicus

2. Rossi, M. Two Platitudes about Interpersonal Comparisons

3. Dietrich, F. and List, C. The Impossibility of Unbiased Judgment Aggregation

4. Bradley, R., Dietrich, F. and List, C. Aggregating Causal Judgements

5. Voorhoeve, A. Should Losses Count? A Critical Examination of the Complaint Model

Volume 1 (2005)

1. Bradley, R. A Unified Bayesian Theory of Decision

2. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Strategy-proof Judgement Aggregation

3. Voorhoeve, A. Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare

4. Voorhoeve, A. and Binmore, K. Transitivity, the Sorites Paradox, and Similarity-Based Reasoning

5. Mongin, P. Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle

6. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Liberal Paradox for Judgement Aggregation

7. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation

8. Davies, G. Rethinking Risk Attitude: Aspiration as Pure Risk