Working Papers

Volume 9 (2013)

1. Heilmann, C. Time Discounting Functions as Measures of Radical Uncertainty about the Future?|

2. Bradley, R. A Note on Transitivity and Incompleteness|

3. Bradley, S. Weak Rationality and Imprecise Choice|

4. Dietrich, F. and List, C.  Reason-Based Rationalization| 

5. Dietrich, F. Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation|

Volume 8 (2012)

1. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology|

2. List, C. and Rabinowicz, W. Two Intuitions about Free Will: Alternative Possibilities and Endorsement|

3. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Mentalism versus behaviourism in economics: a philosophy-of-science perspective|

4. Dietrich, F., List, C., and Bradley, R. A Joint Characterization of Belief Revision Rules|

Volume 7 (2011)

1. Perote-Peña, J. and Piggins, A. A Model of Deliberative and Aggregative Democracy|

2. List, C. Free Will, Determinism & The Possibility to Do Otherwise|

3. Pacuit, E. and Roy, O. A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality |

4. Hájek A. A Poisoned Dart for Conditionals|

Volume 6 (2010)

1. List, C. The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review|

2. Cook, P. and Heilmann, C.  Censorship and Two Types of Self-Censorship|

3. Baigent, N. Topological Theories of Social Choice|

4. Bradley, R. Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals|

5. List, C. and Vermeule, A. Independence and Interdependence: Lessons from the Hive|

6. Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. Independent Opinions?|

7. Dietrich, F. and Spiekermann, K. Epistemic Democracy with Defensible Premises|

8. Nissan, I. Can An Irrational Agent Reason Himself to Rationality? A Triviality Result|

9. Nissan, I. (Being fair as) Doing the Best One Can |

10. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Where Do Preferences Come From?|

Volume 5 (2009)

1. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change|

2. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Propositionwise Judgment Aggregation|

3. Bach, C.W. and Heilmann, C. Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction|

4. Moscati, I. and Tubaro, P. Random Behavior and the as-if Defense of Rational Choice Theory in Demand Experiments|

5. Dietrich, F. Bayesian Group Belief |

6. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice|

7. Douven, I. and Romeijn, J.-W. A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem|

8. Gajdos, T. and Vergnaud, J.-C. Decisions with Conflicting and Imprecise Information|

9. Fleurbaey, M. Assessing Risky Social Situations|

Volume 4 (2008)

1. Bradley, R. Beckers Thesis and Three Models of Preference Change|

2. Dietrich, F. The Premises of Condorcet's Jury Theorem are not Simultaneously Justified|

3. Bradley, R. and List, C. Desire-as-belief revisited|

4. Dietrich, F and List, C. The aggregation of propositional attitudes: towards a general theory|

5. Dietrich, F.: Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework|

6. Heilmann, C.: Measurement-Theoretic Foundations of Time Discounting|

Volume 3 (2007)

1. Dietrich, F. Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism|

2. Voorhoeve, A. Heuristics and Biases in a Purported Counterexample to the Acyclicity of "Better Than"|

3. Bradley, R. Reaching a Consensus|

4. Voorhoeve, A. Scanlon on Substantive Responsibility|

5. Rabinowicz, W. Modeling Parity and Incomparability|

6. Moscati, I. Interactive and Common Knowledge of Information Partitions|

Volume 2 (2006)

1. van der Rijt, J.  The Ruin of Homo Economicus|

2. Rossi, M. Two Platitudes about Interpersonal Comparisons|

3. Dietrich, F. and List, C. The Impossibility of Unbiased Judgment Aggregation|

4. Bradley, R., Dietrich, F. and List, C. Aggregating Causal Judgements|

5. Voorhoeve, A. Should Losses Count? A Critical Examination of the Complaint Model|

Volume 1 (2005)

1. Bradley, R. A Unified Bayesian Theory of Decision|

2. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Strategy-proof Judgement Aggregation|

3. Voorhoeve, A. Preference Change and Interpersonal Comparisons of Welfare|

4. Voorhoeve, A. and Binmore, K. Transitivity, the Sorites Paradox, and Similarity-Based Reasoning|

5. Mongin, P. Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle|

6. Dietrich, F. and List, C. A Liberal Paradox for Judgement Aggregation|

7. Dietrich, F. and List, C. Arrow's Theorem in Judgement Aggregation|

8. Davies, G. Rethinking Risk Attitude: Aspiration as Pure Risk|