

# CPNSS Fixtures List

## ALL-LONDON HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE MEETINGS

### Lent Term 2012

#### ***The LSE Choice Group***

[Contact: Richard Bradley on 020 7955 7333, email [R.Bradley@lse.ac.uk](mailto:R.Bradley@lse.ac.uk) ;  
[www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CPNSS/projects/ChoiceGroup](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CPNSS/projects/ChoiceGroup)]

#### ***The Popper Seminars***

[Contact: Katie Steele, email [k.steele@lse.ac.uk](mailto:k.steele@lse.ac.uk)]

#### ***The Sigma Club***

[Contact: Roman Frigg on [r.p.frigg@lse.ac.uk](mailto:r.p.frigg@lse.ac.uk);  
[www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CPNSS/projects/SigmaClub](http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CPNSS/projects/SigmaClub)]

#### ***The Order Project***

[Contact: Rebecca Robinson, email [R.Robinson1@lse.ac.uk](mailto:R.Robinson1@lse.ac.uk)]

#### ***PH500 Research Methods in Philosophy\****

[Contact: Tom Chivers, email [t.r.chivers@lse.ac.uk](mailto:t.r.chivers@lse.ac.uk)]

#### ***PH501 Philosophical Problems Seminar\****

[Contact: Tom Chivers, email [t.r.chivers@lse.ac.uk](mailto:t.r.chivers@lse.ac.uk)]

#### ***PH551 Research Methods in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences\****

[Contact: Tom Chivers, email [t.r.chivers@lse.ac.uk](mailto:t.r.chivers@lse.ac.uk)]

#### ***PH555 Research Seminar in the Philosophy of Economics and Social Sciences\****

[Contact: Tom Chivers, email [t.r.chivers@lse.ac.uk](mailto:t.r.chivers@lse.ac.uk)]

Unless otherwise noted, all seminars and events are held in T206 and are open to the public. For updated information online [www.lse.ac.uk/cpnss](http://www.lse.ac.uk/cpnss)

\* These are either research or taught seminars but they might also be open to interested people; please contact the seminar leader. Those attending are expected to read the relevant material.

**Lent Term—Week 1: 9/1-15/1/2012**

**Monday, 9<sup>th</sup> January, 3-5pm**

**Lectures on the Foundations of Quantum Field Theory**

**Tuesday, 10<sup>th</sup> January 2:00-3:30pm**

**POPPER SEMINAR**

**Prof. Christian List**

LSE

*Free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise*

**Wednesday, 11<sup>th</sup> January, 4-5.00pm**

**Tea Time Talks**

**John Shotter**

*Living expressions that 'say to show': inquiry in practice*

PLEASE NOTE: This event is taking place in the CPNSS Common Room (T116)

**Wednesday, 11<sup>th</sup> January, 5.30-7pm**

**CHOICE GROUP**

**Magda Osman**

Queen Mary, Psychology

*What is there to learn from coincidences?*

**Thursday, 12<sup>th</sup> January, 12-1.30pm**

**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

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## **Lent Term—Week 2: 16/1-22/1/2012**

**Monday, 16<sup>th</sup> January, 3-5pm**

### **Lectures on the Foundations of Quantum Field Theory**

*Algebraic quantum field theory – mathematics*

**Monday, 16<sup>th</sup> January, 5-7pm**

### **Sigma Club**

**Seth Bullock**

University of Southampton

### *Levins and the Legitimacy of Artificial Worlds*

Abstract: For researchers across a growing number of academic disciplines there is a strong sense that simulation models of complex real-world systems provide something that differs fundamentally from that offered by mathematical models of the same phenomena. The precise nature of this difference has been difficult to isolate and explain, but, occasionally, it is cashed out in terms of an ability to use simulations to perform "experiments".

The notion here is that empirical data derived from costly experiments in the real world might usefully be augmented with data harvested from the right kind of simulation models. We will reserve the term "artificial worlds" for such simulations. Their use, or talk of their use, is on the rise in domains as diverse as drug design, climate change, ecological modelling, warfare and homeland security, and financial modelling.

- How could such models be sources of empirical data like experiments?
- Why are scientists attracted to this problematic perspective on simulation models?
- Why have simulation models been liable to grow and complexity until they resemble artificial worlds?

Drawing on the work of Richard Levins, Valentino Braitenberg, and Andy Clark, we arrive at answers that at least partially legitimise artificial worlds by allocating them a useful scientific role, without having to assign to them the same epistemological status as experiments.

**Wednesday, 18<sup>th</sup> January, 10am-12pm**

### **PH500: RESEARCH METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR**

**Wednesday, 18<sup>th</sup> January, 12-2pm**

### **PH555: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS**

**Wednesday, 18<sup>th</sup> January, 5.30-7pm**

### **CHOICE GROUP**

**Luc Bovens**

LSE, Philosophy

### *Concerns for the Poorly-Off in Ordering Prospects - Prioritarianism: an Ecumenical Approach*

Abstract: I construct a calculus for the evaluation of risky prospects on the basis of ex ante and ex post interpretations of prioritarianism by Diamond, Rabinowicz, McCarthy and Fleurbaey and consider how this calculus fares with respect to a range of hard cases.

**Thursday, 19<sup>th</sup> January, 12-1.30pm**

### **PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 19<sup>th</sup> January, 3-5.00pm**

### **Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

## **Lent Term—Week 3: 23/1-29/1/2012**

**Monday, 23<sup>rd</sup> January, 3-5pm**

### **Lectures on the Foundations of Quantum Field Theory**

**N. Bouatta**

Cambridge

**and M. Redei**

LSE

*Algebraic quantum field theory – axioms and some basic features*

**Monday, 23<sup>rd</sup> January, 5-7pm**

### **PH551: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCES**

**Christophe Schinckus**

*On Econophysics*

**Tuesday, 24<sup>th</sup> January, 6.30-8pm**

### **CPNSS and LSE Public Lecture**

**Dr Roy F Baumeister**

*Willpower: Self-Control, Decision Fatigue, and Energy Depletion*

*Chair: Dr Helena Cronin*

A new understanding of how people control themselves has emerged from the past decade of research studies. Self-control depends on a limited energy supply, and each person's willpower fluctuates during the day as various events deplete and then replenish it. Decision making and creative initiative also deplete the same willpower supply, while eating and sleeping can restore it. Some circumstances propel people to perform well despite depleted willpower, including power and leadership roles, local incentives, and personal beliefs. People with high self-control specialize less in resisting temptation than avoiding it.

**Roy F Baumeister** is one of the world's most influential psychologists. He received his PhD from Princeton in 1978 and currently is Francis Eppes Eminent Scholar and head of the psychology programme at Florida State University. He was over 450 scientific publications, and [\*Willpower: Rediscovering Our Greatest Strength\*](#) is his latest book.

**Suggested hashtag for this event for Twitter users: #sewillpower**

This event is free and open to all with no ticket required. Entry is on a first come, first served basis.

See also: <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2012/01/20120124t1830vSZT.aspx>

For any queries email [events@lse.ac.uk](mailto:events@lse.ac.uk) or call 020 7955 6043.

**Media queries:** please contact the Press Office if you would like to reserve a press seat or have a media query about this event, email [pressoffice@lse.ac.uk](mailto:pressoffice@lse.ac.uk)

**Sheikh Zayed Theatre, New Academic Building, LSE**

**Wednesday, 25<sup>th</sup> January, 5.30-7pm**

### **CHOICE GROUP**

**Hykel Hosni**

Pisa

*Rationality under second-order uncertainty*

**Abstract:** The consensus on the inadequacy of classical bayesianism is today virtually unanimous across the multifaceted field of uncertain reasoning. Yet, when it comes to putting forward justified alternatives, the consensus suddenly disappears. The purpose of this talk is to argue that the much needed extensions of the expressive power of classical bayesianism can go hand in hand with the foundational unity provided by bayesian epistemology.

I propose to tackle the problem from the point of view of the Choice norm which lies at the heart of bayesian epistemology, namely the prescription to never make dominated choices. This allows us to replace the philosophically challenging problem of providing a satisfactory taxonomy of uncertainty with the considerably more manageable task of analysing how certain modelling features of specific choice problems justify distinct norms of rational behaviour.

I will refer to the domain of choice problems for which the classical bayesian norms are fully justified as the class of first-order uncertainty problems. The central part of the talk is devoted to showing how this approach suggests rather natural extensions of classical bayesianism to second-order uncertainty, covering

ambiguity, imprecision, ignorance and vagueness. In the last part of the talk I will argue that the proposed distinction between first and second-order uncertainty is also useful to understand why some currently popular (especially in economic theory) anti-bayesian claims are intuitively appealing, yet foundationally fallacious. This will motivate my conclusion, namely that a bayesian theory of second-order uncertainty of the kind envisaged in this talk would allow us to have our (foundational) cake, and eat it too.

**Thursday, 26<sup>th</sup> January, 12-1.30pm**

**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 26<sup>th</sup> January, 3-5.00pm**

**Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

**Thursday, 26<sup>th</sup> January, 6.30-8.00pm**

**Friends of CPNSS Experts' Panel Discussion**

Chair:

**Dr Roman Frigg** is the Director of the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)

Panelists:

**Mark Addis** is Professor of Philosophy at Birmingham City University and a Research Associate at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science at the LSE

**Fernand Gobet** is Professor of Cognitive Psychology at Brunel University and an Economic and Social Research Council Research Fellow

**Christopher Winch** is Professor of Educational Philosophy and Policy and Head of Department for the Department of Education and Professional Studies at Kings College London

**Jon de Souza** is a Director of Constructing Excellence and was previously at the Construction Industry Research and Information Association

Expertise covers various kinds of practical knowledge, attention based knowledge, skills, decision making, action planning and similar phenomena. Understanding it is a complex multi-disciplinary task involving questions of methodology. Philosophical, psychological and educational perspectives on expertise along with their applications to professional practice and vocational education will be discussed by a panel from academia and industry.

**Wolfson Theatre, New Academic Building, LSE**

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## **Lent Term—Week 4: 30/1-5/2/2012**

**Monday, 30<sup>th</sup> January, 2.30-6.30pm**  
**BSPS**

**Wednesday, 1<sup>st</sup> February, 10am-12pm**  
**PH500: RESEARCH METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR**

**Wednesday, 1<sup>st</sup> February, 12-2pm**  
**PH555: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS**

**Wednesday, 1<sup>st</sup> February, 4-5.00pm**  
**Tea Time Talks**

**Eric Martin**

*Continuity in Evolutionary Theory*

PLEASE NOTE: This event is taking place in the [CPNSS Common Room \(LAK.1.16\)](#)

**Wednesday, 1<sup>st</sup> February, 5.30-7pm**  
**Choice Group**

**Nir Eyal**

Harvard, Medical Ethics

*Fair chances—the very notion*

Abstract: Commonsense morality has it that tossing ordinary coins to allocate goods is fair, and allocation based on personal preference or flips of "loaded" coins is unfair. Here, the notions of fairness and unfairness are applied to the allocation of prospects and risks, not directly to that of outcomes. Despite commonsense intuition, I maintain that fairness never (or only sometimes) applies to the distribution of chance. My argument is that the probabilistic notions of personal prospect and risk admit of several meanings, and none allows for fairness to apply to their allocation throughout. There are examples where objective prospects are distributed in paradigmatically unfair patterns but, intuitively, no serious unfairness arises; and there are examples where subjective prospects are distributed in paradigmatically-unfair patterns but there is no good explanation for any alleged unfairness.

**Thursday, 3<sup>rd</sup> February, 12-1.30pm**  
**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 3<sup>rd</sup> February, 3-5.00pm**  
**Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

**Friday, 3<sup>rd</sup> February, 1.30-3.30pm**  
**Causality Reading Group**

**Mauricio Suarez**

*Propensity-type Probabilities*

## **Lent Term—Week 5: 6/2-12/2/2012**

**Monday, 6<sup>th</sup> February, 3-5pm**

**Lectures on the Foundations of Quantum Field Theory**

**N. Bouatta**

Cambridge

**and M. Redei**

LSE

*The independence hierarchy*

**Monday, 6<sup>th</sup> February, 5-7pm**

**PH551: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCES**

**Mathias Frisch**

*On climate modelling*

**Tuesday, 7<sup>th</sup> February 2:00-3:30pm**

**POPPER SEMINAR**

**Dr Charlotte Werndl**

LSE

*Climate Models, Confirmation and Calibration*

**Wednesday, 8<sup>th</sup> February, 5.30-7pm**

**CHOICE GROUP**

**Kai Spiekermann**

LSE, Government

*Do I Want to Know? – Individual Strategic Manipulations of Belief Sets in Response to Entitlement Norms*

Abstract: This paper presents an experiment to test whether individuals manipulate their belief sets in order to avoid social norms and the associated compliance costs. A social norm sets out what an individual is expected to do, given that the world is in a certain state (Bicchieri 2006, ch. 1). Therefore, a social norm exerts normative force if a subject believes that a state obtains in which the norm applies (Rabin 1995). By contrast, if the subject does not know that the world is in such a state, non-compliance may be excusable. This opens up an opportunity for strategic norm avoidance: if individuals can influence their belief sets about normatively relevant facts, then they may choose to acquire only those beliefs that help them to avoid the force of a norm and the associated compliance costs, using what is sometimes called "moral wriggle room" (Dana 2007).

Our experiment is in three stages. First, a relevant norm is made salient by informing participants about the results of a survey conducted in advance. Second, all participants play a competitive game that will sort participants into high and low performers. Third, pairs of participants play a dictator game such that the dictator knows she is a high performer, but does not know by default whether the receiver is a high or a low performer. Before playing, the dictator can optionally acquire different lotteries for information about the receiver's type.

We hypothesize that dictators tend to avoid information that the receiver is a high performer, and tend to pursue information that the receiver is a low performer. We also conjecture that the information acquired influences the giving behaviour. In contrast to previous studies, we control carefully for the norm causing the described effect, and we separate the normative and the distributional implications of the information acquired. The project raises important questions about the nature of norms, especially about how individuals avoid ethical dilemmas of compliance by choosing to stay ignorant about potentially normatively relevant facts.

**Thursday, 9<sup>th</sup> February, 12-1.30pm**

**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 9<sup>th</sup> February, 3-5.00pm**

**Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

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## **Lent Term—Week 6: 13/2-19/2/2012**

**Monday, 13<sup>th</sup> February, 5-7pm**

**Sigma Club**

**Jeff Barrett**

*How to Understand Everett's Pure Wave Mechanics as Empirically Adequate*

Abstract: Given Hugh Everett III's understanding of the proper cognitive status of physical theories, his relative-state formulation of pure wave mechanics arguably qualifies as an empirically acceptable physical theory. In particular, one can argue that Everett provides a weak resolution to both the determinate record and the probability problems encountered by pure wave mechanics, and that he does so in a way that does not involve and special metaphysical assumptions involving splitting worlds. Everett took his theory to be *empirically faithful*. Reflecting on Everett's notion of empirical faithfulness provides insight into what it might mean for a theory to be judged empirically adequate.

**Wednesday, 15<sup>th</sup> February, 10am-12pm**

**PH500: RESEARCH METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR**

**Wednesday, 15<sup>th</sup> February, 12-2pm**

**PH555: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS**

**Wednesday, 15<sup>th</sup> February, 5.30-7pm**

**Choice Group and Order Group**

**Professor Peyton Young**

Department of Economics, Oxford

*The Dynamics of Social Innovation*

Abstract: Social norms and institutions are mechanisms that facilitate coordination between individuals. A social innovation is a novel mechanism that increases the welfare of the individuals who adopt it compared with the status quo. We model the dynamics of social innovation as a coordination game played on a network. Individuals experiment with a novel strategy that would increase their payoffs provided that it is also adopted by their neighbors. The rate at which a social innovation spreads depends on three factors: the topology of the network and in particular the extent to which agents interact in small local clusters, the payoff gain of the innovation relative to the status quo, and the amount of noise in the best response process. The analysis shows that local clustering greatly enhances the speed with which social innovations spread. It also suggests that the welfare gains from innovation are more likely to occur in large jumps than in a series of small incremental improvements.

**Thursday, 16<sup>th</sup> February, 12-1.30pm**

**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 16<sup>th</sup> February, 3-5.00pm**

**Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

**Friday, 17<sup>th</sup> February, 1.30-3.30pm**

**Causality Reading Group**

**TBA**

**TBA**

**Lent Term—Week 7: 20/2-26/2/2012**

**Monday, 20<sup>th</sup> February, 5-7pm**

**PH551: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCES**

**Sally Riordan**

*On measurement (not QM!)*

**Wednesday, 22<sup>nd</sup> February, 4-5.00pm**

**Tea Time Talks**

**Mark Addis**

*Expertise*

PLEASE NOTE: This event is taking place in the [CPNSS Common Room \(LAK.1.16\)](#)

**Wednesday, 22<sup>nd</sup> February, 5.30-7pm**

**CHOICE GROUP**

**Book Launch Event: Wulf Gaertner and Eric Schokkaert,**

*Empirical Social Choice*

**Thursday, 23<sup>th</sup> February, 12-1.30pm**

**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 23<sup>rd</sup> February, 3-5.00pm**

**Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

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## **Lent Term—Week 8: 27/2-4/3/2012**

**Monday, 27<sup>th</sup> February, 3-5pm**

**Lectures on the Foundations of Quantum Field Theory**

**N. Bouatta**

Cambridge

**and M. Redei**

LSE

*Causal completeness of algebraic quantum field theory*

**Monday, 27<sup>th</sup> February, 5-7pm**

**Sigma Club**

**Michael Redhead**

LSE

*On the relativistic EPR argument*

Abstract: I review the prospects of a relativistic EPR argument, and in particular the view of Ghirardi and Grassi about how to deal with the question of time ordering. I present an argument of Redhead and la Riviere questioning the argument of Ghirardi and Grassi, and draw my own conclusions about the relativistic EPR argument.

**Wednesday, 29<sup>th</sup> February, 10am-12pm**

**PH500: RESEARCH METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR**

**Wednesday, 29<sup>th</sup> February, 12-2pm**

**PH555: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS**

**Wednesday, 29<sup>th</sup> February, 5.30-7pm**

**CHOICE GROUP**

**Peter Dietsch**

Montreal

TBA

**Thursday, 1<sup>st</sup> March, 12-1.30pm**

**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 1<sup>st</sup> March, 3-5.00pm**

**Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

**Friday, 2<sup>nd</sup> March, 1.30-3.30pm**

**Causality Reading Group**

TBA

TBA

**Saturday, 3<sup>rd</sup> March, 11-12.30pm**

**SCIENCE LITERARY FESTIVAL EVENT**

**Professor Mark Pagel**

*Wired for Culture*

Chair: Dr Helena Cronin

**Venue: Sheikh Zayed Theatre, New Academic Building, LSE**

Since humans left Africa less than a hundred thousand years ago there has been a staggering explosion of cultures. What caused this blooming of diversity? Why are there so many mutually incomprehensible languages, even within small territories? Why do we rejoice in rituals, wrap ourselves in flags, or define ourselves in opposition to others?

Humans are usually seen as differing from other animals because of our inherent traits of consciousness, language and intelligence. But Pagel shows we've had it the wrong way round. Many of these things would not exist without our propensity for culture - our ability to co-operate in small tribal societies, to pass on beliefs and practices and to accumulate knowledge over generations - so that we prospered while others declined. Pagel's extraordinary history of the role of culture in natural selection shows how humans acquired a mind that is hardwired for culture. Our cultures – although an accident of birth - have outstripped our genes in determining who we are, how we think and speak, and who we love and kill. Weaving together evolutionary biology, anthropology, natural history, philosophy and Pagel's years of observing human behaviour around the globe, this book sheds light on everything from art, morality and affection to jealousy, self-interest and prejudice, and asks whether our cultural legacy equips us for the challenges of life in the modern world. *Wired for Culture* will change how we view ourselves, not just as individuals, but within the wider story of our species.

Mark Pagel is head of the Evolution Laboratory in the Division of Zoology, School of Biological Sciences, at the University of Reading, and an External Professor at the renowned Santa Fe Institute. He has travelled the world studying evolution and the spread of cultures from the Chalbi Desert in Kenya to Tanzania and Zanzibar, and remote Oceania.

He is the editor-in-chief of the award winning *Oxford Encyclopaedia of Evolution* and co-author of *The Comparative Method in Evolutionary Biology*, which is regarded as a classic, as well as the author of articles in *Science*, *Nature*, and other journals. Statistical methods that Pagel has developed are used by researchers all over the world to study evolutionary trends across species. He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society. This event marks the publication of his latest book, *Wired for Culture: The Natural History of Human Cooperation*.

Suggested hashtag for this event for Twitter users: #lselitfest

**Ticket Information**

All events in the Literary Festival are free to attend and open to all, but a ticket is required. Tickets will be available to request online from Monday 6 February.

See <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/publicEvents/events/2012/03/LitFest20120303t1100vSZT.aspx>

Media queries: please contact the Press Office if you would like to reserve a press seat or have a media query about this event, email [pressoffice@lse.ac.uk](mailto:pressoffice@lse.ac.uk)

From time to time there are changes to event details so we strongly recommend that if you plan to attend this event you check back on this listing on the day of the event.

**Sheikh Zayed Theatre, New Academic Building, LSE**

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## **Lent Term—Week 9: 5/3-11/3/2012**

**Monday, 5<sup>th</sup> March, 3-5pm**

**Lectures on the Foundations of Quantum Field Theory**

**N. Bouatta**

Cambridge

**and M. Redei**

LSE

*Notion of particle in algebraic quantum field theory*

**Monday, 5<sup>th</sup> March, 5-7pm**

**PH551: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCES**

**Fernandanda Samaniego**

*On statistical mechanics*

**Tuesday, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2:00-3:30pm**

**POPPER SEMINAR**

**Prof. Deborah Mayo**

Virginia Tech

*How Experiment Got a Life (of its own)*

**Wednesday, 7<sup>th</sup> March, 5.30-7pm**

**CHOICE GROUP**

**Ben Ferguson**

LSE

*TBA*

**Thursday, 8<sup>th</sup> March, 12-1.30pm**

**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 8<sup>th</sup> March, 3-5.00pm**

**Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

**Thursday, 8<sup>th</sup> March, 6.30-8pm**

**Friends of the CPNSS Special Lecture**

**Professor Evelyn Fox-Keller**

MIT

*What is a Rational Response to Catastrophic risk?*

A substantial literature on risk perception demonstrates the limits of human rationality, especially in the face of catastrophic risks. Human judgment, it seems, is flawed by the tendency to overestimate the magnitude of rare but evocative risks, while underestimating risks associated with commonplace dangers. Such findings are particularly relevant to the problem of crafting responsible public policy in the face of the kinds of threat posed by climate change. If the risk perception of ordinary citizens cannot be trusted, then it would seem logical to base policy decisions on expert judgment. But how rational, how trustworthy, are expert assessments of catastrophic risk? I briefly review the limitations of conventional models of expert risk analysis, especially in dealing with the large uncertainties endemic to the risk of low probability-high impact events in the distant future. The challenges such events pose to the underlying assumptions of these analyses are severe enough to question their basic rationality. I argue that a conception of rationality premised on the bounded knowledge of experts and lay citizens alike, based on context appropriate heuristics, may provide a more trustworthy basis for decision making.

**Evelyn Fox Keller** is Professor of the History and Philosophy of Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her research focuses on the history and philosophy of modern biology and on gender and science. She is the author of several books, including *A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock* (1983), *Reflections on Gender and Science* (1985), *The Century of the Gene* (2000), and *Making Sense of Life: Explaining Biological Development with Models, Metaphors and Machines* (2002). Her most recent book, *The Mirage of a Space Between Nature and Nurture*, is now in press. For further information visit her website at <http://web.mit.edu/sts/people/keller.html>

**Chair: Dr Roman Frigg** is the Director of the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS)

This lecture is part of the **Friends of CPNSS** events programme. Find out more about becoming a Friend of the Centre [here](#).

**This event is free and open to all with no ticket required. Entry is on a first come, first served basis.**

**Old Theatre , Main Building, LSE**

**Friday, 9<sup>th</sup> March, 1.30-3.30pm**

**Causality Reading Group**

**Mauricio Suarez and Inaki san Pedro**

*Causal Markov, Robustness and Quantum Correlations*

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**Lent Term—Week 10: 12/3-18/3/2012**

**Monday, 12<sup>th</sup> March, 2.30-6.30pm**  
**BSPS**

**Wednesday, 14<sup>th</sup> March, 10am-12pm**  
**PH500: RESEARCH METHODS IN PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR**

**Wednesday, 14<sup>th</sup> March, 12-2pm**  
**PH555: RESEARCH SEMINAR IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS**

**Wednesday, 14<sup>th</sup> March, 4-5.00pm**  
**Tea Time Talks**

**Rosa Runhardt**

*Why do we value a theory's cognitive virtues?*

PLEASE NOTE: This event is taking place in the [CPNSS Common Room \(LAK.1.16\)](#)

**Wednesday, 14<sup>th</sup> March, 5.30-7pm**  
**CHOICE GROUP**

**Alvin Goldman**

Rutgers

*TBA*

**Thursday, 15<sup>th</sup> March, 12-1.30pm**  
**PH501: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS SEMINAR**

**Thursday, 15<sup>th</sup> March, 3-5.00pm**  
**Reading Group in Philosophical Logic**

The reading group focuses on chapters 3 to 12 of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. and Choh Man Teng's *Uncertain Inference* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2001). It brings together MSc and PhD students as well as distinguished visiting participants (DVP) who enlighten the discussions with their expertise. Confirmed DVPs include R. Bradley, D. Mayo, M. Redei and K. Steele. Further information can be found on our Moodle page at <https://moodle.lse.ac.uk/course/view.php?id=3434>. (If you do not have LSE access try logging in as Guest. If this fails and you want to know more about our activities contact Alexandru Marcoci at [A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk](mailto:A.Marcoci@lse.ac.uk))

**Friday, 16<sup>th</sup> March, 1.30-3.30pm**  
**Causality Reading Group**

**Adam White**

*Structural Equations and Causation*

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## **Older**

**Monday, 14 March, 6-7.30pm**

**Philosophy@LSE**

**Kai Spiekermann**

LSE

*Buying Low, Flying High: Carbon Offsets and Partial Compliance*

PLEASE NOTE: This event is taking place in the Wolfson Theatre, New Academic Building, LSE

**Wednesday, 16 March, 4-5.00pm**

**Tea Time Talks**

**Philip Thonemann**

CPNSS

*One Uncomfortable Thing Philosophers Should Learn About Wittgenstein*

PLEASE NOTE: This event is taking place in the CPNSS Common Room (T116)

## **CPNSS Fixtures List**

### **Preview of Summer Term 2011**

**Wednesday, 4 May, 4-5.00pm**

**Tea Time Talks**

**Mark Addis**

CPNSS

*Methodology in the Cognitive Science of Religion*

PLEASE NOTE: This event is taking place in the CPNSS Common Room (T116)

**Thursday, 26 May, 4.30-6.00pm**

**CPNSS Special Lecture**

**Guenther Fleck**

Austrian Military Academy

*Varieties of Human Relatedness in Scientific Explorations: Impact on Knowledge Construction'*

**Thursday, 23 June, 4.30-6.00pm**

**CPNSS Special Lecture**

**Christine Redman**

Melbourne University

*Making sense of the relations between persons, their identities and new technology*