

Wednesday, 5 October 2:00-4:00 pm

RESEARCH SEMINAR IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCES

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A Few More Thoughts on Theory Acceptance

Abstract

In the Bayesian literature there are two basic approaches to theory acceptance a decision-theoretic one and one involving probability thresholds. The former dictates that one accepts the hypothesis which maximises one's cognitive expected utility, while the latter allows for theory acceptance only when certain probability values/thresholds are exceeded. In this talk I argue against both these approaches and for a pure Bayesian theory of acceptance, according to which all there is to acceptance is the mere *statement* of a probability value. I contend that if we have any legitimate intuitions about the issue of acceptance, then the pure theory is the only one suitable to express them.